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FOREWORD
My basic academic aim in this dissertation is to have my readers begin to think deeply about anonymity. It 
is a subject you might not have thought about before, until that is, the advent of a full blown digital age 
barely a decade past. (The anonymous discourse o f the World Wide Web is a dissertation in its own right.) 
The preliminary and highly selective nature o f this study (signaled by my use o f “Toward” in all title 
headings)prevents me from moving beyond the origins o f  anonymity as the dark side o f  an all-pervasive 
author-fiinction that I have bowed down to almost slavishly in the case of Foucault who, in having asked, 
"What is an Author?, led me to answer "Anonymous."
This answer, and its attendant question, "What is Anonymous?" make very little sense. Foucault didn't 
write "What is an Author?' anonymously. Nor could I seriously consider writing this dissertation on 
anonymity anonymously. As a pragmatic fact o f life, this dissertation would not have any being if its writer 
were anonymous. Who could defend a dissertation anonymously? Whoever gave academic credit to 
Anonymous? Who has a transcript or curriculum vitae on file labeled Anonymous? The answer to all these 
questions is: Nobody. It is sheer absurdity to speak o f the identity, authority, or community o f someone 
named Anonymous.
The anonymous narrator in Texts fo r Nothing asks—"What matters who's speaking?" This question by an 
"absent character" is authorized into existence not by Anonymous, but by a Nobel Prize winning AUTHOR 
named Beckett who compels another major AUTHOR, Foucault, to ask "What is an Author?" And still I 
answer: "Anonymous"—or more suggestively: The Anonymous Function.
What is the Anonymous Function? Whatever the answer to that question, it would seem to reduce 
significantly the absurdity o f mentioning identity, authority, and community. The answer will require that 
my reader be someone whose erudition is willing to run from (pun intended) the dialectical reasoning of 
philosophy into (but mostly around) all kinds o f  hybridized disciplinary “studies” (cultural, feminist, 
composition). For the sake o f some measure o f simplicity, I place anonymity in a subordinate binary 
relation to each o f the dominant discourses o f identity, authority, and community. The reality o f their 
relations, however, is an “allatonceness” (Ann Berthoff) that baffles my attempts at a clear analysis.
v
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I try to keep these dominant discourses artificially segregated and subordinated within the confines of 
specific chapters to get some control over anonymity’s discursive complexity. I believe my readers will 
begin to see their discursive synthesis, however, in what I contend amounts to The Composition o f  
Anonymity.
As certain as I am o f the author-function being ultimately subordinate to the anonymous function, I am 
utterly uncertain of the audience function—of why and how I should tell you, my reader, to pay attention to 
what I have to say about anonymity. Thus, I present the following epigraphs as a way to evoke my feelings 
and intuitions about the passions that compose the meaning and action o f  anonymity in the world. If these 
epigraphs don’t move your curiosity, as they do my own, then no amount o f academic embellishment can 
fill the absence between us. The presence o f that absence is what I mean by the composition of anonymity— 
or rather, how anonymity composes us— in the reader, writer, and the written.
vi
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JULIET
O Romeo, Romeo! wherefore art thou Romeo? 
Deny thy father and refuse thy name;
Or, if  thou wilt not, be but sworn my love, 
And I'll no longer be a Capulet.
ROMEO
[Aside] Shall I hear more, or shall I speak at this? 
JULIET
'Tis but thy name that is my enemy;
Thou art thyself, though not a Montague. 
What’s Montague? it is nor hand, nor foot, 
Nor arm, nor face, nor any other part 
Belonging to a man. O, be some other name! 
Whafs in a name? that which we call a rose 
By any other name would smell as sweet; 
So Romeo would, were he not Romeo call'd, 
Retain that dear perfection which he owes 
Without that title. Romeo, doff thy name, 
And for that name which is no part o f thee 
Take all myself.
ROMEO 
I take thee at thy word:
Call me but love, and I'll be new baptized; 
Henceforth I never will be Romeo.
JULIET
What man art thou that thus bescreen'd in night 
So stumblest on my counsel?
ROMEO 
By a name 
I know not how to tell thee who I am:
My name, dear saint, is hateful to myself, 
Because it is an enemy to thee;
Had I it written, I would tear the word.
William Shakespeare (or Edward DeVere?) 
* * * * * * *
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I'm NobodyI Who are you?
Are you—Nobody—Too?
Then there's a pair o f  us?
Don't tell! they'd advertize—you know!
How dreary—to be- Somebody! 
How public—like a frog—
To tell one's name—the livelong June— 
To an admiring Bog!
Emily Dickinson
The Unknown Citizen 
(To JS/07/M/378 
This Marble Monument 
Is Erected by the State)
He was found by the Bureau o f Statistics to be 
One against whom there was no official complaint,
And all the reports on his conduct agree 
That, in the modem sense o f  an old-fashioned word, he was a
saint,
For in everything he did he served the Greater Community....
The Press are convinced that he bought a paper every day 
And that his reactions to advertisements were normal in every
way.
Policies taken out in his name prove that he was fully insured,
And his Health-card shows he was once in hospital but left it
cured.
Both Producers Research and High-Grade Living declare 
He was fully sensible to the advantages of the Instalment Plan 
And had everything necessary to the Modem Man,
A phonograph, a radio, a car and a frigidaire.
Our researchers into Public Opinion are content 
That he held the proper opinions for the time of year;
When there was peace, he was for peace; when there was war, he went.
He was married and added five children to the population,
Which our Eugenist says was the right number for a parent o f his generation. 
And our teachers report that he never interfered with their
education.
Was he free? Was he happy? The question is absurd:
Had anything been wrong, we should certainly have heard.
W.H. Auden
What if it turns out, Tim, that anonymity is 
finally an issue o f  masking?
Robert J. Connors
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ABSTRACT 
THE COMPOSITION OF ANONYMITY:
TOWARD A THEORY, HISTORY, AND PEDAGOGY
by
Timothy Thomas Dansdill 
University o f New Hampshire, May, 2001
In keeping with its recognized function o f  non-identity through the suppression o f proper name recognition, 
anonymity is not recognized as “essential” to nominalist consciousness or to intersubjective action through 
language. The founding philosophical discourses of identity, authority, and community reveal an 
“anonymous function”—a transgressive discourse o f impersonation, authenticity, and immunity—which this 
dissertation traces in phenomeonlogy, discourse theory, poetics, rhetoric, and composition.
The first two chapters draw from phenomenology (Schutz and Natanson), and discourse 
theo ry  (Foucault), to propose a theory o f anonymity as integral to any understanding of personal identity 
across the entire performative range o f  self/other orientations. Chapter three draws on literary theory and 
history (Forster, Foucault, and Docherty) to propose a history o f anonymity that reverses the dominant 
position accorded to author-ity and the author-function. Three ancient texts— The Book o f  Genesis; the Epic 
o/Gilgamesh; and The Odyssey demonstrate the “anonymous function.” Chapter four adapts Blanchot and 
Bakhtin to suggest a rhetoric o f anonymity in which audience and community function anonymously. 
“Contact zone” theory and practice (Pratt, Bizzell, Miller, hooks) is then reviewed and redescribed to 
propose in chapter five a pedagogy o f  anonymity—one devoted to merging composition-rhetoric’s 
conflicting demands for “structure” and “agency” in student writing. Anonymous composition logically 
extends the rhetorical mandate of the course evaluation exit document. 20 pieces o f anonymous student 
writing on identity politics are analyzed for functions of impersonation, veracity, and immunity.
xi
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INTRODUCTION
Prologue
"Why Anonymity?" asked Diane. She directs the daycare center where my children now spend their days. 
She was down on the rug with a girl I immediately recognized as my soon to be five year old daughter, 
ClydaJane. Diane has been working with pre-school children for about as long as I've been alive. She asked 
that question with a clearly ironic smile spreading from the comers o f  her mouth when she saw that I 
realized she was calling out each letter o f my daughter's name. She paused, with emphasis, while 
ClydaJane wrote with a crayon across the top of a picture she had just drawn. Her question froze me, even 
though that Why part fires and consumes any inquiry.
So I laughed, loving the irony o f  it all. I finally answered, still in the ironic mode we are both 
comfortable in, but this time emphasizing a double entendre I did not expect her to pick up on: "Because 
Nobody seems interested in answering that question." "Gotta write about something," Diane said. "Bingo. 
Ditto." said I, as ClydaJane held up her written name proudly and said: "See, Daddy, I did it again." And I 
hugged her tight, proud o f her pride—her growing authority—in self-identification, and delighted that the 
little discourse community we initiated a year ago on a piece o f  paper I have on the wall above my writing 
desk is repeating and proliferating itself in this larger community o f  discourse.
Yes, indeed, Why anonymity? Because anonymity, in keeping with its recognized function o f non­
identity through the suppression of proper name recognition, is not generally taken into account when we 
try to understand the actions o f language—speaking/listening and writing/reading. The function of 
language itself, being both social and anonymous, subordinates the presence of anonymity. It makes what 
we call the “social construction” o f identity, authority, and community the dominant account o f  how 
human beings rationalize a universe o f discourse whose vast centripedal and centrifugal forces subject, 
project, and interject meaning through spoken and written utterances.
This dissertation turns these presuppositions o f nominalist consciousness on their head in order to 
explore and propose the anonymous construction and function o f  discourse. The beginning o f  an answer to 
all these can be found in the mode o f inquiry itself. The subject o f  any extended inquiry is generally, and
1
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generously, available through the most cursory search o f  a library's catalogs. Electronic indexes and 
databases now enable the curious researcher to conduct a series o f three discrete "Searches"—by Author, 
Title, or Subject. One also has the option to Search Everything. Given my subject, a search by Author is 
not so much absurd or perverse as it is bemusing, humbling—confirming Dudley Fitts’ observation in his 
introduction as editor o f the Greek Anthology that "the most popular author in history is "Anonymous."
A random run through a bibliographic list titled Anonymous Classics o f the Western World reveals the 
usual "Dark Age" and medieval suspects. We have Beowulf; Sir Gawain and the Green Knight; The 
Ballad o f  Sir Patrick Spen. There is also a teeming mass o f  manuscripts one has never heard of, and will 
never likely look into. Yet, scholars o f  "authorial attribution" are busily—stubbornly— working away as I 
write to drop the pervasive mask o f Anonymous, to identify and reintroduce these orphaned, feral texts 
back into the Community of unquestioned Identity where the writer revealed (and his/her scholar-advocate) 
will enjoy a new or long-lost "Authority."
Add to the groaning lists o f literary and historical texts the even more numerous catalogues of 
anonymous manuscripts of music. Follow this up with Art History's catalogs o f unattributed paintings and 
sculpture. Then top all these "significant" objects off with the endless "ephemera" both on view and 
hoarded away in the "permanent" collections o f  the world's various kinds o f museums. Very quickly the 
curious inquirer begins to understand the empirical sense o f augmentation and proliferation in Fitts' 
observation.
What then does it really mean to do an Author-Search on the Subject o f "Anonymous" (meaning "of 
unknown, or undeclared, origin or authorship")? It means that one must come round dialectically to what it 
means to search for what, in the original meaning o f  "theory," "remains to be seen" o f  the origin and 
function o f  the Author in its largest, yet most lost, sense. The basic lines o f both a "Subject Search" and 
"Title Search" o f "Anonymous" will lead the inquirer back onto the rails o f an "Author Search." In (re) 
searching (for) "Anonymous" I realized that one part o f what I am calling the "composition" o f anonymity 
is obviously historical, but is also, in the most compelling sense, theoretical. Thus, before I could even 
consider what or how to write about "Anonymous," I had to reconsider, philosophically, the possibility 
put forth by Richard Whitlock in 1654: “That it were...wisdom itself, to read all Authors as Anonymous, 
looking on the Common Sense, not Proper Names o f Books.”
2
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My personal sense o f  a "Common Sense"—in effect, the authority o f my experience, —was founded on 
and, arguably, foundered in, a love o f philosophical wisdom. Plato was a true passion of mine in high 
school and in the first years o f college. I drank in The Cratylus, or o f  Names and Naming, the very first 
treatise on the problem o f  "nominalism" or the meaninglessness o f  etymologies and genealogies. At stake 
in this dialogue was choosing to believe in, and living the consequences of, a steady state of Form versus 
the continuous, arbitrary transformations o f Flux. There was no both/and possibility. I look back on The 
Cratylus' critique of names as the prototype o f Derridean deconstruction, o f nominal slippage, 
supplementarity, and ultimately, absence in relation not only to things, but also to any form of 
nomination.
When Cratylus was written, nominalism was a very hot controversy. As poet at war with the 
philosopher in myself, I was no less disturbed some two and a half millennia later with the argument Plato 
had put into Socrates' mouth. It seemed a convincing argument against believing with the young 
Hermogenes that the names o f things had any real connection worthy o f the word, knowledge, never mind
true wisdom.^ I produce Plato/Socrates’ anti-nominalist conclusion below to telegraph what the reader will
come to understand as the anonymous fim ction  or the composition o f  anonymity as theory, history, and
pedagogy. A  covert aim is to work toward, rather than definitively demonstrate, the unnamed, unnaming,
and perhaps the unnamable, in the act o f writing itself.
Soc. And the work o f the legislator is to give names, and the dialectician must be his 
director if  the names are to be rightly given?
Her. That is true.
Soc. Then, Hermogenes, I should say that this giving o f  names can be no such light 
matter as you fancy, or the work o f light or chance persons; and Cratylus is right in 
saying that things have names by nature, and that not every man is an artificer of names; 
but he only who looks to the name which each thing has, and is, will be able to express 
the ideal forms o f things in letters and syllables.
Her. I cannot answer you, Socrates; but I find a difficulty in changing my opinion all in 
a moment; and I think that I should be more readily persuaded, if you would show me 
what this is which you term the natural fitness o f names.
Soc. My good Hermogenes, I have none to show. Was I not telling you just now (but 
you have forgotten), that I knew nothing, and was proposing to share the inquiry with 
you?
 Soc. How true being is to be studied or discovered is, I suspect, beyond you and me
to determine; and we must be content to admit that the knowledge o f things is not to be 
derived from names.
....Soc. [No one] "of sense will like put oneself or the education o f one's mind in the 
power o f names" [since to do so is to] "condemn oneself and other existences to an 
unhealthy state o f unreality.
3
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The "common sense" I have today o f this passage, a quarter century since I first read it, is that though "true 
being" is now a thoroughly suspect, and popularly written, as BEING, I remain attached to it as a category 
for studying and discovering the knowledge to be derived from anonymity (meaning: "the condition of 
having no [proper] name").
Implied in Plato’s critique o f  names is that there is an anonymous quality, an unnamable sense, to his 
now outworn notions of, and arguments for, Ideal Forms. Plato’s reversal o f  our contemporary 
connotations o f naming as normative—deeming it a healthy state o f reality—makes o f  anonymity a healthy 
state o f  reality, not suspect or deviant. Such use o f  a basic dialectical (and therefore nominally 
“deconstructive”) principal o f reversal and reappraisal does not ignore or deny Suzanne Langer’s famous 
phrase, that “ ...the notion o f  giving something a name is the vastest generative idea that ever was 
conceived; its influence might well transform the entire mode o f living and feeling, in the whole species, 
within a few generations"(Philosophy in a New Key). I simply wish to trace and consider the elements and 
arrangements within and around the notion o f  giving something a name that point to the possibility and 
reality that the composition o f  anonymity, as naming’s Other, is equally generative, influential, and 
transformative.
The “nominalist” PRESENCE o f “Anonymous” would seem to be at “play,” in the Derridean sense, 
across the entire range o f  discourse as “signature, event, and context.” The composition o f  anonymity in 
broad theoretical terms infers anonymity’s massive metaphysical and philosophical background. I follow 
throughout this investigation an obsessively-compulsive Derridean (and given the cue from The Cratylus, a 
Platonically dialectical) principle o f reversal that endorses the “presence” o f anonymity’s absence wherein 
dominant terms o f  discourse such as “identity” are not so much subordinated or repressed, but are, instead, 
recessed so that anonymity can come out to play.
We find anonymity’s work o f  reversal (and its serious play) in the OED’s earliest recorded reference to
“Anonymous.” In 1601, Philemon Holland, a translator o f  the writings o f ancient historians, including
Xenophon, Plutarch, and Livy, translated this sentence from Pliny’s History o f the World. “Anonymos,
finding no name to be called by, got thereupon the name Anonymos.” Playful as this appears to be, the
import is that Anonymous is a name, and therefore no exception to the rule o f the proper name. Or, if  it is
an exception, it is precisely the sort that proves the absolute authority o f  Nominalism. Forster tells us in
4
R eproduced  with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
his little essay “Anonymity: An Enquiry,” “it is a queer affair,” this name o f  what unnames. That essay, as 
we will see, is both playful and deadly serious about the generative functions and transformative 
consequences o f  anonymity.
My reader might have noticed that I have gradually linked, and subtly replaced, the term “Anonymous” 
with that o f “Anonymity.” My reason for doing so returns us to the curious inquirer who performs a 
simultaneous Author-Subject-Title-Search using the term "Anonymity" instead o f "Anonymous." What he 
or she will find is a virtual Other End o f the infinite reference spectrum for “Anonymous”: “Anonymity” 
is the subject o f  four books.
Anonymity is a personal narrative by Susan Bergman, a memoir o f growing up with a loving father who 
spent his life passing as a monogamous heterosexual while also sexually involved with other men until his 
death by AIDS. One is a study by Maurice Natanson, a phenomenologist and student o f phenomenologist 
Alfred Schutz (mentored by phenomenologist Edmund Husserl). One is a study by David Beck, a 
hermeneuticist, on the link between anonymity and the “discipleship paradigm” in The New Testament. The 
last is a brief essay by E.M. Forster (yes, the Author).
I will not involve Bergman's personal narrative o f  passing and identity politics, though every fiber of 
my pedagogical being as a teacher o f an expressivist/social constructionist hybrid approach to composition 
tells me the irony/opportunity is too much to pass up. The other three references form the functionally 
nominalist, nominally authoritative core out o f which the foregoing chapters on anonymity's identifiable 
"origins" in phenomenology, discourse theory, hermeneutics, rhetoric, and finally, composition studies have 
their BEING.
Doing Things with Anonymity
Taking a cure from Austin’s famous work, Doing Things with Words, the more direct answer to the
question as to why Anonymity is a significant issue in social and rhetorical life is to ask not what it is, but
rather: what does anonymity enable or accomplish as a social and rhetorical phenomenon; what are the
consequences o f its action as a pervasive “speech act” that derives from and responds to both healthy and
unhealthy states o f reality? In answer, I provide a series o f seven anecdotes that extend Langer’s premise: if
anonymity is not the vastest generative idea ever conceived, its influence does seem to have transformed
entire modes o f living and feeling in the generations that have succeeded her mid-20lh century ideas of
5
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philosophy in a new key. I chose these anecdotes at random, unable to decide which, among the many file 
folders I have amassed over the past four years, would be most “representative” (in Burke’s sense) of 
anonymity’s generative and transformative presence in discursive life.
Anecdote #1.
This, from “digital discourse” is from Eric Hughes, one o f the original Cypherpunks. "Privacy is necessary
for an open society in the electronic age," he writes in the opening o f "A Cypherpunk's Manifesto," which
he put online in 1993. The document continues.
People have been defending their own privacy for centuries with whispers, darkness, 
envelopes, closed doors, secret handshakes, and couriers. The technologies o f the past did 
not allow for strong privacy, but electronic technologies do.
We the Cypherpunks are dedicated to building anonymous systems. We are defending 
our privacy with cryptography, with anonymous mail forwarding systems, with digital 
signatures, and with electronic money...
Cryptography will ineluctably spread over the whole globe, and with it the anonymous 
transactions systems that it makes possible.
The Cypherpunks' philosophy is extreme—they believe that cryptography and anonymous transactions
should and will inevitably make the idea o f the nation-state wither away—and their numbers are relatively
few, but their influence is growing, “augmenting” as it were, as a counter to the prevailing discourse of
centralized authority. In this first anecdote, there is clearly a lack o f identity (or at least o f “identification”)
between Anonymous State Authority and the Anonymity o f  the People to be secure in their persons. We
can see the clash o f vision as to what will best foster and expand a healthy or unhealthy state o f economic
and social reality.
Anecdote #2
This, also from “digital discourse” involves the increasing concern over ‘cyber-stalking.” There is a call by 
many social commentators to eliminate the anonymous shield which deviant individuals—a.k.a. 
“cyberstalkers”—have used to engage young children in virtual chat rooms. These same commentators 
wrestle, however, with the potential loss o f anonymity that they deem absolutely necessary to protect the 
private identity profiles o f  normal Internet users from “unauthorized” surveillance and intrusion by 
corpor'.tions seeking to “personalize” their consumer customer bases.
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In this second anecdote we see, again, a clash between a clearly unhealthy —deviant or libertine—sense 
o f community values versus some pragmatic and moderate version o f the extreme— libertarian—privacy 
rationale o f the Cypherpunks.
Anecdote #3
This, from political discourse, illustrates anonymity’s “heroic’ or noble aspect, rather than its craven or 
insidious capacity. It is well-known that the presidential debate commission set up by our two party 
system is sponsored by the likes o f AT&T, United Airlines, and Anhaeuser-Busch. A recent visit by a 
reporter from National Public Radio to Wake Forest College, one o f the sites o f  the year 2000 presidential 
debates, revealed that Wake Forest gave Anhaeuser-Busch the authority to turn its student lounge into a bar 
for the exclusive use of the press corps attending the debate.
The power o f Anhaeuser -Busch to prevent Wake Forest students from using their own facility flows 
directly from millions of dollars the corporation paid to the college for the right to have its name and 
product identified with this aspect o f our democratic election process. The company’s public relations team 
claims that, “Anhaeuser-Busch is only interested in being a good corporate citizen. We do not realize much 
else from our largesse.” But in an interview with a political analyst who specializes in corporate influence 
in U.S. politics, it was pointed out that the laws governing political contributions permit “anonymous 
donations” to the Debate Commission. The official said: “I f  Budweiser were genuinely interested in “good 
corporate citizenship” exclusively, they would o f course pursue this option. That they wish instead to have 
voters identify their beer with the democratic process is patently obvious.”
In this third anecdote, the corporate drive for consumer identification—in this case “the King o f Beers” 
as visibly identified with the democratic process to elect a President— shuns the invisible honor being an 
anonymous donor.
Anecdote #4
This, from the corporate workplace, illustrates anonymity’s constructive discursive capacity. In a National 
Public Radio series titled “The Changing Workplace” reporter David Malthus focuses on work related 
stress and employee dissatisfaction. The giant pharmaceutical corporation MERCK INC. is universally 
cited as a “superior work environment” because it uses “internal anonymous surveys” to uncover and
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mediate two pervasive problems: “employee stress and managerial mistrust.” Merck’s use o f  anonymity has 
been cited as a “progressive resource” in improving the work environment.
In  this fourth anecdote, we see the generative effects o f  corporate employees dropping their identities to 
speak freely and objectively to authorities about problems in ongoing face-to-face and name-name relations 
so as to transform an unhealthy corporate community where authoritative indifference or arrogance is a 
reality.
Anecdote #5
This final anecdote from higher education. It highlights anonymity’s ambivalent relation to academic 
assumptions about legitimate authority (and therefore o f  student identity, and o f  the university as a 
community.) My spouse is a professor at Wesleyan University, an institution that prides itself on its 
Honor Code. Each incoming student is introduced to this code (running many pages) on policies of 
plagiarism and cheating. Students are required to sign a sworn statement that not only will they not cheat 
in their studies, they will also report any act o f cheating among their peers.
A  student sent m y spouse an e-mail letter informing her that she observed another student cheating. 
Since my spouse did not see the accused student, she called the Dean o f  Student Life for advice. The first 
question from the Dean was: “Did the accusing student send you an anonymous e-mail through the web 
site bulletin board or did she use her real name on her own account? Students who name themselves are 
taken more seriously.” When my spouse assured her that the student named herself, the Dean went on to 
tell her, without any sense o f  an inherent contradiction, that “anonymous senior surveys” reveal that 
“violations of the honor code are rampant.” The university is only rarely given the opportunity to prosecute 
a case, however, because “students do not want to be identified as ratting on their peers.”
This case got to the point o f informing the accused that he would be summoned before the Honor 
Board to face his accuser. Having identified her self to (and with) university authorities, the accusing 
student was told she could not refuse to help prosecute the case. I f  she did, she would be in violation of 
the Honor Code no less than the student accused o f cheating. At the last moment the accusing student 
disavowed her charge, telling the Dean that she could not be absolutely sure of what she saw. The Dean 
told m y wife that the pressure o f being identified in a high profile case o f  “Honor” usually makes students 
think twice about seeing the process through.
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The point o f  this anecdote highlights the hybrid, highly variable, and even excruciatingly ambivalent 
uses and effects o f  anonymity as a discourse that comprises and composes our larger sense o f community, 
identity, and authority.
Here we see university authorities denigrating the legitimacy o f anonymous disclosure even as they are 
utterly dependent upon its function as a truth effect. Furthermore, the student community speaks with one 
authoritative voice o f concern that the Honor Code is a sham. Yet the student community’s anonymity 
helps them to evade the responsibility o f  being identified with the university that has authorized them to 
name those who undermine the Code’s ideal o f  fair and open play across the disciplines. The discourse of 
Identity—in this case, being named as a participant who must cross between two communities with 
different senses o f  authority—carries with it the checks and balances o f anonymity.
Anecdote #6.
This anecdote, again from “digital discourse,” is from the distance learning Website o f Mercy College (or
MerLIN) “where” I taught two online courses—one on Drama, the other on Short Fiction—using the
TOPCLASS educational template.
Students, It is the time o f the year for faculty evaluations on MerLIN. Please go to the 
link above and find your class. The classes are not under departments so scroll down 
until you find yours. Make sure you have the right section and teacher. Click on that 
class and you will be able to submit your faculty evaluation. These evaluations are 
posted to a database anonymously. I f  you submit more than one evaluation per class it 
will kick out both. Click on the above link to fill out your faculty evaluations.
Here is the cybernetic version o f the familiar anonymous course evaluation that students universally 
compose at the end o f every course in the still pervasive face-to face/ ”brick and mortar” context o f higher 
education. Unlike the groaning metal file cabinets in most departments, these anonymous student 
evaluations are out there in 0/1 code, a closed “fellowship of discourse” that is, however, “open to the 
winds” (phrases from Foucault we will look to in Chapter two) o f Mercy College’s community.
This online sense of “community” further mediates the anonymous discourse community (more 
towards “immunity” and its meaning o f “being without office”) that presently persists in face-to-face, hard 
copy file access in all academic departments. It places the necessary rhetorical immunity that makes the 
anonymous performance evaluation work into an authorized event and communicative context that is 
literally elsewhere, out there, in an event and context “without office.” Mercy College’s authorizes access
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to its anonymous discourse community through the now familiar log on “signatures” (proper name plus 
private pseudonym).
Thousands o f  people form an effectively anonymous readership that reads these anonymous writings 
about faculty, classes, and what was performed or learned. The only “named” individual—or truly nominal 
identity—in this discourse community is that o f the instructor. Here is a highly mediated version o f the 
immediate, intersubjective experience o f identity and identification that reign in this faculty-student writing 
ritual at the close o f every course. We see here the rich and complex—rational and healthy— interaction of 
the discourses o f  identity, authority, and community under the anonymous function.
In other terms, here is an academic version o f Merck’s incorporate use by employees to open up and 
judge the performance o f  its most visible, or front line, authorities. In this case, teachers are the 
“executives” and students are the anonymous “employees,” and the online database becomes discourse 
itself—at once social and anonymous (in Bakhtin’s sense, as we will see in Chapter Four.)
Anecdote #7,
This final anecdote is from an academic community—the UNH department o f Composition.
7 December, 1994 
Dear Tim D.—
After your presentation we were in such a state o f disbelief that we could barely form 
words for it. Even now, we hardly know where to begin, but we do know that we cannot 
end this semester without responding honestly to your work and your presentation of it.
So let us get this straight—this is a writing course on personal narrative and universal 
ideas, and you are allowing your students to 'function' under the misconception that 
gender equals sexuality, so that they continue to write into the void about their sexual 
experiences. And they write anonymously, so that there is no sense o f ownership in the 
best sense o f the word, no sense of taking responsibility for one's words and therefore 
attitudes, beliefs, or actions, and no sense o f awareness o f  audience in order to refine their 
thought processes. Thought processes? Are there any? Maybe we missed that part, but we 
saw no evidence o f your guiding hand as a teacher, to gently but firmly direct students' 
solipsism into an awareness o f  how their responses to their experiences affect others. Do 
you at least show them how the sexual can be interpreted in the context o f gender issues?
Your attitude o f amusement is prurient at best and pornographic at worst. You seem to 
take lightly and without analysis potentially traumatic disclosures ranging from abuse 
and rape to masturbation with 'adult' videos. While you 'respond' at great length to a 
select few of these pieces, the responses fall to suggest ways writers can develop actual 
idea-based essays by interpreting their own behavior and refining writing skills; other 
pieces go without response at all. Fostering awareness o f  gender identity and influences 
from our personal and social fives is a worthwhile cause, but using composition classes 
as guinea pigs for your own purposes either personal or academic doesn't sit right with 
us. In addition to your inappropriate— use o f your course's topic, your shocking abuse of 
photocopying privileges and your lack o f eye contact send off bad vibes. If  this is how 
experienced and worldly readers and teachers feel about what you are doing, how must a 
young student feel being forced into this kind o f private (as opposed to personal; Denise
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Levertov's distinction) narrative exposure without any compassionate or instructive 
guidance? As one person in attendance said, it's like therapy without therapy—meaning it 
leaves one vulnerable and exposed in a  potentially damaging and destructive isolation 
that is truly disturbing to consider. We are concerned for your students and sincerely 
hope you will stop this voyeuristic exercise and get yourself o ff to the nearest 
psychiatrist. Academia may have begun your personal journey toward enlightenment, but 
serious counseling may be the only way to continue it.
Sincerely,
Henry Miller and Anais Nin 
In this final anecdote we see the use o f  anonymity to, perhaps, allow people to “tell the truth as they 
see it” in the same way that Merck Corporation and Mercy College uses it. (Strictly speaking, this is 
pseudonymity, in the cunning play of Proper—Authorial—Names associated with transgressive writing to 
mask the actual names o f  the writers. But in effect, the overall mode and consequence is functionally 
anonymous.)
Whereas the use o f  anonymity in the Merck o r Mercy cases maintains the mode and motive of candid 
inquiry to be later used in colloquy, (which operates in both corporate and academic style performance 
evaluations requiring anonymity), the mode and motive in the final anecdote is one o f  obloquy. As such, it 
falls within what Judith Butler has called “excitable speech.” As such, this anecdote trenchantly 
demonstrates what she generally means by “linguistic vulnerability” (in this case mine) in relation to the 
rhetorical immunity provided by my colleagues’ particular use o f  the anonymous function.
They are "responding honestly" under condition o f  anonymity to my work and my presentation of it. I 
cannot, however, respond honestly to their harsh working over, and re-presentation o f  my work and my 
presentation. A void is created: they are invisible/invulnerable; I am visible/vulnerable. They are 
Odysseus/Udeis (as we will see in Chapter Three); I am the hapless Polyphemus, his one big IDEA put 
out, it would seem by a joking, but smarting (Enlightened) stroke of fiery speech. Unlike what they 
accuse me of—teaching my students to write into a  void with "no sense o f awareness o f  audience"—they are 
writing to ME, but I cannot respond. They have indeed taught me a lesson about the variable uses and 
power o f anonymity. It would very much seem to be that in this case, it matters very much who’s 
speaking.
Unaware that my students were writing not to a void, but to an Other—sometimes an author, sometimes 
an imagined identity different than their own—"Miller" and "Nin" respond honestly, and with some degree 
o f  authority (as anonymous colleagues). But they do not respond aesthetically, ethically, or in the best
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sense, pedagogjcally. In other words, their act o f masking or impersonation is not authentic. (Neither the 
real Miller nor the real Nin, given their views of gender and sexuality, would respond in this way to my 
course, I believe. I have read them both extensively, and there is a  tenderness in their libertinism, even in 
Miller’s sexist/sexual narcissism.)
Still, the views these writers took o f my pedagogy based on my presentation have elements o f 
credibility: the relation o f anonymity to audience awareness is problematic; the relation o f responsibility 
and accountability is equally vexed. It is interesting that these writer's sense o f a contact zone will figure 
later-after the effects o f their timely "December 7th" (Pearl Harbor) sneak attack had been measured; it is 
reported they intended to reveal their true identities sometime into the process o f  community reaction. By 
contrast, the students in my classes had written responses from me and full discussion o f their views and 
values in face-face class sessions.
It is difficult to see such a use o f  anonymity as intended for any thing other than to personally injure, 
publicly censure, or to do both. Butler's idea of "excitable speech" may extend from pure racial or 
homophobic hatred to an ambivalent kind o f razzing or hazing among prankster-minded associates. This 
anecdote falls “somewhere” in between an unhealthy and healthy use o f the anonymous function. Its 
censorious character fulfilled a double function. First, by using one o f the more suspect aspects o f  the 
anonymous function to sardonically “teach” me an “object lesson” about the ethical and rhetorical 
consequences of an anonymous pedagogy, “Miller” and “Nin” wished to provoke a pathos o f reaction—not 
an ethos of discussion—in the department. Second, in their “excitement” to incite, they overlooked the 
problem of their immediate responsibility for the identity, and therefore, the author-ity behind their 
charges.
Nevertheless, despite their avoidance o f face-to-face discussion, their "community" intention for this 
writing throws a troubling shadow over the community use I employed with students’ anonymous writing 
in my course. Those texts became common property—attained "immunity", were without office—for use and 
comment by everyone without any need to know who had written what. Why no need to identify the 
writer? Because the values and views expressed were what was important, and these were open for 
discussion for further review and revision. The texts, as part o f  the writing community, became part o f  the
communicative authority and identity o f  the course as well.
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Yet, troubling, and injurious things were written, especially in matters o f  race, in some o f the 
anonymous writing in one o f my courses. The only sense o f  accountability and responsibility I could 
generate was to explore the roots o f such fear and loathing—not to "out" the identities o f  the writers, but to 
address the problem o f  racism there and now, in the presence o f young racists and young empathists, to let 
them hear what the effects o f  their writing could mean to someone of color, or to someone o f  their own 
color who did or didn't share their view. The ethos was pressurized and poignant. It was not therapy 
without therapy as my anonymous antagonists would have it; it was therapy transgressing the Prohibited 
zone; dissensus and consensus politics in close contact. The distance of the anonymous writer from his/her 
direct identification with his/her writing was compensated for by the embodied, face-to-face experience of 
response—of being a listener to oneself as other. Everybody spoke when I asked: "So what do you think of 
this person's racial views?" Nobody was ever silent in response to anonymous writing.
By contrast, it is not at all clear that this letter from my colleagues parodying the sexually 
"transgressive" reputation o f two major authors by trafficking in their name recognition had any 
communicative ethos in mind. The intention was to shock me into silence; humiliate me into a halfway 
place between repentance and recrimination. They succeeded until I found a way to turn their excitable 
speech into an opportunity to examine its place in a much larger spectrum o f anonymous expression. It is 
just another exhibit now in a case that is not about deciding for or against the anonymous function. The 
problem with anonymity is that one must be both for and against it—for it is as vexing as some forms of 
group identity, o f unquestioned authority, or perfectly prescribed standards o f community.
Lessons from Doing Things With Anonvmitv.
Taken together, what these anecdotes should suggest to my readers is that anonymity is itself a mass 
medium that converges our aspirations and suspicions about the health and sickness, the freedom and 
oppression, within the discourses of a founding rhetorical identity (the Subject), o f  historical origin 
(Authority), and o f some sense o f universal mediation (Community.) In this introductory, anecdotal 
approach to sketching out an idea of what anonymity does as a speech act—whose rhetorical absence 
amounts to a transdiscursive presence—my readers should recognize its vexing structure and function. 
Whether deviant and regressive, developmental and progressive, or divisive and transgressive, it would
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seem that anonymity’s equivocal relation to identity and community, together with its ambivalent relation 
to authority, is traceable to its unique capacity for transgression (literally, “to cross over”).
I f  there is a single pragmatic concept that could be said to capture what it is that anonymity performs 
in relation to the discourses o f  community, identity, and authority, then it would be this action o f 
transgression as a “crossing over.” But together with the idea and actuality o f  crossing over and between, I 
argue for another key concept, that is, I think, related to transgression (as both a violation and as a vehicle 
o f discourse). I am thinking o f the notion o f a “contact zone.” As we will see the, this concept has a brief 
but rich and complex history, extending from the writings o f Bakhtin into those o f Mary Louise Pratt and 
on into the field o f composition-rhetoric where a host of teacher-researchers have appropriated the term.
If anonymity can be said to be a site o f resistance as well as re-vision, that it upholds both energies, 
allowing for their ‘transgression,” (both healthy and unhealthy in Plato’s original sense), then it can surely 
also be thought o f as an ultimate zone o f contact for engaging or imagining a range of positions and 
compositions of what it means to be a Self among one’ others and an Other among one’s selves.
If  the meanings and actions o f  identity (self-sameness), authority (increase), and community (common, 
unofficial) can be said to operate as zones of contact, and if  anonymity has a role in each of these as 
discourses, then the idea o f an anonymous contact zone must be composed o f  discursive elements and 
arranged in communicatively rational ways which we need to better understand. In Section HI. I will the 
summarize the composition o f anonymity as a matrix of phenomenological, discursive, hermeneutic, 
rhetorical, and pedagogical lines which cross and curve into the contours o f  a zone o f contact I will come 
to nominate as the anonymous Junction.
Outline Of Chapters 
Chapter Oner Toward a Phenomenology of Anonvmitv.
This opening chapter assumes that Plato’s argument against Nominalism as an unhealthy state o f reality is 
essentially correct, though for reasons that have nothing to do with Truth or Being. It aims to uncover the 
post-philosophical function o f anonymity and set it squarely down as a founding (but generally invisible 
and unknown)discourse which enables us to consider what we mean by Identity as an impossible both/and 
phenomenon of inter- and intra-subjective life. Anonymity informs or prescribes a felt, unified,
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translinguistic, sense o f  Self, as well as a fluid, parasitical sense o f performance scripted by whatever 
discursive event o r context we find our ‘selves’ experiencing.
In this chapter, because I believe no theory o f  anonymity makes sense without invoking the 
dominant discourse o f  Identity, I highlight the discourse o f  Personal Identity and Identity Politics in 
terms of inter- and intra-subjectivity to shed some insight on the nameless nature o f  the self and its 
shifting functions in private and public identity performances. After drawing counsel from social theorists 
(Brubaker and Cooper) who find that the range o f personal and political agency granted to ‘Identity’ makes 
it practically an inert, insupportable lifeworld structure, the logic I play out is that anonymity informs our 
sense of identification o f  others in both the psychic and social realms. Though I can’t ever come to the 
rescue of identity’s disoriented and dystopic fate, anonymity, I argue, has always rocked Identity’s
stubborn discursive delusion o f self-sameness.^
My concern with a theory o f Anonymity as intersubjective with Identity in this opening chapter comes 
from its sources out o f  Husserl’s “phenomenological” conception o f  “the lifeworld.” From Plato to Kant, 
philosophy can be roughly reduced to a concern with the “noumenon” (thing in itself) and “phenomenon” 
(“mental appearance”). We have seen from Plato that names were not considered noumenal, but were 
instead unstable, untrustworthy constructions o f the mind. Names—and by extension all words— could tell 
us about things in themselves, but not really show us their truth in being.
Husserl, and the tradition o f phenomenology he helped to inaugurate, was interested in bridging this 
artificial separation o f  thing-word, body-mind, and by intersubjective extension, self-other, by accounting 
for the lifeworld and its (im)mediate embodiments. Alfred Schutz was an associate o f Husserl’s who 
became interested in phenomenological questions and wrote several treatises on social meaning in the 
lifeworld. His texts are riddled with references to the “mediated” and “anonymous” nature o f social 
phenomena. One o f  his American students, Maurice Natanson, identifies this continuous reference to the 
presence o f anonymity in social relations and wrote a treatise: Anonymity : The Philosophy o f  Alfred 
Schutz.
My purpose and goal in this chapter is to closely read and summarize the work o f Schutz and Natanson
(which covers the last half o f  20th century thinking directly devoted to anonymity as a phenomenon) and
redescribe it for the purpose o f contending that anonymity is a noumenal function—  a thing in itself—that
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informs the appearance and passage o f  all social phenomena. Anonymity—I contend—troubles the 
founding discourses of what we mean phenomenally by Identity, Authority, and Community precisely 
because it is a thing in itself which our Nominalist tradition cannot—or cares not to—acknowledge 
precisely because it is the name o f  what unnames or is unnamed.
Chapter One is therefore a rough, but ready, background against which we will come to understand 
Foucault’s outline o f Language as a  continuously circulating, expanding “universe o f discourse.” (That is, 
language as Nominalism in the largest, systemic or structural sense is universal —“one turning”— within 
which discourse —“utterly running around”—functions in a pervasive anonymity.) In order to get to 
Foucault’s view o f discourse (the subject o f  Chapter Two), I take Schutz’s social—objectively inter­
subjective—view o f anonymity and show how Natanson, his student, tried (but ultimately failed) to extend 
that view to a personal, private— intra-subjective—view o f anonymity’s function.
Natanson fails primarily because his training in phenomenology prevents him from fully following the
psychoanalytical lead his private view o f anonymity requires.^ Natanson, succeeds, however, in making a 
major case out o f  Schutz’s minor reference to the problem o f “enclaves”: that they represent a major point 
o f entry for considering anonymity as an equally intra-subjective aspect o f imagination—of imagining 
otherness. I f  we are to really understand the imaginative “composition” o f  anonymity, (which, as we will 
see, is anticipated in the inquiry E.M. Forster makes into anonymity ), the functional similarity of 
enclaves to contact zones can not go unnoticed. (That is, the phenomenological sense we take away from 
‘enclaves” becomes more noumenological—and therefore rhetorical, connecting the subject positions of 
speaker, spoken, and audience with their textual counterparts.)
Chapter Two: Toward a Discourse o f  Anonvmitv.
Where Chapter One builds the case for a theory o f anonymity by emphasizing its “phenomenological” or 
passing appearance within and across the immediate relations o f identity, Chapter Two emphasizes the 
“noumenal” effects o f anonymity, as a discursive thing in itself within and across identity’s mediated 
relations through language. The slippage or transgression o f meaning between these chapters-on identity as 
anonymously embodied and then as anonymously unfolded—is unavoidable given the impossible work the
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term and discourse o f  identity must always perform as both an inutterable, yet essential sense o f  Self, and 
as a continuously scripted and performed sense o f  an Other among all Others.
Chapter Two builds on Chapter One’s critique o f identity as an indeterminable psycho-social chaos of 
private endearments and public enjambments by closely reading Foucault’s early text, “The Discourse on 
Language.” I attempt to theorize this circular question o f  Anonymity’s (Public) Identity versus Identity’s 
(Personal) Anonymity by placing it within Foucault’s essay, “The Discourse on Language.” I contend that 
the discourse on language has ignored the “presence” o f  anonymity because it troubles its three formative 
philosophical assumptions: the idea of a founding subject, (the Discourse o f Identity), the idea o f an 
originating experience, (the Discourse of Authority), and the idea o f universal mediation (the Discourse of 
Community).
I adapt Derrida’s ideas about signature, event, and discursive context to develop the first principle of 
the anonymous function. Namely, that the /  o f  the subject as writer —even under the regime o f the proper 
name—is essentially anonymous. The sense o f Identity between subjectivity and writing— o f their being 
“selfsame”— is an illusory “presence” supplemented by the energy of anonymity’s nominal “absence” 
circulating the discourses o f community, identity, and authority.
In building up anonymity’s discursive concentration (since it seems to be “diluted” in our general sense 
of discourse), I also suggest how Foucault owes an equal debt to Blanchot, a theorist whose influence he 
acknowledges much later in his career. I then gather up the terms, “anonymous” and “anonymity” (few and 
far between as they are) and suggest how these show up in a few commentators who make up part of 
Foucault’s vast post-structuralist wake.
The point o f all this gleaning is to connect the pervasive anonymity in the Schutz/Natanson account of 
any individual’s life activity—in his or her I/Thou; We/They orientations—to the function o f language 
activity at large. I f  the discourse of identity, (ultimately the belief in a Transcendental Subject), is 
overloaded with ambiguous meanings and orientations, then I try to make the case that anonymity has very 
much to do with identity’s (Subjectivity’s) problematic trajectories in what is (used to be) the language of 
BEING and what is always the Becoming o f language. Chapter Two sets the stage for understanding the 
two other fundamental assumptions which found the discourse o f language: a faith in an spoken/written
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Origin (The Word) and the hope for its Universal Mediation. I, not Foucault, correlate these three founding 
discourses to the problem o f Identity, Authority, and Community.
Having connected the tunnel started via phenomenological anonymity on one side o f the collapsing 
mountain of Being with the tunnel o f  anonymous discourse theory on the other, I propose in Chapter two 
three principles that reflect the functional interdependence o f Identity, Authority, and Community that has 
not been recognized heretofore as the common light—or darkness visible—o f the anonymous function.
I have constructed these principles from my understanding o f Schutz, Natanson, Foucault, Forster, and
Bakhtin. These principles run forward from a  given subjective self-consciousness into the depth and
distance of language at large, and back, through all time and space. They speak the voices in our heads, and
underwrite all texts accumulating, circulating, disappearing through history.
Principle One: The /  o f the writing Subject—even under the sign o f  the proper name—is 
essentially anonymous because the act o f  writing makes the writer endlessly absent from 
his or her own writing. This states the anonymous function o f identity.
Principle Two: That an Origin can not be determined from reading, and "originality" can 
not be ascribed to those whom we all read, (a.k.a. authors who remain writers, merely 
writers, as Bakhtin has it.) A  reader’s experience o f the writer, (never mind the writer’s 
name), disappears in the act o f  reading. The Subject position o f  the reader—equally 
anonymous to the writer in the act o f writing—endlessly disappears into the written as it 
is read. Rhetorical indifference, the motive and consequence o f anonymity in its purest, 
healthiest condition, extends to the indiscriminate, proliferative acts o f  writing and of 
reading, making the text as much the destination, as the origin, o f  Nobody—and 
therefore o f Everybody. This states the anonymous function o f Author-ity.
Principle Three: Following Foucault's definition o f Universal mediation—"when all 
things come eventually to take the form o f discourse,... then all [will] be able to return to 
the silent interiority o f self-consciousness" (157)-the I  o f  self-consciousness cannot be 
founded upon the experience o f  an originating subject, but must give itself up as the 
intersubjective shifter o f a discursive Other that is, according to Principle One and 
Principle Two, a function o f anonymous Identity and Authority. This principle therefore 
projects the anonymous function o f  Community.
The totalization o f  anonymity implied by these principles—its virtual hegemony over the interiority
and exteriority o f all language consciousness —will not be taken seriously by any one who refuses to
consider the vulnerability o f Nominalism and its hegemony in the processes o f  identity, authority, and
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community. Ail names and naming have their proper function. They may in fact be the vastest generative 
idea ever conceived. The problem is: Who conceived them? When? How? I try to set up the possibility that 
any useful answer to those questions must look toward a discourse o f  anonymity.
Chapter Three: Toward a History o f Anonvmitv.
In this chapter, I show how the meaning and action o f "authority" as a discourse is as vexed as that o f 
'identity.' I rely mainly on the work o f  Thomas Docherty for this critique. I then move to a consideration 
o f Foucault's early essay "What is an Author?" where he suggests the possibility o f an anonymous function 
by opening with Beckett's absent character, who asks in Texts fo r  Nothing: What matters who's speaking? 
I closely read this essay, extracting and concentrating the presence o f  anonymity by adding the solvent o f 
my strong reading to Foucault's careful establishment o f the author-fiinction as being nevertheless an 
unstable regime whose trace elements are anonymous.
Between the textual evidence gathered here and in his treatment o f discourse in the previous chapter, I 
conclude that Foucault is really treating the anonymity o f  discourse and the anonymous identity o f  the 
author-fimction within it. I surmise that he does not wish to bring in the influence o f  Maurice Blanchot 
lest he tip Foucault's nostalgia for a founding structure o f  Presence in the function o f the author into 
nihilism. Foucault does however conclude the essay by imagining all discourse unfolding in a pervasive 
anonymity.
Along the way o f closely reading this essay, I summarize the various aspects o f the author-fimction and 
show how they can function negatively (in the photographic sense) to help us picture the anonymous 
function in three representative texts from ancient literature: The O ld Testament; The Epic o f  Gilgamesh; 
The Odyssey. The problem o f  author-ity in these texts is double: not only is the determination of a  sole, 
unitary author impossible, but anecdotes within the texts themselves point to the problems—and solutions— 
that being unknown, because unnamed, present. I draw these anecdotes through two inter-animating levels 
o f anonymity. The “overt” level o f the anonymous is itself composed o f two intersecting lines o f inquiry. 
On the front line we have texts in which the identity o f an original author is unknown (as in The New  
Testament.) Behind this bright line o f  the pure “Anonymous” is the more dotted line o f  traditional 
attribution (as in The Odyssey.)
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I ultimately use the themes and theses o f the author-fimction as set forth by Foucault to exert a triple 
sense o f  anonymity's pervasive functionality. By repeating the epigraph from Beckett at the end o f his 
treatise on the author, and summarizing it as "a rhetorical indifference," Foucault leaves an opening for me 
to construct a Rhetoric of Anonymity. My overall purpose in this chapter is to demonstrate how 
anonymity has always informed the arrangements and constructions o f authority, specifically the “author
function,” whose inherent instability subverts its capacity as a “nomination barrier.” 4 On the other side of 
author-ity’s nomination barrier lies the “no man’s land” —or everyone’s story— o f  what I am contending is 
the anonymous function.
Chapter Four: Toward a Rhetoric o f Anonvmitv.
This chapter links rhetoric—the basic art o f  linking a speaker with what's been spoken to a listener—back to 
the problem o f Universal Mediation as the third founding discourse o f BEING. As with the chapters on 
identity and authority, I use several commentators on community to demonstrate the contested nature of 
the concept. I draw first on a compositionist, Vandenberg, whose review of the meaning o f "discourse 
community" vacillates between the concreteness o f  the latter and the abstraction o f the former. It seems 
they need each other to mean much o f anything.
I then turn to a political philosopher (Mason) who finds community is deeply contested in its 
emancipatory sense, causing a fault line between its ideal meaning and normative meaning, which is not 
contested, he argues. By contrast, a sociologist o f  journalism (Stamm), finds levels to community- 
structure, tie, and process, that would seem to destabilize Mason's claim that the normative sense of 
community is uncontested.
I then bring Blanchot back in, and reflect briefly on his The Unavowable Community and his argument 
that there is "an absence in the center" o f what we mean by it. Taking these together, I then turn to 
Bakhtin's notion o f  a "contact zone" and trace its aesthetic, special conception o f a listener—listening to an 
author's "character zones"— into composition-rhetoric's reception of the term. My intention is to link up the 
problem o f  community as a discourse with the problem o f a contact zone. I see the two as essentially the 
same, except that community is too large for a rhetoric, whereas contact zone is too localized and proximal 
for a discourse.
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Once I work these local and global lines o f contact, I make the case that a rhetoric o f anonymity is a 
contact zone at the very center o f what we mean—or think we mean—by community. If there are "faultlines" 
(Miller) in the contact zone o f community, o f discourse, and o f a discourse community, these are due, in 
significant part, to the rhetorical transgression of anonymity which crosses over the disconnection o f  the 
speaker (writer) and the spoken (written) to place the listener/reader in an exclusive relation to the 
spoken/written.
Anonymity is already a zone o f  contact for the academic discourse community at large in the form o f  the 
anonymous performance evaluation. I argue that this contact zone, which appears to transgress the norms of 
rhetorical relation, is actually essential to maintaining them. It behooves us therefore, to experiment further 
with a rhetoric o f anonymity by introducing its transgressions o f  writer, text, and reader into the main 
compositional lines o f the writing course. Toward this end, Teaching to Transgress: Education as the 
Practice o f Freedom contains three essays—’’Essentialism and Experience,” “Eros, Eroticism, and the 
Pedagogical Process,” and especially, “Building a Teaching Community”— that enabled me to imagine the 
use o f anonymous composition within a Bakhtinian-driven theory o f  pedagogical possibility.
Also in the late work o f Mikhail Bakhtin, are some reflections on the author, the writer, and the which 
“superaddressee" contain a curious coinage—"transgredience”—which I use and adapt as a speculative lens on 
my own curricular and pedagogical experiments with anonymity and identity politics. As I read Bakhtin’s 
coinage, the separate ingredients o f expressivism and expositionism, so called, together with his almost
mystical belief in a superaddressee, point up the poignancy o f  what I am calling the anonymous function.^ 
The argument is that anonymity serves as a rhetorical transgredient in all our assumptions about the 
writer’s identity, authority, and community. Gloria Watkins, whose own engagement with the anonymous 
function is reflected in the fact that she publishes under the pseudonym bell hooks.
Though her calls for risk taking and vulnerability do not approach anything like an anonymous 
pedagogy, one can see the logic o f it in her pedagogical exhortations. Her sense of transgression and 
Bakhtin's sense of "transgredience" are brought together to suggest that a rhetoric of anonymity activates 
the speech of Nobody —a super-addressee, which transcends our traditional ideas of who we are really 
writing to, and what for. I f  not for, or to, an author-ity, if  not for, or to, our self-identity, than the audience 
o f anonymous writing is a sense o f community that has yet to come about because it never will. This
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makes writing an act o f  yearning, a  mask we place upon the audience that may not be there, but we make it 
be there by othering ourselves in writing.
This sense o f  transgressive othering, of communing, without the offices o f  authorship or o f a stable 
identity, returns us to the contact zone o f  composition whose fault lines lie, in my simplified binary, along 
the expressivist logics o f  self-discovery, autonomy, and authenticity as suggested by Murray, Elbow, and 
Macrorie. The alignment o f expressivism with an essentialist unitary self (witting and unwitting) poses it, 
in abstract terms, against the alignment of a social constructionist approach to teaching writing in which 
the self will more or less perform according the discourses it is introduced to. Thus, give students 
authoritative guidelines—accomplished authors to read, “good” writers to model from, and they will 
identify with those authoritative ways o f being and becoming writers themselves. Thus, Bizzell, 
Bartholomae, and recently, Alan France represent the social constructionist approach.
Clearly, teachers mix and match heuristics from both approaches; there are very few either/or 
practitioners o f composition-rhetoric. But if we are to teach students and ourselves as teachers to transgress 
the fault lines in our contact zones for composition, we need to risk what anonymity may provide: the 
expression o f private views and values that have obvious social implications, ideologies that are already 
and always being constructed freely by academic authorities for their non-pedagogical (out of 
classroom)discourse communities. Anonymous composition, if  properly trained on the contact zone 
between autobiographical and academic material, will reveal the fault lines in falsely separating private 
from public senses o f  what's academically appropriate. As both contact zone and fault line, anonymous 
writing amounts to a  rhetoric o f composition's split within itself.
Thus, for example, whatever our students really believe about what happens in their classes is-or 
should be— taken seriously by the entire academic community in a close review o f anonymous performance 
evaluations. It is very likely, I suspect, that such evaluations go unread by the vast majority of 
departmental discourse communities, and often go unread by instructor’s themselves. The expressive and 
socially constructive potential o f this particular contact zone is rhetorically and pedagogically, under 
imagined, if  not, arguably, wasted. But if anonymous writing were made a permanent part o f the 
composition course, o f  all courses, regardless o f content, a new kind o f zone o f contact and discursive
context for academic "community" might be established.
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Chapter Five: Toward A Pedagogy o f  Anonymity.
This final chapter analyzes 25 pieces o f  anonymous writing (from a total o f  33) on issues o f gender and 
sexuality from an advanced course in composition I taught at The University o f  New Hampshire in 1994. It 
then analyzes 10 documents on race identity (from a total o f 40 documents) in a freshman course on race, 
gender, and class identity that I taught the following semester, in 1995.
My preliminary findings suggest that the use o f anonymity in composition places expressivist and 
social constructionist ideals into a zone o f  contact. Further, in shielding identity, it does not destroy, but 
expands a sense o f community by projecting a sense o f otherness on the part o f  writers. Moreover, the 
sense o f  audience that emerges from anonymous writing is a complex awareness—not o f the instructor 
(since the writing cannot be graded); not o f  one's fellow writers, since they know this writing will be the 
property o f all under discussion; the audience is Nobody in particular—an intersubjective merger o f self and 
others.
Where does this sense o f  audience come from? From deep down in the personality, as Forster tells us. 
His brief essay, “On Anonymity”, argues the question o f whether writing should be signed. He ends the 
essay with a “plea for something more vital: imagination.... [For] there are no names down there, no 
personality as we understand personality.” This link between anonymity and imagination serves as a kind 
o f silver backing for my reflections on anonymity’s historical composition o f  an awareness o f audience. 
How does the anonymous writer imagine his/her audience? The attempt is to “mirror” anonymity’s 
imagination across a broad, but necessarily limited, spectrum of literary anecdote. I then try to pick up this 
anonymous—audit imagination—(Bakhtin’s “special conception of the listener”) and make it come into the 
anonymous community o f  the composition course devoted to the expression and construction o f identity 
politics.
Under anonymity, perhaps, college writers find themselves forgetting—and regretting— themselves just 
long enough to attempt the same rhetorical indifference that makes us forget the name o f  the author we are 
reading, involved as we are with character or idea, attitude or argument. And the audience o f students’ 
anonymous writing—which is themselves— doesn’t  need to forget the name o f  who's writing; the focus on
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what's written proceeds immediately. This double sense o f  rhetorical indifference, in which writer and 
reader disappear, and only the writing emerges, becomes its own kind o f  audience. It is tantamount, I 
believe, what Bakhtin calls the "super-receiver."
Perhaps because the writers in their non-identity are fieed from worrying about the authority o f who is 
listening/reading, since everyone is, they can simultaneously conceive and receive the community in voices 
that sometimes yearn for, and spum, the founding discourses o f  identity, authority, and community. There 
is a spectrum o f empathy to antipathy running through these anonymous writings. In this chapter, I do not 
make the outsized claim that anonymous writing is a new communally Utopian contact zone where 
universal mediation takes place in some new unhindered, expansive way. I do, however, trace something of 
what hooks discerns in calling for teaching vulnerability toward the practice of freedom. To do that we 
have to be willing to transgress some of the boundaries that composition-rhetoric leaves in place out of 
inertia, apathy, or fear o f the unknown—or the yet to be named.
Conclusion to the Introduction.
Having outlined the theoretical, historical, rhetorical, and pedagogical case for anonymity as a hybrid, 
opportunistic, pervasive action in our lifeworld that can be best understood by pairing it with more 
dominant terms such as Identity, and Authority, I personally believe that it is Composition’s Community 
o f  Anonymity that is primary. Thus, the collective legacy o f  expressivism as handed down from Donald 
Murray (“discovery”), Ken Macrorie (“authenticity”), and Peter Elbow (“autonomy”) can also be understood 
in triadic relations similar to anonymity’s discursive transposition across the “asymmetric opposites” of 
community, identity, and authority.
It is my contention that the use o f anonymous writing in the “personal plus textual” approach to 
teaching composition bridges what many would have us believe are opposing banks o f the river that is 
college composition. ^  I contend that anonymous writing is a “bridging” discourse not only because it 
spans often untenable distinctions between (and assumptions about) private and public composition. 
Anonymous writing ultimately enables students to “cross over” (again, to literally transgress) some not so 
hard and fast genre boundaries o f exposition and narration.
The difference between personal expression as a  discursive starting point and academic exposition as the 
final destination always returns to how teachers ask students to question who they are really composing
24
R eproduced  with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
for. It is this issue o f  disclosure and reception that underwrites what anonymity can do as a rhetorical 
situation in which a  writer’s subject position and the position o f  writing as a  subject become, in Bakhtin’s 
words, “a  double voiced discourse.”
Far from addressing a rhetorical void, the voice o f the anonymous writer in my courses (which focus on 
the composition o f  gender, sexuality, race, and other issues o f  identity politics) echoes Forster’s sense that 
anonymity enables imaginative—more public and civic—possibilities of expression. I extend his suggestion 
that there is no personal identity under the condition o f  anonymity— the nomination barrier having been 
transgressed.
I propose, therefore, the thtird principle o f the anonymous function. Anonymous writing helps mediate 
between equally universal disxursive claims: personal narrative and academic exposition share the same 
equivocal, ambivalent pronoun shifter—”1.” It is neither subjective nor objective, but projective o f an inter­
subjective imagination whose sense lies in the composition o f  a discourse community.
My case for anonymity as a pedagogical and rhetorical resource that has been misperceived or actively 
avoided because o f  its transgressive power lives or dies in the anecdotes o f students’ anonymous writing I 
analyze. A different discourse o f community emerges—one that reflects and intensifies the expressivist credo 
o f Discovery-Authenticity-Au-tonomy—when anonymity becomes part o f normal composition pedagogy. 
That is a truth claim that is fragile in the free o f what we normally assume about the power o f  the proper 
name and the legitimacy whicti attaches to the signature as shorthand for an Identity Authorizing itself for a 
Community.
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NOTES TO INTRODIJCTTON
* Who Speaks fo r Plato: Studies in Platonic Anonymity an edited book o f  essays, covers problems of 
Socrates’ identity and Plato’s absent authorial voice. Theslef argues the “often forgotten fact” that “Plato’s 
Socrates is never a real ’’authority” and that he “felt himself to be a new Socrates, continuing the search his 
Master had begun. I f  so, his personal anonymity is...easily explicable”(59). W est reviews the “mouthpiece 
theory” that would have Socrates, the Master, speak for the Disciple, Plato. “I f  one adopts this interpretive 
method, the problem o f  Plato’s anonymity is resolved” (101). West, however, is not convinced. Two 
scholars, writing on the same issue o f  Plato’s authority open up the equivocal, contested ground of that 
authority’s identity crisis, as it were. I f  an AUTHOR such as Plato functions anonymously—on what 
Foucault has called a “transdiscursive” level—then the discursive relation o f  anonymity to community, 
identity, and authority cannot be ignored.
2 In arguing thus, I try hard not to make o f anonymity a post-structuralist or post-humanist hobby horse. It 
is far more “original” than those critiques would have us believe. Frankly, it is undecidable whether 
anonymity functions as the metaphorical rider o f  Identity or is that rocking horse’s runners. The hobby 
horse itself is really language itself as an endless metonymic function, My Derridean play with anonymity 
as Identity’s other, displacing and standing for Identity when its dominant position in a binary relation that 
is language itself, collapses, enabling the suppressed, subordinate term, Anonymity, some brief sense of 
precedence or succession, is part o f  the hidden origin, not post-structuralist destination, o f language.
3
The scope o f  this dissertation prevents me, too, from extending Natanson’s psychoanalytical (as opposed 
to a transcendental) clue to the anonymous function. That clue would have us follow the 
phenomenological work o f Merleau-Ponty on the embodied character o f all discourse—“the flesh o f the 
world.” It would have us jump o ff into certain “corporeal” and “linguistic” feminists such as Gross and 
Butler who owe much to the Lacan-inspired psychoanalytical feminism o f  Kristeva and her American 
followers. Thus, my reader might sense some degree of “disembodiment” because o f  my determination to 
first trace the male dominated origins o f  the anonymous function. If  so, then it is because at this point in 
my project, I do not understand how to incorporate the inutterably feminist presence of, and influence on, 
what one must ultimately come to mean by the anonymous function. Namely, we know the subject/abject 
positions o f Woman as Body—in the representative containment o f  all her choreographic (“dancer’s 
writing”), pornographic (“prostitute’s writing”) positions as womb space, mother-love, home-fire, genius 
nurse, whore-void. These are at the center o f  what it means to be Anonymous, because Woman as Mind 
was erased from the discourse o f Author-ity in all its philosophical, historical, literary, and legal discursive 
turns for so long. If I ever turn this dissertation into a book, the incorporation o f  the imperative/problem: 
“Woman thy Name is Anonymous” and the feminist question/solution: “Am I that Name?” will be 
addressed. No true—authoritative and authentic—Composition o f  the anonymous function would ignore 
the name/unnaming of more than one half o f  our discoursing universe.
4“Nomination barrier” is from David Beck’s The Discipleship Paradigm: Readers and Anonymous 
Characters in the Fourth Gospel. He also cites and adapts Patrick Docherty’s theory o f  “absent character.” 
Given his proximity to my subject and thesis, it would normally make sense for me to incorporate Beck 
more directly in my approach to a history o f anonymity. That I discovered his work after digesting 
Docherty’s ideas leads me instead to give precedence to our common adaptation o f Docherty’s absent 
character motif. The notion o f  a “nomination barrier” is essential, especially given my ambition to explain 
anonymity from a perspective much wider than Beck’s. Beck’s approach to linking anonymous
26
R eproduced  with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
characterization with readerly identification to Docherty’s “absent” character theory comes at the very 
beginning of his study.
The absence o f  a name can enhance a reader’s potential for identifying with a character in 
a narrative. The lack o f  a name removes the nomination barrier [emphasis added] that 
distinguishes the character from other characters and from the reader. The inducement to 
identity with a character occurs when anonymity combines with other elements of 
characterization, including a progressive unveiling o f  the character which is both positive 
and consistent (1-2).
Beck’s “discipleship paradigm” applies, o f course, to Holger and West’s counterfactual questionings of 
Platonic anonymity. I argue that anonymity animates a larger trans-discursive complex of community, 
identity, and authority across all rhetorical situations, including the composition classroom.
I do apply Beck’s notion o f  a nomination barrier to historical anecdotes o f  anonymous authority. It will 
be most useful in Chapter Five’s account of what happens when an expressivist approach to composition 
pedagogy concludes that anonymity can be a useful way to test and otherwise transgress the nomination 
barriers which normally stand between students and their instructors.
^That Bakhtin hid his own authorship through collective ghostwriting in the face o f Stalinist repression is 
more than coincidental to his reflections on a transgredient contact zone where the discourse o f  nobody, 
alone in discourse, is nevertheless “populated” with the voices o f others—(perhaps a transcendental return 
to an anonymous origin, o f  what we imagine to be Other as Author-itative (more toward Authoritarian) 
Discourse. Uncannily, in “Toward a Pedagogy of Anonymity,” we witness one student addressing God to 
rescue him/her from racialized Others.
^The phrase “personal plus textual essay” and its suggestions o f Bakhtinian hybridity comes from an essay 
by Gordon Harvey in College English titled “Presence in the Essay.” Harvey counsels a purist approach to 
teaching the genre o f  the essay, and refers to my sense o f  an expressive-expositional hybrid as 
“Frankenstinian discourse.” Given my notion o f the anonymous function, it is significant that Shelley’s 
evermore humanly present “monster” remains anonymous, yet his transgressions o f community, identity, 
and authority are commonly confused with his creator, the rather more “absenf ’ character of Dr. Victor 
Frankenstein. Chapter Five will look skirt the idea o f anonymous expressivism as a hopeful monster. It 
is also significant, that after my presentation o f an anonymous pedagogy to my colleagues, one 
sniffingly—and again erroneously— dismissed my ideas o f textually named and unnamed discourse 
merging in the composition o f  the writing course as it does in the greater course o f  the lifeworld itself as 
“a Frankenstein.”
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CHAPTER ONF-
TOWARD A PHENOMENOLOGY OF ANONYMITY
Locating Anonvmitv within the Dilution of'Identity'
"Identity" is what Kenneth Burke might call a "god-term." As a founding structure o f  all philosophical 
discourse, it can be imagined as the supreme being o f both metaphysical analysis and epistemological 
application. Thousands o f years o f "Western" and "Eastern" thinking are invested in, and represented by, 
this single term. It becomes an automatic fall back point, a portmanteau concept, everyone claims, yet no 
one can really carry off. It is so massively packed, spilling over with "hard" won political facts, but also 
with "soft" philosophical parades o f  what Derrida has termed "the Metaphysics o f Presence."
The word literally means "the same, sameness," and it naturally connotes the sense o f self-sameness—or 
permanence— any individual feels, or believes he or she can feel, even as the body changes, ages, fades. 
This makes personal "identity" a function o f memory, o f remembering, o f  autobiographical stability—that 
one can identify a history—tell a life story. Our roughly remembered sense o f self-sameness—being the hero 
or heroine o f our experience in the world over a given lifetime—creates voice(s), conscientiousness, an 
intra-subjective independence that is nevertheless dependent on the self-same suppositions o f  Others, 
making, therefore, inter-subjectivity possible, inevitable, and the penultimate condition between natality 
and mortality. Thus, "identity" must do the work o f  phenomenological or lived experience: it is a concrete, 
embodied practice. It must also do the work o f what Burke has called "logological or languaged experience: 
it is an abstraction, the point of, and part of, all analysis.
The problem of the essence and the existence o f Identity fascinated both Descartes and Hume. Their 
introspective analyses—and those of many philosophers in between and after them—represent a kind of 
historical parentheses that amount to a modem tradition o f general skepticism that belies a deep anxiety 
about Identity which endures in the present epoch o f "post-humanist" and "social constructivist" analysis.
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In a  fine overview o f  the “problem” o f  Identity, Douglas Kellner captures the (post) modem anxiety about 
identity as a lived experience and as an academic catch-all for radically incommensurate notions o f  its 
meaning and action.
...[0]ne is caught up in so many different, sometimes conflicting, roles that one no 
longer knows who one is. In these ways, identity in modernity becomes increasingly 
problematical and the issue o f identity itself becomes a problem. Indeed, only in a 
society anxious about identity could the problems o f  personal identity, or self-identity, or 
identity crises, arise and be subject to worry and debate. Theories o f self-identity 
(Kierkegaard, Nietzsche, Heidegger. Sartre) are often anxious concerning the fragility o f 
identity and analyze in detail those experiences and social forces which undermine and 
threaten personal identity Thus, in modernity, the problem o f identity consisted in how 
we constitute, perceive, interpret, and present our se lf to ourselves and to others. As 
noted, for some theorists, identity is a discovery and affirmation o f an innate essence that 
determines what I am, while for others identity is a construct and a creation from 
available social roles and material. Contemporary postmodern thought has by and large 
rejected the essentialist and rationalist notion of identity and builds on the constructivist 
notion which it in turn problematizes (Kellner, 144).1
In their 2000 article "Beyond "identity," social analysts Brubaker and Cooper sum up the 'problem' o f
identity in a legitimate, yet typically cranky appeal to academic precision. Identity becomes a ‘problem’
because it can’t possibly do the double—and ever re-doubling— work that four centuries o f  essentialist to
constructivist statement and counter-statement have authorized it to do.
We argue that the prevailing constructivist stance on identity—the attempt to "soften" the 
term, to acquit it o f  the charge o f "essentialism" by stipulating that identities are 
constructed, fluid, and multiple—leaves us without a  rationale for talking about 
"identities" at all and ill-equipped to examine the "hard" dynamics and essentialist 
claims o f  contemporary identity politics. "Soft" constructivism allows putative 
"identities" to proliferate. But as they proliferate, the term loses its analytical purchase. If  
identity is everywhere, [then] it is nowhere (1).
In their final suggestion o f  syllogistic reasoning whose conclusion points to a useless Utopianism for
Identity, I perceive that the problematic o f Identity is a function o f  anonymity. Identity is everywhere—a
discursive mesh o f  sensual and textual bodies always in play. Everyone—any one—has claims to identity.
Yet no one of us can nominate Identity as an unambiguous category o f  either autobiographical or analytical
practice. Amidst the proliferation and diffusion o f identity talk, claims, crises, politics, I see the discourse o f
anonymity, the suppressed, unreified Other o f Identity and its equally diffuse predication, Identification,
with its legal and psychoanalytical meanings. Because I believe it is both a suppressed and pre-possessive
term in the discourse o f  Identity, I can grant metonymic, or dynamically substitutive energy, to anonymity.
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My argument, in theoretical terms, is that no "...one can analyze "identity-talk" and "identity-politics" 
without, as analysts, positing the existence o f {anonymities}" (Brubaker and Cooper, 5). I have, given my 
premises, elided the author's use o f "identities" and substituted anonymities to suggest that it is not an 
antonym o f identity (or o f other contested and congested god-terms such as "authority" or "community"). In 
more poetic terms, (with apologies to Blake), my argument for anonymity is that it is the invisible metonym 
that flies through our nominalist nights o f practice, o f  analysis. It founds—and finds out—the uneasy 
amalgams o f  what we employ to mean and mean to employ, and unnames us somewhere—nowhere— 
between rage and remembrance, sorrow and joy.
The 'problem' o f identity is its multiple groundings, it continuous academic grindings (to the point of
becoming ground down) into anonymities o f individuality and collectivity, o f sameness and difference, of
the solitary and o f solidarity, o f the self as core and as cover, o f  the essential and the performative. In
contending with Craig Calhoun's Social Theory and the Politics o f  Identity, Brubaker and Cooper quote him
in order to agree with his baseline assumption o f our universal identification in a collectively nominalist
consciousness. But our common Identity as Namers effectively unnames—anonymizes—Identity. And
therein lies the rub that I dub the anonymous function.
It is certainly true that "[we] know o f no people without names, no languages or cultures 
in which some manner o f distinctions between self and other, we and they, are not 
made." But it is not clear why this implies the ubiquity o f identity, unless we dilute 
"identity" to the point o f  designating all practices involving naming and self-other 
distinctions (13-14).
I am making neither a "hard" or "soft" case for the ubiquitous function o f anonymity in the problem of 
identity. It is self-evident that anonymity dilutes identity as both a category o f phenomenological practice 
and programmatic analysis. A ll phenomenological practices involving naming and therefore, self-other 
distinctions, are <ie-signated by the structural and functional orientations o f an anonymous lifeworld where 
identity has become so overburdened as to be incapable o f  naming our inter-subjective orientations. In 
order to make that case—endlessly open and shut—I turn to Alfred Schutz, a philosopher o f  the social 
whom Brubaker and Cooper would have done well to incorporate in their call to move "beyond identity."
30
Reproduced  with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
A Phenomenology o f  Inter-Suhiective Anonvmitv
The first phenomenological account o f  anonymity may be traced to Alfred Schutz. Influenced by Edmund 
Husserl's work on the meaning and structure o f the human sciences, Schutz wanted to extend Husserl's 
lifew orld  concept (a concept often accompanied by the word "anonymous" Habermas' and Giddens' 
reworkings o f  Husserl). His goal was to understand "[t]he everyday life world [which] is...fundamentally 
intersubjective; it is a social world" (Schutz, 16). Exiled by the Nazis, Schutz lived in the United States 
where, before his death in 1959. He influenced many social theorists including Habermas, Giddens, and 
Talcot Parsons. The Structures o f  the Lifeworld, which his student, Thomas Luckmann completed in 1973 
from Schutz's notes, crystallizes and clarifies the philosophical discourse o f Identity—the Self-Other 
Relation— as it has obscurely trickled down from Hegel through Heidegger. In addition, one can find in 
Schutz the merger o f a philosophical and anthropological humanism which Buber popularized in his "I- 
Thou" relation (a treatment which also influenced Bakhtin, and to which he returned at the end o f his life.)
Chapter Two o f The Structures o f  the Lifeworld —titled "The Stratifications o f the Lifeworld"—lays out 
what I see as the basic phenomenological relation o f anonymity to the fundamental intersubjectivity of the 
lifeworld. My summary o f this relation is not definitive. It is meant to confirm and codify the total 
presence o f anonymity—from relations o f  "I" to "You" to "We" to "They"—so that we might better 
understand the Discourse o f  Identity as beholden to a theory—or what remains to be seen, about 
Anonymity.
This section o f The Structures o f  the Lifeworld also contains an interesting reference to "finite provinces 
o f  meaning" and their essential incompatibility with, or irreducibility to, one another without some kind 
"...of a "leap" (in Kierkegaard's sense)" (24). This existential leap is "...accompanied by a shock experience 
that is brought about by the radical alteration o f  the tension o f consciousness" (24). According to Schutz, 
though the everyday lifeworlds o f Home, Work, Church, State are relatively finite provinces o f meaning, 
we "traverse a whole series o f such provinces." In such, "[t]here are just as many shock experiences as 
there are finite provinces of meaning able to receive the accent o f reality through changes o f attitude" (24). 
Schutz provides a footnote to this passing mention o f "finite provinces o f  meaning" and their attendant 
"shock experiences" that speculates on "the problem of "enclaves" and the necessity o f " a reflective 
attitude"—presumably to deal with the shock o f leaping between lifeworld provinces (24).
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Maurice Natanson, a student o f Schutz, seizes on  this notion o f  "enclaves" to develop a thesis that 
anonymity operates in the overlap (or perhaps overleap) o f  intersubjective meaning. We will look at what 
he calls "passion in the enclave" so as to complete the theory o f  anonymity as one that remains, if not 
always attended to or "seen" in both inter-subjective and intra-subjective provinces o f  the lifeworld. (Why 
this is important to establish will become clear ortce we enter the "lifeworld" o f the composition classroom 
in Chapter Five, "A Pedagogy o f Anonymity.")
Schutz is interested to "stratify" the lived, and generally taken as granted, sense o f having an inter­
subjective, social Identity according to the basic positionalities o f  the Self in relation to Other Selves. 
Accordingly, he moves from the immediate experience o f  self-consciousness to the less, but still relatively 
immediate experience o f  the Other. He does this through a reworking o f the I/Thou relation into a  series o f 
more highly "mediated" "orientations" toward the "We" and the "They" with some suggestion o f  the "It" or 
totally Other relation o f  Cosmos, God—whatever one's sense o f  the Unnamable might be. This is a 
phenomenological, and therefore, classically categorical, treatment o f these levels o f Identity. My only 
goal is to suggest to the reader the pervasive role that anonymity plays in Schutz's systematic explanation 
o f  lifeworld orientation.
Schutz reminds us that "[a]ll experience o f social reality is founded on the fundamental axiom positing 
the existence o f other beings "like me" (61). He then distinguishes how this fundamental identification o f 
some one Other than one's Self is "arranged according to various levels o f proximity, depth, and anonymity 
in lived experience (61, emphasis added). In Schultz's distillation o f  the discourse o f  Identity (o f the "self­
same," the "like me" tendency o f consciousness), it turns out that "anonymity" is one o f the "structures in 
which the social world becomes built up in experience" (61). Anonymity quickly and pervasively becomes 
a factor once "the face-to-face situation...the only social situation characterized by temporal and spatial 
immediacy" is set as a phenomenological baseline. It would not seem so, of course, until we attend to 
Schutz's stratifications o f  the Self/Other situation.
Since attention to the se lf is a phenomenological given, the social situation presupposes "that I turn my 
attention to the Other" (62). This turning o f the S elf and its internal community outward, as it were, "is a 
universal form in which the Other is experienced "in person" "(62.) Succinctly, the "I" experiences a "thou- 
orientation." It is a personal, essentially "unilateral" orientation that is itself subtly nuanced and articulated 
in terms o f alienation and intimacy within the spatio-temporal proximity of the situation. I f  the Other
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attends to my "I" than the orientation is, o f  course "reciprocal." That is, "...a social relation becomes 
constituted" which Schutz designates the "we-relation." Schutz is careful to remind his reader that there is 
no "pure" Thou or We relation. Both are "...actualized only in various stages o f  concrete apprehension and 
typification o f  the Other" (63). At the same time, once the immediate, intimate sense o f  Self has been 
reoriented to the social world, the apprehension and typification o f the Other is always "mediated" (63).
O f course, as long as there is a face-to-face orientation, what Schutz is calling the " "pure" we-relation, 
which is constituted in a reciprocal thou-orientation" (64), is immediate, but there are "gradations o f  
immediacy" (65). He looks into these gradations o f  one's "fellow man" [s/c] 67 in the examples o f lovers, 
kin, various kinds o f friends, and acquaintances. He sees that "[t]he mirroring o f  se lf in the experience o f  
the stranger (more exactly, in my grasp o f  the Other's experience o f me) [which] is a constitutive element 
o f  the we-relation" (67). These gradations o f  immediacy— in what amounts to a reciprocal attempt at self­
recognition—are eventually mediated, as we will see, by gradations o f  anonymity. "In general,' [however] it 
is...in the we-relation that the intersubjectivity o f the life-world is developed and continually confirmed" 
(68).
What I read as an intimation o f anonymity's function in the inter-subjectivity o f  the lifeworld, Schutz 
concludes consideration o f the we-relation in this way: "The lifeworld is not my private world nor your 
private world, nor yours and mine added together, but rather the world o f our common experience (68). I 
insist that that common experience—or sense o f community, immediate or otherwise— is beholden to 
anonymity. This sense emerges, I believe, in the often unconsidered interstices or borderlands that Schutz 
appears to be alluding to in the always and already anonymous Otherness of this "Our" orientation. In this 
already anonymous orientation the "...differences in the immediacy o f  my [your, our, their] experience o f 
the Other already stand out" (69).
This brings Schutz to a consideration not o f immediate others, but to "...the transitions o f  living we- 
relations to social relations between contemporaries" (73). Thus "The more we approach the latter, [i.e. 
"contemporaries] the smaller is the degree o f  immediacy and the higher the degree o f  anonymity 
characterizing my experience o f the Other" (73). (It will be of interest to the reader to note here, early on, 
that Schutz’s equation of anonymity with lack o f "immediacy" is logical, even natural, in strict definitional 
terms o f  the social. A different logic is operative in the psychosocial terrain o f  the teaching situation, and 
in the complex rhetorical passions that inhabit the "enclaves" of reading texts and writing them.)
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In a subsection o f the "Stratifications" chapter titled " The contemporary as type and the they- 
orientation," Schutz begins a ten page stretch o f  analysis that comprises another subsection titled "The 
levels o f  anonymity in the social world." "Contemporaries" are not in bodily time and space but in "world 
time" (74) which we know through experience, knowledge, and "...the help o f  various lifeworldly 
idealizations" (74). The relation between "idealization" and "anonymization" becomes critical for Schutz's 
thesis. (The reader can look forward to accepting or rejecting my sense that it is a relation equally crucial 
in a pedagogy o f  anonymity.) "Idealization" is a complex term, but it appears to be equivalent to what he 
means by "typification"—how we must necessarily "type" Others—even intimate Others— according various 
constraints o f  language and knowledge. Thus, "[i]n contrast to the way I grasp the conscious life o f  a 
fellow-man, [s/c] the experiences o f mere contemporaries \a.k.a. "they-relations"] appear to me as more or 
less anonymous events" (75).
We have, then, a large reservoir of "...typical knowledge concerning typical processes" in the social 
world (75). We have a generalized sense o f otherness at this level o f the social. In "...whose consciousness 
[do] these typical processes transpire" is open question o f "idealization": "the idealizations o f "and so 
forth" and "again and again," that is, assumptions o f  typical anonymous repeatability" (76). We are all 
familiar with, but generally, do not bother to reflect on the typical anonymous repeatability of self/other 
identification in the series o f situations that constitute our everyday lifeworlds.
These become, in effect, "objective meaning-contexts"; and the more these "replace subjective-meaning 
contexts, the more anonymous will be the reference point o f  [our] they-orientation" (76). This is where 
"typification" sets in and not only informs, but largely founds our "stock o f  knowledge" about the world 
(77). The fluidity and positionality o f subjective and objective meaning contexts is obvious, on self- 
reflection. Each o f us is aware that we can zoom in or out o f the I/Thou/We orientation into a they- 
orientation, depending on the situation involving "contemporaries." (Schutz uses the example o f a card 
game in which some individuals are known to each other, others are new to the game. The game o f cards 
itself is a highly typified, objective context Intimacy and anonymity wind and weave throughout the inter­
subjective meaning contexts within the orientation toward the objective context o f  a card game as played 
by anyone, everyone—all contemporaries in world-time as it were, past, present, future, never.
Schutz opens the subsection, "The levels of anonymity in the social world" this way: "The foundational 
moment o f  the they-orientation is that one imagines the Other, whose existence is assumed or suspected, as
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a reference point o f  typical virtues, characteristics, etc" (79). It is this act o f imagination—or "idealization"- 
-that links up with what he is calling "anonymization." That is, "...the world o f  contemporaries is stratified 
according to levels o f  anonymity" (80). We imaginatively realize the Other through acts o f idealization 
and/or demonization (though Schutz doesn't break down idealization along this line o f  binaric typification.)
For Schutz, "[t]he most important variable [in this act o f imagining the Other] is the degree o f 
anonymity”; and he sees "[t]he anonymity o f a typification [as] inversely proportional to its fullness of 
content" (80). Thus, "[t]he sooner I can immediately experience the typical characteristics o f "someone" 
as properties o f a fellow-man, [j i c ] as components o f his conscious life, the less anonymous is the 
typification in question" (81). In effect, we have a  sliding, eliding continuum o f  otherness always and 
already operative throughout our inter-subjective social rounds o f being and becoming. His nominative 
examples o f  anonymous typification include: "citizen o f the world," "leftist intellectual liberal," 
"combatant," "American" " (81). It is easy to add to this list, so easy in fact, that I (-Thou) begin to imagine 
a "mobius strip" construct or "double-helix" contour prescribing the codes o f linguistic consciousness 
itself: nominalizing and anonymizing at once.
In this subsection Schutz takes us through various "individualized types" that shade and adumbrate 
themselves away from a "friend." Thus what he calls "personal types " are constructed and projected on the 
basis o f " "people like X" " (82). These are not just "anyone", since they orbit our personal stock o f past 
and immediate experience with a host o f intimate others. (Presumably, a favorite author, or more 
accurately, an author's created character, can assume this status o f a personal type, as we will see in 
Chapter Two in our treatment of the anonymous author function.)
Several steps beyond these personalized gradations (what I think of, following Bakhtin, as 
"transgredient" and therefore rhetorically transgressive moments o f personal identity and identification), 
are "the functionary type"-, "...typifications which closely approach pure behavioral types and which have 
already reached a higher degree of anonymity"2 (82). Schutz uses the example o f  the "postal employee" 
who delivers our personal correspondence day to day. Both these types remain highly "individualized"— 
they are still relatively "close to lived experience" compared to "[t]ypifications o f so-called social 
collectives..." (83). Based on his descriptions, these types cover, in my own experience, the YMCA, the 
Salvation Army, the U.S. Congress. These are still "...built on individualized functionary types or even 
personal types" (82) which we can recast in terms o f a "we-orientation."
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Finally, according to Schutz, we get to  typifications "...like " the  state," " the economy," " the social 
classes," etc, they are completely unamenable to conversion into the living reality" (83) of reciprocal 
Self/Other orientations. These typifications are ''[hjighly anonymous Objective-meaning contexts and 
behavior-contexts" and constitute what social theorists o f  many stripes—from Althusser to Foucault— 
"ideological apparatuses" or "regimes o f  truth." Writing a decade before the onset o f  "post-structural" 
conceptions o f  Identity, Schutz sees these highly anonymous contexts o f  identification as being 
"...embodied in symbols that operate by instituting communities, ...in which these symbols become taken- 
for granted data o f the social and cultural world into which the individual is bom" (84).
The term "typification" becomes a crucial conceptual axis upon which Schutz turns and returns to the 
anonymity and "anonymization" o f  the lifeworld. My overview o f  anonymity's phenomenology according 
to Schutz is intended to suggest its functional range across a bewildering number o f  situations just beyond 
the pale of an immediate face-to-face orientation. Anonymity, it would seem, is not only a typically social 
stratification. It also typifies nearly every inter-subjective situation outside o f  family, friendship, certain 
collaborative relations, and lovemaking. It may, in fact, function in these more "immediate" orientations, 
as well, as we will begin to trace in Natanson’s development o f the enclave, below.
We can roughly conclude from Schutz that the essential sociality o f  subjective experience is idealized 
and is, to a greater or lesser extent, objectified across a highly nuanced spectrum o f intensely private— 
"immediate"—to highly public—"mediated"— "provinces" or "enclaves" o f  meaningful orientation. The 
arrangement o f these meaningful forms o f  orientation is accompanied by "prescribed levels o f anonymity"; 
therefore, to understand the social formation and meaning o f subjective experience, we cannot discount nor 
disavow the function o f anonymity.
In the final chapter o f Schutz's study, (titled "Knowledge and Society"). Schutz provides a 
compositional cue (or maybe a clue) to his notion o f anonymity as "prescribed." My tendency toward the 
idealization of anonymization leads me to take the term o f  prescrip tion  in that literal way which doubles 
back into symbolization. Anonymity is written on the wind o f discourse itself. Discourse is at once social 
and anonymous, centripedal and centrifugal, as Bakhtin has it. The whole o f  utterance, o f  language, is an 
inter-subjective (dis) orientation o f  naming and self/other distinctions that move beyond any congested and 
contested holding term like "Identity." Given that the object o f my inquiry is anonymous writing and the
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composition o f  identity politics, it is fortuitous that Schutz provides one example from writing and one 
from self/other identification to suggest the range o f anonymity's rhetorical and attitudinal (im)mediacies.
Thus, for example, the fullness o f  symptoms in which the Other is given diminishes, 
according to whether one is concerned with the exchange of letters, with news which is 
obtained through a third person, etc. In order to illustrate the variations in anonymity, we 
need only think o f  the difference between the exchange of letters between two married 
people and a  business letter, or a last will and testament which refers to later generations, 
stock transactions, judicial decrees, etc.
.... Social attitudes can be related, on the one hand, to a concrete individual ("my 
absent father"), or also to different degrees o f  anonymous social groups, roles, 
institutions, social objectivations, etc. (aversion to lawyers, fear o f the police, respect for 
the Ten Commandments, preference for Italian, etc) (253, emphasis added).
In the first example, Schutz is running a gauntlet familiar to any teacher o f composition—or to any one who
must be aware o f "audience." To make students aware o f  the general importance o f audience, to help them
discover the genre conventions that virtually prescribe particular kinds o f  addressivity, I have used an
exercise from rhetorician Ross Winterowd that provokes a range of "variation" similar to what Schutz
describes. The subject is money. The problem is that the graduating student needs some. The object is to
write a letter that will best insure a solution to this problem. The assignment is to write three letters: one to
the student's parent or parents; one to a "best," but long lost, friend from grade school who always had
money; and one to a loan institution.
The resulting letters invariably demonstrate variations in familiarity—o f a sense o f identity, o f authority, 
o f  community—that are clearly coextensive with Schutz's "variations in anonymity." Though not written 
anonymously, the letters do point to the inevitable sense o f an anonymous "To Whom It May Concern" the 
farther one traces the implications o f the rhetorical directive, "Consider Your Audience."
The second example from Schutz conforms to my epistemological interests as a teacher o f composition. 
Students write properly named personal narratives on their immediate sense and source o f personal identity 
(as in Schutz's "my absent father"), and gradually "relate" these compositions to larger, more anonymous, 
socially constructed, "groups, roles, objectivations" through academic research. At the same time, writing 
as an anonymous community, the fullness o f  symptoms in which the Other is given replenishes or 
diminishes students' named discourse of identity according to how they exchange and extend the personal, 
textual, attitudinal, and social anonymity already suggested in their nominally identified compositions.
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Making anonymity a worthwhile rhetorical phenomenon in composition pedagogy requires that teachers 
stress the inter- part o f intersubjectivity and intertextuality. Understanding the inter requires that teachers 
make the case for the same sort o f  Kiekergaardian "leap" between the private and public that Schutz 
describes as happening between discrete provinces o f  meaning—between lifeworlds. The "shock 
experience" which accompanies this leap, according to Schutz, is evident, as we will see in some of the 
anonymous writing, but cannot be adequately conveyed except in the face-to-face, "we" relation o f named 
students confronting the "they-relation" o f  their own anonymous writing. Some o f  the writing might be 
thought o f  as outresubjective or outretextual— o f  mere "shock value." That possibility is part o f  a 
legitimately "critical pedagogy" in which leaps and risks—transgressions— must be undertaken between 
expressivist and constructionist "enclaves."
Before we can reflect on anonymity as a pedagogical phenomenon, however, there is a need to extend 
Schutz's phenomenological account o f  anonymity from the intersubjective, into the intra-subjective. Even 
in my cursory outline and overview o f Schutz's treatise on the function o f  anonymity in the structures o f the 
lifeworld, the reader can begin to understand why one of his students, Maurice Natanson, might nominate 
its function in the "enclave" as worthy o f a separate phenomenological investigation.
A Phenomenology o f  Tntra-Subjective Anonvmitv 
Maurice Natanson has determined that the Ieit motif of Schutz's work was anonymity, and has written a 
book titled Anonymity: A Study in the Philosophy o f Alfred Schutz, which is one o f  many books published 
under Studies in Phenomenology and Existential Philosophy series. In his introduction Natanson tells us 
that he is "convinced that anonymity provides what Husserl called "a transcendental clue" to the 
understanding of Schutz's philosophy o f the social world. Our task is the tracing o f that clue" (22).
Schutz's central insight about anonymity is its apparent "social" discontinuity with regard to the voice(s) 
in our heads that we identify as subjectivity or personal identity. Anonymity for Schutz is a social, not a 
psychic, operation. We are not strangers to ourselves, only estranged by the sheer phenomenological 
otherness o f the situational array outside our personally embodied space. (One can begin to see Schutz’s 
foundational importance to the phenomenology o f Merleau-Ponty, whose approach to anonymity we cannot
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follow up in these pages.) To confirm this, Natanson quotes fromt one o f Schutz’s earlier books Life Forms 
and Meaning Structure
[W]hen we speak o f  subjective meaning in the social world, we are referring to the 
constituting processes in the consciousness o f  persoms who produced that which is 
objectively meaningful. We are therefore referring to th e ir  "intended meaning," whether 
they themselves are aware of these constituting processes or not. The world o f  subjective 
meaning is therefore never anonymous, for it is essentially only something dependent 
upon and still within the operating intentionality o f  an ZEgo-consciousness, my own or 
someone else's (22 emphasis added).
In other words, what can never be anonymous is the inner cu rve  o f the "I-you" dialog we use in making
sense to ourselves—for ourselves, a ME like no Other. This is the narrative o f personal identity reserved in
our heads. It is that lifelong internal monologue which Bakhtin, ass we shall see, was interested to explain in
terms of a "dialogical imagination." Anonymity only takes hold- in inter- subjective, not intra-subjective
3
relations. We don’t mask our identities from our selves, according rto Schutz.
Shutz's insight is consistent with Blanchot's insight about the winter’s identity disappearing in the act o f 
writing, since subjective meaning has left the head and its self-reflection and entered the fascination o f  the 
page. Anonymity is structured in broad social, not deep personal, life. Natanson basically thematizes and 
over-determines Schutz's stance on the subjective to make some basic but generally overlooked 
phenomenological facts about the anonymity o f everyday life. An extended passage from Natanson is 
worthwhile at this point. It summarizes and authorizes what I educed from Schutz's stratified approach to 
anonymity as a Iifeworld structure.
For the most part, anonymity is not considered by moost o f us in daily life to be a 
desirable condition or circumstance. Who "most o f  us" are is one o f the philosophical 
aspects o f the problem of anonymity... (23).
Most o f us must settle for knowing a small number o f  p*eople, for knowing about a 
larger circle o f  fellow humans, and for being aware o tf multitudes who are and will 
remain anonymous. This is the normal state o f  affairs. /And if  it is "normal" that most 
individuals are anonymous to most other individuals, them it is evident that anonymity is 
a standard feature o f everyday life, anonymity is part o f  tlfae structure o f the social world. 
...[Ajnonymity is an invariant feature o f an existence lived  in the taken-for-granted terms 
of ordinary life. What is implied by this taken-for-graantedness is the reciprocity o f  
anonymity: I am anonymous to most Others just as most Others are anonymous to me....
In any case, there is no difficulty in understanding whait it means for someone to be 
treated as a number by the bureaucracy, to be looked at a s  though you weren't there, to 
have nobody interested in you, to be a perpetual strangerr, not to belong—anywhere. The 
experience o f  anonymity is widespread, if  not commo-nplace; the concern with that 
experience—its thematization, in phenomenological terms—is not an integral part o f daily 
life (24-25).
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Obviously, my concern with the experience o f anonymity is to thematize it and make it an integral part o f 
composition's daily pedagogical life. Since it is an integral part o f  the social structure o f  the lifeworld 
(including that o f  academia), m y concern is with how it prescribes the agency o f self/other relations in 
composition pedagogy. As both a theorist o f discourse, and as a  teacher in composition-rhetoric, my 
interest is in the double nature o f  anonymity that Natanson elaborates from Schutz's work. We have already 
noted the reciprocity o f anonymity that makes it a standard feature o f  social life. In this phenomenological— 
taken-as-granted— kind o f  anonymity, there is a an autonomy, a freedom, that gives (inter)subjectivity its 
hermetic seal and social security—its selfsameness, its identity, as I have argued in Section I.
But there is also the anonymous experience that Natanson tells us usually carries our common sense of 
anonymity as wholly negative—the kind o f Kafkaesque depersonalization and alienation that no first name 
basis can overcome. This essentially existential (versus the reciprocally social) experience o f anonymity 
carries a sense o f unfreedom, and in binary relation to a positive sense o f self-identity, projects a negative 
charge o f  (In)Different Otherness.
With this great binary tension o f  SelfrOther in its ambit, it is less o f  a stretch to understand the total 
"dialectical" (more toward "dialogical") reverberations o f anonymity. And though we are still sketching out 
what I consider a "background anonymity," I am hopeful that the reader can intuit something o f what I 
mean by anonymity's figure or character as represented in the "reciprocity" or inter-subjectivity o f  
anonymous writing in a college composition class.
As I understand the theory and practice o f what has come to be known in composition-rhetoric studies 
as "expressivism," it is not about personal narratives for the performance o f Self only. At its most 
expressive—most social and political—the expressivist approach is dedicated to the expression o f an Other. 
And the reciprocal—and "negative"— powers of anonymity can aid and abet this expressive goal. Just as no 
composition of philosophy according to Schutz and thematized by Natanson can ignore the double edge o f 
anonymity, neither can a philosophy o f  composition, in my view, ignore what the Natanson extracts from 
his mentor to call the "enclaves" o f  anonymity. It is to these I will now turn before concluding this 
particular subsection on anonymity's background.
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Schutz develops his concept o f  "enclaves"—shorthand for "provinces o f meaning" from his 
understanding o f Sarte's theory o f  the Other (which, by my lights, was appropriated by Lacan, Bakhtin, and 
a host o f  other "critical" theorists). Natanson seizes on enclaves—which he defines as "phenomena of 
intersubjectivity." He then attempts a more detailed description than the footnoted asides o f  Schutz.
Within the course o f  daily life, enclaves are more often than not "inhabited by Others....
You and I share some region of work, family relationship, avocation, past history, which 
is our intersection in the world, not only unshared by, but unknown to, Others (96).
Simply understood, I think Natanson is speaking o f "the private realm." We all have our private, intimate
relations, real or imagined. Since every one senses privacy, the collective sense o f  individual claims to
privacy points to a public  domain in an ideal sense— a community o f subjectivity. The crucial link between
anonymity and the sense and maintenance o f  personal, private identity gives anonymity a social, public
identification. Anonymity is the "open secret" o f  inter-subjectivity.
Natanson seems to be distinguishing between intimate and generalized Others, or Strangers, within "the 
paramount reality" o f  the anonymous social world. This is a double overlap o f intimacies with certain 
known Others, and the reciprocal recognition o f anonymity with Others in general. Natanson concludes that 
when it comes to understanding the firewall between intimate and generalized otherness there is a 
"temptation...to concentrate on intimacies, on private features o f the individual's life: hidden religious or 
sexual activity, for example" (96). But if we are to understand enclaves, such intimacies prevent their 
status as "a more vital, a more nearly structural aspect o f the social world" (96).
He returns to trying to define what an enclave is by telling us what it is not. "It might be thought that 
formal alliances—marriage, friendship, business partnerships [and he later includes academic departments]- 
-might automatically establish enclaves; they do not" (110). The reason they do not is because i f  anything 
"intimately shared in such relationships" does "not cross the boundaries of the finite province in which they 
are held"—if, in other words, their secrets don't secrete, they are something else. The moment the privacies 
of different provinces are conjoined, an enclave is entered" (110). At this point "enclaves" seem to both rely 
upon and deny the privacies o f self-identity.
Natanson's conclusion about enclaves subverts one o f his mentor's central contentions that "The world
of subjective meaning is...never anonymous, for it is essentially only something dependent upon and still
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within the operating intentionality o f  an Ego-consciousness, my own or someone else’s." There is 
something "objective" about the condition and operation of anonymity. Its meaning is, at a minimum "inter- 
subjective." But Natanson contends that
[wjhat lies within the enclave, from an egological standpoint, includes an intensity of 
experience concerning several provinces o f meaning, a remembered, anticipated, 
imagined, or fantasized state o f affairs in which only the aspect o f  experience relevant to 
the enclave is attended to while the rest--an immense remainder—is not only set at a 
distance but is apperceived as anonymous.... A glimpse of "otherness" is provided within 
such a conception o f  the enclave (110-112, emphasis added).
Natanson had initially defined enclaves from something like a "sociological" standpoint—"the more familiar
state o f affairs in which the individual knows Others only through the enclaves formed by the taking of
social roles" (112). This makes sense, given Schutz's attention to the socially structured character of the
kinds o f anonymity with which Natanson begins his study.
Why he shifts to an almost psychoanalytic take on enclaves is part o f a larger problem for philosophers
who consider themselves phenomenologists, who have split the difference between epistemology and
ontology and are caught on the horns o f the dilemma of Identity as blurred emergencies of external and
4
internal Identification. That problem we cannot address here. Our inquiry involves the "immense 
remainder" o f Self identity (reminiscent o f  Freud's "repressed elements" that Lacan says are "structured 
like a language"). Does Self-identity have any access to, or is it accessed by, the "immense remainder" of 
the world and its anonymously social otherness? Remember that he defined the enclave as: "The moment 
the privacies of different provinces are conjoined, an enclave is entered."
That definition appears to effectively eliminate the pedestrian, emancipatory reciprocity o f Self/Other 
anonymity; it points to the widespread experience o f repressive anonymization. In other words, the 
possibility o f self-identity depends on an immense anonymous remainder that is distanced from the 
immediate needs of that continued identification. Its presence is not only an immense remainder; it is a 
reminder—a glimpse of one's own otherness. Thus, (and I am connecting disparate elements that Natanson 
can't or won't), "...what is distanced from the [egological] enclave intimates an altogether different realm, 
one in which truncation o f possibility signifies the recognition o f anonymity no longer as a mode of 
abstraction but as otherness" (112). We are reminded here o f  Brubaker's and Cooper's irritation over
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Identity's claim to abstract as well as practical categories. Otherness becomes a  practice in the enclave. The 
glimpse o f  otherness provided by such "a conception o f  the enclave" "is to be distinguished from the more 
familiar state o f affairs in which the individual knows Others only through the enclaves formed by the 
taking o f  social roles." (These, as we have seen, include the commonplace anonymity known as 
reciprocity).
Let's try to summarize Natanson's summary o f Schutz's original conception o f  anonymity—that it is an 
abstraction we use upon the social world and its commonplace otherness to the self, an abstraction that 
permits homogenous or typified recognitions that make for a generalized intersubjective behavior that is 
essentially anonymous. Natanson argues that his teacher has made an important point about how human 
beings tend to customize—to "typify"— reality with its capacity for uncertainty, chaos, accident. The way 
we do this is to purify the continuous confusions o f perception and action through an act o f  self-protective 
reflection or typification. Schutz, once again, describes it this way. “ In the typifying synthesis of 
recognition I perform an act o f  anonymization in which I abstract the lived experience from its setting 
within the stream o f consciousness and thereby render it impersonal” (Natanson 114).
There are any number o f (stereo)typical situations that demonstrate the presence o f anonymity. Schutz
was apparently not given to examples, according to Natanson, though I have found some, as we have
already witnessed. As Natanson tells us, Schutz used the word "anonymous"
to...replace the time-bound, circumstance-determined, situated particulars o f individual 
existence.... Thus: the greater the purity, [as if  intersubjectivity exists apart from its 
relational and situational particulars] the greater the anonymity. In this way, [for Schutz} 
typification generates sameness (114).
Conformity, typification, sameness (the etymological meaning o f identity) are wrapped up in Schutz's
conception o f anonymity; it is how he displays the structure o f social life in its generalized "impersonal"
character. This description follows from one o f anonymity's synonyms—"non-descript." And there is a kind
of rightness to what he was pointing to. When all is going according to plan, whether at a train station, at an
assembly plant, or in a  classroom, "...the more standardized the prevailing action pattern is, the more
anonymous it is, the greater the subjective chance o f  conformity and, therewith, o f  the success of
intersubjective behavior" (In Natanson, 113).
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Nantanson's departure from his mentor pivots on, as we have seen, anonymity as a lived experience of 
de-personalization, in contrast to the typical background reciprocity o f  im-personalization. His detour into 
the imaginative—intra-subjective— realm is an attempt, I think, to challenge one o f  Schutz's opening 
assertions that subjectivity, the meaning we make from and for the continuance o f  selfsameness, is never 
anonymous. This challenge depends not upon sameness but upon difference, in turning a reciprocal logic of 
identity into a disjunctive one o f otherness. Natanson seems to be saying that anonymity runs down into the 
selfs glimpse o f  its own otherness as well as out into the social. He assures us that his teacher has 
performed a useful analysis o f anonymity based on a "dialectic o f  common sense." But when we come to 
the end o f that dialectic, (which we quickly must when we countenance actual situations o f 
intersubjectivity), we come to "the beginning o f that more primordial meaning o f  anonymity which we 
have called "otherness" " (114).
The otherness o f anonymity, the enclaves it inhabits and interprets, may be said to dilute, even confute, 
the discourse o f Identity. On the other hand, Natanson's intra-subjective take on anonymity helps us re­
name self-other distinctions through the unnaming of our "identities" which are "first intimated by [their] 
passion in the enclave which anonymity provides." However, we have now  before us a few 
phenomenological suppositions. There is the hard and fast categorization o f Identity as a politics of 
idealizing an "Us" and demonizing, or at least, reducing the humanity o f a "Them." We have lived practices 
in which subjectivity requires a vast distancing o f  others (both within and without a given self), "origin and 
passion [are] taken from [others], [and] the anonymized Other continues to be a human "otherwise" " (115). 
This typification o f  an anonymous Otherwise, in both idealized and demonized terms, shows up, gets 
mirrored in the masking operations o f an anonymous pedagogy.
Conclusion to Chapter One
My attempt to retrace the "phenomenological" character o f anonymity through Schutz and Natanson leaves
much to be desired in terms of clarity. I f  there is one practical theme that stands out from my summary
analyses of Brubaker and Cooper, Schutz and Natanson, it would seem to be that subjective, self-same
Identity, performatively anonymous or not, has an Other-wise orientation which the traditional discourse of
Identity does not account for. It therefore becomes us (so to speak) to see the anonymous identity function
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as a Active possibility for college writers. The Anonymous is a fugitive YOU that a given I —already other­
wise—is always ready to discursively intimate in the enclave/community o f  We anonymity provides.
Given the passionate enclave an "expressivist" pedagogy should provide, the passion in the enclave 
anonymity provides (e.g., cyberspace's chatrooms) could become an intra- and inter-subjective discourse 
community. In this zone o f  taking social roles, the ambiguity o f  secrecy and disclosure creates new 
possibilities o f reciprocity that will in turn help us to rethink the relations o f identity in community. Given 
the theoretical bent o f  this chapter, it is not yet clear what gets rethought in the anonymous enclaves o f  a 
composition course whose problematic frame if  the discourse o f  identity itself. Natanson can help us chart 
this pedagogical whatness in advance o f actually analyzing students' anonymous writing.
Although it is not clear which encounters [of Self/Other] qualify as constitutive in 
establishing enclaves, it does seem in the encounter with the Other that, in being "looked 
at," in finding m yself as an "object" for the subjectivity o f  the Other—as Sartre contends— 
a central moment in the becoming of the enclave is revealed: negativity is occasioned by 
the "look" o f the Other but experienced in me, the "looked-at," as a "nothing" which is 
already the herald o f  otherness (116-17).
So then, what has this to do with anonymity, either in the commonsense definition o f a person unnamed, 
unidentified, unknown, hidden, invisible, non-descript, or in the two highly nuanced corollaries set forth by 
Schutz and nuanced nearly to terminological death by Natanson's attempt at a phenomenological 
thematization? According to Natanson (courtesy of Nietzsche, Heidegger, Husserl, Blanchot, among 
"others" I would think), the self-looked at (virtually from birth) negates the negation in that gaze, and that 
immense remainder o f  a selfs "nothing" distances and defends the enclave, makes it possible. And why is 
the enclave important to the discourse o f anonymity? Because
[o] thers are permitted access to the enclave in abused form; their unity negated, their 
possibilities denied, the work of the enclave accomplished, [then] others have become, at 
last, anonymous. And this anonymity holds good for fictive as well as "real" persons. A 
grand census o f the enclaves would have to include those who are imagined as well as 
those who possess actuality—who have "papers" to establish their identity. It is time for 
the credentials o f those who have fictive being to be examined (117).
This theoretical overview o f  anonymity as a phenomenological discourse in its own right is a truncated 
attempt at a grand census o f  anonymity's discursive enclaves. My reader can reasonably conclude, however, 
that anonymity does have a  clear role in the lived realities—both psychological and social—of everyone's 
identity. The idea o f "enclaves"—their private/public equivocation—stands or falls on understanding the
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reach o f  "inter-subjectivity" and its origin in an alter-able, fictive sense o f  the otherness prescribed by the 
discourse o f  anonymity. It is a discourse that prescribes the problematic and overburdened enclaves o f 
Identity itself.
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Chapter Notes
1
The work o f Erving Goffinan, a so-called "symbolic interactionist," remains useful for its peculiar sense 
o f  skepsis on self-identity  as a  continuously anxious balancing act or performance o f  "cynical" and 
"sincere" social roles in everyday life." By my lights, Goffinann brings the entire existential problem o f 
self-identity into a  complex intersubjective performativity o f roles that at times do the work o f  masking and 
other times o f  mirroring the basic intersubjective orientation o f  se lf in face-to-face orientations. What 
happens to personal identity in more mediated situations, such as writing, is not, however, a problem 
Goffinann is interested to engage. Ever new “cynical” and “sincere” possibilities for making, masking, and 
mirroring one’s “person” through various personae are marketed by a capitalist culture. Captialist role 
making is devoted to technologizing personal identity as a reproducible commodity. Such identities become 
consumed by the flow o f  information exchange and consumption. This is also usefully summed up by 
Kellner with Goffinannesque trace elements.
"It is thus claimed that in PM culture, the subject has disintegrated into a flux o f 
euphoric intensities, fragmented and disconnected, and that the decentered postmodern 
self no longer experiences anxiety (with hysteria becoming the typical postmodern 
psychic malady) and no longer possesses the depth, substantiality, and coherence that 
was the ideal and occasional achievement o f  the modem self. Postmodern theorists claim 
that subjects have imploded into masses, that a fragmented, disjointed and discontinuous 
mode o f experience is a fundamental characteristic o f  postmodern culture, o f both its 
subjective experiences and texts (144).
Identity today thus becomes a freely chosen game, a theatrical presentation o f the 
self, in which one is able to present oneself in a variety o f  roles, images, and activities, 
relatively unconcerned about shifts, transformations, and dramatic changes....
...This analysis would suggest that what might be called postmodern identity is an 
extension o f the freely chosen and multiple identities o f  the modem self that accepts and 
affirms am unstable and rapidly mutating condition, which was a problem for the 
modem self, producing anxiety and identity crisis.... Yet one surmises that there is a shift 
of identity formation and that postmodern selves are becoming more multiple, transitory, 
and open... (158).
Rather than identity disappearing in a postmodern society, it is merely subject to new 
determination and new forces while offering as well new possibilities, styles, models, 
and forms. Yet the overwhelming variety o f  subject positions for identity, in an affluent 
image culture no doubt create highly unstable identities while constantly providing new 
openings to restructure one's identity. (174)
The anonymity o f  mass culture— that it provides new openings to compose or restructure one’s 
identity—has its local counterpart in what I will be arguing in Chapter Five, A Pedagogy o f Anonymous 
Composition.
2
The status o f the “functionary type” relates o f course to immediate personal experience. The various 
situations o f meeting and talking with all sorts of strangers—from shopping to traveling—inevitably beg the 
functionary question of: "When do I ask for this Other's name, or name myself? "Typically," the 
anonymity of my LThou orientation never crosses what one theorist has termed the "nomination barrier." I 
find this to be the case even in more supposedly "reciprocal" and proximal situations, such as parents 
encountering and recognizing one another over the course of a year as they pick up their children from pre­
school. "Hello" and "Hi" are pro form a , but these greetings only underscore an anonymous functionary 
norm that no one seems aware of, never mind curious about. "Parents" are there to drop off and pick up 
their "child" or "children." Our identifications become typified, enabling a level of anonymity that "floats 
all boats" as it were. An additional sense of porous yet "incompatible" provinces of meaning between 
family and school lifeworlds is that the children o f other parents will refer to me as "Clydajane's Dad" or 
"Zoeann's Dad"—demonstrating a blurry, but still bright line between named and anonymized socialization 
through functionary encounters.
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3
I will be making much o f  the obvious function o f  anonymity as a masking operation in the history of 
literature, and in the practice o f  composition. But i f  the problem o f  identity is its complicity with 
anonymity, then anonymity also performs mirroring function. The standard rhetorical anonymity used by 
editors o f newspapers in their viewpoint essays is not only meant, for example, to perform a sense of 
community in masking the identity o f individual writers, a "common sense" which in turn lends a shared 
sense of authorship and author-ity to its readers. The anonymous editorial page functions even more as a 
two way "mirror" for "reflection" on important issues o f  the day. This is one o f anonymity's rhetorically 
reconstructive powers.
In terms o f  understanding its "media [ating]/mirroring power as a discursive danger, I nominate the 
increasing appropriation and re-presentation of familial, fraternal, and other sorts o f filial (com)passion by 
visual media with their celebrity performances o f inter-subjective intimacy. We might reasonably conclude 
that anonymity is not only a "prescribed" level in the discourse o f  Identity and Identification, but one 
"postscripted" within the structures o f the simulated Life(less)-World entertained by Baudrillard. (That 
anonymization holds both powers and dangers as a structuring discourse is something alluded to by 
Foucault, as we shall see.) The anonymity of television—from the discourse o f advertising to its culture of 
celebrity—is the primary reason I won't have it in my home; my children's intersubjective lifeworld would 
be infected, I believe, in their identification with its parody o f  cathartic intimacy.
Similarly, I remember how my first experience with pornographic film in college enabled me to 
understand the difference between "making" love and "having" sex; in the former, anonymous inter­
subjectivity is not possible. This is one o f the dangers o f  the anonymous. Yet, in this connection, there are 
legitimate powers o f  empathic identification. The film Last Tango in Paris profoundly affected me as a 
young man. In retrospect, it was the film's poignant and conflicted sense o f identification in Marlon 
Brando's character that sticks with me. Recall that Brando's character refuses to give his name to the young 
woman he is having an affair with. When she tries to give him her name, he refuses it—shouts her down. 
This intersubjective—erotic— anonymity is contrasted to the scene in which Brando's character is seen 
speaking—praying, really-to  his dead mother, addressing her by her proper name. His identification with 
her is anything but anonymous, and yet her death—her absence—in every sense, but in name, reinforces the 
form and meaning o f Schutz's sense of anonymity.
As we will see, this paradoxical energy of anonymity—its capacity for alienation and intimacy— points to 
its power and danger for intersubjective expression and construction o f the Other within the composition 
classroom.)
4
The question o f the rightness or usefulness of psychoanalytic theory as regards this question is o f course 
ignored by Schutz. Despite his interest in all "phenomenon," he is a philosopher, after all. As a 
philosopher-historian (some have called him a new kind o f  "geographer"), Foucault also skates around the 
psychosocial implications o f the Prohibited in his historical outline of discourse. But he does acknowledge 
the important work o f  Freud and Lacan on the question o f  subjective meaning in the social world—summed 
up in a single word "speech," which often stands in for "discourse" itself. What Schutz is calling subjective 
meaning in the social world cleaves close to a Vygotskyean notion o f the speech in our heads. And it is 
equivalent to what Foucault is calling first speech, then discourse. And, in the psychoanalytic connection, it 
is important to repeat what Focuault does say about such speech or subjective meaning: "[P] sychoanalysis 
has already shown us that speech is not merely the medium which manifests—or dissembles—desire; it is 
also the object o f desire" (149). Assuming Schutz agrees with this assertion, he would then maintain that 
subjective meaning, as the object o f desire, is never anonymous, even though it can be, and often is, 
prohibited. The relation between prohibited and anonymous discourse is obvious, according to my 
commentary on Foucault. Schutz's student, Natanson, sees this blind spot in his mentor’s conception o f the 
anonymous, and tries to exploit it in developing a notion o f  the anonymous "enclave" in which there is a 
desire for an other, or at least, an otherness, of self-identity—as we will see.
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CHAPTF.R TWO
TOWARD A DISCOURSE OF ANONYMITY
Anonymous Discourse and Post-Structuralism 
With the terminological confusion that continues to surround, and very nearly surmount, the usefulness of 
"poststructuralism" for anything but its own self-reflexive theorization, it is useful to remember that the 
very last sentence o f Foucault's "The Discourse on Language." It plays an interesting role in the term's 
gestation, if  not its overt appearance. “And now, let those who are weak on vocabulary, let those with little 
comprehension of theory call all this—if its appeal is stronger than its meaning for them—structuralism” 
(162). As can be predicted from one o f  the internal rules o f discourse Foucault laid out, "commentators" 
rushed in to infer that Foucault was christening his work, and calling for, a thoroughgoing "post- 
structuralism." He never, to my knowledge, used or avowed the term "post-structuralist" to describe either 
his interests in, or conclusions about, discourse. Still, it is easy to identify him with the discourse o f post­
structuralism given the way he distinguishes, for example, the personal author from a collective, historical, 
and impersonal "author-fiinction." So to with his distinction between the "subject" (as in a person with a 
self-identified sense of subjectivity) and "subject position."
That I have identified what I am calling the anonymous function as playing a critical role in the now
"post-structural" understanding of both the author-fimction and the subject position does not mean that
anonymity is a post-structural development. If  I had time and space I would conclusively demonstrate that
anonymity functions transhistorically, across and within all disciplines and discursive functions. If
anything, anonymity is the powder post beetle of post-structuralism, the termite in the White Master's
House o f  Nominalism. It is absent, yet powerfully, culminatively present. It is visible historically (the
author function of "Anonymous" is generic yet non-descript), but is invisible rhetorically (with speaker-
writer and listener-reader positions exchanged and mediated in largely unrecognized actions upon our senses
49
R eproduced  with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
o f identity, authority, and community). Nevertheless, the anonymous functions as a pragmatic, not a 
nihilistic, part o f our Iifeworld.
My "commentary" on the anonymous function is authorized by Foucault's early essays "The Discourse 
o f  Language" and "What is an Author?" The research I have done to enable that commentary —wherever 
anonymity is named or...metaphorized— has taken me into and across so many commentators repeating 
Foucault's findings about discourse that I now understand not only the role o f these published "authors" but 
my own role as a writer on anonymity. Foucault's definition o f  commentary is, therefore, not post-anything 
but takes us past the structural as we think o f it and back to the functional: the function o f  repeating, of 
saying, o f  voicing, o f  reciting what we think we hear and believe about what really matters.
[C]ommentary's only role is to say finally, what has silently been articulated deep dow n.
It must...repeat tirelessly what was, nevertheless, never said. The infinite rippling o f 
commentary is agitated from within by the dream o f masked repetition: in the distance 
there is, perhaps, nothing other than what was there at the point o f departure: simple 
recitation (153).
In my (re) search for the function o f anonymity, Foucault's cursory remarks on the discontinuity o f the 
philosophy of the subject and o f discursive subject positions, for example, kept returning as I read in a 
"dream of masked repetition. Take, for example, this passage by Chantal Mouffe in The Return o f  the 
Political, written 22 years after the appearance o f Foucault's essay. Utterly laced with Foucauldian trace 
terms, it assumes its readership takes them as granted, part o f  current disciplinary organization, so there is 
no need for authorial attribution. "We" is the author, its academic audience, and Foucault the author-ity, 
invisible in the anonymous distance o f discourse now considered public/political domain.
We can thus conceive the social agent as constituted by an ensemble o f 'subject 
positions’... constructed by a diversity o f discourses among which there is no necessary 
relation, but rather a constant movement o f overdetermination and displacement. The 
'identity' o f  such a multiple and contradictory subject is therefore always contingent and 
precarious, temporarily fixed at the intersection o f  those subject positions (1993 77).
If this dissertation were an extended bibliographic essay I could extend this "dream o f  masked 
repetition" almost indefinitely. The "poststructuralist" sentiment/sediment it expresses happens to resonate 
with my own theoretical views personally, and with my general view of anonymity as a shifting, 
positional ensemble o f  the discourses o f community, identity, and authority.
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As we will see in "The Pedagogy o f  Anonymity," anonymous writing is one o f that "diversity of 
discourses" which constructs the subject position o f the college writer. The personal "identity" o f the 
college writer is an important part o f expressivist inquiry into the academic relation between writing and 
experience. The social constructionist approach to college writing, by contrast, sees the college writer as 
"an ensemble o f 'subject positions' " o f which the questions and problems o f  'personal identity' become 
irrelevant in the greater project of understanding the issues o f  the discursive 'construction' o f  the 'ensemble' 
that is the "social agent." Anonymous discourse, I will contend, operates at, and even enacts, the 
"intersection" o f  those academic "subject positions" (personal narration and authorial analysis) among 
which the expressivst and constructionist believe "there is no necessary relation."
In the present chapter, however, the goal is to suggest the very necessary relation between a 
poststructuralist notion o f discourse and the anonymous function. Poststructuralist discourse references 
anonymity and the anonymous—or its superordinate terms, identity, subject, author—in a dream of masked 
repetition that my commentary might waken in my readers
The reiteration o f  anonymity—both direct and suggested—within poststructuralist discourse might lead 
readers to assume that anonymity is partly responsible for subverting humanism's privileged discursive 
subject. But even cursory reflection will tell us that the anonymous vastly predates any theory of 
personality or individuality, which are themselves no more than five centuries young. As we will see in a 
brief history o f the anonymous author function, the idea o f a "personal" author was alien to the social 
agency o f textual construction and representation.
While we are on the subject o f personal expression versus social construction, it is important to
remember the conclusions of Ferdinand de Saussure. He was a structuralist who believed that the whole of
language carried a sort of God or Author-like priority: its systemic, "synchronic" presence bears the same
indifference to individual, "diachronic" users as the genetic code does to any one species member. He
privileged the speech function o f language over its writing function, reconfirming in linguistic terms what
Plato had affirmed in philosophical terms over the Sophist's use o f writing. I also think, though, that
Derrida is right about the (dia) chronic need to reverse and play with the dominant speech/subordinate
writing binary opposition, make it into something like a synchronous polarity, a continuum of self-
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identity into a shifting ensemble o f  utterance, a community o f  discursive subject positions.) Following 
Saussure, the system o f language is anonymous to its users as are the users to the (not their) system. 
Following Derrida, the nominalism dictating the structure and function o f  the sign system is highly 
mutable; in other words, the name o f  the signifier is unknown, hidden—anonymous —to the signified and 
vice versa.
Following both thinkers, I intuit a double anonymity—a natural, nameless duplicity— operating across 
the gaps of an determinate system governing the indeterminate linguistic identity of any one self in relation 
with a range o f others. Following, finally, the ethos o f an expressivist (more toward confessivist) approach 
to writers and writing, I see the discursive "I" as indispensable, yet anonymous
in relation to the conditions imposed (a) by the code and (b) by the context of 
enunciation, in which the speaking subject caught up in discourse is indeed up against it, 
so to speak, but still, in a strong sense, operative, [and] still is an indispensable term in 
a functionally understood process (Lewis, 7).
To repeat: the speaking/writing "I" subject is still very much operative under the condition o f anonymity,
and is, if  such is possible, even more caught up against discourse as a functionally understood process. I
therefore think o f myself as a Post-structural Romantic, a Social Expressivist, a Personal Textualist. That
is, I agree with the following: "No one has quite managed to extricate philosophic discourse from an
idealist, still essentially Cartesian problematics in which priority ultimately reverts to the mission o f an
individual subject: to secure knowledge o f self and world" (Lewis, 13).
But I also agree with the flip side o f that insight. That is, the order o f that discourse o f self and world 
needs continuous questioning and provocation. "For understanding the reaction against 
[post]structuralism," according to Lewis, "it is the threat it poses to institutional authority, rather than the 
theme of the decentered subject, that is decisive"(21). My theoretical and pedagogical interest in 
anonymous discourse derives from a similar decisive understanding. It is capable of interrogating and 
subverting both institutional authority and the logic o f centralized identity. Subject positions that might 
go un-expressed or un-constructed become part o f the ongoing academic commentary. "The simple 
recitation" it performs is not only the writing/reading-speaking/listening process o f whatever composition
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pedagogy one chooses. Anonymous discourse can claim performativity across the entire disciplinary script 
of the humanities.
Let's return a  moment more to "commentary" as described by Foucault above. Like Chantal MoufFe, 
Paul Bove is an unabashed post-structuralist. His debt o f "simple recitation" to Foucault is clear in the 
essay, "Discourse," which he wrote for the now ubiquitous reference Critical Terms fo r  Literary Study. It 
is also clearly useful to me, to my sense o f the anonymous function as having been "articulated deep down 
" so that I cannot help but recite and repeat my sense o f  its articulated silence, o f  darkness visible in our 
nominalist need.
In its thinking about discourse...poststructuralism offers us a kind o f  nominalism-, all 
that exists are discrete historical events, and the propositions or concepts which claim to 
tell the truth about them have no reality beyond that acquired by being consistent within 
the logic o f the system that makes them possible....[In effect,] [t]he function o f  discourse 
and the realities it constructs are fundamentally anonymous. This does not mean that no 
individuals hold these perspectives nor that no individuals effect them. It means, rather, 
that their effective realties depend upon no particular subject in history (Bove 56, 
emphasis added).
Bove's unabashed advocacy o f a post-structuralist view does not prevent me from seeing its congruence 
with the stubborn Cartesian (and Rousseauesque) insistences o f Philip Lewis, who is far less assured that 
there is any thing "post" in poststructuralism. At the risk o f endlessly repeating my thesis, it seems to me 
that the discourse o f anonymity is key to closing the circuit between nihilism (problems o f  cause, 
construction, and conviction) and pragmatism (problems of "personality, power, and provocation" in 
Cornel West's view). The reason it is key is that a discourse o f anonymity can be seen to run parallel to the 
explanatory processes o f nominalism (problems o f naming). I have set forth the commonsensical "meaning" 
of anonymity and the anonymous as key terms. They are, however, "finally more important for their 
function, for their place within intellectual [and social, political, and cultural] practice, than they are for 
what they may be said to "mean" in the abstract" (Bove 51).
My aim at a truth claim (or truth effect) for anonymity, therefore, is that it will be seen to be integral to 
an endless discursive circulation o f authorities, identities, and communities. The question o f what for, with 
what consequences, is the substance this dissertation will try to analyze and understand.
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Anonymous Plav in the Absent Field o f  Presence
In "The Discourse on Language" Foucault holds that "[ejxchange and communication are positive forces at 
play within complex but restrictive systems" (155). This subsection will extend that teaching to the 
discourse o f  anonymity.
Within the (unsettled history o f metaphysics, for example, particularly as Derrida has (unsettled it, the 
anonymous is clearly at play within the structure and sign "of Being as presence in all senses o f this 
word." Though he does not employ the terms "anonymous" or "anonymity" in demonstrating the profound 
"absence" behind the various nominees for the "transcendental signified," he might well have. At the 
beginning o f "Structure, Sign and Play in the Discourse o f  the Human Sciences," he asserts that this 
concerted effort to establish and enforce a "metaphysics o f presence" is demonstrated in
all the names related to fundamentals, to principles, or to the center [that they] have 
always designated an invariable presence—eidos, arche, telos, energeia, ouisa (essence, 
existence, substance, subject) aletheia, transcendentality, consciousness, God, man, and 
so forth (84).
It is crucial that we keep the question o f  the presence/absence binary as simple as possible when tracing 
the relation o f anonymity to what it names or designates. Our purpose in this dissertation is to better 
understand the rhetorical, rather than the metaphysical, "presence" anonymity. The apparent absence o f the 
subject as designated by a proper name is a worthwhile metaphysical aside, but we are interested to 
understand and interpret the anonymous subject at "play" in real rhetorical situations that are between or 
beside the points of the history o f its presence/absence. Derrida teaches us that
[p]lay is the disruption o f  presence. The presence o f an element is always a signifying 
and substitutive reference inscribed in a system of differences.... Play is always play of 
absence and presence, but if  it is to be thought radically, play must be conceived of 
before the alternative o f presence and absence. Being must be conceived as a presence or 
absence on the basis o f the possibility o f  play and not the other way around" (93).
Following Derrida’s teaching that substitution and supplementarity are the ever-present rule o f language's
(de)termination of actual things and actions signified in absentia, I read the above passage and nominate
anonymity as a worthwhile substitute for, and supplement of, play.
I f  it is to be thought radically, anonymity must be understood as the alternative o f  presence and
absence. Or if  that is too totalizing, anonymity must be considered to be at play within the contest over
who or what is present and/or absent in language, in linguistic self-consciousness and, for that matter, in
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what Gordon Harvey calls the composition o f the "personal plus textual essay." My speculation is that the 
"Being" o f  anonymity is perfectly and poignantly rhetorical because it "becomes ontological," in DeLuca's 
sense. That is, rhetoric and philosophy were unjustly separated in their youth by Plato, and the anonymous 
is not only a Sophist's compensation. It is, to adapt DeLuca's sense o f  an ontological rhetoric: "the 
mobilization o f signs for the articulation of identities, ideologies, consciousness, communities, publics, 
cultures" (346). This rhetorical mobilization and ontological affirmation that I see in the condition of 
anonymity depends on one's chosen frame of interpretation.
In one final adaptation from Derrida's teaching, I have chosen to interpret the subject o f anonymity and 
anonymous subjectivity from the side o f "Nietzschean affirmation" as opposed to "the saddened, negative. 
nostalgic, guilty, Rousseauistic side" o f  "the lost or impossible presence o f  the absent origin" (93). I have 
read both authors, and I believe in Derrida's distinction between their interpretive frames as these affect the 
subject o f anonymity's relation to the inter-play o f community, identity, and authority. Nietzschean 
affirmation, as Derrida describes it in positively nominal terms, uncannily clings to the anonymity not 
only o f animal life, but also to that o f  humankind. The mobile, performative, ensemble o f identity is 
shifting endlessly, often insensibly, between the subject position o f a first person singular "I" and that of a 
first person plural "We."
Derrida describes The Rousseauistic interpretation o f structure, sign, and play this way: "It dreams of 
deciphering a truth or an origin which escapes play and the order o f  the sign, and which lives the necessity 
o f interpretation as an exile...." The Nietzschean dreams or recites another interpretation. It is
[t]he other, which is no longer turned toward the origin, affirms play and tries to pass 
beyond man and humanism, the name of man being the name o f  that being who has 
dreamed of full presence, the reassuring foundation, the origin, and the end of play (93).
Taking Derrida at his word, this "other" interpretation is an interpretation o f  the other that I believe is the
affirmative order o f anonymity's structure, sign, and play in the discourse o f  language. But in order to
understand that claim, we will need to leave Derrida's rhetorical spin o f  philosophy and its subject, and
look to Foucault's historical and, dare I use the word, structural location o f anonymity within the
discourse o f language. I f  anonymity is at play within discourse to the extent I am claiming, it takes its
own linguistic turn like anything else we’ve come to imagine as “human.’
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The Discourse on Anonvmitv
The Prohibited Subject
"The Discourse on Language" Foucault sets forth three themes which he believes, as we saw with Derrida, 
have been undermined by the linguistic and, ultimately, rhetorical turn away from the philosophy of 
founding structures. These themes are “the founding subject”; “the originating experience”; and “universal 
mediation” (157). Within the massive metaphysical and philosophical background represented by this 
trinity I recognize the anonymity as a rhetoric that foregrounds the discursive play o f  identity (or founding 
subject); authority (or originating experience); and community (or universal mediation). * Foucault builds 
his historical outline o f  discourse by linking the three great themes o f philosophy to the activities of 
writing, reading, and their exchange. I intend to adapt these themes, as well as several other principles he 
lays out in "The Discourse on Language" and in "What is an Author?" I freely adapt to help us better 
understand what anonymity is and how it functions in the gaps left open between the subject and 
discourse, the author and text, the proper name and identity.
One adapted definition o f anonymous discourse might then read: [Anonymous] "discourse is really 
only an activity, of writing in the first case [of the founding subject], of reading in the second [of 
originating experience], and exchange in the third" [case of universal mediation] ("The Discourse on 
Language," 158). The problem with the relation o f  discourse to the three themes, however, is that the 
themes have been traditionally proposed and conserved in order "to elide the reality o f discourse" (157). 
The reality o f discourse is that it unfolds in a pervasive anonymity—thus linking what Foucault calls the 
author-fimction with way I call the anonymous function. If I can persuade the reader that Identity, 
Authority, Community are realities in large part informed by anonymity, than the themes don't elide the 
reality o f discourse but ride on the back of anonymity. Anonymity and reality are in closer dialogue than 
we might at first imagine.
Like Derrida, one o f  Foucault’s more critical principles is that of reversal. He uses it, however, at a 
different order o f hermeneutical resolution. I intend to demonstrate the principle o f  reversal as it applies to 
anonymity's relation to the discourse o f  identity in this chapter, (and to authority and community, in the
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chapters, which follow). Before doing so, I am bound to comment on his commentary as it relates to 
anonymity’s function within the discourse of language.
Foucault's central thesis about discourse is that its "institutional" power is produced, "controlled, 
selected, organized and redistributed according to a certain number o f  procedures, whose role is to avert its 
powers and dangers" (149). He then discusses at length "the three great systems of exclusion governing 
discourse—prohibited words, the division of madness [and reason] and the will to truth [over falsehood]" 
(151). The second type o f  exclusion does not concern the discourse o f  anonymity directly, i f  at all. The 
first and the third forms o f  exclusion, however, can tell us a great deal about the powers and dangers of 
anonymity. In the simplest form o f  recitation, anonymous discourse permits prohibited words, and is 
therefore, a highly contested, deeply ambiguous discourse in its representation of the will to truth [over 
falsehood.] Under anonymous condition or its function, the nominal identity o f  the speaker/writer has been 
for a host o f  reasons "prohibited.
Women interested to write, who managed, gradually, to overcome the constraints on their literacy 
through access to books, then to the tools of writing, were prohibited from the manly art o f writing and the 
masculine career o f  authorship. As any number o f examples from feminist historiography and literary 
analysis will show, the will to the truth of writing for women had only one avenue: through the 
"falsehood" o f  Anonymous (or the dissemblance o f the Pseudonymous.)
The slave who has been prohibited from learning the discourse o f  the master, and is therefore rendered 
anonymous in social-political terms, will nevertheless master the tools o f  the master and write in a will to 
truth (often anonymously) against the anonymous falsehood o f slavery.
Anonymous Chinese dissidents, prohibited from speaking against totalitarian rule, use untraceable web 
sites to carry forth the will to the truth o f  democracy.
The information held by the industry or government "whistleblower" is often officially prohibited 
(marked "confidential" or "top secret") and to reveal his or her identity would be prohibit the revelation of 
those documents' truth.
The location, never mind diagnosis, o f ADDS and HIV infected persons was next to impossible,
according to Health officials in every major city o f  the United States. This stigmatized and hidden—
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essentially prohibitive condition—had to be brought into the will to truth of public health. The only way 
was through an anonymous telephone and e-mail system.
The anonymous government official spinning the rationales o f power operates from a very different 
sense o f  the prohibited, and is engaged in a different will to truth that is not always the same as that of the 
print media's. The reader is left to figure the discrepancies between a will to truth or falsehood. (The use 
by Kissinger, Haldeman, and Nixon himself, o f  the subject position of "high administration official on 
condition o f  anonymity" sends—or descends— the relation o f these two great systems o f  discursive 
exclusion back into the second great system: that o f  reasonable madness.)
Foucault believes the prohibited  class is the "most obvious and familiar," covering three types: 
"objects, ritual with its surrounding circumstances, [and] the privileged or exclusive right to speak of a 
particular subject." These three types o f prohibition "interrelate, reinforce and complement each other, 
forming a complex web, continually subject to modification" (149). He spends very little time on the first 
two classes o f exclusion, but does focus on the third type, which we will call "speaking rights." The 
question o f  a prohibition on speaking rights (and rites) is obvious and familiar. Foucault reminds us: “We 
know perfectly well that we are not free to say just anything, that we cannot simply speak o f anything, 
when we like or where we like; not just anyone, finally, may speak o f just anything" (149).
We know, for sure, that women and slaves, in their historic subject positions, and to a lesser extent, 
the dissident, the whistleblower, and the diseased person understand this problem o f  speaking rights in a 
brutal, opaque, ineluctable fashion. The high administration official, and for that matter, the identity o f the 
hate monger who has taken the Klan's white hood into cyberspace, also understand this relation between 
prohibition, speaking rights, and anonymity in a much more manipulative and transparent fashion. What I 
find interesting, is that the anecdotes I have chosen at random, from the top o f my research memory, as it 
were, form a sort o f  discursive web whose constructive elements Foucault has already discerned.
For Foucault, "the areas where this web is most tightly woven today, where the danger spots are most
numerous, are those dealing with politics and sexuality" (149). We might find this assertion outmoded
now, at the opening o f the 21st century. There seem to be no discursive prohibitions at all. The
inter/discourses o f sex and politics, o f  sexual politics (and political sexuality) do, however, continue to
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fascinate and stir up an incipient sense o f  prohibition. Foucault's observation continues to carry weight, for 
"[i]t is as though [such] discussion, far from being a transparent, neutral element, allowing us to disarm 
sexuality and to pacify politics, were one o f  those privileged areas in which they exercised some o f  their 
most awesome powers" (149). Why should this be so? And what is the link of sexuality and politics to the 
discourse of anonymity?
According to Foucault, the answer to the first question depends on an understanding o f  "speech" (verbal 
and textual language) that "reveals its links with desire and power." For this insight he draws from the 
history of psychoanalytic discourse, telling us that it has "already shown us that speech is not merely the 
medium which manifests—or dissembles —desire; it is also the object o f desire" (149).
The answer to the second question is a historical one better left to another Foucauldian context ("What 
is an Author?") which we will take up below. But what can be said provisionally is that anonymous 
discourse both assembles and dissembles desire; the anonymous is an objective] o f both political and 
sexual identification. It is, in short, the subject position o f identity politics writ large, in which its private 
and public realms transcode and transgress. Much in our private codes and public rights o f  speech carries a 
binding and conforming sense o f prohibition that transcends any legal sense. It is this internalized sense of 
one's forbidden identifications being watched and listened to that Foucault demonstrates so forcefully in 
his histories o f 'carceral consciousness'—from a penal to a pastoral power o f  the "Panopticon." The 
anonymous function is both an instrument o f  the Panoptic power and a weapon against it.
Its power resides in its capacity as "a transparent, neutral element, allowing us to disarm sexuality and 
pacify politics." Because it has this power (and danger) anonymous discourse is not just another "medium 
which manifests—or dissembles—desire; it is also the object o f desire" precisely because o f its proximity to- 
-and identity within— the rules o f  exclusion and prohibition. It must be remembered that Foucault does 
not come anywhere near to these speculative claims for the anonymous function. But given his separate 
analyses of discourse and authorship, I believe my syntheses o f his conclusions can be adapted to better 
understand anonymity as a discourse.
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Anonymous Authenticity
The third great system o f  exclusion—the will to truth—needs its own treatment before we turn to the relation 
o f anonymous discourse to "internal rules, where discourse exercises its own control" (152)—namely, 
through commentary, the author, and disciplinary organization. The third rule o f exclusion—"the will to 
truth [or falsehood]"— prepares the way toward understanding the pedagogical battle in composition 
between expressivist "authenticity" and social constructionist "author-ity."
In his background sketch as to how truth became divided (sometime in Greece, 5th century BC), we see 
the line getting drawn between philosophy and sophistry—"between Hesiod and Plato, separating true 
discourse from false" (150). To summarize Foucault’s already dense precis o f this particular rule, his 
research found that Plato's legacy has tended to affect (Derrida would say infect in a "parasitical" way) not 
just scientific "truth," but the truth o f "Western literature.” “ It has, for centuries, sought to base itself...in 
the plausible, upon sincerity and science—in short, upon true discourse" (150).
We can sense that Foucault sees the will to truth as itself a sort o f sophistic rhetoric that "has, 
gradually, been attempting to assimilate the others [i.e., prohibitions and madness] in order both to modify 
them and to provide them with a firm foundation" (151).
Foucault does not use the term sophistry or rhetoric when explaining the assimilative operations of 
true discourse, but he might have. Read his explanation o f  how it has operated over and against the central 
objects o f human conflict—power and desire, or politics and sexuality.
[T|f, since the time of the Greeks, true discourse no longer responds to desire or to that 
which exercises power in the will to truth, in the will to speak out in true discourse, 
what, then, is at work, if not desire and power? True discourse, liberated by the nature of 
its form from desire and power, is incapable o f  recognizing the will to truth which 
pervades it; and the will to truth, having imposed itself upon us for so long, is such that 
the truth it seeks to reveal cannot fail to mask it (151).
This is a signature "poststructural" approach to the always-problematic binary. For our purposes, the issues
of revelation, recognition, and response "in the will to speak out in true discourse" point directly to the
revelatory masking operations of anonymity and the anonymous. As I see it, anonymity is a truer
discourse in that it has always responded to the exercise o f desire or that which exercises power.
Anonymous discourse, intimately tied by the nature o f  its form to desire and power, is quite capable o f
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recognizing the prohibited which pervades it and provides it, paradoxically, with the mask that helps reveal 
the sources o f  sexuality and politics, o f  identity politics in the largest sense—discourse itself.
When I assert that anonymity is a  truer discourse o f  truth , I am not advocating some naive sense of 
rhetoric that sees itself as a mere transmitter o f  preformed, ahistorical Truth. My emphasis is on discourse. 
But unlike Foucault, who can't bring him self to fully and finally countenance the power o f rhetoric, so that 
he is always burrowing around trying to uncover and discover the meaning o f discourse, I see discursive 
meaning continually reconstructing itself through the largely unacknowledged rhetorical practices of 
anonymity. Foucault anticipates and works out the upshot o f discursive constructs, o f  course, making 
possible the now ubiquitous "subject positions." But it is not clear to me that he focuses his massive 
learning on the linkage between discursive subject positions and anonymity. If  anonymity offers—or at least 
troubles—the possibility o f  a "truer discourse" because it mixes a range o f speaking rights and subject 
positions, then we can begin to discern its possible academic presence and application within composition- 
rhetoric.
Anonymous Author-ity
Foucault is critically important to this dissertation because he does at least acknowledge the presence of 
anonymity in the production and distribution o f  discourse. But where he looks to constructs such as the 
author first, I look and see the anonymous foremost. But as with all binary logic, we must understand the 
dominant term first before we can gain access to its suppressed other. Foucault carefully distinguishes 
between “ ...the author in the sense o f  the individual who delivered the speech or wrote the text in question, 
[and] the author as the unifying principle in a particular group o f  writings or statements, lying at the 
origins o f  their significance, as the seat o f  their coherence” (153).
As Foucault goes on to detail the author principle, it is certainly set in opposition to the contingencies 
o f  anonymity where identity is a relative, mobile construct. In contrast, "[t]he author principle limits this 
same chance element through the action o f  an identity whose form is that o f  individuality and the I  " 
(153).^ Foucault, however, is in principle  quite alert to the discursive pervasiveness o f authorial 
anonymity.
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All around us, there are sayings and texts whose meaning or effectiveness has nothing to 
do with any author to whom they might be attributed: mundane remarks, quickly 
forgotten; orders and contracts that are signed, but have no recognizable author; technical 
prescriptions anonymously transmitted (153, emphasis added).
This became the case with literature starting in the 17th century and "has become steadily more important."
Unlike scientific discourse, literary discourse "circulated relatively anonymously throughout the Middle
Ages," but in modem times
[w]e ask authors to answer for the unity o f the works published in their names; we ask 
that they reveal, or at least display the hidden sense pervading their work; we ask them to 
reveal their personal lives, to account for their experiences and the real story that gave 
birth to their writings. The author is he [or she] who implants, into the troublesome 
language o f fiction, its unities, its coherence, its links with reality" (153).
Together with his contrast between the author principle and the commentary principle—"the action o f an 
identity taking the form o f repetition and sameness —I see first the problematic relation of a writer to his or 
her writing. Moreover, there is the related, but altogether different, order o f (non)identity between a writer 
who becomes an author and his or writing becomes a "work."
Foucault is careful to distinguish the author from the writer—that "from his new position as an author" 
the author function comes to be in "the still shaky profile o f  his oeuvre (153). This idea o f writing as a 
"work" (as in a work o f  art) is clearly indebted, I think, to Maurice Blanchot's 1955 work The Essential 
Solitude. In one subsection titled "The Work, the Book," Blanchot reiterates the great presence/absence 
binary coiled within the discourse o f being and its philosophical proxy, identity. Blanchot's way of 
framing these distinctions also influenced Derrida's deconstruction o f  the metaphysics of presence.
The writer writes a  book, but the book is not yet the work, the work is not a work until 
the word being  is pronounced in it.... The writer belongs to the work, but what belongs 
to him [or her] is only a book, a mute accumulation o f sterile words, the most 
meaningless thing in the world.... And in the end, the work ignores him [or her], it 
closes on his [or her] absence, in the impersonal, anonymous statement that it is—and 
nothing more (825, emphasis added).
Blanchot is having the writer be a catch all for author here, but what is important is not the meaning of
writer, but that o f the work, which Foucault does not declare quite so directly as his mentor does here.
Foucault finds the impersonal anonymous statement circulating in the systems of disciplinarity and
commentary, but cannot quite bring himself to assert from the shadow o f Blanchot that anonymity is at the
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heart o f the author function also. (How I restate this question within a rereading o f  "What is an Author?" 
awaits us below.)
The Disciplinarity o f Anonvmitv
I have concluded provisionally that anonymity plays a crucial part in not only the structure o f the sign 
(Derrida) but in the function o f the author's "signature" (Foucault). It should now be easier to move from 
the theoretical identity o f the anonymous function to consider its presence within the field of composition 
studies. I am particularly keen to trace the anonymous work in expressivist theory and pedagogy and will 
take this up below. Composition teaching deals with writers—student writers—not authors, and with acts of 
writing, not finished works. Yet, with Foucault's and Blanchot’s insights fresh before us, it seems to me 
that the principle of reversal is at work when it comes to considering the mandates o f literary studies and 
composition studies within the discipline o f English.
As I see the lay o f the discursive land, then, literary studies is tied to the commentary principle, while 
composition studies is, paradoxically, linked to the author principle on the strength of what we ask of 
student writers. Foucault appears to be describing the author exclusively, and yet, what does the 
expressivist teacher ask o f students—if not the following: "[W]e ask them to reveal their personal lives, to 
account for their experiences and the real story that gave birth to their writings." Expressivism is all about 
author-izing student writers to perform a discursive recognition that is coiled, like a double helix of 
individuality and the "I", within their own proper name re-cognition. But when we push Foucault’s 
casualness about authorial anonymity to its original Blanchotian affirmation, we understand that "The Act 
o f Writing" (another subsection o f Blanchot's The Essential Solitude)
is to pass from the I to the He [or She], so that what happens to [the] me happens to no 
one, is anonymous because o f  the fact that it is none o f my business, [and this] repeats 
itself in an infinite dispersal (emphasis added, 831).
Anonymous writing is personal writing that places the expressivist "I" into an infinite dispersal of "other"
identity claims, creating for the writer an absence o f personal identity that makes for a presence whose
author-ity derives from being in the act o f writing, rather than becoming a writer.
This issue of composition studies defined as a separate field within the "disciplinary" rubric o f English
by virtue o f a pedagogical corollary to certain aspects of authorship leads us directly into Foucault's third
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principle o f internal rules o f  control—the disciplinary principle. He argues that this rule is opposed to that 
o f  the author and the commentary principles.
Opposed to that o f  the author, because disciplines are defined by...their corpus of 
propositions considered to be true, the interplay o f  rules and definitions, o f  techniques 
and tools: all these constitute a sort o f anonymous system, freely available to whoever 
wishes, or whoever is able to make use o f them, without there being any question of 
their meaning or their validity being derived from whoever happened to invent them 
(154, emphasis added).
The anonymous system  o f  a  discipline—essentially its authoritative texts—is an order o f concreteness related 
to the more abstractly anonymous system o f  language which all individual users (we are all on parole) 
make use o f without there being any question o f who invented language. So we see that anonymity and 
discourse are intimately entwined.
It is customary to see the author as that individual, or that I  (in principle, anyway) drawing a bright 
line of identity and identification (for a given discipline's commentators) between these two overarching 
layers of systemic anonymity. But perhaps anonymity's discursive orders o f  reification or resolution go all 
the way down. I propose that we begin to extrapolate from Foucault's discursive rules and limits to 
conclude that the author principle is no less saturated with anonymity than are disciplinarity and 
commentary. Perhaps the author, like "beauty" is only a skin-deep identification, whereas anonymity is 
tantamount to what we might consider "being" if ontology, rather than rhetoric, were still o f use in 
understanding discursive existence.
This proposal runs against the current o f  Foucault's line o f  argument. Authorship as a  "unifying 
principle in a particular group o f  writings" cannot be said to constitute a sort o f anonymous system, Seely 
available to whoever is able to make use o f it. As we will see, the principle o f  authorship is tied up with 
the legal discourse wherein the proper name becomes a kind o f  exclusive discursive right of property—more 
commonly known as a copyright. Thus, commentators or other users o f  discursive systems must "get 
permission from the author or the author's agents" before using his or her individual text in what appears to 
be an anonymous system freely available to "whoever."
Conversely, the disciplinary principle doesn't operate through the action o f  an authorial identity whose 
form is that o f  individuality and the /. "Disciplines constitute a system o f control in the production of
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discourse, fixing its limits through the action o f an identity taking the form o f  a  permanent reactivation of 
the rules" (155). It operates upon a collectivity—a community o f  interests who follow these rules—rather 
than the exclusive individuality roles exclusive to the author principle. And though disciplinarity relies 
upon the principle o f  commentary (the second internal rule of exclusion codified by Foucault), commentary 
and disciplinarity are also at odds. Commentary, as we saw, is "simple recitation"; "the dream of masked 
repetition," which fancies itself original. "(T]n a discipline, what is supposed at the point o f departure...is 
that which is required for the construction o f new statements" (154). Put in another way, if  a discipline 
does not begin with and accrue fresh propositions for community use, it loses the identity o f its authority 
and vice versa.
As a dutiful commentator I have reiterated Foucault's principle o f authorship: that it retains the 
discourse o f individuality; that its collection of I ‘s is no dream o f masked repetition; that "new” (if not 
"original") authors appear all the time within (or they are appropriated by) a discipline. (This is not to say 
that many "authors" are not simply engaging in the commentary game, hypnotized by the specters of 
initially fresh propositions within the dream o f masked repetition that often constitutes publication within 
a discipline.) We have seen that each o f these principles works to control and limit the powers and dangers 
o f  discourse. The disciplinary principle, however, is ultimately opposed to commentary and authorship 
essentially on the strength o f  its capacity to formulate—"and of doing so ad infinitum"— an "anonymous 
system" of "fresh propositions." These must also "fit into a certain type o f theoretical field" (154). And yet 
the disciplinary principle does this work utterly dependent upon the two principles it is opposed to.
Therefore, it can be inferred, merely on the strength o f  Foucault's use o f the term, that anonymity is a 
fundamentaiybrce holding the discourse o f language together. Let us assume this is so, that anonymity is 
the formal cause o f the three principles Foucault outlines. That means that authorship, as final cause, is a 
projection o f anonymity with a highly ambivalent or unstable hold on the discourse o f  identity. Foucault's 
own historical outline o f the principle strongly suggests something o f this instability, while reducing its 
priority as a principle to one among many factors o f discourse. With that established, we have before us the 
profoundly obvious fact that the author principle is bome out of discursive anonymity. It originates in the
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very anonymous system o f  language freely available to whoever is able to make use o f  it for the discourses 
of truth, power, desire, and subjectivity or, in Foucault's case, o f  discourse itself.
The Rarity o f  Anonvmitv
In moving, finally, to "a third group o f  rules serving to control discourse" (155) Foucault summarizes the 
first group o f external rules (The Prohibited; Madness; Will to Truth). These deal with ways to avert "the 
hazards o f  [discourse's] appearance," while the second group o f  internal rules amount to coping with "the 
mastery o f the powers contained within discourse." Now we are to understand this third group as "more a 
question o f determining the conditions under which [discourse] may be employed, o f  imposing a certain 
number o f rules upon those individuals who employ [discourse], thus denying access to everyone else." 
Already it is easy to discern again the presence o f anonymity in the way it is elided by the discursive 
claims o f identity. We had seen that the disciplinary principle is constituted by an anonymous system 
freely available to all. Now we are told that this final group o f rules "amounts to a rarefaction among 
speaking subjects: none may enter into discourse on a specific subject unless he has satisfied certain 
conditions..." (155).
What Foucault is up to with this last group o f rules o f discursive control and exclusion is, I believe, 
to put a human face on a history that has otherwise privileged event horizons, large synchronic movements, 
anonymous operating systems. Like Saussure, he recognizes that langue is controlling and finalizing, but 
we are all on parole, after all: the carceral Panopticon o f is watchfully listening to us all. What he means 
"exactly" by rarefaction is that “ ...not all areas o f discourse are equally open and penetrable; some are 
forbidden territory (differentiated and differentiating) while others are virtually open to the winds and stand, 
without any prior restrictions, open to all” (155).
This description should remind us o f his definition o f  the first rule of exclusion—the Prohibited. 
Specific speech rights, in other words, get codified in particular institutions and their particular discursive 
situations. Thus, lawyer/client, or doctor/patient discourse are not open to all, while a telephone talk 
program, a chapter o f  Alcoholics Anonymous, praying in a church, or visiting an Internet chatroom, are 
virtually open to the winds.
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He is basically drawing a line between public and private—or wbat I call opportunistic and oligarchic— 
discourse. And because his subtextual subject is about govemmentality, or the hidden ways language users 
are subjected to discursive rules, it is easy to forget that Foucault sees these rules o f  exclusion, restriction, 
or limitation as enabling rather than enervating. "Exchange and communication are positive forces at play 
within complex but restrictive systems; it is probable they cannot operate independently o f these" (155) is 
a credo that ties in nicely with Foucault's overall sense o f  power/knowledge regimes as opportune rather 
than oppressive. With this run up, he introduces the rubric o f  “ ’fellowships o f discourse', whose function 
is to preserve or to reproduce discourse, but in order that it should circulate within a closed community, 
according to strict regulations, without those in possession being dispossessed by this very distribution” 
(156).
I have tried to cover all of the rules under the first two groups while pointing to the two that most 
resonate in a discourse o f anonymity—prohibited speech and the author principle. Now we come to what is 
Foucault's version o f saving the best (or worst) news for the end o f his treatise. Foucault insists that these 
discursive fellowships, (religious and musical apprenticeships are his examples), though "archaic" and rare, 
manage to persist within contemporary discourse communities with "their ambiguous interplay o f secrecy 
and disclosure," and their "non-interchangeability" o f  speaking and listening roles (156).
My interpretive inclination throughout has been to substitute anonymity for the primary referent in a 
given authorial context. In this context, I don't believe anyone would question that anonymity features an 
ambiguous interplay o f secrecy and disclosure. The identity o f a writer is kept secret from the reader or 
from a readership. Yet much is disclosed—ranging from deeply private to compelling public issues— 
depending on the status o f the writer's stated identification with this or that regime o f truth (that is, of 
private desire or public power.)
The complexity o f anonymity’s range or regime o f  ambiguity between secrecy and disclosure operates 
in the private desire o f the stigmatized individual (a homosexual, for example) to publicly—yet secretly— 
disclose and share this highly political side o f her/his sexual identity in the universal mediation of an 
anonymous chatroom. This same ambiguous regime o f  secretive disclosure informs the desire o f  the "high
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government official" who on "condition o f  anonymity" truthfully reveals the rationales o f governmental 
power, or just as often, "spins" the wheel o f  power politics.
The other part o f Foucault's requirement for the "rarity" o f  'fellowships of discourse'—"non- 
interchangeability" o f  speaking and listening roles"-holds—or appears to hold— for the "closed community" 
o f  reporters and their sources. The unnamed official desires to speak privately, secretly— completely "off" 
the record— to the named reporter who discloses to the public official information. There would seem to be 
a  "non-interchangeability" between this governmental source o f information flow and its media tributary. 
And yet the authenticity and authority o f  this information is vouched for—in effect, voiced over, and in a 
real sense impersonated— by the identity o f the named writer, not the anonymous speaker/writer. Thus, the 
"non-interchangeability" o f this established fellowship o f discourse between two rhetorical subject 
positions across two discourse communities is not as closed or immobile as we might think.
I f  the nominal identity is closed on one end of information input, then it is obviously wide open on 
the output end. Less obviously, the closed nature o f the identity, authority, and community o f the 
discursive exchange is actually an open, flowing, secret Foucault's qualification that such fellowships o f 
discourse feature a "non-interchangeability" o f speaker/listener subject positions becomes very fluid, 
indeed, when we look to the more "private" sector example o f the anonymous homosexual in a multiple 
user domain in cyberspace. He/she is seeking a fellowship o f community through a closed identity —yet 
one that is wide open in identification. (Of course, the problem o f  the anonymous "pedophile" in 
cyberspace, stalking young people on their personal websites which are open to the digital winds, hurls us 
back into the rule o f exclusion—the Prohibited, and highlights the 'danger spots' in an attempt to "pacify" 
politics or, in this case, sexuality.)
Unfortunately, I do not have the space to fully treat the fascinating inter-changeability and fluidity
between discursive desire and discursive power as these are linked back to Foucault's first great system of
exclusion governing discourse. (The "prohibited class" and the problem o f "speaking rights" when "dealing
with politics and sexuality" (149) take on greater urgency in Chapter Five.) Obviously, the complex desire
for power in dealing with governmental politics requires both an "ambiguity" and  a "fellowship" between
informant secrecy and information disclosure. So too, an informant's power o f desire in dealing with
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identity politics requires an equally ambiguous relation between discursive identity, authority, and 
community.
Inspired by Foucault's critical genealogy o f discourse, I am contending that anonymity is the discursive 
link or web which both ties and defies our definitions o f  private and public discourse, as well as our 
notions o f privacy and publicity in general. Where Foucault is interested to categorize discourse into great 
systems o f  exclusion and inclusion, however, I am interested to rhetoricize them. I am preparing us to 
understand that the "non-interchangeability" and "closed community" of what Foucault is calling the 
historical "rarity" o f  discourse is opened up by theorizing an anonymous function  which certainly operates 
historically, but our interest is how anonymity functions rhetorically in the writing class.
More traditionally minded teacher-researchers in the general disciplinary matrix o f  English might wish 
to cleave to Foucault's notions o f  "rarity" and o f a "closed community" dictating particular "speaking 
rights." Thus, literary theorists, analysts, and teachers o f  literature wish to exclude "compositionists" from 
their "closed community" o f discourse. Likewise, compositionists of the social constructionist mould, 
argue for the "rarity" and "non-interchangeability" o f their discursive approach over that of the 
expressivists, and vice-versa.
We can now begin to see that it is the objectively anonymous character o f discourse at-large. Better yet, 
through my distillation and revelation o f that character across Foucault's many themes, classes and rules of 
discourse, I hope my readers can see that the anonymity is never far from, and may in fact (in)form, the 
subject o f discourse. More specifically, it is my hope that my readers will begin to understand that 
function in more specific rhetorical terms. In the composition o f discourse there is a historically 
"impersonal" effect in the anonymous "web" as it is interchangeably "dealing with politics and sexuality. 
The power o f desire and the desire o f power share a community o f  immunity, an impersonating effect, a 
rhetoric o f self-other making, which needs to be experimented with and examined within the discourse of 
composition.
There are, as Foucault tells us, "powers and dangers" in this anonymous discourse I have intuited and
extrapolated from Foucault's historical outline o f  language itself as a "Discourse." As a member of my
dissertation committee, Professor Cinthia Gannett, concluded recently, anonymous discourse is "a perilous
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pedagogy." This insight follows o f  course, from an understanding theoretically o f  anonymity's role in the 
discourse o f language itself.
The most difficult case to make about anonymity, o f course, is that it has any thing to do with 
"fellowship" or what I am calling community. Anonymity does, however, operate from and for a sense of 
community; anonymous identities interplay ambiguously between presence and absence, secrecy and 
disclosure. And in this last go round with his schemas of discourse Foucault offers ever-greater credence for 
my hypotheses about the discourse o f  anonymity. "[D]o not be deceived," Foucault writes:
even in the order o f published discourse, we still find secret-appropriation and non- 
interchangeability at work. It could even be that the act o f writing, as it is 
institutionalized today, with its... personality o f the writer...occurs within a diffuse yet
constraining, ’fellowship o f discourse.' The separateness o f  the writer, continually 
opposed to the activity o f  all other writing and speaking subjects, the fundamental 
singularity [the writer] has long accorded to ‘writing,’—all this manifests...the existence 
o f a certain 'fellowship o f  discourse' (156).
To render this simply, the cult[ure] o f the authorial "person" is a function  o f  the secrecy and disclosure, and
non-interchangeability that has grown up around the institutionalization o f writing. More complexly, we
see the singularities o f writing and the author holding each the other in an ambiguity that hearkens back to
the power/desire binary Foucault opens this essay with.
Remember too that Foucault is focusing on "academic" realms. He mentions in passing that there are 
"entirely different schemas o f exclusivity and disclosure"—"secrets" diffused and circulated across scientific, 
medical, technical, and even "economic or political discourse (156). The common sense o f anonymity as a 
kind o f  rarity given the pervasiveness o f identification and the discourse o f identity is undercut by the 
variety and depth o f anonymity's presence, not only in the discourse o f  authorial identity, but in a given 
disciplinary community.
As I have already asserted, I believe anonymity plays a crucial, protean role in these schemas of
exclusion and disclosure, and may in fact be the ultimate schematic holding 'writing' as structure and
author as 'function' in a tight orbit o f  (in)visibility—"an ambiguous interplay o f secrecy and disclosure."
But in holding that premise I am reminded o f  anonymity's negative reputation in the popular imagination.
In my attempt to present it as a  positive force by high-glossing Foucault's extremely over-determined
outline o f discourse, I would be remiss if  I did not explain the discourse o f anonymity according to "a
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principle of reversal" (158). He reserves this principle for what he calls the " 'critical' group' which sets the 
reversal-principle to work" (160).
The Critical Function o f  Anonymous Discourse
The 'critical group' is to be distinguished from the 'genealogical' group. It covers those "external rules” and 
concern "that part o f  discourse which deals with power and desire" (152). Their main connection to a 
discourse of anonymity involves "what is prohibited  " (149), as we saw above. We recall that the main 
areas of prohibition are sexuality and politics (and religion to a lesser extent). Near the end o f his lecture 
Foucault sets up his consideration of the reversal principle by questioning the apparent "logophilia" of our 
civilization. He believes "a certain fear hides this apparent supremacy accorded" to discourse.
This fear is reflected in the zones o f prohibited discourse. These are “ ...taboos, [those] barriers, 
thresholds and limits [which] were deliberately disposed in order, at least partly, to master and control the 
great proliferation o f  discourse, in such a way as to relieve its richness o f  its most dangerous elements; to 
organize its disorder so as to skate around its most uncontrollable aspects” (158). And so he concludes, in 
a  reversal of our common sense o f discourse, that "a profound logophobia" is at work in and around 
discourse.
One of my interests in anonymous discourse is o f  course the source o f its negative connotations. It is 
my hunch that anonymity, operating as it does along and across the borders o f discursive prohibition, is 
both an object of, and complicit with, this profound logophobia. Since my personal inclination is toward a 
profound logophilia, I  do not fear these zones o f  prohibition or the relations o f anonymous discourse to 
those zones. As we shall see, the Foucauldian historian in me is countered and balanced by the Bakhtinian 
rhetorician.
That is, I see these zones o f  prohibition for what they are, but also for what they can be—as Bakhtinian 
"zones of contact" for "double-voiced discourse." I would have the reader suspicious o f  anonymity to find 
in it a curious power o f  reversal, or at least, o f ambiguity, so that he or she would find in it those factors 
which play a positive role. Put in another way, there is no traducing the tradition o f  anonymity, so we 
might as well give it the benefit o f  our doubt. Perhaps we can better begin to do this i f  we understand what 
Foucault means by "a principle o f  reversal.”
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Enough has already been glossed from Foucault's analysis o f  "those factors which seem to play a 
positive role, such as the author, discipline, will to truth" to conclude that they mask a "negative activity 
o f  the cutting-out and rarefaction o f  discourse" (158). If  we then apply this reversal principle to the factor o f 
anonymity, particularly in relation to the author, we see that anonymity may in fact mask a positive 
activity in that it performs a cutting-out o f  authorial claims and control, and thus reopens and proliferates 
the rarefaction o f  discourse. But what then? What are the positive consequences of negating the controls 
and limits exerted by the author principle? Aren't we just on a  theoretical see-saw with Anonymous on one 
end and Author on the other, one now up, the other down, now you see one, now the other—the descent of 
anonymity beckons, as the ascent o f  authorship beckoned (to paraphrase William Carols Williams)?
As we will see in my Bakhtininan treatment of "A Rhetoric o f Anonymity," the sense o f being hurled 
inward and outward simultaneously by the discourse of language—what Bakhtin calls the "centripedal" and 
"centrifugal" forces of language—attends to the private/public force o f  anonymous writing in a composition 
course. I am referring to that course that is devoted to merging contending expressivist and constructionist 
identifications which seem, at times, to be pulling the entire field o f  composition-rhetoric inside out and 
back again.
Once we have ceased considering the author function as a fundamental and creative action, and can 
bring ourselves to consider the anonymous in those terms, it turns out that we have gone as far as we can 
go with a "critical" approach to the anonymous/author binary. Into the breach between them comes 
discursive prohibition. We now have "to bring other methodological principles into play" (158), which 
means we now have to play the "genealogical" game in earnest.
The Genealogical Function o f  Anonymous Discourse
In contrast to the external rules, the genealogical group covers "internal rules" that are "involved in the
mastery of another dimension o f  discourse: that of events and chance" (152). Commentary, the author, and
disciplinary organization constitute these rules. The author, as we will see in the next chapter, is of greatest
concern to a general understanding o f  the anonymous function as not only a reversal of the "author -
function" but its profound transversal and transgression. We will also understand how a principle o f
reversal can place the author (ultimately underwritten by the philosophy o f  the subject) in a zone o f
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prohibition while raising the profile o f the anonymous as a potentially positive force o f discursive 
proliferation in the universal interest o f  exchange and communication.
Foucault describes three principles that put the genealogical group to work: discontinuity, specificity, and 
exteriority. According to the first principle, "discourse must be treated as a discontinuous activity, its 
different manifestations sometimes coming together, but just as easily unaware of, or excluding each 
other." According to the second principle, "...there is no prediscursive fate disposing the word in our favor. 
We must conceive discourse as...a practice we impose upon [things]." The last principle "holds that we are 
not to burrow to the hidden core o f discourse... we should look [only] for its external conditions of 
existence, for that which gives rise to the chance series o f  these events and fixes its limits" (158). I have 
attempted, in direct contradiction o f Foucault, to burrow to anonymity's truly, or literally, hidden core.
Conclusion to Chapter Two 
The upshot o f these principles taken together help us to reach two provisional conclusions that directly
concern the discourse o f anonymity as I have come to understand it. The first is that the principle of
authorship might help to uphold and extend Tradition and its history o f ideas as a necessary fiction. Its
fellowship of internal controls can't tell us much o f anything, however, about the origination, creation, or
unity o f discourse, because there really aren't any points for entry and understanding along these lines.
Foucault is teaching us to blow by Eliot's distinction o f the working relation between Tradition and
Individual Talent and just look at discourse circulating, impersonally, serially, discontinuously—
anonymously.
The second conclusion is that the subject positions of'writing' and the subject as 'writer1 (together with 
their indispensable others, 'reading' and ’reader1) have secretive roots in the prohibited. These positions take 
up potentially transgressive positions, however chance and discontinuous, within desire and power, rather 
than in some will to truth or knowledge. The actions o f  their identities take on forms that are not of 
individuality and the I  in the controlling sense o f the author, but as objects o f  sexuality and identity 
politics that are the subjects o f writing in its most allusive, yet elusive and therefore, most inclusive 
context. (I like to believe, however, that within the Prohibited, there lies a will to truth or knowledge. But 
that is where "The Taboo" and "The Truth" set a discursive boundary—a genre distinction—that is not meant 
to be transgressed or otherwise blended within academic settings, but only by writers who operate not
under laws o f commentary and exclusion, but under those o f creativity and inclusion.
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At the end of "The Discourse on Language" Foucault hopes for both kinds o f study, critical and 
genealogical, with the first "one o f  studied casualness" the second "one o f  felicitous positivism." Whatever 
becomes o f these projects on discourse, Foucault emphasizes "that the analysis of discourse thus 
understood, does not reveal the universality o f a meaning, but brings to light the action o f imposed rarity 
['critical' group], with a fundamental power of affirmation" ['genealogical' group] (162).
The methodological message I draw from this early lecture by Foucault is that there is no 
"genealogical" approach to anonymous discourse. It has no formative signature primarily because it efiaces- 
-even as it continually retraces—large areas of academic institutional purview, and not only because it is the 
antithesis o f the author principle, with its cult o f identity and attributed originality. The absenting presence 
o f anonymous discourse also profoundly affects the principles o f commentary and disciplinary organization 
that form an academically discursive fellowship with the author effect. For all that, the absence o f a 
genealogical approach to anonymity does not preclude a mood of "felicitous positivism" or of the mode of 
an "affirmative approach" in creating, as we shall see, a pedagogy o f anonymity.
I have attempted in these first two chapters to create some semblance o f  anonymity's internal and 
external conditions o f existence. It is an attempt that takes it for granted that the subject who is prescribed 
by social anonymity is also one who de-scribes him or herself anonymously is dispersed across "a 
multiplicity o f possible positions and functions." Given its inter/intrasubjective force in self-other 
orientations, as well as in acts o f writing for oneself and for a range o f  others, I am certain that anonymity 
is a discontinuous, essentially ungovernable "ensemble" o f desire and power, o f sexuality and politics, of 
identity and difference. The anonymous is at-Iarge-prescribing and describing all practices of naming and 
identification.
Having brought us a bit closer "toward" the anonymous function as a lived phenomenon of 
subjectivity, and as a function o f the discourse of language within the problem o f 'identity,' in Chapter 
Three—Toward a History o f Anonymity— I look at the problem o f  literary author-ity as an anonymous 
function. Its 'problematic,' or at least ironic, character was first suggested by E.M Forster in "On 
Anonymity." It was then broadly sketched by Michel Foucault in "What is an Author." It has, of late, 
been handled panoramically in two studies by Thomas Docherty: On Modern Authority and Absent 
Character.
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In a very real sense, all three thinkers pursue a "genealogical" approach to understanding the levels of 
authority in the author function. Our job, thanks to Schutz and Natanson, will be to tease out the critical 
levels of anonymity working and playing in parallel to those o f authority. In effect, we will pursue a 
"critical approach" to the genealogical problem of the authority o f  anonymity. As such, the supposed 
"rarity" o f anonymity will, on the principle o f reversal, reveal itself as a ubiquity that, I believe, Bakhtin 
understood in his notions o f  the "contact zone" and the "transgredient moment" (which we take up in 
Chapter Four—A Rhetoric o f  Anonymity.)
When the time comes to give the entire ungovernable ensemble o f  desire and power, o f  writer identity 
and reader authority, its truly "critical" due in Chapter Five, my critical approach will be "genealogical" in 
tone. The handling o f  'a perilous pedagogy' requires a felicitous positivism, rather than one o f  studied 
casualness, in Foucault's distinction. So far I have tried to maintain a playful, ironic distance on the idea of 
a genealogical approach to anonymity. This enables us to more seriously entertain the idea o f  a purely 
critical approach to all o f  anonymity’s functions.^
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Chapter Notes
4 t  is tempting to account for a critical genealogy o f anonymity as a  sophistic nemesis o f the formative 
philosophies that posit a founding subject, originating experience, and universal mediation. To avoid 
complexity and lengthy commentary, however, I will only suggest a sophistical genealogy as I might in 
the future develop it within my view o f  anonymity's structure, sign, and play in the discourse o f language.
Principle One: The I  o f  the writing subject—even under the sign o f the proper name—is essentially 
anonymous.
Principle Two: To the extent that origins can be determined from reading, and "originality" ascribed to 
those whom we all read (a.k.a. authors), experience of the real eludes discursive recognition; it does not 
acknowledge processes o f  naming and its attendant orders of truth formation.
Principle Three: Following Foucault's definition of Universal mediation—"when all things come 
eventually to take the form o f  discourse, then all [will] be able to return to the silent interiority of self- 
consciousness" (157)—th e /o f  self-consciousness cannot be founded upon the experience o f an originating 
subject. It must give itself up as the intersubjective shifter o f a discursive other that is, according to 
Principle One, anonymous.
2 Looking ahead at further Foucauldian distinctions, (as well as my own adaptive commentaries on them), 
authorial anonymity is very nearly a self-negating construction. Since we don’t know the identity o f the 
individual responsible for the speech act, his or her status as a unifying principle for a community that 
might wish to respond to that status under the commentary principle, is unknown, insignificant, and 
incoherent under normative conditions o f  discursive authority. I f  not an accident o f time or contingency of 
human conflict wherein an author's nominal, and therefore biographical, identity is lost or destroyed, then 
the deliberate inclination to discourse anonymously is institutionally suspect (with many paradoxical 
exceptions, however, as the Introduction will detail).
3 Having already thrown my interpretive fate in with Derrida's notion o f Nietzschean affirmation, and given 
the clear connection o f Nietzsche's method o f approach with what has come to be called by both Derrida 
and Foucault as "genealogical," the attentive reader would find me guilty o f  a massive self-contradiction 
here. How can I claim an affirmative approach to anonymity, but assert that there is no genealogical 
interpretation of it worth pursuing? The apparent contradiction disappears when it is realized that I consider 
both Derrida and Foucault to be "critical" theorists who have helped to bring a rhetorical approach back 
into vogue that is, by my lights, best upheld by Bakhtin. The contributions o f  Foucault, Derrida, as well 
as Schutz and Natanson to my dissertation are themselves genealogical or historical, rather than critical. 
They are not responsible for any prohibited zone o f discourse; they only point to the anonymous as 
prohibition's contact zone (to be taken up in Chapter Five's Pedagogy o f Anonymity.) Any critical 
interpretation o f anonymity and its prohibitional effects comes from my interpretive and pedagogical 
experience, not theirs. Ultimately, my approach to the discourse o f anonymity and to anonymous discourse 
is rhetorical rather than critical or genealogical. That is, I am interested in the inter-relation and inter- 
subjectivity—the community—of speaker-Iistener and writer-reader.
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CHAPTER THREE
TOWARD A HISTORY OF ANONYMITY 
Anonvmitv and the Problem o f  Authority
Critical Genealogies
In Chapter One we examined the discursive problem o f  Identity. In Chapter Two we examined the 
problem of Discourse itself. In each examination we traced the common trajectory and complicity of 
anonymity in their problematic conditions as academic terms and as lived actions of an individualized "I" 
in relation to a range o f Others—immediate and mediated, real and imagined. In Chapter three we examine 
the problem o f Authority as a founding philosophical discourse and as a locatable origin and lived 
condition in the lifeworld. The discursive relation o f Authority to that o f Identity extends from their 
shared provinces o f  denotative meaning. It is a relation that opens transactions (more toward transgressions) 
in acts o f anonymous writing where the Identity of the Author is "defaced"— or at least effaced. Thus the 
Identification o f Authority must reside in the dialogical imagination o f a reader, of a readership, and over 
time, o f  an Audience, that is never really present, never quite absent, as an Anonymous Community 
indifferent to who is speaking/writing.
Outside the philosophical treatments o f Schutz and Natanson, only one literary "author"—E.M. Forster— 
has directly attended to the problem of the author (and o f the authority of the author function) as an 
anonymous function. After his little literary essay —"Anonymity: An Enquiry"— written in 1925, we have 
Michel Foucault's little historical outline—"What is an Author?"—written in 1969, which indirectly 
addresses the anonymity surrounding the "author-function." Beyond these two, the work of Thomas 
Docherty comes closest to a  literary and historical synthesis that links the problem o f authority to the 
problem of anonymity. Docherty though important, is also indirect in his treatment o f these concepts of 
character and proper name displacement. He does not develop outright an "anonymous function" that, by 
my lights, is logical given his concern with "modem authority" in "the theory and condition of writing" 
and in the use o f what he calls "absent character" in modem fiction.
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We will consider each o f these writers on the  problem of what I will henceforth term author-ity. This 
will highlight the historic relation o f the writing person who becomes an "author," to that o f the larger 
discourse o f "authority" whose center or "presence" has been located in notions o f  an Origin (whether of 
God, the King, the State, the People). Before w e do, however, I want to set up some o f  the overlapping 
problematics between the discourses o f Identity and Authority that I could not entertain in our 
examinations o f  phenomenological and discursive anonymity.
My reader will recall that I concluded my parallax view of the relation o f  Foucault's "The Discourse on 
Language" to a  discourse o f anonymity by saying that, given his definition, it is not possible—for obvious 
reasons o f  pervasive namelessness—to take a "genealogical" approach to anonymity. Equally obvious, 
however, is the fact that in the "genesis" or origin o f writing itself—and in some o f  our most "original" 
texts—the anonymous is with us speaking "in the beginning" (whether in the Vedas or in Genesis).
In a  collection o f  essays edited by Stewart Hall titled Questions o f  Cultural Identity, Nikolas Rose, in 
"Identity, Genealogy, History" attempts, in a clear debt to Foucault, what he calls "the genealogy of 
subjectification" or "How should we do the history o f  the person?" (128). This genealogical approach 
would try to trace how we "authorize" personhood or personal identity, and
...would focus directly upon the practices within which human beings have been located 
in particular 'regimes of the person'. This would not be a continuous history o f  the self, 
but rather an account of the diversity o f  languages of'personhood' that have taken shape- 
-character, personality, identity, citizen, individual, normal, lunatic, patient, client, 
husband, mother, daughter.... —and the norms, techniques and relations o f  authority 
within which these have circulated in legal, domestic, industrial and other practices for 
acting upon the conduct of persons (131, emphasis added).
Rose proposes a number of "linked pathways"—including "Problematizations," "Technologies," and
"Authorities" (131-133). My interest is in his notion o f "authority" as a pathway. The question he poses to
open his focus on Authorities is quite useful for focusing ourselves on the problem o f what I am calling
Author-ity. "Who is accorded or claims the capacity to speak truthfully about humans, their nature and their
problems, and what characterizes the truths about persons that are accorded such authority?" (132). For
Rose, and for us, the focus upon authority—"...the diversity o f  ways in which authority is
authorized...seems to be a distinctive feature o f this kind o f  [genealogical] investigation (133).
The relations between authority and personal identity have many roots and routes. Rose is interested in 
the late work o f  Foucault that sketches out the history o f "technologies o f the self." (Foucault traces out the
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importance of autobiographical writing among the privileged class o f  ancient Roman political authorities 
where the intended reader is the writer—selfsame, but now othered in the act o f writing about one's 
authoriative self.) In a marvelous summary of Foucault's rather scattered overview o f the self-authorizing 
power o f  writing, Rose writes:
Technologies o f  the self take the form of elaboration o f  certain techniques for the conduct 
o f  one's relation with oneself, for example requiring one to relate to oneself 
epistemologically (know yourself), despotically (master yourself) or in other ways (care 
for yourself). They are embodied in particular technical practices (confession, diary 
writing, group discussion, and the 12 Steps program o f  Alcoholics Anonymous). And 
they are always practiced under the actual or imagined authority o f some system o f  
truth and o f  some authoritative individual, whether these be theological and priestly, 
psychological and therapeutic or disciplinary and tutelary (135, emphasis added).
The discourse of identity—o f  self: knowledge, mastery, or care—finds its origin in some way through a
discourse o f authority that it itself tied to some kind o f ethics o r ethos. Though based on immediate self-
other relations, this ethos is projected in increasingly mediated ways into anonymous enclaves both
intersubjective (Subject-King; Citizen-State; Student-University) intrasubjective (Sinner-God; Ego- Ego
Ideal; Student-Author) and transgressive (Slave-Master; Lover-Beloved; Child-Parent; Subject-Discourse.).
And it is clear enough from what we have discovered about the phenomenological and discursive nature
o f anonymity, that the source o f  an author-itative technology o f se lf is not always known or nameable. As
a technology of the self, autobiography, for example, attempts to create for a reader a continuous, authentic
history o f  the self. This is o f  course impossible: the writer can authorize his or her own personal
experience, but cannot access in any complete way all the actual or imagined authorities that comprise a
given "person." Not only do the forces o f personal or passionate identification vary, but also the senses of
authority being identified also vary in the intensity of their presence.
In keeping with the word's historical action, re-presenting the intersubjective "masks" o f one's "person"
through the practice o f writing is not so much an un-masking, as it is a mirroring, o f the self in the
otherness o f language itself. Arguably, it is the code o f  language, not the revealed credo o f  a person
somehow before and beyond that code, that is the source o f  authority for personal identity.
Rose, in authentic Foucauldian language, imagines the pathway provided by the discourse o f  authority
as being "... not a matter, therefore, o f narrating a general history o f  the idea o f the person or self, but of
tracing the technical forms accorded to the relation to oneself in various practices..."(138).^
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As a  "technical form" or "technique" o f  authorizing self-other relations and distinctions, anonymous 
writing is not, in the vast oceanic history o f writing (as distinguished from the surface history o f  author­
ship) does not submerge the characterization o f subjectivity or personal identity. In keeping with the 
originally problematic meaning of authority itself, anonymity awg7wen/'.y—proliferates—the identity and 
identification o f  the person. In doing so, anonymous writing experiments with the location and 
provocation o f  various authorities: "those who have authority " and "those subject to authority " (Rose, 
146). How it does this, or why it has to be considered whenever we attempt to understand the meaning and 
action o f authority, is a question taken up by Thomas Docherty in On Modem Authority: The Theory and 
Condition o f  Writing: 1500 to the Present Day.
Docherty opens his study o f modem authority by attacking E.D. Hirsch's now famous "intentionalist"
position and what Docherty calls his "authoritarian" model o f the author—the Author as God, singular,
unitary, unchanging. First Hirsch:
When we simply use an author's words for own purposes without respecting his [ric] 
intention, we transgress...the ethics o f  language, just as we transgress ethical norms when 
we use another person merely for our own ends" (Docherty 22).
Docherty has trouble, as most of us do, with the idea that we—or rather, certain authorities such as Hirsch
standing in mediate relation to an Author—can divine the "original" intention o f a given author. More
troubling to Docherty is Hirsch's assumption about an author's sense o f private "property" rights to a
common discourse—the system of language itself.
Firstly, in a modem print culture the words in question are not 'the author's words’ in a 
strictly possessive sense: the author, at most, "borrows' the words that the common 
lexicon is generous or gracious enough to afford an author. The typographic font is a 
public fountain, and cannot be drunk dry of potential fluency or meaning as its words are 
used up or 'possessed' by 'authors' (22).
This private/public split over language and a given author's property] rights to it becomes crucial to our
anxiety or suspicion about anonymous writing. Where is this language coming from? Why doesn't the
writer authorize his/her proper[tizing] name—in effect identify his/her authority to claim this language as
his/her own? Aside from the rhetorical motives o f protecting one's identity against authorities who might
punish—justly or unjustly— the writer for language so used, these questions move onto the larger question
of rhetorical—even disciplinary—indifference as a transgression of—a "violence" to—what is hermeneutically
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sealed and properly authoritative. Docherty extends his criticism o f  the Hirsch-Bloom canonical purity 
and propriety in this way.
But transgressive criticism...is seen as willful violence only from the point o f  view o f a 
consciousness which understands or accepts dogmatically that texts are monuments 
(which must not be 'defaced'), monuments to the quasi-sanctity o f another consciousness,
that o f an author (who is to be 'obeyed' simply by dint o f being 'authoritative') (31).^
Once Docherty lays out the problems o f authority in his introduction, he opens Part One o f his book— 
significantly titled "(Fe) male Authority"—with a subsection titled "Authority in Crisis: The Threat of 
Female Emancipation." He covers the complexites o f private and public "properties" as these are tied up in 
the "...none too devious etymology" o f  authority. We find that Vico "explicitly linked 'property' to 
'authority,' arguing a connection between autos (“self') and auctor (“author") on the "Renaissance" idea that 
one is the privately "proper" owner/author o f  one's own self. Whatever the legitimacy o f this liberty with 
etymology, Docherty, believing that language in the abstract belongs to everyone and or to no one, it is the 
writing, not the writer, that has and will hold "authority." In this connection, we need to look more closely 
at the meaning of "author-ity" itself. And on this score, Docherty is quite democratic in his authoritative 
unpacking o f the word's inter/intrasubjective relations to ‘identity’ as a 'property' o f the self.
The OED finds an alternative root for 'author1 in augere, with its suggestion o f beginning 
or increasing. Both etymologies [Vico's and the OED's] here bear fruit. Property certainly 
gives some kind o f identity to its owner; the word itself does derive from proprius,
'related to one's self.' Property, then, does give the kind o f  'title' name or identity at 
issue. But in order to retain such a name or identity, such an 'entitlement', the owner not 
only reifies herself or himself in the 'property' but also must by definition strive to 
solidify, increase or regenerate more o f  this property in order for the name or identity to 
remain stable. It is precisely this capitalistic 'title to property' that More is questioning, 
among other things, in Utopia (60).
My reader will recall that what upset analysts Brubaker and Cooper so much about the problem of identity
is that it had been claimed as the proper name for so many different kinds o f  meanings and actions-of
entirely incommensurate discourses— that it has, in effect, been "authorized" (as in augmented) into a kind
o f "Utopia"—a conceptual Erewhon. As such, it continues to increase as the proper authority o f  Everyone—
or No One. We have the eternal call for an autonomous and stable sense o f Identity. We have Docherty's
history o f Author-ity as requiring an equally strong sense of retaining and regenerating the Proper Name of
Male autonomy over discourse. Between these we can begin to see the problem that Anonymous Writers
(largely women, but also Other subject positions lacking authority)—began to (com)pose for the Authority
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o f  Identity and the Identity o f  Authority.^
Docherty titles part two o f  his book, "Natural Authority" (with "Natural" crossed out). With the 
augmentation and proliferation o f  "Author-ity" opened up by female writing, Docherty begins to play 
seriously with the idea o f  an original or natural Authority. H does not propose an anonymous function as 
being integral to this play within and against authority. He does make much —especially in Chapter Six, 
titled "The Impossibility o f  Authenticity"—of "the struggle for authority" that has clearly emerged at the 
beginning of the modem period (1650-1700 AD) and which continues today in so-called "post-modem" 
terms. For,
[o]nce God and nature as a source of authentication o f authorities disappear, then what is 
left is either tradition (a kind o f intertextual authority) or the authority o f  the present 
'individual talent' struggling both with and also against such a  tradition. Some attempts 
to rediscover authenticity, but again...[the acts o f  "authoritative" interpretation had 
proliferated beyond the point o f  a pure hermeneutic return to the Word],
The stage was set, then, for the struggle o f  authority which was much later to be 
posed as fundamental philosophical question by Humpty-Dumpty, in another text where 
the reflexive mirror plays a huge role, Lewis Carroll's Through the Looking-Glass :
'When /  use a word', Humpty Dumpty said in rather a scornful tone, 'it means just what I 
choose it to mean—neither more nor less.'
'The question is', said Alice, 'whether you can make words mean different things.'
'The question is', said Humpty Dumpty, 'which is to be master—that's all' (In Docherty,
228).
We all know what happened to Humpty Dumpty. The sense we got from our Chapter One analysis o f the 
"master" term Identity is that it has, like Docherty's sense o f the master term o f Authority, "had a great 
fall." If  neither is "to be master" —even when there seems to have been a vigorous effort to shore them up 
as an inter-textual construction within an emerging capitalist discourse of "property"—then naturally we 
have to look to the "wall" which both have fallen from. In this chapter, "Towards a History of 
Anonymity," I will be making the case that that Wall is none other than the "nomination barrier" whose 
structure is a master function o f anonymity—"that's all."
Forster: Anonymous Information or Imagination?
Forty-four years before Michel Foucault opened and closed his essay "What is an Author?" with an 
epigraph from Samuel Beckett's Texts fo r Nothing ("What matters who's speaking?"), E.M. Forster 
opened his essay "Anonymity: An Enquiry" with a less polemical, but similarly rhetorical question. "Do 
you like to know who a book's by?" (7). His own answer—"The question is more profound and even more
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literary than may appear"—is supported fay an example that compares the difference between the "The 
Rime o f  the Ancient Mariner" and " The Ballad o f  Sir Patrick Spens." The difference comes down to one 
of authorship, o f  course. When we speak o f the former, we say "a poem by Coleridge," whereas, when we 
speak o f  the latter we say, "a poem." He then asks, in an uncanny anticipation o f  both Beckett and 
Foucault, "What difference, if  any, does this difference between them make upon our minds?"(7-8).
Forster contends in the next fifteen pages that ”[w]ords are all o f  one family," but that they have two 
fundamental functions: to convey information and to create atmosphere, "...and the combination o f those 
functions is infinite" (12). He provisionally concludes "...that what is information ought to be signed; and 
secondly, that what is not information need not be signed" (13). By "atmosphere" Forster means passion, 
pathos'. ".. the power that words have to raise our emotions or quicken our blood. It is also something else, 
and to define that other thing would be to explain the secret o f  the universe" (13).
Forster does, o f  course, attempt to define that "something else "—the Otherness o f  that function. He 
believes that "all literature," in its function to create "another world" "...tends towards a condition of 
anonymity...."
It wants not to be signed.... It is always tugging in that direction and saying in effect: "I, 
not my author, exist really...." It may here be objected that literature expresses 
personality, that it is the result o f the author's individual outlook, that we are right in 
asking for his [wc] name. It is his [sic] property—he [sic] ought to have the credit"(15).
Forster acknowledges that this is an important objection, but that it is "...also a modem one, for in the 
past neither writers nor readers attached high importance to personality that they do today" (15). He then 
reminds readers o f  the vast anonymous writings that comprise the Greek Anthology and sweeps through, in 
another anticipation o f  Foucault (who suspiciously does not acknowledge Forster’s inquiry) by mentioning 
the anonymous stretch o f the medieval period. Personal Authorship, he reminds us, "...troubled neither the 
composers nor the translators of the Bible"; "...they did not make a cult of expression as we do to-day. 
Surely they were right, and modem critics go too far in their insistence on personality" (16).
Forster then appeals to the findings o f  Freud and Jung (still radical and fresh in 1925 for a host of 
writers—Forster, Woolf, and James—experimenting with "stream o f consciousness" narratives that would be 
pushed to the limit by Beckett). The reason modem critics go too far in their insistence on the personal
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author is that they don't understand that like words, linguistic consciousness "...has two personalities, 
one on the surface, one deeper down." The upper one "has a name." The lower one "is a very queer affair"
(16). He is quite puzzled by this lower personality, but without, he is sure that no literature could be 
written, nor could it be read. Having delved into the phenomenology o f anonymity courtesy o f Schutz and 
Natanson, we can at least speculate along with Forster that this "very queer affair" of a nameless voice, of 
words without a speaker, o f  a passionate otherness "...is in any case the force that makes for anonymity"
(17).
Forster ends his inquiry into anonymity pretty much the way he began it. But he makes some close 
and rapid connections that point to the reason that Foucault can "imagine all discourse unfolding in a 
pervasive anonymity" at the conclusion o f  "What is an Author?"
We decided pretty easily that information ought to be signed: common sense leads to 
this conclusion, and newspapers which are largely unsigned have gained by that device 
their undesirable influence over civilization.... [As for literature,] [w]hile the author wrote 
he [s/c] forgot his [sic] name; while we read him [s/c] we forget both his[s/c] name and 
our own" (22).
Common sense does seem to confirm what Forster is saying about the act o f deep reading—any reading of 
anything, not just literature, in my experience. The anonymity, as we learned from Natanson becomes 
reciprocal, a passionate enclave in which the otherness o f the text o f  nobody—for nobody—is revealed and in 
which we revel. I make no plea for this mastering force o f anonymity in the way that Forster does. I 
simply point the reader to the uncanny community his notion o f  the imagination shares with Natanson's 
more obscure and dry phenomenological treatment o f "passion for the other in the enclave that anonymity 
provides."
My plea is for something more vital: imagination.... Whether those words are signed or 
unsigned becomes, as soon as the imagination redeems us, a matter o f  no importance, 
because we have approximated to the state in which they were written, and there are no 
names down there, no personality as we understand personality, no marrying or giving in 
marriage. What is down there—ah, that is another enquiry...(23).
It is an odd phrasing Forster uses—"no marrying or giving in marriage"—in connection to the
community o f anonymous writer and reader in that No Where o f  the imagination. But it does suggest a
sense of author-ity that is expressed, augmented, proliferated beyond the claims o f personal identity. I read
Forster's essay as a serious play/plea for more anonymous imagination (if  such were possible) and less
identification and explanation. He was, after all, a literary author whose writings have become famous
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for their characters' sense of solitary otherness, tHieir search for a passionate private enclave, in the world. 
It is no surprise that he links redemption to imagirxiation (a position at least as old as poetry itself).
More surprising is the idea that redemption iss therefore available in the anonymity that provides this 
primary imagination. But his plea for the mastery* and mystery o f anonymity is also a  ploy, since he does 
not, much like Beckett and Foucault, test the limirts o f  his plea by leaving his own works unsigned. (But 
personal credit must be given, as history will Ibe forgiven, until the monstrous/mountainous author- 
function is folded once again into its original anon~ymous care and core.
Foucault: The fin) Difference of Anonvmitv
The scope o f this chapter permits only a scan o f anonymity’s ancient literary “author-ity.” I will look at 
anecdotes from three universally "representative" tlexts: The Epic o f  Gilgamesh; the Book o f  Genesis; the 
Odyssey. A historically minded reader o f  the truly Old school might reasonably expect some attempt at a 
"genealogical" account of, say, the number, frequenncy, and periodization of pseudonyms, or the presence of 
the category "Anonymous" as an archival marker aacross literary, musical, and artistic antiquities. But as we 
saw in Chapter Two any historical account or ""moment" o f Anonymity, and o f  the "Anonymous" in 
particular, requires a "critical" rather than a genealor-gical approach. (Or, what is required to best understand 
the anonymous function is an awareness that it reverses and exchanges the rules and themes o f each 
approach to history until naming and identifying g iv e  way to reflection and imagination.)
The only "genealogical" approach we might taEce must be with regard to what Thomas Docherty calls 
“absent characters.” Or it could be framed by what: Nikolas Rose calls a discontinuous history o f the ‘the 
person’ (with emphasis, by my lights, on the Fresnch sense o f personne as the mask o f  “nobody” or “no 
one”). “God,” as developed and deployed by tlhe anonymous writers and compositors o f The Old 
Testament, is the most “original” o f this line o f ccharacters in the Western hermeneutic/literary tradition. 
“His son,” Jesus o f  Nazareth, developed and deployed by named writer-disciples, would be next in a 
genealogical line. (Anonymity and absent character in The New Testament is beyond the scope o f this 
chapter, however.)
Though counter-intuitive, the genealogical senses is a smaller circle within the much wider circle drawn 
by a "critical approach. A critical sense, according; to Foucault, "sets the reversal-principle to work." The
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first and most obvious consequence o f  setting it to work in a history o f  the anonymous is that 
nominalism—theories o f  the name, and o f  the proper name most significantly—becomes anomalous. That is, 
when anonymity takes a proper name, it takes on one name only—Anonymous—and that name deviates 
from and subverts the general rule and regime o f  nominalism/*
Anonymous is a proper name, which earns the capital letter o f a  true name even though it merely 
classifies unknown writers, does not isolate the unique qualities o f  properly named authors, and can be 
prefixed by an or the. My basis for this conclusion remains stable even if  the signature) o f (the) 
Anonymous destabilizes the norms o f  identity and identification. Anonymity is always-already 
demonstrating the principle o f  reversal, radiating the logic o f both/and, rather than one o f  either/or. Any 
history o f  anonymity, therefore, would need to proceed not in some linear, narrative form, but must 
showcase anecdotes that tell us o f  its antiquity, its poetry, and its mysterious "indifference."
It is this last quality—anonymity's power o f indifference—that upsets our customary assumptions about 
the power o f names and o f  naming. Considered as a proper name, Anonymous designates a person who is 
unknown because unnamed. But it also describes a "work" that can be known, obviously, but cannot be 
attributed and codified under the normative proprietary regimes o f  Foucault’s Author-Function. The 
anonymous work, cannot, in other words, be Properly Named. More critical than what constitutes the 
"work" o f  the Author, is the answer to his more specific question, "What is the name o f an author?" That 
question must always beg its critical other: What is the name o f Anonymous? Forster tells us the answer to 
that question is "the secret o f the universe." Schutz and Natanson, more sure o f themselves as a 
phenomenologists, tells us over and over again the name is not important, it is the levels o f anonymity 
that provide our nominalizing distinctions and orientations in both private and public terms.
The origin, departure, and destination o f  anonymous discourse might strike the reader as artificial and 
abstract. Foucault makes them rather more concrete in “What is an Author?" (completed two years before 
"The Discourse on Language" and later collected in Language, Counter-Memory, Practice, 1977). He does 
so by all but concluding that the Author is ultimately anonymous. As we saw in my commentary on 
Foucault's work on discourse in Chapter Two, he radically demoted the author to one o f twelve principles 
and themes. My ultimate take on the implications of that post-structural dispersion o f the authorial 
subject's authority is that it resoundingly affirms the power o f anonymity according to Foucault’s own use 
o f  it to account for "discourse."
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One of the more interesting interpretive outcomes o f  "What is an Author?" is that the answer 
Foucault provides to that titular question is itself a question in the form of an epigraph that he repeats at 
the end o f the essay. The question is taken from Samuel Beckett's little monological study Texts fo r  
Nothing— a run up to his famous tetraolgy o f anonymously voiced experiments whose final work is titled 
The Unnamable. The question, as written in Beckett’s original text, reads: "What matter who's speaking, 
someone said, what matter who's speaking." Foucault finds this tidbit from Beckett significant enough to 
assert that
[i]n an indifference such as this we must recognize one o f the fundamental ethical 
principles o f  contemporary writing. ...[T]t stands as an immanent rule, endlessly adopted 
and yet never fully applied (139).
Needless to say, most o f  us, regardless o f our disciplinary (and therefore institutional) affiliations, believe 
that the answer to that question is no matter o f indifference at all—that it makes a vast difference not only 
to know, or to identify who is speaking/ writing, but to maintain that identity$
Foucault uses the occasion o f the Beckett epigraph to create his own detour from some standardized 
remarks about authorial status and his "research into authenticity and attribution" so as to restrict himself 
"to the singular relationship that holds between an author and a text" (139). In trying to restrict himself 
thus, Foucault draws forth four major "themes" concerning the "author.” These Themes are 1) Rhetorical 
Indifference; 2) Authorial Death; 3) Naming the Author; and 4) Authorial Function. Under each o f  these 
themes he sets forth at least two major theses so as to illustrate and elaborate their categorical importance.
Thus, Rhetorical Indifference involves the ascent o f  writing itself that creates "an opening where the 
writing subject endlessly disappears" (139). Rhetorical Indifference also points up "the kinship between 
writing and death” (139).
According to Foucault, this kinship is important enough that it be recapitulated as the second major 
theme: "the author's death." The concepts o f the "work" and o f ecriture (or Writing as a transcendental 
God-term whose presence is, as Derrida has shown, an absence) serve to illustrate this second major theme 
(140).
The third theme involves the complex problem o f how "The name of an author" emerges from authorial 
death, disappearance, and absence. Its theses concern the Proper Name, and its complex, heterogeneous 
relation to the name o f  the author (141).
The fourth theme spells out the "author-function" under four theses: the author as a feature of "property"
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rights (and proprietary rites); as a historical feature that "is not universal or constant in all 
discourse"(143); as a projective secular feature (and literary future) o f "Christian exegesis" (143) that (as a 
counter to the third thesis) was concerned with establishing the authenticity and uniformity of authorial 
authority; and finally, as a performative feature wherein the author-function "operates so as to effect the 
simultaneous dispersion of...three egos" (145).
In a series o f  hypothetical questions that constitute the essay's last paragraphs, however, Foucault 
outlines the kind of critical history that would have to be written not about the author-function, but rather, 
about the function of the anonymous (though he does not state this directly). As we have seen in my 
previous analysis, anonymity bears a problematic relation to our more important "holding terms" of 
discourse. A critical account o f what really involves what we often believe to be the author’s exclusive 
discursive coordinates—identity, authority, and ultimately, community— actually help us locate the 
anonymous (though Foucault does not say so.)
The end o f "What is an Author?” speculates briefly on "the absolute nature and creative role o f the 
subject" (148). (And, as we now know, he picks up this reconsideration two years later in "The Discourse 
on Language"). What Foucault is asking (for) at the end o f "What is an Author?" is not that the discourse 
o f the subject "be entirely abandoned" but rather that it "(and its substitutes)...be stripped o f [their] creative 
role and analyzed as a complex and variable function of discourse." This means that the "author-function" 
is "only one o f the possible specifications o f  the subject" (148). What all o f this means for attempting a 
critical anecdotal history of the anonymous through the work o f the reversal principle is that when we tally 
up the functional relations o f author, subject, and discourse we discover the following hypothesis:
A) The subject is a function o f discourse.
B) The author-function is a species o f  the subject.
C) In writing (and Writing) the subject writing endlessly disappears.
D) The historically significant, but highly mutable, "presence" o f the author must therefore 
"endlessly disappear," as it were, given the significant "absence" o f the anonymous 
specification of the subject. This yields
E) wherefrom
[wje can easily imagine a culture where discourse would circulate without the need for an 
author. Discourses, whatever their status, form, or value, and regardless o f  our manner of 
handling them, would unfold in a pervasive anonymity (148, emphasis added).
Following the logic of Foucault's conclusions, I could not be accused o f  jumping to an untoward 
conclusion that a  history of the anonymous should begin with our own discursive present. It could focus
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exclusively on the Internet, the Worldwide Web, Electronic Mail, never mind traditional media such as 
the daily newspaper, radio, and television. In doing so we could revise Foucault's "we can easily 
imagine.~a pervasive anonymity" to read: "A pervasive anonymity easily realizes us." Forster, as we saw, 
had pretty much concluded this in his "enquiry"—except he was not cognizant o f discourse as a totalizing 
"god-term."; his was the old fall back o f an anonymizing "imagination." Foucault, though more “post- 
structural”  bears a similar sense o f  anonymity as structural to the imagination.^
The truly critical approach to a history of the anonymous however must pay attention to some o f  the 
themes and  theses Foucault has outlined in his own historical outline o f  the author. Such attention must 
have as their object works o f  literature first and foremost, and the more "well known" the better so as to 
highlight their unknown specifications. In the sections following in which I take up issues o f authority and 
the anonymous function within that problematic discourse, I will apply various strains and combinations 
o f  Foucault’s author-function themes and theses. I have chosen for my analyses The Book o f  Genesis, The 
Epic o f  Gilgamesh, and The Odyssey so that we can begin to understand the problem of originality and the 
growth o f  what mean by authority from some presumed Origin, can not be understood apart from an 
anonymous function, the “other” side o f an author-function
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The Genesis o f  Anonvmitv
Anonymity’s Shifting “I”
The last thesis in Foucault’s outline o f the author-fimction—performativity—most easily reverses itself so 
as to constitute the anonymous-function through what he calls “pronoun shifters.” Foucault rehashes this, 
one o f the certitudes o f literary analysis (but one which always freezes first year English majors with looks 
of amazement or disbelief) in this way. In a more complex and variable text with an author (his example is 
the "novel"), [i]t is well known that...[when narrated] in the first person, neither the first person pronoun, 
the present indicative tense, nor for that matter, its signs o f  localization refer directly to the writer, either to 
the time when he wrote, or to the specific act o f  writing... (144).
In effect, trying to link author with his or her choice o f  a narrative voice is like trying to identify an 
official who agrees to speak to the public on condition o f anonymity. There is an element of the 
unrecognizable and unacknowledged (with the stress on recognition and knowledge) in the whole business 
of voice that at the very least lends itself to considering the force and function o f  anonymity. Crudely, 
what Foucault is repeating bears repeating according to my terms: The firs t person pronoun—the “I"  
Junction—is an anonymous Junction. It might seem that I am leaping before looking more deeply at 
Foucault. But further on he mentions the effect o f  "shifters" (144)—that is, personal pronouns—which do 
not refer, purely and simply, to an actual individual insofar as it simultaneously gives rise to a variety of 
egos and to series o f  subjective positions that individuals o f  any class may come to occupy" (145).
The obvious and natural existence of authorial projection and impersonation of “personae” (otherwise called 
“characters”) in texts remains for many people a sure sign that the “imagination” is a real phenomenon. It 
has psychological and sociological routes that cross and merge into that continuous cultural traffic that 
Foucault, as we saw in chapter one, would sum up as the “discourse o f language.” Anonymity plays across 
the dispersion and performance of these subjective/discursive positions.
For a powerful sense o f how the theses anonymity’s proper name and its shifting claim on/of a 
subjective position, the responsible analyst is actually required to go back to the beginning o f literature. 
Genesis, however, much a Bloomian mistake, a deliberate, belated misreading o f what it means to begin, 
is aptly named for illustrating these theses. (Gilgamesh, on the other hand, is better suited for elucidating 
anonymity’s work o f  writing (im)mortality.)
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After laying out his themes and theses o f the author-function, Foucault never asserts outright that he 
is really inquiring into the reversal o f that function-that he is really answering my question: “What is the 
anonymous function?” What he flirts with in the final paragraphs I must radically assert and defend, lest I 
have no thesis. The Anonymous, itself an Ideal or Transcendental signifier (though, in keeping with its 
empirical gradient, remains unnamed and unknown as such) makes not only the name of the author, but all 
proper (more toward propertied or proprietary) names possible. Under the critical principle o f reversal, then, 
it has the capacity to make real, empirical, liberatory inroads into how we use and abuse our so-called 
identities, our questionable authorities, and our fragile communities.
Furthermore, like any controlling historical category, anonymity cuts a both/and swath: it is both 
present and absent, public and private, open and closed, protective and hurtful. In my historical scan of 
three primordial texts, we will see early indications of both valences. As a matter of historical analysis of 
primordial texts, anonymity has been both a burr under the saddle and the horse that lets the historian 
(literary or otherwise) ride over the (non)identity of those writers responsible for the world's oldest 
writings. Again, Foucault makes the definitive historical case while making yet again the ulterior argument 
that anonymity's constancy undercuts the pervasiveness o f"  the "author" as a function o f discourse."
[T]he "author-function" is not universal or constant in all discourse. Even within our 
civilization, the same types o f  texts have not always required authors; there was a time 
when those texts which we call "literary" (stories, folk tales, epics, and tragedies) were 
accepted, circulated, and valorized without any question about the identity o f their 
author. Their anonymity was ignored because their real or supposed age was a sufficient 
guarantee o f their authenticity (143).
The "authors" of the Gilgamesh, o f  The Bible, and The Odyssey (despite the customary attribution to 
“Homer”) are unknown. As Foucault states, their anonymity is accepted, circulated, and valorized.^ My 
task is to reverse the ignorance o f  history: to not ignore anonymity; to try to know its function; and take to 
heart part o f Foucault's nay saying at the end o f "What is an Author?": "No longer the tiresome repetitions: 
"Who is the real author?" Instead, we must apply one o f his alternative questions: "What placements are 
determined for possible subjects" (148)—subjects made possible not by the author-function, but by the 
anonymous-function.
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Analyzing the Anonymous Authority o f Genesis 
In order to take on Genesis as one o f the representative anecdotes o f  the anonymous-function, for example, 
I find it impossible to free myself from Foucault's designations. The rhetorical situation in this piece of 
primordial writing fits exactly with his general sense that a human author's empirical activity has been 
"effaced to allow the play, in parallel or opposition, o f religious and critical modes o f  characterization." 
That fact o f  effacement grants "a primordial status to [the] writing" in and o f itse lf as I understand and 
adapt Foucault. The fact o f authorial anonymity in Genesis also (un)knowingiy "sustains the privileges of 
the author" by extending them "within a grey neutrality" (which I would equate with the "presence" o f God 
as "fundamental" Author.) I therefore know o f no better opportunity for engaging in the play o f oppositions 
and parallels between the author and the anonymous than in a primordial text such as Genesis. Its empirical 
author has been effaced, yet extended under an "Author" whose unspeakable name, according to Jewish 
orthodoxy, lends it an anonymity whose transcendence acts as a "check" on the disappearance o f the author 
function.
The rhetorical situation in Genesis—the nature o f  what Lloyd Bitzer would call its "exigency"—is one 
where anonymity stands in place o f the conception o f  writing which Foucault argues "sustains the 
privileges o f the author through the safeguard o f  the a priori" (141). Since the empirical author of Genesis 
is primarily interested to establish the a priori existence o f  "God" as Author of The Book o f  Life, the role 
of anonymity in safeguarding this conception becomes so critical as to appear integral, indivisible, and 
original to that existence. Hermeneutics, originally the art o f  interpreting "holy" scripture, has long since 
become a set piece o f  secular humanistic exegesis.
One lesson Harold Bloom has learned from the ^response to his ideas about interpretation as deliberate 
misreading is that there are no purely secular texts, because canonization [of this or that text] by the secular 
academies is not merely a displaced version o f  Jewish o f Christian or Moslem canonization. It is precisely 
the thing itself, the investment of a text with unity , presence, form, meaning, followed by the insistence 
that the canonized text possesses these attributes immutably, quite apart from the interpretive activities of 
the academies (Bloom 293). I suppose I am trying to  make the case for the canonization o f  anonymity, if 
only for its immutable "presence" as a form o f  absence. Its presence, form, and meaning in a canonical 
exemplum such as Genesis (a text notoriously lacking in "unity") do however require academic 
interpretation.
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I liken my reliance on Foucault's historical synopsis o f  the author-function to interpret 
anonymity's apriori presence to that o f  the physician's need for machines that reveal the body's interior (e.g. 
x-ray, CAT Scan, MRI). In addition to the conceptions o f  death, writing and o f  the work, two other 
Foucauldian ways of seeing anonymity are the theme o f  the author's "proper name" and the thesis o f 
pronoun "shifters." I adapt and combine these to try to answer my adaptation o f one o f  Foucault's "new" 
questions: "What placements are determined for possible [anonymous] subjects?" Genesis, in particular, 
resonates to the theme o f the author’s proper name, as well as to the thesis o f  the role o f personal pronouns 
or "shifters" with respect to the unnamed "person" of a given author.
My reading o f certain passages in Genesis is a direct response to these ethical imperatives to a better 
understanding o f the author-function. And, in taking seriously a critical approach to a history o f the 
anonymous, its principle o f reversal enables me to see in the shifts and disappearances in authorial point of 
view and presence the emergence o f  the anonymous-function. But before we look at particular sections o f 
Genesis that illustrate what I mean by "the anonymous-function," The Author o f  the Book of Books, 
following Foucault's conclusion, would therefore represent the ultimate retainer o f societal discourse. (That 
all hotel rooms in the nation have a  Bible in the drawer of the bedside table, that our national currency and 
pledge o f allegiance feature the name o f  "God", attests to a thoroughgoing, if now largely formulaic, 
retention o f discursive author-ity.) But what exactly is the proper placement o f  this authorial subject?
Our initial attempt at an answer might well start with Genesis 1:3: "And God said, Let there be light:
and there was light." When we read this, we assume what any grammarian assumes. The writer (unnamed)
is recounting what someone named "God" (or what the Greeks called "Logos") first spoke as the first real
speaker in a universe o f discourse to come. This writer's point o f  view is ironically "omniscient" and
technically profane: God, supposedly the eternally present, transhistorical First and Last Person to turn the
lights on and off, is presented in the "third person" past tense. This mere writer has the first word in 1:1-2.
"Anonymous" presents God, supernatural Author of creation, as any natural author would with a given
character created through a chosen point o f view. The Babylonian Epic o f  Creation not nearly so old as
Gilgamesh, but much older than Genesis also has an anonymous author whose third person point o f view
creates an aura o f author-ity. Interestingly, that author (or rather, an incorporated group o f scholar-scribes)
makes no bones about divine Identity at all. The "First Tablet" begins this way:
When on high the heavens were not named,
And beneath a home bore no name...;
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...When none o f the gods had been brought into being,
And they were not named, and fates were not fixed,
Then were created the gods in the midst thereof (Langdon 67).
Anonymous and Anonymity were both the form o f  discourse and the discourse o f  the void in this epic of 
creation. Orthodox believers or plain allocentric secularist might claim that Genesis, because it begins in 
nomination, represents an advance in Self-Other consciousness over the Epic o f  Creation. I believe that the 
anonymous function begs to differentiate) itself from a Profane/Sacred binary.
With Genesis, historically considered, we intuit a scribe (or more likely, a group of scribes) names 
unknown, who trans-scribed the tale o f a nomadic tribe with an anonymous oral tradition o f long 
precedent. Their anonymous transcriptions, recounting a local community's origins, author-ized the textual 
identity o f  that community's implied Author-Function(ary). Even a cursory reading o f Genesis reveals gaps 
and contradictions in plot and character continuity that signal the collective and patchwork activity ofmaiy 
writers over the course o f  the book's final development. Somehow, however, in face o f all human 
discursive activity prior to and following its creation, this "epic" o f Judaeo-Christian tradition has managed 
to claim for itself a divine author-ity. Part o f the reason it has been able to do so, I will argue, is the way 
its "anonymous-function" was parlayed into a projection o f an ultimate Author. This Author, as 
transcendental signifier, is imagined to hold a copyright on human discourse itself. Yet all historical 
evidence confirms that anonymous authorship was the generic, normative expectation o f textual production
beginning in Mesopotamia some two thousand years before the appearance o f Genesis &
The external source evidence of the anonymous function is a sine qua non o f  ancient studies. More will 
be said about the cultural pervasiveness of anonymity in the ancient world when I consider the Epic o f 
Gilgamesh below. Our concern is with the plausibility that ancient "literary" texts internalized the external, 
perdurable culture o f anonymity through the "novel" application of such literary devices and licenses as 
point o f vision, projection o f voice, and the predication o f value. This trinity, I believe, has much to do 
with the emergence o f  omniscient "third person" poetics as a central marker o f our first literary texts.
In Genesis this omniscient third person past tense formation continues through 1:25, enabling the 
reader to see what God saw, thus creating the artifice o f God in/as the first person: "And God made the 
beasts o f the earth...: and God saw that it was good." But then a remarkable shift occurs in 1:26 that 
continues through 1:29. It is this section we will focus on deeply, using Foucault's fourth criterion o f the
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author-function, the effect o f "shifters" (144). These are personal pronouns that do "not refer, purely and 
simply, to an actual individual insofar as it simultaneously gives rise to a variety o f egos and to series of 
subjective positions that individuals o f any class may come to occupy" (145).
Genesis 1:26 begins this way: "And God said, Let us make man in our image, after our likeness:..." 
1:29 begins this way: "And God said, Behold, /  have given you every herb bearing seed..." (emphases 
added.) The sudden appearance o f these personal pronouns needs to be considered in concentric circular 
terms. The smaller circle radiates the terms Foucault has set forth as illustrative o f the author-function as a 
series ofsubject(ive) positions. The larger circle circum-scribes what I argue is the "anonymous-function"— 
the author-function's negative image, nemesis, or genetic "counter memory" (to adapt Foucault’s coinage) 
of those subject positions.
Whether we are critical thinkers or unquestioning believers, the odd use o f the plural pronouns "us” and 
"our" in 1:26 tells us several things. In Foucault's language, God's subject position is not at all stable, 
comprising, at the very least "a "second self' whose similarity to the author is never fixed and undergoes 
considerable alteration within the course o f  a single book" (144). God is first represented as a third person, 
a re-creation o f an actual but anonymous writer. God is then presented, at a minimum, as having a  double 
presence, (or in Catholic exegesis, this early passage is "testament" to his "three-personed" Godhead.) We 
should logically assume that this second, third, or plural sense o f self does not refer to our anonymous
writer.^ The "discourse" o f Genesis is linked not to a mere scribe or immediate author, but to a 
"fundamental" Author. But once we perform this identification, Foucault assures us that "the role of 
"shifters" is more complex and variable" than in texts without an author.
The appearance o f the "I" shifter at the end o f Genesis 1—"Behold, I have given you...."— coincides 
with the creation of human beings: "male and female he created them. " This "I" shift is used by the 
immediate writer o f Genesis to indicate God's fundamental authority, while indicating he is shifting from 
monological to dialogical speech, since he has just created the very first listeners or dialogical counterparts 
(still in a nascent condition o f  anonymity and non-speech).
In chapter two of Genesis the writer returns to a third person omniscient point o f view as God creates, 
but does not name, the "Garden o f Eden." The writer reporting this activity does not shift to the "I" and 
have God name Eden's four rivers; the writer does this. Similarly, in 2:17 the writer reports that God "took 
the man and put him into the garden o f Eden." This writer has God command the unnamed man not to eat
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of from the tree o f  knowledge (whereas the unnamed woman, created at the same time as the man 
according to the writer in Chapter 1, has become a  non-creature.)
Suddenly, in 2:18, the writer has God speak o f  the man's aloneness and shifts to the "I": "I will make 
him a help meet for him." Just as suddenly, the writer reports in 2:19 that God has brought all the beasts 
of the field "unto Adam to see what he would call them: and whatsoever Adam called every living creature, 
that was the name thereof." It is to this act o f naming that we will now turn to develop the elentic side of 
another o f  Foucault's themes o f the author-function. We must keep in mind our critical project o f reversing 
his themes' polarity so that we might trace the hidden transdiscursive power o f  the anonymous-function. 
(The reader who dismisses this attempt at reversal will see my thesis as nothing more than a slavish 
dependence upon the author-function.) But as we know, the question that opens and closes Foucault's 
examination o f  the author-function appears to confirm the anonymous function: "What matters who's 
speaking?
The poststructuralist thinker who is trying to apply a critical, rather than a genealogical, view of the 
author-function, is presented with a very unstable situation in applying the principle o f  reversal to these 
opening passages o f  Genesis. Again, we don't know the identity o f the writer o f Genesis. This anonymous 
scribe's use o f  shifters, however, could lead us to believe that the character, "God", is the text's true author. 
In pursuit o f our critical principle o f reversal let's assume this belief to be true, particularly so when the 
text's pronoun "shifters" ("signs that refer to the author") shift from "us" to "I". According to Foucault, in 
this more complex and variable text with an author (his example is the "novel"),
[i]t is well known that...[when narrated] in the first person, neither the first person 
pronoun, the present indicative tense, nor for that matter, its signs o f localization refer 
directly to the writer, either to the time when he wrote, or to the specific act o f  writing...
(144).
I realize we are ourselves shifting—or continuously reversing—the subject positions o f  natural and 
supernatural "writer." Let's see if we can freeze this movement a moment and come to a conclusion that 
advances our argument about the anonymous-function as superordinate, rather than subordinate, to the 
author-function.
If we are referring to the natural writer, we can see that Foucault's description applies quite well. In fact, 
our anonymous writer’s decision to shift to the "I" shifter is an unambiguous sign that not he (or "she,” 
according to Harold Bloom, below) but that the Author, God, is doing the narrating. But Foucault also
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tells us, as I pointed out above, that these first person elements "stand as a "second self’ whose 
similarity to the author is never fixed...." So we must reach the same conclusion whether we assume a 
natural writer behind Genesis or a supernatural Author. That conclusion is this: The identity o f  the Author, 
never mind that o f the actual writer o f  Genesis depends upon anonymity to sustain the authoritarian 
privileges o f the author-function as it has come down and enveloped through history.
Furthermore, if  the reader will grant even a shred o f credibility to my contention that the anonymous- 
function is the binary other o f the author-function, then that same reader will appreciate my interpolations 
to the following critical distinction as made by Foucault. I f  the "true"" author is at least doubly 
anonymous, then
[i]t would be as false to seek [God,] the [Transcendentally Anonymous,] author in 
relation to the actual [anonymous] writer as to the fictional narrator [named "God" by the 
actual anonymous writer]; the "author-function" [and so too the suppressed "anonymous- 
function"] arises out o f  their scission—in the division and distance o f the two (144).
So we have a mysterious, yet masterful division in Genesis between writer, author, and fictional narrator 
(with theology claiming o f  course that God is the person behind all three). We also have a distance between 
the author-function and its anonymous counterpart. This total scission cuts across the philosophy and the 
politics of Identity, and fo ld s  the subject position o f the writer so seamlessly into the act o f  writing that he 
or she endlessly shifts or dis-appears, as can be seen in these opening passages from a founding narrative. 
The meaning o f Genesis under the logic o f  the anonymous function is the authorization o f the Identity of 
the human with the Authority o f  creative self-expression. The ambiguous dis-appearance o f shifters in 
Genesis, particularly the "I", points up the thesis o f  an anonymous subjective performance—o f anonymity 
as the original subject position which is crucial to this book’s performative "genetics."
Basil Cottle's study, Names, can help us get a hold on what Plato was originally up to in his critique 
o f  nominalism via The Cratylus. Cottle is cognizant o f the scission o f  the Identity/Anonymity binary in 
that he finds it "an odd concept—that Man's naming o f  creatures confirmed their subjection to him" (11). 
We can extend our "genetic" understanding o f the discourse o f the anonymous and its radical power o f 
reversal. When it comes to considering the meaning o f the Name o f  the A.uthor, we should think o f the 
ambiguity and elision o f personal pronouns in Genesis as a problem o f subject positioning and subjection 
o f  others.
That is, an anonymous "immediate" human author has represented "God" as the Author o f the Human.
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This ultimate Author then names "Adam" ("first man"), who is then authorized to name all subject 
creatures (including "Eve"—literally "serpent" and "garden"). We then find ourselves as readers pondering 
the following pentagon. First, we have an unnamed group of (im)mediate writers. Second, these writers 
create a character and project it as a fundamental Author. Third, this Author is made to make and name 
Man. Fourth, Man names Woman "Serpent in the Garden" because, fifth, she transgressed the authorial 
power subjection through naming by provoking knowledge through language and therefrom the authority 
of subjectivity.
Eve's eating o f  the fruit from the tree o f knowledge was a transgressive, liberatory act. God considered 
the power o f  naming knowledge enough. The power o f Logos, reserved to him, was prohibited to those 
created in his own image. Eve altered existing power relations. She chose what Foucault would call the 
"unthought" or "what is prohibited " ("The Discourse on Language", 149). She chose actual "thinking" 
over Adamic "knowledge" (naming things without any sense o f signature, event, or context.) Her 
independent discursive act (not in speaking to God's nemesis, but dialoguing with her own daemon) 
transformed her "subjection" (under God's control) into a subject position (self-knowledge).
In effect, Eve's transgression toward an actual Identity unveiled the Transcendent Anonymity of God 
and the Empirical Anonymity o f his proxy, Adam. Eve becomes the first postructuralist, or denier of the 
transcendental tradition. Her transgression was not an exclusively feminist act, but in fact the first act of 
liberatory secular humanism. Her punishment, under the principle o f reversal, was to become an unthought, 
anonymous, while Adam was given the power of subjection over her which God once held over him: "and 
thy desire shall be to thy husband, and he shall rule over thee" (Genesis. 3:16). The feminist mission has 
been to uncover and reverse this act o f anonymization o f "Woman" ever since Eve.
But I digress from our central concern. It is the anonymity o f the human author o f Genesis which 
creates the character o f  an Author who occupies, in Foucault's terms, "a "transdiscursive" position" ("What 
is an Author?" 145). This subject position is the absence o f subjectivity even as it is supercharged with the 
presence o f subjection. Cottle reminds us that this transdiscursive position (a./fca. "The God of the Jews") 
"was known to have a Name, but it was unspeakable as His Face was invisible, and only its four
consonants, which Greeks called the Tetragrammaton, were displayed" (3 1 ).^  From the discursive "get- 
go" o f Genesis, then, anonymity was an integral part o f the socially taboo, or prohibited  practices that 
made its writing possible. The Name o f God, an originating prohibition, turns out to be The Name of the
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Anonymous.
So even though the immediate author o f Genesis will remain forever unnamed and unknown, his/her 
transdiscursive persona will always be known—but never definitively, properly Named. (Or rather vice- 
versa.) This double, triple, or up to Eve—quintuple (and therefore quintessentially troubled) undecidabilxty 
about the subject(ion) o f discursive author-ity in Genesis leads Cottle to make a wry observation. "But 
leave the Godhead unnamed, the monotheist might argue, and you give the lie to the old quip about man's 
making God in his own image" (37). And yet, as we have seen, it is not implausible to assume that the 
willed anonymity o f  a human author (what George Eliot would call "anonymous heroism”) was 
instrumental in impressing upon history the image o f an anonymous God who cannot be definitively 
named or known. The name of God, as a truth effect o f both faith and reason, is the unthought that reverses 
itself into the god o f the Name Prohibited, leaving us to weigh (and inveigh against) the "genetic" 
authority o f Anonymous.
Anonvmitv: Deictic Deitv or Everyday Elentic?
I have been stressing in my initial look at the text of Genesis the ambiguities o f Identity and Anonymity, 
o f Writer and Author, and their intersections: the Anonymity o f Authority, the Writer's (Non)Identity. I 
have also been toying with the text under the assumption that those signifiers or shifters, which refer to the 
author, are as much or more at play than in other, more belated texts. We get a sense o f the undifferentiated 
quality o f these authorial indices, and find it difficult to settle the question o f whether or not the text o f  
Genesis is with or without an Author. Yet at the same time we know for sure that the writer is deeply 
anonymous, and the attribution o f official authorship will remain forever unnamed and unknown for all but 
the true believer and Jesuitical exegete.
This pervasive ambiguity makes it truly difficult to come on board with Foucault and state categorically 
that the themes and theses o f  "the author-function" are operating normatively in Genesis. And, if  there is 
something deviant about Genesis, we can, under the law o f binary operations, argue that "the anonymous- 
function" is in the ascendancy in this historic text. Finally, if  anonymity is functioning with so high a 
profile in one of the world's acknowledged Ur texts or master narratives, it might be necessary to grant a
greater sense of history to the structure and function o f the anonymous in all writing.
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Before I move to the next Biblical passage to illustrate another o f Foucault’s themes o f  the author- 
function under the blacklight o f  the anonymous, there is one more acute angle to measure within the 
distinction between what Foucault is calling the "author-function" and the "actual writer.” He tells us that 
if  the text does not have an author, its shifters "refer to a real speaker and to an actual deictic situation, 
with certain exceptions such as the case of an indirect speech in the first person" (144). As we have seen, 
the "real" speaker referred to in the Bible is a person named "God." This speaker is re-presented through an 
"omniscient" point o f  view, referred to in the third person, past tense frame.
The rhetorical reality o f  this speaker is clear and convincing enough to those who participate in both 
private and public rhetorical situations. The outstanding example, given our present subject, is that God is 
believed to be, or at least invoked as, a real speaker in the Churches as well as in all 50 State Houses and 
the U.S. Congress through the genre of "prayer." I have more or less settled the question o f whether 
Genesis has an author. (It does not; it has an anonymous writer who creates the subject position o f a real 
speaker through the ambiguity o f  personal pronoun shifters.) It is logical to conclude therefore that the 
moniker "God" is not a reference to "a real speaker." As a transdiscursive element however, "God" is 
spoken to and is believed to be listening. As the one and only "superaddressee" (a function that, according 
to Bakhtin, carries a high degree o f  anonymity) God transcends dialogical common sense. This absent, yet 
ideal, listener gets repositioned as the speaker o f whatever "house" one cares to metonymize: at home, in 
church—from the State o f  the Nation to the state o f the soul.
Before us is the consideration o f  whether the appearance o f the shifter "I" in Genesis refers to "an actual 
deictic situation." "Deictic" (from the ancient Greek, "to show") is defined as "capable o f  direct proof; of 
showing or pointing out directly." Foucault chose the term because it is a standard grammatical reference 
in dealing with personal pronouns: pronouns differ from nouns in that they are essentially deictic. I like the 
term because it provides an opportunity for unparalleled play on deity. There is no etymological common 
ground between the Greek deiknynai ("to show") and the Greek root for "god." The deictic problems of 
identity and authorship in Genesis do however stem from the ambiguity o f deity. The pronominal shifts 
between the third and first persons make it difficult for God "to show" up in the text, except as a subject 
position. If  anything, my cursory analysis o f the he/I/our shifters suggests the logical opposite o f a deictic
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situation. The "absence" o f  God in Genesis is an elentic situation—"serving to refute" "his" rhetorical 
reality and, following the meaning o f  the original Greek, elenchein, permits the interested reader "to cross 
examine" the text over and against Foucault's categorical definition.
We are now left with the very important exception that Foucault supplies. I f  the shifters in Genesis do 
not in fact refer to a real speaker or to a deictic situation, that must mean that there is an author. But 
perhaps the issue is moot (and mute) since it also seems clear enough that the anonymous writer's shift to 
the "I" o f  God is a "case o f indirect speech in the first person." According to the rules o f an authorless text, 
therefore, we can only conclude again, and this time definitively, that the text o f  Genesis shows no proof 
o f  either a real speaker or o f pointing out, in direct fashion, an actual deity. But that means that the 
discourse o f Genesis must be "linked to an author" wherein "the role o f  "shifters" is more complex and 
variable."* *
Well aware that I am arguing in circles, caught in the centripetal force o f a  complex and variable text 
that only tightens the tautological relation between author function and actual writer, I will repeat once 
more my belief that this elenctic situation is caused and contained by the "anonymous function." 
Furthermore, my counter theses o f the anonymous function, though crude, uncategorical, and slavishly 
dependent on Foucault's theses o f the "author-function," turn the author-fimction on its head, turn it into an 
ignoration elenchi, or "ignorance o f  proof." This means that it is a fallacy in logic to suppose that the 
point at issue-the anonymous function—can be proved or disproved by an argument—the author-function— 
which proves or disproves something not at issue. That is, the author-function is not at issue in Genesis. 
The anonymous function is what is at issue. To use the author-function to prove or disprove the 
anonymity o f God through the theses o f  authorial uniformity, regularity, and historicity is a fallacy not 
only o f logic, but also o f  Logos itse lf (Logos being the ultimately anonymous Word o f History.)
The fact remains, however, that however liberal the law of binary relations in permitting the sublation 
and transgression of a dominant term by its suppressed term, the dominant term of argument cannot be 
eliminated, even under the logic o f its obvious ignorance of proof. I need the deictic situation o f the author 
function in order to privilege the anonymous function's elentic situation (whose other meanings along with 
cross-examine and refute are transgressive: "to shame, to scold, to swear"). Nor should it go unnoticed that
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Foucault does supply another possibility in his essay. He admits that he has "given the term "author" an 
excessively narrow meaning" at times. He pauses to remind the reader that it is easy to confuse the author 
as a real, phenomenal person, and the author as a circum-textual, epi-phenomenal, function. After all the 
rigmarole o f shifters in authored and authorless texts, he asserts that
it is obvious that even within the realm of discourse a person can be the author o f much 
more than a book—o f a theory, for instance, of a  tradition or a discipline within which 
new books and authors can proliferate (145).
He concludes, as we mentioned above, that "such authors occupy a "transdiscursive" position." Since 
he believes that "Homer, Aristotle and the Church Fathers played this role," why might we not therefore 
conclude that "God" also occupies this "transdiscursive" subject position? Whereas the Church Fathers 
(many of whom were anonymous) for example, were once living authors, and might be called "initiators of 
discursive practices" (145), we might well call the author-ity o f God in Genesis the initiation o f  anonymity 
as the transdiscursive alternative to the intrinsic norms o f  authorship. This declaration needs some 
clarification before we can complete our exegesis o f the anonymous in Genesis.
By extending Foucault's argument about initiators of discursive practices to their (Il)Logical origin in 
God's rhetorical situation, I am in danger of contradicting my Nietzschean belief that there is no origin or 
point of return. This pitfall is avoided however by always remembering that anonymity, as a discursive 
practice, is a primary point o f  reference in any speculation about the origins of discourse. I f  its origination 
point is to be appreciated it must be traced (or its traces would be found) in the earliest existing texts. 
Foucault distinguishes between origins of "rediscovery", "reactivation”, and a "return."
My sense o f these distinctions eliminates the first, since the "rediscovery" of the anonymous function 
would have the effect o f  an "analogy or isomorphism with current forms of knowledge that allow the 
perception of forgotten or obscured figures" (145). My capacity for tautology is large, but to state that the 
anonymous author function allows us to clearly locate and understand anonymous figures has the 
analogical effect o f asking the proverbial snake which has swallowed its own tail to cough up the truth of 
its continuous (dis)appearance. (The Anonymous as a primary signifier is, in any case, more about 
shedding, than swallowing, the philosophical skein o f Identity.)
Adapting Foucault once more, we could consider more clearly the "reactivation" of the anonymous as a
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primary point o f  present historical reference—that it "refers to something quite different: the insertion of 
[anonymous] discourse into totally new domains o f generalization, practice, and transformations" (145). 
The recent national concern with the privacy domains o f  the Internet and the World Wide Web clearly 
demonstrates anonymity’s general, practical, and transformative insertion. (I will take up this sense of 
reactivation in my analysis o f anonymous discourse as a  transformative practice for composition pedagogy 
in Chapter Four.) But whatever one's sense o f  Biblical scholarship or the contemporaneity o f hermeneutics, 
it hardly qualifies as opening up "totally new domains."
I have no immediate hermeneutic choice, then, but to return to the "phrase, "return to," Foucault's third 
distinction. If  I "return to" Genesis as one o f  anonymity's most primary points o f  reference, "it is because 
of a basic and constructive omission, an omission that is not the result o f accident or incomprehension" 
(146). That omission turns out to be the anonymous representation o f  "God" as the self-admitted/omitted 
personification o f  all discursive initiation. Following Foucault's definition o f  how this fundamental 
omission operates, the absent character, "God," becomes a "barrier imposed by [His own] omission."
In my exegetical return to Genesis I want to show that this paradoxical notion o f  God's omission or 
absence as "[b]oth the cause of [His anonymous] barrier and means for [His anonymous] removal" "arises 
from the discursive practice in question." The discursive practice in question involves an unnamed and 
unknown writer devoted to the representation o f  an essentially unknowable, onomastic character—"God". 
There is no real return but only and "always a return to a text in itself, specifically, to a primary and 
unadorned text with particular attention to those things registered in the interstices o f  the text, its gaps and 
absences." Genesis is just such a text. To return to it as the initiation o f  anonymous discourse is to return 
"to those empty spaces that have been masked by omission or concealed in a false and misleading 
plenitude" (147).
As I read and adapt Foucault's call for a return to a textual absence that transdiscursively initiates the 
metaphysics o f presence, it is not a stretch to transpose his conclusion that "it [i.e. the eternal return of the 
anonymous function] is an effective and necessary means o f transforming discursive practice." Why is my 
insertion o f the anonymous no distortion or some sort o f  Bloomian "misprision" o f his intention for the 
author function? The answer is supplied by Foucault and involves five (quintessential) reasons.
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First, my sense o f  these "retums...tend to reinforce the enigmatic link between an author and his 
works" (emphasis added).
Second, if  that link is enigmatic, then it cannot be an absolute condition that a "text has an
inaugurative value precisely because it is the work o f  a particular author"; that is, "our returns are [also]
conditioned by this knowledge" [of the anonymous function].
Third, "[b]ringing to light," the book o f Genesis "to the extent that we recognize it as a book" [by
Anonymous ], "can transform not only our historical knowledge, but the field o f ' [discourse theory] "—if
only through a shift o f  accent or o f the center of gravity."
Fourth, "[t]hese returns [to the Anonymous], an important component o f  discursive practices, form a
relationship between "fundamental" ["God"] and "mediate" [Adam/Eve] authors, which is not identical to
that which links an ordinary text to its immediate author" [who, in the case o f Genesis, is "Anonymous"]
(emphasis added).
Fifth, "the "author-function" is sufficiently complex at the level o f  a book or a series o f texts that bear a 
definite signature. It also has "other determining factors when analyzed in terms o f larger entities—groups of 
works or entire disciplines," according to Foucault (147). How much more complex then is the 
"anonymous function" which appears to shadow and answer Foucault's adumbrations o f  the author 
question? With the logic o f the anonymous function now  (un) settled to our total (dis)satisfaction, I can 
now continue a counter-exegesis o f Genesis.
The Name of Anonymous: 'The Lord God o f Your Fathers'
I now move to consider three sections o f  Genesis in which the character "God" is portrayed by its 
anonymous writer as an authority who cares about preserving rather than punishing those created in "our 
image." All three sections have in common the theme o f  "the Proper Name as set forth by Foucault and 
reconsidered above. Two sections are from Genesis -17 :1 -5 , where God makes his covenant with Abram 
and changes his name to Abraham; and 32:24-30, where "a man" wrestles with Jacob and his name is 
changed to Israel. I will also comment on the identity o f  God's anonymity in Exodus 3:2-15, where Moses 
encounters "God" in a "burning bush." All three passages highlight the dialogical acquisition and 
transference o f authoritative names even as the name o f  God remains anonymous.
As an early interlocutor o f the Bible—first as a very small child listening in Church and in Catholic
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school, later as a voracious reader re-searching my identity apart from religious orthodoxy—I was always 
fascinated by the hide and seek character o f  "God." You can't get very far into the Bible without noticing 
that "God" cyclically calls on his male creatures—from Adam to the last o f  the Prophets (excluding Jesus, 
interestingly)—in this way: "So and So, where are you?" And So and So invariably answers: "Here am I, 
Lord." This sense o f identity as a matter o f spatio-temporal location helped me to dimly discern that an 
"other" axis o f identity— Who am I? — was also at work in these call and response rituals. The "identity 
crisis" in Genesis o f  course is summed up by the answer of a vexed 'God" to Moses' question, Who am I  
and Who are You? (That answer—"I AM WHO I AM"—is said with such emphasis I can almost hear the 
"GODMANIT!" that has presumably been expurgated by certain anonymous "Church Fathers".)^
More seriously, the "identity crisis" in Genesis can be thought o f  as rising, falling and melding along 
two amplitudes o f identification. The first is the heterogeneity o f  God's authority. The second, which 
actually causes the first, is the hermeneutic finding that the authorship o f Genesis is itself heterogeneous, 
comprising at least three, and perhaps four anonymous writers. (Arguably, when we read this "book" we are 
reading a text that should rightly be re-titled HeteroGenesis. That coinage re-cognizes Foucault's thesis that 
the author-function has never been stable over time, sometimes enduring, even relying on, anonymous 
authorship, other times, making its proper(ty) claims via a proper name.)
To extend something o f  the ersatz presence of the early creator "God" to that o f a more political 
chieftain God, the anonymous writer o f Genesis 17 has this "God" renew the Covenant that was broken by 
Adam when he took Eve's lead and ate o f the Tree of Life. This "God" "appeared to Abram, and said unto 
him, I am the Almighty God.... And I will make my covenant between me and thee.... And Abram fell on 
his face" (17: 1-3). We have here a now familiar character ploy and communicative device. Face-to-face 
interaction with God fuses the deictic and elentic energies described above. In effect, the announcement of 
God's "presence" is tantamount to the concealment o f an "identity." This primordial anonymity has long 
maintained its (Revolutionary "spin" in modem press coverage o f political and governmental activity: the 
rhetoric of full, authoritative disclosure is possible only through the invisibility or dazzling vagueness of 
some 'highly placed, official source.' In contemporary terms, readers o f political news must fall on their 
faces, unable or unwilling to demand full recognition o f the identities o f their own elected authorities.
Abram's face being well hidden from the well hidden face o f Being, the writer then reports that "God 
talked with him, saying, As for me, behold, my covenant is with thee..." (17:4). Again, we find an
105
Reproduced  with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
evasion o f who or what God's "me" is. In its stead, Abram is given what "we" (the faithful) are surpposed 
to believe is tantamount to the identity o f  God. His "Covenant"—his agreement to meet with his heslpmeet 
or proxy— is his Identity. His Word—Logos—is Identical to what we might call the "me", ego, o r  self. 
"God" then performs the sort o f  flapdoodle nominalism that Frank Baum parodizes through that hrumbug 
from Omaha, "The Wizard o f  Oz": "Neither shall thy name anymore be called Abram, but thy nam*e shall 
be Abraham; for a father o f many nations have I made thee" (17:5).
To underscore the indivisibly "genetic" structure and function o f  his Logos, "God" prom ises to 
"establish my covenant between...thy seed after thee in their generations for an everlasting covenant, no  be a 
God unto thee, and to thy seed after thee" (17:17). It is no secret that hermeneutics, despite its sem inal tie 
to secrecy—the "hermetic seal,"—is all about the bloody rupture o f  truth, the leakage of meaninag, the 
secretion o f signifier into signified, until everything is actually "significant" to any given interpretamt. The 
covenant o f "God", as it underwrites Judaeo-Christian identity, is that its efficacy springs from a literal 
undercutting of this hermetic seal in all male members who "must needs be circumcised: and [o n lv  then] 
my covenant shall be in your flesh for an everlasting covenant" (17:13).
Crazily, any newborn male with the hermetic seal o f his foreskin not cut off is a "soul [that] sfcnall be 
cut off from his people; [for] he hath broken my covenant" (17:14). What God's chosen "people" armounts 
to is a triple mutilation in the form o f an historically ungenerous exclusion of certain genitalia, o f  a ^certain 
gender, and most certainly, o f  the genesis of cultural difference. The entire project and projection rests
significantly on the exclusion o f women, and ultimate anonymity o f Woman. ^  All this prin»ordial 
prejudice, all this "genetic" damage, is Author-ized by an anonymous writer in the ambiguously (ind irec t 
speech of an unseen character. That character’s unspeakable name enables the equation o f that anonymous 
speech with the idea of Identity itself—the bloody cum seminal circumcision of the sexual, the fam ilial, the 
gendered, the ethnic, the racial, the national.
In Genesis 32: 24-31, Jacob (son o f Isaac, grandson o f Abraham), is met by "God" through a proixy, "a 
man" who is generally interpreted to be one of "the angels o f God" (32.1) whom Jacob meets at the sttart of 
his journey. It is an odd passage that reiterates Cottle's sense that subjection through naming is ana "odd 
concept." Jacob gets into a wrestling match with this nameless "man" in the middle o f the nighat and 
wrestles him to a draw "until the breaking of the day" (32. 24). Frustrated, this (over)"man" resorts tto  the 
dirty trick o f using supernatural powers o f  what amounts to "accupressure" and puts "the hollow o f  Jacob's
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thigh out o f  joint" (32.25). But Jacob wrestles on. Reminiscent o f a vampire, the angel o f God begs 
Jacob to let him go "for the day breaketh. Clearly aware that he has an unparalleled opportunity for 
advancement, Jacob refuses, "except that thou bless me" (32.27). In what follows I see as a remarkably 
representative anecdote of the anonymous-function, or at the very least, yet another example o f  anonymity's 
binary relation—its historic, virtually "genetic," covenant— with identity.
And he said unto him, What is thy name? And [Jacob] said, Jacob.
And he said, Thy name shall be called no more Jacob, but Israel: for as a prince hast thou 
power with God and with men, and hast prevailed.
And Jacob asked him, and said, Tell me, I pray thee, thy name. And he said, Wherefore 
is it that thou dost ask after my name? And he blessed him there.
And Jacob called the name o f  the place Peniel: for I have see God face to face, and my 
life is preserved. (Genesis 32. 27-30)
Cottle, in a chapter titled "The Acquisition and Transference o f Names," makes much o f  this passage. 
He calls it "[o]ne o f the most haunting stories in the Bible" in that it exemplifies his assertion that "the 
privilege o f  possessing it [i.e. a proper name] and the right to change it are jealously guarded" (36). What 
Cottle sees in the ex-change o f names between Jacob and "God" (the former becomes "Israel" or 'Prince of 
God', the latter "Penuel" or 'the face o f God') is that "a whole new life for the Hebrews is implicit in [this 
exchange]" 36. Because Cottle is writing about Names, while I am writing about Namelessness, it would 
be expected that his angle of interpretation would differ from my own, even as we are [mis]taking different 
sides o f the same hermeneutic co[i]n.
What I see o f  course is God's high-handed evasion (a mixture of arrogant refusal covered by a blessing) 
o f  Jacob's legitimate desire to know the name o f  his nemesis. Jacob identified him self upon request and 
expected to know the man's identity in turn. Clearly, when the question was met with a question and a 
blessing, Jacob inferred he had met his maker. "God" apparently disappears before this more than 
competent, self-confident "Prince o f God" gets it into his head to prohibitively name—or, in a truly 
transgressive act, rename—"God." Instead, "God" remains anonymous (under cover o f that universal 
pseudonym). Jacob not daring to describe the person, designates the place o f the struggle, 'Face o f God.'
The anonymous writer of this tale never o f  course has Jacob describe the face o f  god. We are only told 
that he has seen the main 'Man' "face-to face." Given the Hebrew's fear o f pronouncing the name of God, 
and their habit o f  re-presenting his face as unbearable, as o f the sun, it is sensible to conclude that Jacob is
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expressing profound relief at the end o f this passage. He says that he has seen God face to face yet his 
"life has been preserved." But if  there were such a state as being super-sensible in our hermeneutics, I 
would conclude that Jacob's life has been preserved precisely because o f the anonymity o f the exchange.
The anonymity o f the actual writer o f  this tale, an empirical fact o f history, makes possible, as I have 
asserted above, the transcendental anonymity o f the "God" character. It also enables the transactional 
anonymity running through the plot and development o f some o f the bible's central protagonists—Adam, 
Eve, Abraham, Jacob, and, as we will see, Moses. The narrative device, strategy, or trope o f  anonymity is 
becoming, I believe, quite clear. Whether it is to be thought o f  as an emergent property o f the author 
function or the transmigratory ground upon which author-ity is figured and reversed is an open question. 
That the function o f anonymity is indispensable to the Authority o f  Genesis is, I think, incontrovertible.
The final Biblical anecdote that best illustrates the function o f anonymity as the enabler o f a 
fundamental identity o f a god and the collective identification o f  a "people" can be found in Exodus 3.2-6; 
10-15.14 Arthur Hertzberg, editor-commentator o f  Judaism , reminds us that unlike the covenant with 
Abraham, whose name change represented the creation o f  a familial tribe, "[t]he covenant with Moses is a 
new and wider one, with a people as a whole. This is symbolized by the "new name" by which God makes 
Himself known" 21). What Hertzberg is referring to o f course is that the writers responsible for Exodus 
(different than those o f Genesis) decided to once again raise, by transgressing, the "nomination barrier. 
"God" changes his name to "Lord” when speaking to Moses.
And God spoke to Moses saying, "I am the Lord. I appeared to Abraham, to Isaac and to 
Jacob as God Almighty but by My name of Lord I did not make Myself known to 
them.... Therefore say to the children o f Israel, \formerly known as the children o f  Jacob 
renamed "Prince o f God" by "God" now "Lord God"], 'I am the Lord, who will bring 
you out.... And I will take you to Myself for people and I will be your God; and you 
shall know that I am the Lord your God who brought you out.... I am the Lord' (Exodus 
6 : 2- 8).
Moses, as is well known, deviates from the normative line o f  God's chosen. When we encounter him, 
he is nameless, almost purely anonymous given his unnamed parentage— the son o f an "man o f the house 
o f Levi" who took "to wife a daughter o f Levi" (Exodus 2. 1). Levi, the third son o f Jacob, had three sons, 
Gershon, Kohath and Merari. But the writers of the Bible, usually such sticklers for paternal genealogy, do 
not mention these names.
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Moses, an anonymous bastard (and perhaps the issue o f  the incest taboo?), was named by an 
Egyptian woman who found him floating in a basket on the Nile River. Certain compassionate midwives— 
Shiphrah and Puah—who ignored the Pharoah's edict to drown all newborn Jewish males, had saved him. 
(Our anonymous writer, in a nice aside tells us that "[B]ecause the midwives feared God, ...he made them 
houses" Exodus I. 21). He was then hidden away and then cast unto the waters by his unnamed mother in 
order to avoid the Pharaoh’s version of "The Final Solution."
The initial encounter with God in the form of a  burning bush reiterates the theme o f  hiding God's 
identity, keeping it mysterious, enigmatic, and powerfully anonymous. God's face cannot be seen; it is his 
voice that is crucial in all o f these anecdotes, from the Garden of Eden to Mt. Horeb. (Though the 
anonymous writer o f Jacob's encounter would have the reader believe that the face o f  God was seen, it is 
fairly clear that the prohibition on His Name, leaves His Face as anonymous as his voice.) In a now 
familiar gambit, the anonymous author handles the problems of identity and identification this way: 
"Moreover he said, I am the God of thy father [anonymous!], the God of Abraham, the God of Isaac, and 
the God of Jacob. And Moses hid his face; for he was afraid to look upon God" (Exodus. 3. 6). Obviously, 
the burning bush has petered out and God is something of a "man" with a free that Jacob is said to have 
seen. But Moses, unlike that more intrepid creation o f  our writer, is afraid to look at his face, never mind 
ask for his anonymical name behind all those patronyms.
As we know, "God" has chosen Moses to lead his people out of Egypt. Given Moses' sense of 
uncertainty about his origins, his question—"Who am I, that I should...bring forth the children o f Israel...?" 
(3.11)—takes on all the modem freight o f an identity crisis underpinning the "prophetic" question of his 
authority to undertake such an adventure. In The Authoritative and the Authoritarian, Joseph Vining 
combines legal and humanistic scholarship to inquire into sources o f the law's authority. In a chapter titled 
"Authenticity: Connecting the Speaker and the Spoken," looks into the differences between the authentic 
authority o f a Supreme Court judge and a literary author.
The difference seems to come down to one o f "delegation" o f authority, and with it, authenticity. 
Looking at the problem o f clerks writing opinions in "the name of the judge" he concludes that 
"ghostwriting" takes many forms and is differentially (in)authentic or (non)authoritative as it runs across
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the incommensurate discourses o f  the legal opinion and literary production. Vining nuances the problems 
o f  author-ity's possible inauthenticity in this way, which leads us, literally, back to the source of the 
(Mosaic) law as handed down—delegated—by an unseen, effectively, ghost-writing, authority.
Thus the problem o f delegation is not simply one o f  deceptive packaging, which is 
immaterial and can be forgotten (as the dust jacket o f a book is forgotten) because it is 
the writing that is important, not is packaging.... But, it may be said, justices do not 
speak for themselves even when they themselves think and speak. They speak for the 
Court. Great authorities, it may be said, rarely speak for themselves. Moses came down 
from Mount Sinai with tablets purporting to have been written by the finger o f  God....
The only difference seems to be that the justices sign their own names when speaking for 
another and Moses did not....[T]he putative author and the true author are separate, yet 
the texts have had authority. Knowing, or believing, or assuming that Jehovah himself 
did not cut the tablets does not seem to affect the authority o f  what is written on them 
(55-56).
What Vining appears to be overlooking, as with so many commentators on the problem o f authority, the 
sources o f its authenticity, etc., is that some function or form o f anonymity is always near to hand in these 
transactions between proper authority and a properly named identity behind such authority.
When Jacob essentially asks "God", Who are you? His answer is a name change and a profound
promotion. "God" is made to perform a similar evasion and indirection when answering Moses' question]
o f  identity qua authority: "And he said, Certainly I will be with thee" (3.12). Moses wants to know who
he is in both an essential sense o f  identity and a performative sense o f  his authority. All he gets is the
assurance of an unseen, anonymous presence—"God—whom he "shall serve...upon this mountain." It turns
out, however, that our anonymous writer is as vexed by a divine identity gambit as all thinkers (and
believers) should be. The writer then turns the same characterological trick that was done with Abraham
and Jacob, lending Moses their same level o f  hermeneutic suspicion or brinkmanship.
And Moses said unto God, Behold, when I come unto the children o f Israel, and shall 
say unto them, The God o f  your fathers hath sent me unto you; and they shall say to me 
, What is his name? What shall I say unto them?
And God said unto Moses, I AM WHO I AM: and he said, Thus shalt thou say unto the 
children of Israel, I AM hath sent me unto you (3.13-14).
Much has been made o f  this passage.^  My first sense that it had real carrying power into a child's life 
beyond the walls of a church was in the cartoon Popeye the Sailor Man, who habitually pronounced, in a 
speedy riff "Iamthatlam!" Popeye used it in a humble yet cooly confident sort o f way. There was a what- 
you-see-is-what-you-get finality to his way o f making no excuses for his identity. It would have taken a far 
more tongue in cheek writer, willing to push much further the anxiety o f  a Moses or Abraham, or the 
incipient skepticism of a Jacob into a  character who might ask God:
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Tell them 'I AM' sent me? You've got to be joking. I have no credibility as it is, and you want 
me to base my assumption o f  leadership o f  an entire Community on the premise that 
your Authority is a tautological reduction o f  Identity in and of itself-that I spoke, on 
condition o f Anonymity, with someone named 'I AM?' They'll think me an insane 
solipsist. Just tell me who you are. What's you're real name, so that I might share the 
Identity o f  its Authority with our Community?
In a connection to this passage and shadowing our ongoing theme, Marmorstein quotes K. Abba b.
Mamal, who paraphrased the God/Moses exchange in  this way.
'God says to Moses, "Thou wilt know m y name? I am called according to my deeds.
When I judge the creatures, I am xxxx; when I fight the wicked], I am xxxx; when I leave 
the sins o f man in suspense, I am xxx; and when I am compassionate, I am xx! " ' (52).
[As I don't know the Hebrew, nor do I have typography to reproduce it, I have 
substituted an x  for each o f  the original letters in each word.]
We see in this Rabbi's paraphrase o f  the Exodus passage a conflation o f the arrogant, evasive God
answering the natural and justifiable inquiries o f  Abraham and Jacob. We also see the fundamental
philosophy o f nominalism  that is underwritten by what I have been calling the anonymous-function in
these anonymous writers' repeated representation o f'G od ' as a naming, nameful, yet maddeningly nameless
character.^
It is as if  the anonymous writers) of this passage became aware o f his/ her/ their excessive, 
transgressively anonymous epithet a t the end of 3:14-. Immediately after the writer tells us that the character 
'God' tells Moses that "I AM hath sent me unto you ' 3:15 that writer seems to pull back his/her character 
into a semblance o f rationality. The writer has some pragmatic awareness that genealogy, however much a 
function of anonymity, would better advance Moses' political chances.
And God said moreover unto Moses, Thus shalt thou say unto the children o f Israel. The 
Lord God o f  your fathers, the God of Abraham, the God of Isaac, and the God o f  Jacob, 
hath sent me unto you: this is my name forever, and this is my memorial into all 
generations.
3.16 begins with "Go...." and virtually repeats this patrimonial appeal word for word, as recognizing that
the cranky enigmatic (a)nominalism o f LAM had fallen a bit awry. But again, a cursory glance at this four
part genealogical evocation reveals that the name o f  'God' remains up for grabs. Which name is his name
"forever" that will serve as an eternal generational "memorial"? The reader now very well knows what my
answer is. It is the anonymous function, the fluid pseudonymity of Identity itself, that has become
etemalized-and internalized—for all generations requiring a "religious" (literally "to bind") identification
with what the originator o f Critical Theory, Max Horkheimer, has called "the Totally Other."
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(Too?) Much has already been made, in both the body o f my text and in footnotes, o f the use of 
pseudonymity to create a divine presence from an essentially absent and anonymous character. Those who 
initially wrote "God" into existence recognized the importance o f maintaining an enigmatic atmosphere 
even as the character of a Creator who just "Is" had to be named in some way. As the Prohibition on His 
Name came into effect, new names were substituted. But neither the writers o f  Genesis nor of Exodus were 
operating under that Prohibition. To achieve the (ob)scenic truth effect o f  a divinity that is unknowable 
making itself known these writers initiated and continued (through acts o f  redaction) the "nomination 
barrier" whose final cause is the "anonymous function."
Enough representative anecdotes have been presented that the reader should be able to divine what I 
mean: take out the names "God" and "Lord" and you are left with a funny, wise yet foolish, often irascible 
self-referentaility. The rule o f "Me", "Myself, but most of all that great discursive solvent, the anonymous 
"I", dominates these anecdotes. This first person point o f view, under the screen of third person 
autobiographical voice points, I think to Foucault's definition of discourse as "universal mediation": "when 
all things come eventually to take the form o f discourse,...then all [will] be able to return to the silent 
interiority o f  self-consciousness" (157).
When I consider the legacy o f the Bible's early anonymous writers, I don't think it can be over-stated 
that their most outstanding achievement (because so rhetorically understated it resists rhetorical 
understanding) is this subjective projection from behind and beyond a nomination barrier. But studies of 
texts far more ancient than those o f  the bible have clearly established a link between the anonymous 
Semitic writers o f Genesis and their Babylonian, Sumerian and Mesopotamian predecessors. The device of 
the anonymous third person autobiographical voice is equally operative in Gilgamesh, though the density 
and gravity o f its nomination barrier leaves much to be desired by those who believe in only One Tme 
Anonymous writer whose Name returns all to the silent interiority o f no Other consciousness.
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The Epic Work of Anonvmitv
Gilgamesh: The Genesis o f Third Person Autobiography
Many pages back I had said that Foucault's theme linking writing and death could be best illustrated by 
considering The Epic o f  Gilgamesh, the oldest known piece o f  "fictional" writing yet discovered.^ It is 
fitting to apply his characterization of contemporary writing and writers to its ancient situation in 
Gilgamesh.
If we wish to know the writer in our day, it will be through the singularity o f his [or her] 
absence and in his [or her] link to death, which has transformed him [or her] into a 
victim of his [or her] own writing (140).
We now know that Foucault was mainly addressing the metaphysics, with a nod, perhaps, to the
rhetoricity o f a writer's relation to his or her text (as in "What matters who's speaking?") By accessing the
work o f Piotr Michalowski, Mesopotamian scholar, we can better understand how the rhetoricity of
anonymity is inevitably tied up with its historicity. Whereas for Foucault, the voice o f the author amounts
to a theory o f indifference, for Michalowski, "[t]he voice is more than sound: it is the locus o f authority"
(182). Both Michalowski's assertion about the ancient anonymous writer of Gilgamesh and Foucault's
assertion about the indifference and absence of the writer in our own day can be brought together. Their
synthesis serves as an "olamic" (or, depending on one's tradition o f immanence or transcendence,
"kairotic") reminder that anonymity does not mean the end o f  a text's import. On the contrary, anonymity
can be seen to be the "formal" and possibly "final" cause o f a text's Authority.
The work of Kramer has shown us that Gilgamesh is "The First Case of Literary Borrowing" ( 181). 
The notion o f a properly named Author, with its hard and fast intention as the property o f a copywright, 
simply didn't exist at the time Gilgamesh was finally cobbled together. Writing in 1985, Kovacs takes up 
Kramer's 1950's realization that Mesopotamian literature was a  culture o f literary borrowing. He applies it 
to the going concern with the author this way: "As was traditional in Mesopotamian literature, 
"authorship" consisted largely in the creative adaptation o f existing themes and plots from other literature 
to new purposes" (xxi-xxii). Borrowing and adaptations were not only commonplace in ancient literary 
circles, but as Michalowski, writing in 1996 has it, they were expected at a time "when anonymity of 
authorship was the rule" (185).
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In other words, "collaborative", "patch", and what our hierarchical culture o f  the truly gifted 
autonomous author would consider "plagiaristic" writing was the rule o f those giants in whose anonymous 
shadows we now stand. ^  Distinctions between writing as an original action—between "scribing" and "de­
scribing"—and all the acts o f writing's redaction (gathering, adaptation, translation in order to get it ready 
for publication) simply did not hold at the time o f  the Sumerian Gilgamesh and its later Babylonian 
versions. Michalowski informs us that "the anonymity o f Mesopotamian literature..." is precisely the kind 
o f  pervasive anonymity that Foucault imagines in 1969 will one day unfold and take hold. Why? How? 
Because it "...provides a marked contrast to the Romantic and post-Romantic concept o f  the author that we 
[in the wake o f  Foucault's anatomy o f  authorship's poltergeists] find so difficult to shake"(l83).
Furthermore, through the deliberate anonymous construction o f  various ancient scholar-scribes, and the 
anonymously intentional destruction o f  those original tablets ("deliberately broken to bits when Nineveh 
was sacked in 612 B.C " Biggs, Xll.), Gilgamesh speaks to us as a "double-voiced discourse,” to adapt a 
phrase from Bakhtin. That is, the singular absence o f  its actual writer(s) provides the transformative link of 
"Gilgamesh" as the central character that epononymously becomes the text's "fundamental" Author. As we 
will see, King Gilgamesh, a mortal character seeking divine immortality, represents the very earliest 
cultural concern with Foucault's paradoxical sense o f Writing as Death's ultimate victimizer o f the 
Immortality it would supposedly confer upon the writer who would be an Author. Truly, if we would 
know the writer o f  our own day, we must, at some level, look back to the beginning o f  writing itself.
The advantage o f starting an anecdotal history o f  the anonymous with a look at passages from the 
Judeo-Christian bible is that it helps to highlight the less obvious intentions and tropes o f anonymity in a 
literary precursor such as Gilgamesh. Regardless o f  anonymity's overwhelming "identity", my argument 
that the writers o f  The Old Testament maintained anonymity in order to foist and foster the delusion o f 
divine authorship is ultimately a thought experiment rather than an empirical conclusion. Foucault's 
themes and theses about authorship serve as speculative instruments that magnify and amplify anonymity's 
visibility or signal strength, but they are not the thing itself, and should never be confused as such. With 
The Epic o f  Gilgamesh the reader might come to conclude that my sense o f  the anonymous is a grasping at 
hermeneutic straw men or a running on Foucauldian fumes. I do believe the reader will be convinced,
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however, o f  the power o f  the principle o f reversal to animate their reception o f this text.
The modem Sumerian scholar S.N. Kramer has already been invoked in a footnote to remind us that 
certain ancient anonymous scholar-scribes of Babylonia nominated one o f their own antecedents as the 
"mediate author" o f Gilgamesh. As his "postmodern successor, Michalowski, makes abundantly clear, 
however,
Sin-leqe-unninni, or someone under such a name, remodeled the older Gilgamesh tale on 
the pattern o f an equally old Naram-Sin text [legendary King considered the "prime writer 
o f his own deeds"] and added a prologue that turned the whole story into a third-person 
autobiography, thus radically changing the whole narrative (187-188).
Kovacs, whose translation we will be using as part o f our anecdotal analysis, extends my argument linking
the narrative innovation o f this "third person" to an anonymous vision, voice, and value—tinat such an
autobiographical presence sprang organically from an all-pervasive anonymous function.
Though Tablet I o f  the Old Babylonian version is not extant, we know that it began at 
line 28 with the traditional royal hymn o f praise. The narrator's opening lines were added 
by a later author who wanted to impart very different values, honoring not Gilgamesh's 
adventures but his achievement o f understanding and humanity (2).
The fact that the name of a scholar-scribe was nominated from among an anonymous collectivity that had
in turn borrowed heavily from anonymous Sumerian sources to create the Babylonian original is o f  course
interesting, given the present thesis. But because "source analysis" is neither my specialty nor the heart of
my obsession, such questions o f historicity pale and fall away in comparison to questions of anonymous
rhetoricity, o f  unidentifiable voices o f author-ity that continue to speak to and resonate with otherwise
incommensurate communities o f interpreters.
My residual passion for literary themes and problems, particularly those that point up the heights and 
depths o f  (mis)understanding and (in)humanity will not go away however. That is why it is important for 
my thesis o f the anonymous-fiinction that Gilgamesh too, according to Kramer, "revolves about forces and 
problems common to [humankind] everywhere through the ages." O f these forces and problems, I will 
focus on "the impelling urge for fame and name", "the all-absorbing fear o f  death," and its binary other, 
"the all-compelling longing for immortality." According to Kramer, it is "the varied interplay o f these 
emotional and spiritual drives in [humankind] that constitutes the drama of the "Epic of Gilgamesh"— 
drama which transcends the confines o f time and space (183). Now that we are familiar with the Hebraic
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concept o f olam  (with its obvious complement to the Greek concept o f kairos) it becomes all the more 
"timely" to consider the possibility that the anonymous-fimction—as an authoritative absence— has a 
timeless role in this sense o f  spatio-temporal transcendence or "presence." In other words, "the impelling 
urge for name and fame" is continuously transgressed by the equally compelling desire (in the form o f  a 
cultural directive) for collaborative namelessness and obscurity.
Before we can get to representative anecdotes that elucidate pet themes and theses, a fuller summary of 
Michalowski's findings on the "third person" autobiographical construction are in order, since such a 
"voice" or tropic projection reminds us of Foucault's idea o f a "third" ego in the structure o f  authorship. It 
should also remind us a bit o f what is going on in the book of Genesis.. As with the epic o f Gilgamesh, 
it is also narrated in the third person. My adaptation o f Foucault's description o f pronoun shifters and their 
relation to the projection o f various "egos” by an "author" purportedly "fundamental," "actual," or 
"mediate," was meant to implement and underscore the projection o f God's "ego." In other words, the 
books o f  Genesis and Exodus are to be treated (by secularists and orthodoxists alike) as a "third-person 
autobiography" o f  "God".
According to Michalowski, where these two grand narratives part company is in the flood story. In 
Gilgamesh, (which is universally agreed upon to be far older than the so called divinely authorized Old 
Testament version featuring Noah and "God"), the flood story "was used for an amazing new narrative 
purpose, one that appears to have been an innovation within Mesopotamian literature" (188). It turns out 
that this innovation was the anonymous deployment o f this "third person autobiography." This primordial 
literary innovation within Gilgamesh uses the autobiography of "Uta-napishtim" (the very first "Noah" 
figure). Without descending into this part of the actual text, it is important to treat this "historicist" 
situation in some detail before considering specific passages that exemplify the themes o f name and fame, 
and o f death and immortality. Micahlowski must be our interpretive guide.
In essence, Michalowski's source analyses enables what he admits to be only an "intuition" that the 
inserted third person autobiography of "Uta-napishtim" "directs Gilgamesh to the ultimate end o f his quest. 
He will achieve immortality only through the epic itself because his immortal fame [and name] will only 
be a function o f  the tale that he will write down with his own hand" (188). O f course, as Michalowski
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knows much better than I, the figure "Gilgamesh" is a character as much or as more as he is an actual 
historical personage. True, there was a King Gilgamesh o f Uruk, who is credited with building the great 
walls o f the city o f Ur (from which we derive the term ur-text.) None o f  the scholarship I have read, 
however, gives credit o f  authorship to " G i l g a m e s h " . ) ^
Taken together, Auerbach, Michalowski, and most recently Gallagher and Greenblatt, help us conclude 
that a millennium o f Mesopotamian, Sumerian, and Babylonian cultural mimesis or "textuality was quite 
specific in its local knowledge and network o f assumptions. As Gallagher and Greenblatt would have it, 
this textuality [was] "not a system distinct from lived experience but an imitation of it, and "imitation" 
(that is, representation) is the principal way human beings come to understand their existence and share it 
with others" (40). As it just so happened for thousands o f years, however, ancient forms o f mimesis, the 
principal way to understand and share—in effect, communicate—were pervasively anonymous.
Rhetorically and historically considered, Gilgamesh does not write down the tale with his own hand, 
but the double anonymous screen o f third person autobiographical positioning projects the mimetic or 
representational sense that "he" did so. The third person autobiography o f "Uta-napishtim" which 
Michalowski writes about occurs deep in the epic, at the end o f the tenth and into the eleventh o f  the 
twelve surviving tablets that comprise The Standard Version. Its appearance is, according to Michalowski, 
unprecedented. It is the first person autobiographical voice which opens the Prologue o f Gilgamesh, 
however—the opening lines which Kovacs attributes to a later anonymous author who wanted to impart a 
very different sense o f vision, voice, and value— that must first concern us.
Even though patch written by a later anonymous writer, it has become the locus o f  all the tablets' 
authority. And though, strictly speaking, this narrative voice cannot be considered "third person 
autobiographical," I consider it, according to a Bakhtininan rhetoric, a superaddressee. In other words, 
there is the person o f "Gilgamesh" ("He who has seen everything"). There is the person o f the writer who is 
speaking to us about this person who has seen everything. Yet if  we follow in the considerable wake o f 
both Foucault's discursive histories and Wayne Booth's The Rhetoric o f  Fiction, we find, first, that author 
and narrator are never one and the same persona. Second, this authorial projection of an "other" voice to 
speak to a reader, is often, according to Booth, an "unreliable narrator" and has been so at least since
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Henry James' fiction. He writes, "Some o f our greatest problems come when we are given another 
character as unreliable as the hero to his ambiguous story" (339).
According to Booth, there is a tendency in modem fiction for such characters to disrupt the "normative" 
function o f  narration which has been regulated by a Western tradition o f "rhetorical purity." This sense of 
extends to narrative vision, voice, and to the (evaluation o f what happens in the story as being consistent, 
ingenuous, trustworthy—in essence "reliable." At some point this reliability is undermined by authorial 
shifts in perspective. Part o f what I am arguing is that the ambiguous figure o f the unreliable narrator so far 
preceded the "modernist" experiments o f James that it can either be likened to the discursive equivalent of 
"the lost wax method" or it is overtly operating in the ancient culture of anonymous discourse that 
produced Gilgamesh, The Odyssey, and The Bible. Furthermore, anonymity transgresses this tradition of 
rhetorical purity even as it underwrites a tradition o f  transcendental author-ity.
Thus, in narrator at the opening of Gilgamesh we surmise that an unknown author (very unreliably 
known as "Sin-leqe-unninni") emended the opening o f Gilgamesh. He or she did so to create a  persona who 
is not writing (his? her?) first person autobiography. He or she is instead addressing a super "third" person 
who is meant to "identical" to the person o f Gilgamesh, that part human, part divine, heroic king. It is 
difficult to rely on this narrator, who is obviously re-presenting "Gilgamesh" as a posthumous figure. But 
because this anonymous narrator is the projection o f  an anonymous author, its double unreliability 
performs a positive reflection or redaction upon the rhetorical position o f the reader in Western history.
Much in the same way that two negatives added together equal a positive number, this superadded 
anonymity paradoxically falls into the sort o f narrative reliability that has constituted the tradition of 
rhetorical purity—or so I would I argue. Moreover, anticipating a Bahktinian rhetoric, these heterogeneous 
of elements o f (un)reliability create the reflexive conditions that (im)personate a reading self. In a very real 
and most lasting sense, then, the originally anonymous narrator envisions, voices, and values the endless 
anonymity o f the reader. The polarity o f these anonymities creates a sense of community, identity, and 
authority which transcends any particular immanence o f authorship —whether original, mediate, or one 
more author-itative translator—and readership.
In this shifting rhetoric o f the anonymous—at once embedded" in all embracing ancient culture of
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anonymity, and floating free as a narrative fixture possibility—we have the "vatic" voice that Eliot and
others have distinguished and that has become a staple assumption o f literary rhetorical analysis. "Vatic"
comes from a long etymological line having to do with a voice or song that is "possessed" somehow 
divinely. It correlates with Bakhtin's sense o f the superaddressee. It also points up anonymity's nomination 
barrier where vision, voice, and value turn the quest(ion)of identity into a transparent veil—an ambi-valence- 
-over someone, anyone who has seen everything, who will make known, who will teach in our own 
alikeness.
As for the actual representative textual anecdote from Gilgamesh, I present two versions. The first is a 
"transformation" by a poet who has no knowledge of the original language. The second is a strict
"translation" by a Mesopotamian scholar, and only one o f two women that I know of, who has rendered
Gilgamesh for the umpteenth time into "authoritative" English.
Fame haunts the man who visits hell, 
who lives to tell my entire tale identically.
So like a sage, a trickster or saint,
GILGAMESH 
was a hero who knew secrets and saw forbidden places, 
who could even speak of the time before the 
Flood because he lived long, learned much, 
and spoke his life to those who first 
cut into clay his bird-like words (Jackson, p.2; 1997).
He who has seen everything, I  will make known (?) to the lands.
I  will teach (?) about him who experienced all things,
...alike,
Anu granted him the totality o f knowledge o f  all.
He saw the secret, discovered the Hidden, 
he brought information o f  (the time) before the Flood.
He went on a distant journey, pushing himself to exhaustion, 
but then was brought to peace.
He carved on a stone stela all of his toils 
and built the wall o f Uruk-Haven (Kovacs, p.3; 1989).21
Our sense o f anonymity's binary other has long since settled upon 'identity," (even as we must try to 
keep in mind that anonymity resists such singular reiteration, that i f  "identity" is its media res, 
"community" is where it begins, and "authority" is its end). Not surprisingly, I am keen on Jackson's use 
o f "identically" and the triple role o f "sage, trickster, saint" used to describe "Gilga" ("mesh" being a 
generic epithet for "hero"), but which also point back to the identity o f  the narrator behind "my tale." 
Kovacs' more strict translation places the first person "I" o f this narrator up front and center, but does not,
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like Jackson, or those I featured in my endnotes, transform "alike" into an identity issue.
Kovacs teaches that this anonymous narrator's addition o f  27 lines, which has managed to displace 
what would be the original start o f  the poem given the loss o f  Tablet I, deviates from the norm o f  ancient 
anonymous authorship, according to Michalowski. As an atmospheric historicist, Michalowski equates 
Gilgamesh’s fame with his ability to write down the tale o f  his quest— to perform the first autobiography. 
The quest for fame is tied up with self-authorization in the form o f  an autobiography whose author-ity 
derives not from a first person, but from a third person point o f view. His argument must lead us, he 
asserts, "back to the beginning o f the text—in Sin-Ieqe-unnini's version—to the fact that whole composition 
is an elaborate naru, a  gigantic royal inscription" (188). (Kovacs and Micahlowski agree that the name 
"Sin-Ieqe-unnini" is not a proper name at all, but is itself pseudonymic cover operation o f what I am 
calling the anonymous function.)
It is to the beginning o f  the text that I have led us, given. Kovacs’ cue about the mediate author. I have 
tried to make clear the rhetorical complexity and effect o f this anonymous text as a projection o f a larger 
cultural discourse o f anonymity. But I am not really up to it and must let Micahlowski confirm, and to 
some extent clarify, what I groping to understand about anonymity writ large, not just in terms of its 
Mesopotamian genesis.
The fact that the whole composition is a gigantic royal inscription, projecting the impression (however 
much obviously "ghost written") that it is the word of Lord Gilgamesh reminds us o f how Genesis is 
assumed to be "the Word o f the Lord." This notion o f super-inscription and o f a superaddressee should tell 
us something too about the rhetorical power and performance o f the anonymous function over the course of 
history, as a force o f history. The parallaxis o f Kovacs’ anonymous narrator and Micahlowski’s thesis of an 
unprecedented third person autobiographical voice can be best understood if we can appreciate, according to 
Michalowski, "the commemorative nature o f first-millennium Babylonian narrative." Like anonymity's 
network terminations o f  community and identity—the "commemorative" nature of Babylonian narrative
authority is rooted in antiquity but [in the opening o f  Gilgamesh] now seeks authors and 
authorities, [and thus] reaches its highest level. It is a matter that we will have to rethink 
in the future, since our own notions of hero, author, and redactor are simply inadequate 
to handle such a situation. The Gilgamesh text is narrated in third person, is ascribed to 
an author named Sin-leqe-unninni, but is actually treated as a third person autobiography 
of Gilgamesh(188).
120
Reproduced  with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
I f  this is not a direct affirmation o f  Booth's "unreliable narrator" thesis, I don't know what is. It also, 
obviously, hurls its innovation as modernist, back to the very beginning o f  narration itself. It is also an 
illustration o f  Foucault's thesis o f  the work and o f whether an anonymous work is not something written 
by a person called an "author." Always accompanying this authorial disappearance is the sure answer that 
the royal work o f inscription bypasses "the individuality o f the writer" who may or may not attain "status 
as an author" (140). I have presented, I think, a fairly persuasive scholarly case that the anonymous 
discourse culture that produced Gilgamesh was in existence to create the illusion that the text is a "giant 
royal inscription."
Furthermore, the narrative voice behind that inscription achieves a "vatic" third person status 
equivalent to that o f the man-god, King Gilgamesh, speaking transdiscursively to all once and future 
readers. That is, the story o f Gilgamesh's story, though unattributable, is not at all unrealiable. Quite the 
contrary, it is highly conscientious—its motive and agency being not "vicious" but "vatic" in the best 
sense, and to a degree that only the anonymous-function can underwrite and thus guarantee. I f  this is be the 
case, then we must reverse our sense that the anonymous-function is an "unreliable" narrative structure 
dedicated to undermining readers' expectations through the kind o f viciousness that Booth describes.
It is not simply that 'the story o f  one's story' [i.e. narrative] has become more than the 
original idea [i.e. motif or theme o f  the story]; that in itself would not necessarily cause 
trouble. But the reflector, [i.e. "narrator"] in becoming inconscient about his own 
motives and about the reality around him, becomes a vicious agent in the story (347).
This is not the say that anonymous writing does not have its share o f  vicious agents (as we will see in the
chapter on "A Pedagogy o f Anonymity"). It is only to say that any consideration o f the rhetoric of ancient
fiction must assume more modernist motives and tendencies.
I will not burden my readers with the Boothian complexity o f the Uta-napishtim third person
autobiography which Gilgamesh listens to so as to Ieam how to achieve an immortality he fails to achieve.
I have been trying to compress a Boothian with a Bakhtinian rhetoric so as to point up Micahlowski's and
Kovacs' conclusions about Gilgamesh : that it ultimately derives the identity o f  its authority from an
anonymous community of scribes. My larger point is that this squaring o f  anonymity with community,
identity, and authority demonstrates the "historicist" credibility o f the anonymous function. A legacy of
individual reliability or autonomous purity was not the primary motives o f  ancient discourse. Immortality
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o f  fame and name were not to be achieved through the named property o f a properly named author's 
work. The work o f  ancient anonymity was not caught up in our more covetous, meretricious—vicious— 
cult(ure) o f  authorship. It was more concerned with a vatic, commemoritorious (a made up word combining 
a "commemorative" and "meritorious") sense o f author-ity.
The End o f Gilgamesh: Anonymous Procreation or Famous Death?
I want to close out this section o f  representative anecdotes in pursuit o f the anonymity o f  Gilgamesh with a 
cue from Kramer as quoted above—the interlocked problem o f  fame, name, death, immortality. If I intuit 
his universal thematic appeal argument for this epic correctly, he would, I think, conclude that the 
humanity and understanding to be found between two male characters who are the true prototypes for the 
"buddy film" lies ultimately in this epic's depiction of death/"hell." Gligamesh is, in Jackson's words, 
literature's "first recorded vision o f  afterlife (91). This takes place in the final. Twelfth Tablet. Gilgamesh 
visits his dearly departed friend Enkidu in hell. (Thus Jackson's poetic license in transforming the epic into 
an "envelope" with hell in the first line.) The reader is led at first to believe that Gilgamesh, though he has 
lost both his friend, and the secret o f  eternal life, has at least his fame and name inscribed upon the walls 
o f the city he built. Whereas, for Enkidu,
Hell became his home
.... Not even the soldier's death-in-battle,
with all its false and phony honor,
helped Enkidu. Death just swallowed him, unrecognized (93-94).
In this passage we can see the eschatological linkage between death and anonymity which can not but 
underwrite perennialist attitudes regarding fame, name, and Authorship in whose hold the individual, who 
holds a ticket o f passage of whatever class, might sail immortality's vast ocean. The unpublished work of 
mere writers gets swallowed, unrecognized. But if Foucault is to be believed, the work o f  the author is no 
less a death wish. More interesting, though, is the conversation Gilgamesh and Enkidu have when the 
former is permitted a short visit with his dead friend in hell. Gilgamesh, though utterly grief-stricken, is 
curious about death and identity:
Speak to me please, dear brother, 
whispered Gilgamesh.
Tell me o f death and where you are (95).
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Gilgamesh then asks Enkidu a series o f questions that revolve around the requirements and meaning of 
lasting fame. Most pointedly is his question about fatherhood, since Gilgamesh is remembered as the 
builder o f  the walls o f  Uruk (where, as we saw above, the story o f his story is meant to be imagined as 
inscribed as an U r-text). Nowhere in the Epic o f Gilgamesh is there mention o f a genealogical or even a 
patriarchal legacy as with the "heroic" characters in Genesis or Exodus. As we will see, it is the mother of 
Gilgamesh, Ninsun, who "affirms the centrality o f  family and kin to human life, the importance o f the 
private sphere to men who dominate the public sphere" (harris, 81). But once in hell, a different form of 
fame haunts Gilgamesh, the man, who has failed in his quest to become a god. He asks Enkidu: "Did you 
see there a man who never fathered any child?" And Enkidu answers: "I saw there a no-man who died." 
Back and forth, Gilgamesh asks about men who did or did not father, beginning with one child, and 
ending with seven children. Enkidu's answer is always joy for the father, and the anonymous loneliness 
for the childless man, ending with the immortality o f  the fully familied man, as in,
"And could you find a man with six or seven boys?"
"You could and they are treated as the gods" (95).
Given our ongoing dialectic between a transcendental and a transactional level o f  the anonymous, this 
final tablet o f  Gilgamesh is quite telling. It tells us that he has perhaps botched his quest for fame and 
name. He wore himself out seeking the secret o f immortality. The only immortality he will achieve is 
having a giant royal inscription inside a wall o f his own purported construction. The stories he hears in 
hell add up to a very different name for fame: the anonymous heroism of having and raising a family.
The dramatic poignancy of this last tablet is considerable, even if it did not bear so directly on my 
thesis as it is developed in later chapters. Even more to the historicist point o f my thesis is the fact that 
this last tablet is often disdained and rejected by many translators because it is by another anonymous 
community o f  patchwriters come-Iately (some few centuries hence). Kovacs, honoring the rules o f a strict 
historical translation, leaves it out. Jackson, o f a more poetic sensibility, perhaps understands the theme of 
rhetorical indifference—"What matters who's speaking?—how it manages, under condition o f  anonymity, to 
reverse the apathy (more toward a-pathos ) o f academic attributive authority into the poignancy of 
identity's common composition.
The paternalism o f this dialogue in hell permits us to point our consideration o f Gilgamesh in another
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direction: the historical anonymity o f Woman. Michalowski is quite explicit about this when he traces 
the exceptions to the pervasive authorial anonymity in Mesopotamia. Significantly, these exceptions 
involve five texts by two women writers: Enheduana and Lu-Inanna, both priestesses. Given the pervasive 
anonymity and pseudonymity o f  the time, Micahlowski stresses that "there is no assurance that [either 
woman] was truly the author o f  these pieces." He concludes this way: "The uniqueness o f these claims of 
authorship only serves to underline the anonymity o f Sumerian literature" (184). What is perhaps an 
extreme case o f waving a weak hermeneutic flashlight at such dark Sumerian stars, I want to pursue the 
anonymity o f  Gilgamesh in a more historicist-feminist direction, than that supplied by humanists like 
Kramer, or translators like Jackson.
The more poignant, "counterhistorical", and atmospherically anonymous alternative for closing out our 
analysis o f  Gilgamesh rests with the cue provided by Michalowski. He finds in the uniqueness of 
Sumerian claims to authorship by a couple of temple priestesses underlines the anonymity o f  Sumerian 
literature generally. What I find in his finding is the overwhelming identity of woman becoming 
progressively—historically—anonymous. In "The Marginalization o f  the Goddesses," Tikva Frymer-Kensky 
clearly shows how
[t]his diminution o f the goddesses continued and intensified in the Old Babylonian 
periods and later. There are very few stories about females in Akkadian literature, [the 
official scholarly term for the discursive culture in which Gilgamesh appears] and those 
females who do appear are generally in ancillary roles and in stereotypical figures of 
mother, advisor, and temptress (97).
After listing all "the major female figures o f  Sumerian literature [that] have shrunk [into sexual consorts] or
disappeared" into that immanence that has come to mark Woman as Anonymous under The Name o f the
Father, Frymer-Kensky tells us that finally, "Nisaba's role as goddess o f writing and patron o f scribal
schools was taken over by [the male god] Nabu" (97). With this poignant historical background before us,
it is fitting that I summarize Rivkah Harris' "Images o f Women in the Gilgamesh Epic," since it engages in
the sort o f counter-historical activity o f the new historicism and draws on Foucault's principle o f reversal in
the bargain—what she calls "symbolic inversion."
True to Frymer-Kinsky’s findings, Harris finds that "[t]he adventures o f  the heroes [Gilgamesh and 
Enkidu] preclude a primary role for women. In their dialogue in hell, only fathers and sons, not mothers
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and daughters, are linked to a legitimate sense o f fame, name, and immortality. The force o f the 
feminine, and the function o f women, are confined to that of "intercessors, playing intermediary roles"(79). 
It turns out, however that two o f the women, "wives," are significantly anonymous, whereas two 
prostitutes are given names and are thus elevated in status. Harris believes this role/status reversal— 
"symbolic inversion1'— to be "[a] crucial element in the epic" and constitutes the earliest instance o f such 
inversion. Quoting Barbara Babcock, editor o f  the study, The Reversible World: Symbolic Inversion in Art 
and Society, Harris defines symbolic inversion as
any act o f  expressive behavior which inverts, contradicts, abrogates, or in some fashion 
presents an alternative to commonly held cultural codes, values and norms be they 
linguistic or artistic, religious or social or political (81).
We can ignore the general conclusion that anonymity is just such an "act o f  expressive behavior," that it
presents a pervasive discursive alternative to all codes, values and norms, yet remains unacknowledged.
Gilgamesh, however, much like the smaller o f Burke's two concentric circles, is symbolic reversion's ur
text operating within the much wider transdiscursive orbit that is the anonymous function.
Nor, I think, is this symbolic reversion reserved for marginal female characters. The liberties which 
Jackson takes in his opening trinity o f epithets for Gilgamesh—"sage, trickster, saint"—wittingly reinforce 
this sense o f reversion, particularly its most telling form—"the comic principle o f  inversion which involves 
a sudden, comic switch o f expected roles" (Harris, 81). I say comic because the original epithet, the one 
that opens most translations o f Gilgamesh is "He who has seen everything." That this great hero, in hell, is 
shown to have been quite blind as to what is important for posterity, certainly reverses the epic's dominant 
m otif that an anonymous "fame" does not haunt, but instead insures, the act o f  "inscription" or ecriture. 
(Or, ever mindful o f Foucault's own principle o f reversal, Writing itself haunts the author's "work" insuring 
the anonymity o f its fame.)
But rather than stand on Harris' feminist shoulders to wave my dim flashlight at the male stars of 
Gilgamesh, I wish to conclude where she does, but with an additional twist that the anonymous function 
always exerts. Harris has managed to notice something about the female characters in the epic o f Gilgamesh 
that nearly two hundred years o f  male translation and commentary has been blind to and reduced to the 
depressingly familiar binocularism o f the Mother/Whore spectrum.
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Relying on Hannah Arendt’s distinction between the private and the public as detailed in The Human 
Condition, Harris reminds us that ”[b]oth prostitute and tavemkeeper belong to the extra-domestic 
domain; both were important in the leisure activities o f Mesopotamian men." But, unlike the two wives 
in the epic, the innkeeper and the prostitute are both named, "given individuality and personhood” (82). 
According to Harris, this comic inversion must have been enormously amusing to Mesopotamian 
audiences (at least the men.)
On the other hand "[tjhe two married women in Gilgamesh, the wife o f Utnapishtim [the only mortal
to have achieved immortality and whose third person autobiography so complicates the narrative] and the
Scorpion-man's wife, are unnamed , anonymous creatures" (84). As far as I can interpret, Harris does not
find this side of the inversion comic. From my point o f view it is nothing if  not inversely, —and perhaps
perversely— poignant in that from the rhetorical position o f their anonymity they ensure that Gilgamesh
carries on his quest. Utnapishtim's wife gives Gilgamesh bread after he fails the sleep test that would
grant him eternal life. The Scorpion-man's wife recognizes that Gilgamesh is part human and convinces
her husband to assist him in his river passage. In these inversions I see the earliest instance of an
anonymous heroism that became, in a modem example, the unspoken maxim of George Eliot’s fiction.
Harris concludes her fine investigation with a question
The Gilgamesh Epic informs and reveals cultural stereotypes and ideals, perhaps 
even the irretrievable life experiences of its authors), but what can it inform us 
about everyday life?
My answer relies, like so much of my interpretive momentum, on the metonymic function. Given the 
presence and power of the anonymous function (a presence I don't think Harris has adequately perceived 
in her interpretation), the question should end as "but what can the Gilgamesh Epic inform us about the 
anonymity of everyday life?" Rephrased thus, I think it teaches us far more than the nomination barriers 
that were erected by the later authors o f the books of Genesis and Exodus. Also, with the interpolation o f 
"anonymity" we have a reconfirmation o f the discursive "anonymous heroism" that motivated the epic's 
authors. That much of what has passed for a pervasive eveiyday anonymity has been the resort and role 
o f women is not a comedic, but a tragic, representative anecdote, one that is only glanced at in the even 
more patriarchaUy charged books o f the Bible. My present scope does not permit consideration of Beck’s 
analysis of the “discipleship paradigm.” If it did, we would come to realize that in the books o f The Hew
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Testament the figure o f the anonymous womatn returns with a poignancy that, as we have seen, has its 
genesis in Gilgamesh. In the interim, we will ttum  to an anecdote o f  the anonymous that represents its 
invulnerability and/or injury, but also symboliizes the "eye" o f  anonymity's discursive hurricane of 
centrifugal forces (the discourse o f Authority), ancS centripedal forces (the Discourse o f  Identity).
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The Odvssev o f Anonvmitv
“Nobody is hurting me”: Enlightenment and Anonymity
In our analysis o f the anecdote from Homer’s Odyssey, in which Odysseus cunningly saves himself from 
the Iiteralist Cyclops, Polyphemus, who had promised to eat “Udeis” (NoBody ) last, I will draw from 
several o f these Foucauldian themes simultaneously to confirm and extend a now famous reading o f  the 
same passage by the critical theorists Max Horkheimer and Theodor Adomo in their Dialectic o f  
Enlightenment.
If I were to apply any one o f  Focuault’s themes, It would involve the performative feature o f what I call 
the anonymous-function (which, in principle, reverses the author-function.) It seems clear enough that 
Odysseus’ adoption o f the protective and projective pseudonym “Udeis”—Nobody— is also an introjective 
anonym. It points ironically to his own properly named status as very much a Somebody—dispersing Ideal 
Ego #1 within the epic itself. Ideal Ego #2 is Odysseus as a key Authority figure in the mythic and ethical 
lifeworld of Ancient Greek culture. In terms o f our “Western Canonical Tradition,” the cunningly character 
o f “Odysseus/Udeis” created by the Homeric author-function, (since we have no substantive knowledge of 
a personal author, “Homer”), begins to iconically blend, or stand in, with an anonymous Homeric 
Tradition, such that the duplicity o f  Nobody/Somebody effect becomes the original dispersion o f Ideal Ego 
#3 from the anonymous-function o f rhetorical indifference: “What matter who’s speaking?”
But I will not pursue this line o f  analysis. I am more interested in tracing some of the isssues o f 
identity and duplicity, impersonation and authenticity, suggested by this Homeric anecdote. For they help 
us to better build a case for the pedagogical use of anonymity as a rhetoric o f  community in which the 
disappearance o f Somebody becomes the problematic opening within a course of composition where 
Everybody is reading what Nobody is writing. The purported author o f The Odysey occupies a different 
category of authorial anonymity than o f  that o f Gilgamesh or o f Genesis in that he is named. The name of 
"Homer" remains, however, a textbook illustration o f what Foucault means by the problem of the author's 
proper name. A recent article in U.S. News &World Report (July, 2000) reveals a growing popular 
fascination with issues o f authorial attribution and authenticity that have been "business as usual" at least 
since the time of Nietzsche, and other 19th century founders o f philological analysis. The article, by Jay
128
R eproduced  with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
Tolson, is a vulgar, and therefore quite useful, reduction o f the scholarly “problem” o f  authorial 
attribution. As part o f  a series the magazine inaugurated around the hype o f “miilenium fever” titled 
Mysteries o f  H istory the title poses this question: ‘Was Homer a solo act o f a bevy o f  bards?” The subtitle 
reads: “Classicists have few  clues but lots o f  theories” (39).
What’s most useful about the article is the way Tolson handles the historical literature on the identity 
o f  Homer—the living individual/personal author. Fifth Century Greeks had long since accepted the legend 
that Homer was a blind itinerant performer who lived, according to the notorious historical fictions of 
Herodotus, “400 years before my time—and no more than that” (Tolson, 39). No one ever doubted 
Homer’s standing as personal author and “sole creator” o f the epics that have come down to us until the 
early 18th century when Vico, extending the work o f  Bacon, began seriously upsetting canonical and 
curricular assumptions about Traditional Author-ity that would reach its satirical epitome with Swift’s The 
Battle o f the Books. Tolson skips this part o f  the disagreement over Homeric Authority to focus on the late 
20Ul century.
We have scholars like Barry Powell who theorize an “ ‘Adapter’ —the recorder o f Homer’s works”— 
versus Robert Fagles, the reigning king o f Homeric translators who operates more on “feeling” that Homer 
was sole creator (39). What I find interesting in this struggle of theory and feeling about original versus 
evolutionary authorship is how it conforms to what we saw in Forster’s distinction between the 
“information” and the “atmosphere” of author-ity. To say that one can’t believe there was more than one 
“Homer,” or that one fee ls  the work of many hands is, I believe andfeel, a confirmation o f the anonymous 
function.
Aside what one or we might believe or feel, the information we do seem to have at present The 
Odyssey, as we have come to know it in its many translations from "the original,” is itself a collection or 
composite o f  at least two texts—one truly primordial, the other more recent, as in "ancient." From the 
Ancient Greek, meaning "scraped again," the continuously erased and rescribed parchment manuscripts of 
The Odyssey —as well as those of the Old Testament and Gilgamesh—by unnamed and unknown hands 
("Manuscribers"), can be seen in the patched palimpsestic writing of "Homeric" "mythic" and "epic" genres 
spanning centuries o f "...a histrorical process which can still be discerned where the disparate elements of 
the Odyssey have been editorially reconciled" (Horkheimer and Adorno, 43). We haven't the space or scope 
to consider, however, this complexity of "blurred genres" supporting "blurred author-ities" amounting to
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anonymity's function as a  transhistorical palimpsest.
In our final anecdotal approach towards a history o f anonymity, we will focus on the name which 
Odysseus uses to deceive a one-eyed, flesh-eating, immortal demiurge—the Cyclops named Polyphemus. 
We will lean heavily on Horkheimer’s and Adorno's chapter, "Odysseus or Myth and Enlightenment" in 
their now famous treatise, Dialectic o f  Enlightenment. As with so much of my research into critical 
literature that supports my thesis o f an anonymous function, Dialectic o f  Enlightenment neither mentions 
the words "anonymous," or "anonymity," nor treats, in even an indirect way, their functions. Nevertheless, 
as founder's of what we have come to call "critical theory, Horkheimer and Adomo link the instrumental 
rationality of the Enlightenment subject to what they call "...the sophistic double-entendre of Odysseus' 
false name" (65). This, as we shall see, confirms much o f what I have been trying to demonstrate as 
anonymity's ever-present function as a problematic solution o f nominalist consciousness itself.
Simply put, the concept o f Enlightenment Reason—starting with Bacon and finding fruition in
Kant—“ ...has always aimed at liberating men [ric] from fear and establishing their sovereignty”
(Horkheimer and Adomo, 3). This primal fear o f primitive humans was directed at Nature, its awesome
forces. Such terror gradually coalesced into reverence, and reverence into myth-making, magic, and the
religious impulse—to literally “bind” the individual to the natural. Horkheimer and Adomo sum up the
relation of terror to the sacred and therefore to the emergence o f  language as the original utterance o f Self-
Other identification in a  new nominalist consciousness this way.
The gasp o f surprise which which accompanies the experience o f  the unusual becomes its 
name. It fixes the transcedence o f the unknown in relation to the known, and therefore 
terror as sacredness (15).
Anonymous Nature, the Great Unknown (because Unidentical, Utterly Other and therefore reciprocally 
Unspeakable/Unnameable, but gradually identified in mythic, religious, and scientific versions o f reason as 
a literal coming to terms), underscores the Known as a series o f tentative nominations “...as evidence for 
an Other...[in which language expresses the contradiction that something is itself and at one and the same 
time something other than itself, identical and not identical” (15).
In other words, we are back to the philosophical discourse o f the Origin—o f Identity, Authority,
Community. With this attempt at sketching the primordial function o f  anonymity in relation to the
emergence of language as the technology o f self-preservation and affirmation, o f sameness amidst sheer,
contingent difference, Horkheimer and Adomo posit “Odysseus” as “ ...a  prototype of the bourgeois
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individual, a notion originating in the consistent self-affirmation which has its anicent pattern in the 
figure of the protagonist compelled to wander” (43).
What these two thinkers go on to argue in “Odysseus or Myth and Englightenment” is that this 
prototypical actor/seeker after sovereignty, o f freedom from Natural Terror, in fact “ ...loses himself in order 
to find himself.” And, given the confusion and conflation o f  older mythic texts with later epic texts that 
comprise the books o f The Odyssesy, we see that, “[a]t the Homeric level, the identity o f  the self is so 
much a function o f  the unidentical, of dissociated, unarticulated myths, that it must derive itself from 
those myths (48). That is, the identity o f the self must derive itself from the anonymous function.
But how does this prototypical, this new, self in the character o f Odysseus accomplish this leap from 
undifferentiated anonymity into self-nominative identity, autonomy, and therefore authority? How does the 
“self’ (autos)— the “I”—which “Homer” introduces in relation to Odyssesus’ encounter with Polyphemus 
make itself Other to the natural order of otherness represented by the Cyclops? “Artifice is the means by 
which the adventuring self loses itself in order to preserve itself’ (49). That is, Odysseus, as the prototype 
o f enlightened self-consciousness, deceptively, but protectively calls himself “Udeis” (No Body ) when he 
realizes that he might not survive the encounter with Polyphemus, that his body would be eaten as a 
sacrifice to expiate his original sin against Poseidon, father o f the Cyclopes. Here is the key passage from 
The Odyssey.
You, Cylops, asked my worthy name. This I will tell, 
and you must give to me, as promised, your guest gift.
My name is "Udeis". Odysseus is what I am called 
by mother and by father and by all my friends.'
Later, the blinded, agonized Cyclopes reports to his fellows on who put out his eye.
'Friends, NoBody ["Udeis"] slays me by deceit; there 
was no force."
And they, in turn, replied to him with these winged 
words:
'If Nobody there to you, alone, does violence, 
can you escape the sickness Zeus imposed on you?'
Recounting this story to his hosts, the Phoenecians, who had asked this "Udeis" (this "NoBody") to
identify himself after his incognito story of linguistic conning and self-preservative cunning, Odysseus
finishes his allegory o f  anonymity with this comment: "Now thus the Cyclopes spoke and left, and in my
heart I laughed that name and clever scheme had so deceived them all."
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One direction we might take in understanding how the anonymous function operates in this famous 
passage from one o f the founding texts o f  Western literature is to look at its relation to what Judith Butler 
calls "linguistic "vulnerability." As we will see below, Odysseus' superior sense o f an Austinian "how to 
do things with words" makes the Cyclops linguistically vulnerable to the homonymic blurring between the 
name o f the hero, "Odysseus" and that o f  "Udeis" (NoBody). The use o f  the anonymous function to protect 
his identity (and his life) is a case o f  what I call anonymity’s rhetorical immunity or, to modify Butler, 
"linguistic invulnerability."
The irony o f the blind Polyphemus bellowing for help—"Nobody is hurting me"—and receiving none 
because of the non-descript, essentially anonymous, name Odysseus has used to identify himself is an 
exquisite, excruciating irony. It reminds that excitable, and "injurious speech" (Butler) is always possible 
under conditions o f anonymity, even as it protects (in this case, justifiably) the identity o f the speaker. In 
my reading of the Odyssesus/Udeis duplicity we see not only the transgressive power o f naming as 
underwritten by anonymity, but their "traumatic" (Butler) power. The scope o f this study, however, cannot 
take up the ethics o f anonymity's relation to traumatic substitution, linguistic (in)vulnerability and 
injurious speech.22
In effect, what Horkheimer and Adomo refer to as “the sophistic double-entendre o f  Odysseus’ false 
name,” is both a no-name and one phonically self-same to his actual name. It the metonymic epitome of 
what I have been calling the variable and pervasive functionality o f  anonymity, of its play across the 
founding discourses o f modernity and “enlightenment”—so-called.23 Odysseus’ self-sacrifice through the 
serious play o f anonymizing while metonymizing his own name, confirms his standing characterization as 
being “cunning.” For Horkheimer and Adomo, this nominalist, calculating consciousness—its “deceit and 
artifice” (50)—is at the center o f enlightenment rationality. There also, at this originating, radiating center, 
is the dialectic o f  self-mastery through self-renunciation which Foucault made much of, and which we saw 
as integral to Nikolas Roses’ attempt at a  “genealogy o f subjectification” or “a history o f the person,” the 
sources and technologies of authority that make for personality and inter-subjectivity. Again, uncannily, 
Horkheimer and Adomo ramp up, forty years earlier, to this same sort o f  genealogical approach in their
“critical” theory o f  the Odysseus myth o f rationality through anonymity.
The calculation that, once blinded, Polyphemus would answer his tribesman’s question
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[“Who is hurting you, brother?’] as to the source o f this anguish with the word “Nobody!”
-thus concealing the deed and helping the guilty man to escape punishment— is only a 
thin rationalistic covering (67).
That is, Horheimer and Adomo need to remind us that Odysseus’ new found authority in playing the 
dialectic o f  enlightenment within vicious/virtuous circles within circles o f  imitation and deception, of 
identity and anonymity, that he will end in an extreme form o f self-authorization—/zwirir. It is a neat 
ethical turn, for they want to instruct the reader that the dialectic o f enlightenment, the mastery o f nature 
through various forms o f renunication and deception o f  otherness, has brought as much loss in reason as it 
has gained for civilization.
In their focus on the deception and artifice in the nominalized identity crisis between Odysseus as 
Somebody who becomes Nobody in order to survive as Somebody, Horkheimer and Adomo see our way 
past Odysseus’ consummate impersonation as finally anonymous, a Nobody, whose enlightened self- 
interest saves him from the fate of his consumed companions.
In reality, the subject Odysseus denies his own identity, which makes him a subject, and 
keeps himself alive by imitating the amorphous [more toward anonymous non-identity of 
Nature]. He calls himself Nobody because Polyphemus is not a self, and the confusion of 
name and thing prevents the deceived savage from evading the trap...(67).
Odysseus’ adroit use o f the anonymous function as a technology of self-mastery (through a tight orbit of
nominal renunciation, enuciation, and denunciation) can be seen as maladroit and arrogant according to
Horkheimer and Adomo. For it must be remembered that once he has escaped the cave o f  the now blinded
Polyphemus, Odyssesus taunts the Cyclops, revealing anonymous concealment by yelling “..his real name
and his origin” (68). This is an act o f hubris—of insolence—and therefore o f nominalist stupidity rather than
one o f anonymous author-ity, as I read and adapt the endlogic o f Horkheimer and Adomo. Their conclusion
is that, "...once having been known as nobody, lest he again become nobody, he must restore his own
identity with the magic word [that is "Udeis" now reintonated to sound like Odysseus ] already dissociated
from rational identity" (68).
This is indeed an act o f hubris in that Poseidon hears the name Odysseus rather than "Udeis" and 
pursues him once again with renewed vengeance. And, in perhaps their most insightful take on the 
Homeric anonymous function as it supports and subverts the author-ity of the proper name, they cap their
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charge of hubris this way: "The cunning o f  th e  clever man who assumes the form of stupidity turns to 
stupidity as soon as he surrenders that form. That is the dialectic o f  eloquence" (68). In other words, 
Odyssesus, a man, a King, in fact, who understands words, their distance from things, how they can refer 
to many things at once, or to no thing at all_  just a stream of other words, very rationally—cunningly 
(literally "knowingly")— nominates the word inr closest proximity to his own proper name. A cunning King 
suddenly becomes a stupid non-descript non-p*erson—Nobody— with the slightest inflection o f his own 
proper name.
In the technology o f self-affirmation as renunciation that his practice o f  the anonymous function 
literally proto-types, the character Odysseus/Ud*eis had been relying on sophrosyne— the opposite o f hubris. 
That is, however cunning and deceptive, the artifice o f his double name game o f protecting a heroic 
Somebody behind a vulnerable Nobody in ordenr to reproject himself as heroic Somebody, was an act not of 
insolence but o f the highest discretion and prudience. The anonymous function becomes a form of stupidity 
in the deepest sense: it is a act o f astonishment*, amazing the un-worded, in-eloquent Polyphemus. But as 
soon as Odysseus indiscreetly, arrogantly dropsj the anonymous persona, he has committed a "stupid" act 
in the worst sense. The sophrosyne of the anonymously functioning Nobody turns to the hubris o f the 
properly named hero, Odysseus.
Thus, the anonymous function, as I read Horkheimer and Adorno’s reading o f  this anecdote, is at the 
center of what they are calling the "the dialectic: o f eloquence" in which the authority and authenticity of 
discourse are in continuous, inter-subjective tension, in much the same way that Forster's twin functions of 
language as information and language as atmosphere inform his inquiry into anonymity. The charged 
atmosphere of Odysseus' properly named heroine, yet hubristic authority is a surface whose anonymous 
depth is the authentic (as in sophrosynically "prudent") information of being Noman, Nobody.
This problem between authenticity and auOthority and their relation to anonymity's proper-improper 
naming, its person-impersonating, or mask-unmasking effect has been picked up as we saw above by 
Thomas Docherty. In Part Two of his study, M odem Authority titled "Natural Authority" (in which 
"Natural" is x'd over), Docherty genealogically traces this problematic relation o f  authority in a Chapter 
titled "The Impossibility o f Authenticity." Whatt he has to say about the impossibility of authenticity by
134
R eproduced  with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
the time we get to the age o f  Shakespeare (speaking o f a problem o f author-ity) is already well under way 
at the Homeric origin o f  literature.
To impersonate another person, as Shakespearean twins demonstrate, is to question the 
very individuality o f  the person thus duplicated. As a result, the question o f  the 
authenticity o f  the 'original' is raised. When one person stops imitating or impersonating 
another, she or he does not return to an authentic selfhood, but returns instead to an 
impersonation o f  the 'originary’ self.
It would seem that Horkheimer and Adomo get close to "the secret o f  the universe" as Forster put it, by
noting Odysseus' originating play o f nominalist self-consciousness through the impersonation o f Nobody.
The reader will remember that Forster speaks o f a "lower personality" a "down there" where there are no
names. Horkheimer and Adomo posit a self for Odyssesus but no self for Polyphemus. The Odyssean self,
built on the impersonation o f  an originary non-identity, are one and the same for them.
Odyssesus' two contradictory actions in his encounter with Polyphemus, his answering 
to the name, and his disowning it, are neverthelessone. He acknowledges himself to 
himself by denying himself under the name Nobody; he saves his life by losing himself 
(60).
Thus if we follow Docherty's alignment o f "an authentic selfhood" with the problem o f an author-itative 
impersonation or impersonation o f authority, we end up wondering with him whether "...there arises a 
realization that the question o f an originary source becomes simply unanswerable: an essential nature gives 
way entirely to the play...of artifice...which might be called duplicity" (214). And then we find ourselves 
with back with H&A critically theorising that Odysseus' orginating "[a]rtifice is the means by which the 
adventuring self loses itself in order to preserve itself' (49).
If this literally original—author-itative—characterization o f Odysseus is to be taken as the prototype of 
an authentic, intersubjective self-identity, then the function o f anonymity in what "might be called [its] 
duplicity" is rather incontrovertible. This possibility of an orginating anonymous duplicity is itself a 
sophistic double entendre, since we have no authentic sense o f  who Homer was, only the knowledge that 
the character o f Odysseus created under the authoritative name o f  Homer is an authentic prototype o f self- 
other duplicity.
135
Reproduced  with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
Conclusion to Chapter Three 
Anonymous duplicity brings me, by way o f  a conclusion, to the observation o f  Walter Benjamin, a fellow 
member o f the original group o f  critical theorists founded by Horkheimer and Adomo. "The authenticity of 
a thing is the essence o f all that is transmissible from its beginning—.Since the historical testimony rests 
on the authenticity...what is really jeopardized when the historical testimony is affected is the authority o f 
the object" (852). The "author-ity" o f  the object The Odyssey, much like that o f  The Book o f Genesis and 
The Epic o f Gilgamesh, is really not a problem. Nor is the respective "authenticity" o f their characters 
operating across a range o f nomination barriers and anonymous contact zones, as we have seen. The 
problem lies in the function o f  anonymity within the double—or duplicitous—discourse o f authority and 
authenticity.
It is a problem, I am arguing, because, we don't wish to believe that the irresolution and duplicity of 
discursive anonymity explains the continuing centrality o f Foucault's author-function. Nor do we wish to 
consider that if that function is to be denominated as central, (as Anis Bawarshi, a worker in the field of 
composition-rhetoric, does by renominating "the genre function" in its place), then it is the anonymous 
function that enables whatever substitution or displacement we might become enamored o f as authentic and 
authoritative. As a matter o f fact, I can't name a single person who might concur—making me quite certain 
that absolutely Nobody believes in the authentic and original authority o f  anonymity.
The anonymous function comes down to merely a "rhetorical question" that is effectively unanswerable 
in terms o f its historical testimony:" What matters who is speaking?" The answer to this question matters 
very much indeed, as we will now see in Chapter Four, where the matter o f connecting the speaker and the 
spoken is not one o f rhetorical indifference at all to the one or to those who are the "spoken to." Identity, 
Authority, their problematic origins and authenticity are ultimately connected to the concerns o f a 
community, and of specifc "audiences," be these listeners, readers, or viewers.
My consideration o f the inter-related problems of authority and authenticity as ones that cannot be fidly 
understood without accounting for the largely unaccountable presence and influence of an anonymous 
function will now turn, then, to the problematic anonymity o f community, and o f  the audience function. 
"The murmumr of indifference" that Foucault says accompanies Beckett's unanswerable question, "What 
matters who's speaking?" is countered rhetorically by a question of community in the form of a declaration: 
What matters is: who's listening? The disconnection between the anonymous speaker/writer and the
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spoken/written emphasizes the linkage between community—as a special conception o f the 
Listener—and anonymity—as a special conception o f  the Other. We now take up this issues as one 
intimately linked to the meaning and function o f  community in Chapter Four, ‘Towards a Rhietoric of 
Anonymity.” Bakhtin can help us understand stand that community is a kind o f identity sshield or 
immunity from the discourse o f author-ity, and that the rhetorical immunity at the operative centner o f the 
anonymous function has much to do with what has come to be called a zone o f contact between ax Writing 
Self and its Other.
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Chapter Notes
*As we will see in Chapter Five, the linkage o f the anonymous pastoral practice o f confession, for 
example, to that o f an expressivist approach to composition under conditions o f  anonymous writing 
problematizes the practice o f  actual and imagined authority in the composition course. This is especially 
apparent in a course that values both named and unnamed texts within face-to-face orientations o f  group 
discussion o f both kinds o f  writing.
2
Looking ahead from the present problem of compositional author-ity to that of the composition 
community, many o f my composition colleagues were hostile to my use o f  anonymous writing, I believe, 
because they were similarly invested in the sacrosanct and monumental tradition o f  the author-ftmction. 
Not really committed to personal writing, they often used author-driven belles letters anthologies to teach 
composition. They therefore uncritically, or at least to some extent, unconsciously, transferred and 
projected this "author-tarian" conception o f  writing into their own positions o f  authority as teachers o f 
composition in charge o f giving students a dubious "ownership" o f  their texts. Thus, they might have 
conceived o f my anonymous pedagogy as a literal "defacement" o f  the subject position of the "student" and 
his or her "personal" investment as a writer "speaking" to a reading "audience." It did not matter to them 
that the ethos of the situation in which students' anonymous writing was re-presented and commonly 
shared was hardly faceless, for I required that all students discuss in face-to-face interactions the exigent 
senses o f  authority named in the writing  as it transgressed self-other identifications, not the contingent 
identities o f the writers so un-properly named. Reactionary colleagues were not as concerned with an 
expressivist identity crisis, as they were with what anonymity might present for them as a crisis o f theft- 
own authority.
3
Even though my analysis o f  the presence o f the anonymous function in Ancient Author-ities deals with 
supposedly Male writers—"God," Gilgamesh, Homer— I try to identify the authority o f Anonymity as 
always provoking the voice, image, and im-proper name o f Woman as Author. The (fe)male author, always 
on the original anonymous margins o f  the history o f authorship, gradually—ironically— augments the 
problematic center o f author-ity until writing does become a Utopian province o f  meaning, a passionate 
enclave for anyone, everyone—an erewhon available to the anonymous No One writers and readers become 
in the anonymous textuality o f history itself.
^More precisely and more complexly, Anonymous becomes the nomenclature for all pseudonyms that have 
ever been used in place o f  an "actual" proper name that the individual, for various personal, social, 
rhetorical, ideological, and economic reasons, has determined must remain invisible, in suspended 
animation, and most important, not so much without a discourse o f  author-ity, but functionally distant 
from what it nominates. If  the so called "nomination barrier" is perfected by the writers o f the book of 
Genesis it was—theoretically— invented by the nameless scribes who figured out from the Phoenicians how 
to alphabetize oral discourse. Horkheimer and Adorno, as we will see when we look at The Odyssey, 
speculate that the first Ur-Writer who transcribed the oral poems o f  the unknown personal author, "Homer" 
(or whatever nameless group o f listeners who connected the spoken with a speaker so named), discovered 
"nominalism" out o f the literal "formalism" of the words “scribed” onto parchments that became 
palimpsests—literally "scraped again and again" over generations o f  revision and redaction. Thus, these 
Homeric Adapters (or re/de-scribers) realized in breaching the nomination barrier that they had not only 
transgressed the oral and the written, they had crossed erasure and rescription. In doing so, they exposed 
"..the fact that they [words] distance themselves from every fulfilling content, and at a distance refer to 
every possible content—to Nobody [“Udeis] as to Odysseus" [Wandering Hero] (60).
5 The ethos or ethical principle governing the teaching o f composition extends across the disciplines. That 
is, it matters very much indeed who’s speaking or writing, to which audience/readership, and that together 
this basic rhetorical relation (which is essentially grounded in the metaphysics o f presence, and out of that 
"speaks" to a phenomenology o f Self/Other) influences what is being communicated. In “The Speaker 
Respoken: Material Rhetoric as Feminist Methodology,” Vicki Tolar Collins features the Beckett quote 
used by Foucault as her own epigraph to remind us that “Who is speaking and who is silenced are core 
feminist issues in both rhetoric and literary studies” (CE 61/5: 545). I will discuss this feminist ethos of 
material and rhetorical (indifference in greater detail in Chapters Four and Five, A Rhetoric and a
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Pedagogy o f  Anonymity, respectively.
As I will make clear, my sense of what Foucault is ultimately up to (and up against) in "What is an 
Author?" is a dalliance with the "dark star" o f anonymous discourse—that it is more powerful—more 
permeable and permanent—than its more open and over-determined counterpart, authorial discourse. When 
at the end o f the essay he imagines all discourse circulating "without any need o f an author," unfolding "in 
a pervasive anonymity" (148), he is providing the overriding answer to the question o f  what is an author: 
the name o f  the author depends upon and unfolds from  the pervasive anonymity o f  writing itse lf Thus, 
though the example o f  an anonymous poster having a writer and not an author would seem to highlight the 
importance o f  authorial identity and authority in all discourse, it is actually a cue to the ever-unfolding 
pervasiveness o f anonymous discourse that has only spread more deeply and widely since Foucault's 
speculations in 1969. Foucault could hardly be unaware o f the pervasive anonymity o f radio and 
television's advertising underwriters, never mind the longstanding tradition o f anonymous editorializing in 
print media. With the advent o f the Internet and the World Wide Web, Foucault's generalized notion of 
anonymity’s pervasiveness had begun to take on a concrete discursive reality that looked like it might 
reverse the dominant-subordinate order o f exclusive author/excluded writer. Copyright law, however, being 
grounded in notions o f  proper-ty under the ownership o f an Author proper-Iy (usually Corporately) named 
is ultimately having its way with free digitized identities and common law anonymity. That is because the 
right o f the Author is an extension o f Capital as the only believable a priori category. The progressive 
priority o f Capital has, ironically, displaced trust in the transcendental signifier responsible for faith in the 
value o f currency and the currency o f all value—namely, an unnamable and therefore unknowable sense of 
God.
7 Foucault also reminds us that anonymous author-ity has been very conveniently ignored. It has been 
historically convenient, and in the case o f The Holy Bible, ideologically essential. We attribute authorship 
to "Gilgamesh"— King of Ur, or to "God,” King of the Universe, or to "Homer,” king o f  Poets. Yet all 
scholarship points to a  either a collaborative effort at an undetermined point in time when orality was 
congealing toward textuality, or to a corporate patch-write, a collective redaction o f an undetermined 
original. To push to the limit o f Foucault’s assertions, the anonymity o f these preeminently "literary” texts 
does not diminish but instead thoroughly guarantees their authenticity. In this passage, as in other places 
in "What is an Author," Foucault seems to be robbing from the Peter of the author-function in order to pay 
the Paul o f what I have been calling the anonymous-function. In any case, no historical outline o f the 
anonymous can ignore the presence o f these absent authorial identities. Again, the common suspicion of 
contemporary uses o f  anonymity and the anonymous as somehow inauthentic deserves, like all common 
sense conclusions, to be questioned, tested according to a  critical principle o f reversal, and if  need be, 
overturned for its bad faith or un-truth effect.
 ^As we will see in our analyses o f representative anecdotes from the Epic o f  Gilgamesh—"the predominant 
epic o f them all" (Ferry, viii)—the obvious heterogeneity and discontinuity o f the Genesis epic in part 
derives from the anonymous function, the same function responsible for its projection as unified. The case 
of Gilgamesh sets a  rule from which Genesis can hardly be thought to be some transcendent, ahistorical 
exception. "The earliest indications [of Gilgamesh] are o f  an oral tradition, with many variants, taking 
shape in a variety o f  compositions which later were merged, seemingly cobbled together into a work of 
literature by some unknown Babylonian poet" (Ferry, ix).
^Believers o f the truly, madly, deeply persuasion, however, read these shifters as a sign that God, the 
Author o f The Book, first wrote himself into existence using the omniscient past tense point o f  view. In 
effect, the anonymous writer, and the authoritative character being described as God is one and the same 
authorial ego. In effect, there is no anonymous scribe, only God, at once present in the Word and absent 
only to the reader who sees His Book as reducible to "literature" rather than what it "IS": revealed scripture. 
But anonymity, or the anonymous-function, will no more disappear at the insistence o f orthodoxy, than 
will the author-function which, as we know from Foucault, gets canonized, in large part because o f  St. 
Jerome's principles o f  authentication. As we can see, and as I have been repeating and will reiterate 
throughout this dissertation, there can be no author-function without the anonymous-function. They are as 
tightly braided as the double helix of genetics, as the speaker/audience system of self-consciousness, or as 
the identity o f writer and author in Genesis.
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10Yet another indication o f the transparent, taken-as-granted, generally unexamined presence o f the 
anonymous is this open secret o f the Tetragrammaton. It continues to be considered "blasphemy" (literally 
'evil speaking’) to pronounce the forbidden name o f god. My take on this as a blasphemer, or at least, as a 
disbelieving atheist who believes firmly in life before death, is that to come clean and pronounce the name 
o f  god would give up the whole game o f  divine authority and human subjection. Say the name and "God" 
becomes just another subject. But this subject has a purely rhetorical, not historically embodied name—a 
name lacking real historical reference but for that concocted by a group o f anonymous writers working near 
the beginning o f fiction. Logically, the name should lose Truth-value, most o f  its meaning, and therefore 
its hermeneutic cachet. A look into Webster's Third New International Dictionary provides the following 
entry on Tetragrammaton. What this entry says to me is that the forbidden name o f god turns into an 
anonymity that is itself the source o f  a renaming so obsessive and neurotic as to preserve not only an 
Identity that does not in fact exist, but unwittingly transgresses the original Prohibition. But such is the 
paradoxical, uncanny nature o f the anonymous function. A prohibition on Naming and Identity turns the 
Anonymous and Anonymity into an acceptable rhetorical action. Paradoxically, anonymity is viewed as 
transgressive, abnormal, anti-social, in much o f the secular humanist side o f  language life.
The Hebrew word o f four letters constituting a divine proper name which the Jews out of 
reverence or fear o f desecration ceased to pronounce about three centuries BC and for 
which they substituted Adonai or Elohim and being variously transliterated without 
indication o f vocalization usually by YHWH, YHVH, JHVH, JHWH, IHVH and with 
vowels usually by Jehovah, Yahweh, Jahveh, Jahweh, Yahveh, Jahve, Jahwe, Yahve,
Yahwe (264)
11 It is difficult to imagine a more complex and variable discursive situation than the text of The Bible 
(literally, "The Book"). Its authorlessness is radically anonymous, which means, according to Foucault, 
that its shifters refer, first o f all to "a real speaker." TTiis is quite puzzling. This can be cleared up to some 
extent by granting that Foucault is making a distinction between a canonical (originally, "holy") Author 
and merely profane (literally, "before the temple") writers or mediate authors. This distinction is implied 
in his summary of the relation o f modem literary criticism and "Christian exegesis when it wished to prove 
the value o f a text by ascertaining the holiness o f its author" (143). In this summary—the thesis o f the 
author-functioris "projective" character— he shows how modem literary criticism, "in its desire to "recover" 
the author from a work, employs devices strongly reminiscent of Christian exegesis." He then recounts St. 
Jerome's "four principles o f authenticity" guaranteed to "disclose the involvement of several authors" versus 
the singularly authentic author. There is, in terms of the texts to be considered, "a standard level of 
quality"; "a certain field o f conceptual or theoretical coherence"; "stylistic uniformity"; and " definite 
historical figure in which a series o f events converge" (144). Clearly, when we turn to The Holy Bible, the 
supposed Alpha/Omega Book o f books, with these Christian exegetical principles in mind, the questions 
o f authentic authorial quality, coherence, uniformity, and singularity fly in all rhetorical directions. The 
center o f  Jerome's authorial authentication cannot hold this Book's centripedal and centrifugal forces (cf. 
Bakhtin in Chapter Four, "Toward a Rhetoric o f Anonymity"). So now we have a disparate series of 
anonymous writers responsible for the most canonical of all texts, a "holy" text that is wholly—"utterly"— 
unworthy o f Jerome's principles o f  authentication. On Jeromian principle, the Bible should have been 
rejected (even after taking "The Apochrypha" or the Bible's rejected texts into account—never mind the Dead 
Sea scrolls still awaiting exegetical authentication or rejection).
12 Catholicism of the old order overtly underscored this double indemnity and indecision of one's 
creaturely identity. This was no accident. Its operation is another angle on what Foucault meant by 
"pastoral power" and how it springs from the culture of the confessional. It was a rhetorical action that 
helped advance its goals o f fear and shame. It would not surprise me to finally realize that my Catholic 
immersion in The Bible was the "genesis" o f my present interest in anonymity as the guarantor of 
community, identity, and authority. I have since managed to expunge the major part o f my belief in a 
Catholic God, and am happily engaged in the transgression and reversal o f its retroactive remnants. What I 
see as the interlocked Catholic legacy o f  exegesis and confession is not so easily "transcended", however, 
into an immanent practice. (Though the recent academic vogue o f "auto-critique" gives me hope. It leads 
me to suspect that part of its deeper motivation is hidden in the collapse o f the Catholic Church
13 "God" does change Abraham's wife's name from "Sarai to Sarah, but he does not o f course tell her of
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his plan to make her "a mother o f nations." As we learned from Basil Cottle above, it is an odd concept 
"that Man's naming o f  creatures confirmed their subjection to him." It is not so odd however when a non­
descript, virtually unidentifiable character has the power to (re) name his creatures and in so doing confirm 
their subjection to "Him." And when fiction invents life (thus the title (Genesis) it is a truly mind- 
boggling subjection that would have real listeners or readers turn into billions o f believers who have 
subsequently identified with a  covenant predicated upon a name game played by an anonymous author. The 
immense reminder and remainder o f the name o f  Woman as an ultimate anonymization may be summed up 
in the consideration that the name o f the Father always and already eliminates the Name o f the Mother, but 
it is not a problem we can explore here. Cottle goes on to speak o f "primitive races, [y/c] and even 
primitive folk [sic] in English villages, who feel that our [sic] knowledge o f their names is related to a 
power over their bodies, though being numbered (by National Health, or one's bank, or even the genial 
National Trust) is closer to depersonalization and slavery" (11). I see here the multivalent nature o f 
anonymity, an issue we will take up more directly in Chapter Four, on "A Rhetoric o f  Anonymity." In 
short, all kinds o f "primitive" types have clung to the protectiveness o f anonymity, rightly frightened of 
European (or bureaucratic) elites armed with the power o f naming as codified and extended through the 
power of literacy. Cottle turns this protective form o f  the anonymous on its head and speaks o f  anonymity 
as depersonalizing to the point o f  creating nondescript slaves—audits o f modem bureaucratic life. He is 
hinting that the subject citizen comes to wish for the more "primitive" situation where a person was at least 
in part identified, and maintained some sense o f  group identity, through his or her name, rather than, say, a 
social security number. As with the covenant o f  circumcision proffered by an anonymous double— 
Author/writer—modem anonymity is both a cut and suture across the idea o f Community, Identity, and 
Authority.
It should not go unnoted that the entire Book o f  Esther never once features, makes reference to, or 
otherwise uses, the name "God." This tale, of a beautiful Jewess who is beloved by a Persian King bent on 
destroying all Jews, is o f course anonymously authored. That it does not even use the word "God," never 
mind get close to the Tetragrammaton, tells us that it was written at the height of the time when Jews 
strictly observed the prohibition on using God's name, either in Temple, or outside. It is a strange, 
virtually a-theistic, story. It points up the total anonymity o f a God who obviously enables his people to 
prevail against their enemies, but because of the Tetragrammaton, the covenant or commandments at the 
end o f the story concerning the Holy Days of Purim seem to be created by a Woman. God forbid!
Harold Bloom's essay, ""Before Moses Was, I Am": The Original and the Belated Testaments" makes 
very much of this passage. Ever-true to his lifelong project o f  all textual interpretation being some 
variation on a deliberate misreading, he finds that The Revised Standard Version o f The Bible is "like 
every other version, [in that] it cannot handle Yahweh's awesome, untranslatable play upon his own name: 
ehyeh asher ehyeh. I expand upon a suggestion o f Martin Buber's when I render this as "I will be present 
wherever and whenever I will be present." For that is the Yahwist's vision o f olam as "a time without 
boundaries," and o f the relation o f  Yahweh to a dynamics o f time that transcends spatial limitations" (293- 
294). Bloom went on to write an entire book treating the problem o f  the identity o f the Yahwist author o f 
the first books o f the Old Testament, titled The Book o f  J. He is therefore cognizant o f the writer/Author 
split in The Old Testament, which often gets elided or overlooked because o f the tradition o f belatedly 
sacralizing certain texts as "the world o f  God", rather than as the writing o f an intentionally anonymous 
writer. My take on Bloom's Buberian retranslation o f "IAM WHO I AM" is not altered a whit. It is an 
artifice, an artful dodge employed repeatedly by a writer committed to creating an olam via the power o f 
writing as the grand synthesis o f  expression and intention that transcends the writer into what has since 
been codified by T.S. Eliot as the "vatic voice." The voice o f "I AM" is the olam that would transgress its 
"nominal" existence as the original Prohibition, or name that m ust not be uttered. "I AM" becomes the 
substitute for Identity as the tautology o f the self-same. The Name o f God was Prohibited because its 
content is fundamentally absurd. As in Baiun's parody, no amount o f  smoke, fire, or angry, amplified 
voice, can ultimately disguise its anonymous construction (and your little dog/god that is its undoing, too, 
dearie.)
16 The take o f rabbinical scholarship on this question o f an inchoate, incorporate, and perhaps incontinent 
nominalism turns out to be quite fascinating. Rabbi Arthur Marmorstein's The Old Rabbinic Doctrine o f  
God has a chapter titled "The Names o f  God in the Bible" in which he tracks the various epithetic sum 
totals down through the ages. Some say 57, others 70. His definitive genealogical work finds that there are 
91 ancient rabbinical synonyms. "I" is one o f these. "God" is another, as is "Man," and most
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tellingly, "The Name." Marmorstein also has a chapter, "The Pronunciation o f  the Tetragrammatron," 
which traces the history o f  the prohibition on saying God's true name. He clearly shows that the 
prohibition was not always in effect, that it shifted according to where one was, and whether one was naked 
or clothed, and what kind o f  Jew one was. "As to the manner o f  pronouncing the Name, however, there is a 
consensus o f  all reports. It seems that even in the Temple the pronunciation was not distinct. The High 
Priest tried to utter the Name in such a way that the people listening to the blessing should not hear the 
Name distinctly" (26).
^  At this writing, there are three extant versions o f the Gilgamesh epic that were composed over a 
thousand-year period. Additional tablets and fiagments have been discovered and await translation. In the 
foreword to her 1989 translation, Maureen Gallery Kovacs informs us that it "is assumed that stories about 
the deeds o f  the famous King of Uruk, Gilgamesh, circulated in his own time, ca. 2700 BC. The earliest 
written epics about Gilgamesh were produced in the Sumerian language...ca. 2000 BC (xxii-xxiii). Texts 
considerably older than The Epic o f  Gilgamesh survive from somewhere between the Fourth and Third 
Millennium BCE According to Tikva Frymer-Kensky, the Abu Salabikh are "our earliest religious 
documents" (96), considerably older than the Semitic sources that produced the books o f what is now called 
the Judeo-Christisian Bible. But it is The Epic o f  Gilgamesh—a.k.a. "the Old Babylonian Version- that 
presents, according to S.N. Kramer, "the earliest example o f  literary evolution." That is, somewhere 
around 2500 BCE someone o f Sumerian birth decided to let a human being hold "the center o f the stage" 
(183). A more recent Gilgamesh cycle—AKA "the Standard Version"— has been attributed by "ancient 
Babylonian scholars...to a man named Sin-Ieqe-unninni, a scholar scribe who probably lived in the Middle 
Babylonian period (about 1300B.C)" (Biggs, XV). Recent scholars agree that the text's ultimate authorial 
origins are lost in Mesopotamian civilization. But enough o f  this. Whenever I try to mimic the 
genealogical seriousness o f scholars devoted to authorial attribution, Foucault's borrowing from Beckett's 
The Unnamable keeps up its echo: What matters who's speaking?
18 This last sentence is o f course patching from Rebecca Moore Howard’s Standing in the Shadows o f  
Giants: Plagiarists, Authors, Collaborators. W e  will have occasion to return to her contentions and 
conclusions in the chapter on anonymous pedagogy. In the present "historical" consideration o f the ancient 
"anonymous-function," we can reflect, however on how her four defining properties o f the author might be 
greeted by the ancient scribal circles—aboriginal composition classes or writing centers—o f four thousand 
years ago: "the author is or can be autonomous and should be original. The autonomous, original writer 
deserves property rights to his or her work. The writer who is not autonomous and original demonstrates 
an absence o f morality, earns the label "plagiarist," and deserves punishment” (58). In Foucauldian terms, 
the pagan collaborators who patched and plagiarized the Gilgamesh material lacked all discipline and not 
only should have been punished, but have been, in that anonymity is their legacy. A  different set of 
anonymous scribes and compositors responsible for the various patch jobs that constitute the Judeo- 
Christian Bible, on the other hand, become the disciples o f  "God," the only true autonomous author. 
"God's" exclusive property rights to his text are summed up by St. John in The Book o f  Revelations in a 
clear warning to all future collaborators, patchwriters, and plagiarists: 'If anyone adds to or takes from this 
book, his punishment is banishment from the sight o f  God." The sheer hypocrisy o f this can be summed 
up by referring ourselves to one of the more representative anecdotes o f Genesis—namely, the Great Flood, 
in which "God" renews His covenant with "Noah" after drowning the whole world, including the innocent 
children o f the iniquitous. That this event is borrowed from Gilgamesh, a text 1500 years older than 
Genesis, and becomes part o f  the patchwriting o f  Genesis is an undisputed fact o f non-orthodox textual 
hermeneuticists. In Gilgamesh one reads that the Sumerian Gods and Goddesses wept over and regretted 
the actions o f  one o f  their number in bringing the Flood with such indiscriminate vengeance. One is 
forcefully reminded that the anonymous creators o f  the Genesis God decided to include no such sense o f 
remorse in their divine persona. How much the better would a Western religious tradition have been if  it 
had understood the more compassionate collaboration o f Gilgamesh and stood in the anonymous shadows 
o f  giants whose subtext suggests dedication over discipline, perseverance over punishment?
^  Compared to the 'discipline and punish' author-ity situation o f the Judeo-Christian "Bible,' which has 
generally succeeded in attributing authorship to "God," the naturally assumed anonymity o f  Gilgamesh is 
historically and communicatively rational. Even the little that we now know o f writing's history, o f  its 
rarified, elite circle o f  priests and scholar-scribes, it is clear that the gift and burden o f composition was its 
atmospheric anonymity ( if  I may be permitted to redact Gallagher's and Greenblatt's redaction o f
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Auerbach's "atmospheric realism"). For a general sense o f  what I mean by atmospheric anonymity in 
connection with the history o f  writing, the interested reader should look at the introduction to Ernst 
Doblhofer's Voices in Stone: The Decipherment o f  Ancient Scripts.
20"rhe importance o f "rhetorical purity” to a rhetoric o f  anonymity will be explored in Chapter Three, 
where Booth's rhetoric o f fiction is placed into the context o f  Bakhtin's idea o f  rhetoric. Because Bakhtin is 
quite cognizant of a rhetorical impurity, given his notions o f "heteroglossia" and "double-voiced discourse" 
he is probably the best theoretician-historian for understanding the sense o f  an anonymous narrator as the 
extreme case of unreliability and impurity.
2*1 chose Jackson's translation (or "transformation') of Gilgamesh from a bewildering number o f (un) like 
efforts. His takes the most transformative or appropriative liberties with the "original" (itself an 
appropriated transformation.) His take on the politics o f identity—"who lives to tell my tale identically"— 
contrasts nicely with the more strict translation o f Kovacs' "alike," which is far more ambiguous, and can 
only be said to correlate with the identity or consubstantiality o f all things, not rhetorical agents.
22 Aside from the perfect application o f her analysis of "Linguistic survival" to The Odyssey—"[T|t appears 
that the metaphorical connection between physical and linguistic vulnerability is essential to the 
description o f linguistic vulnerability itself'(4). Butler's Excitable Speech: A Politics o f  the Performative 
would be the center o f a proposed, but for now, unwritten Chapter 6, "Towards an Ethics of Anonymity." 
My reader can, however, look forward to Butler's ideas o f performativity, injury, vulnerability and their 
relation to the anonymous "recirculation" and mediation function in Chapters Four—Toward a Rhetoric of 
Anonymity, and Chapter Five—Toward a Pedagogy of Anonymity. For now, two passages from Butler on 
"the force o f the name. The first could help us radically extend Horkheimer's and Adorno's reading o f  the 
prototypical passage from Homer, in which Odyssesus is triumphant, and Polyphemus is traumatized, 
through the force o f the name and its anonymously variable (invulnerability. Thus, I might title this first 
passage from Butler
“The Trauma of Polyphemus”
I f  we understand the force o f the name to be an effect o f its historicity, then that force is 
not the mere causal effect o f an inflicted blow, but works in part through an encoded 
memory or a trauma, one that lives in language and is carried in language. The force of 
the name depends not only on its iterability, but on a form o f  repetition that is linked to 
trauma, on what is, strictly speaking, not remembered but relived, and relived in and 
through the linguistic substitution for the traumatic event (36).
The second passage can help us look forward to how the force o f  the unnamed, historically a part o f 
composition pedagogy in the anonymous course evaluation, is an intersubjective transgression o f  potential 
"trauma" and "excitement" within the scene o f writing instruction. The question posed by Butler holds an 
answer that may be supplied by the anonymous function, as we will see in Chapter Five. Thus, I might 
title this second passage,
“Recirculation/ Reverse Citation Via Anonymous Writing”
Can repetition be both the way that trauma is repeated but also the way in which it 
breaks with the historicity to which it is in thrall" What makes for a reverse citation in 
the scene o f trauma, how can hate speech be cited against itself?
In the case o f hate speech, there appears to be no way to ameliorate its effects except 
through its recirculation, even if  that recirculation takes place in the context of a public 
discourse that calls for censorship o f such speech: the censor is compelled to repeat the 
speech that the censor would prohibit.... There is no way to invoke examples o f racist 
speech, for instance, in a classroom without invoking the sensibility of racism, the 
trauma and, for some, the excitement.
23Horkeheimer and Adomo take a long excursus into the relation o f human sacrifice and the nominal 
sacrifice by Odysseus’ o f his identity. We cannot follow this up in these pages, but the reader should be
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reminded o f Foucault’s theme of writing as “a voluntary obliteration of the self that does not require 
representation in books.” Uncannily, the identities o f  the writing collective nominally obliterated, yet 
reiterated, under the author-ity “Homer” did, proto-typically, represent this ‘post-‘enlightenment theme of 
anonymous-self-sacrifice
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CHAPTER FOUR
TOWARD A RHETORIC OF ANONYMITY
fdentifVing the Authority o f Community
Both mysterious and mundane, the linkages between the structural anonymity o f  language (Saussure) and
anonymous social function (what Schutz calls “typification”) point beyond a discourse of Identity to
summon or provoke a discourse o f community. Why is this so? The short, popular, but reductively vulgar
answer is: “We are all socially constructed.” More robustly, the discourse o f  Identity teaches us that every
individual existence continually summons “a plurality of others...though it would risk losing itself in the
infinite if  that number were not determined...” (Blanchot 6). Sheer otherness, the sense we have o f
ourselves, is determined by an anonymous function (Natanson). The plurality o f others summoned by a
given personal identity summon in turn,
...a  community: a finite community, for it in turn has its principle in the finitude  of the 
beings which form it and which would not tolerate that it (the community) forget to carry 
this finitude constituting those beings to a higher degree o f tension (Blanchot 6).
This higher degree o f  tension, I have been arguing throughout Chapters One and Two, amounts to the
anonymous function—a curve o f binding energy between language and the individual lifeworld. The
Discourse o f Author-ity, attempts to both negate and elaborate the anonymous function o f language by
claiming—impersonating— this higher degree o f  tension as its own.
Thus, before we could entertain the intimate linkage between anonymity and community, in Chapter 
Three, "Toward a History o f Anonymity," we had to countenance the mask o f the author-function, to 
expose it as the anonymous function. (The tension between the “mask” and the absent “face” o f the 
rhetor/author is a lesser degree of tension than that between the being of an individual listener/reader and an 
audience/readership, but it remains awesome.) That is why we tried to understand (again paradoxically) the 
problematic discourse of authority—particularly that of the author-function as a point o f origin—within the 
larger historical moment of the anonymous function.
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The communicative rationality o f any shared sense o f  Identity (understood as a performative relation 
between sameness and difference) is not only at work between speakers with bodies in history, but also 
between bodies o f work—texts—whose "speakers" transcend the identity o f  a  given Author. That is, the 
author-function, as central as it is to Discourse (political, philosophical, legal scientific, poetic), is itself 
pervasively anonymous; it is a function of the anonymity that haunts and heralds all senses o f authority as 
origin.
In Chapter Four, "Towards a Rhetoric o f Anonymity," our overall aim is to understand in rhetorical 
terms the subject position not o f  the Rhetor/Author, but of the speaker/writer who is, or becomes 
anonymous, for whatever motive or condition, chosen or not, and the relation o f  this anonymous subject 
position to that o f a particular (discourse) community. Throughout this dissertation, I have repeatedly, 
tiresomely, invoked a shortened form o f  the Beckett line from Texts fo r  Nothing: “ ‘What does it matter 
who is speaking,” someone said, “what does it matter who is speaking?’ ”
I did so initially to try to get to the rhetorical heart of Foucault’s critical use o f it as an epigraph to his 
“What is an Author?” As a rhetorical question whose answer lies in an understanding o f rhetoric itself 
(from the Greek eiro : “I say”), Focuault’s evocation o f Beckett’s question from an anonymous “someone” 
suggested that that “someone” is no body in the sense of an embodied speaker/writer.
The body in question is some body o f discourse—o f writing—that speaks. The author-function is not a 
corporeal, embodied function, but a rhetorical, evocative one that owes much, if  not all, to the function of 
anonymity. But Focuault’s rhetorical use o f Beckett’s almost anti-rhetorical question, (if it doesn’t matter 
who is speaking, then it doesn’t matter who’s listening, and therefore nothing matters), was a tactical 
opening toward understanding the massive and pervasive structural conditions o f  discourse which turn 
individual users into ephemeral, ultimately anonymous, functionaries.
In a genuine “rhetorical” (from the Greek, eiro : “I speak”) treatment o f the anonymous function, 
however we will want to locate the special conception o f  a speaker/writer and a listener/reader which must 
pertain in the anonymous function—which does matter very much indeed, as we have seen, in many
senses, if  not yet a purely “rhetorical” sensed For that “special conception” or “image” o f a writer and a 
reader dialogically imagining the other, it seems to me that Bakhtin becomes the rhetorician o f choice, even
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though he was essentially a literary historian. But we have much to consider before we can get to Bakhtin’s 
special conceptions of a speaker and listener in a “contact zone.”
First, we will try to understand the discourse o f community and its source in the very same anonymous 
function that is never far from what mean by a discourse o f identity and authority, respectively. As a way to 
set up the heteroglossic nature o f the discourses o f Identity, Authority, and Community (since, only in 
theory, never in lived practice, can we separate these discourses, for they are o f  "one tuming"~a literal 
universe of discourse), let's pick up some of the loose etymological interstices or aporia left in our wake 
between Identity (as "sameness"), Authority (as "increase"), and Community (as "in common" and "without 
office".)
It is a "phenomeological" fact that the discourse o f community is a lived "public" meaning for any and 
all persons whose identities are oriented towards various "privacies" or enclaves o f meaning which operate 
inter- and intra-subjectively simultaneously. That is, there are sites and sights o f "official" and "unofficial" 
authority throughout any community—so-called. Yet, the total sense o f a community is that it is itself 
"without office": it is an emergent property, floating in some sense free, o f the personal identities and 
historical authorities, which inform its lived reality.
Hearkening to its etymological roots, community develops an "immunity" to the claims o f Identity and 
Authority even as it holds in tension their combined forces as an increase o f  the same. How is this 
possible? And what has this to do with the anonymous function? The short answer to the first question is: 
This is possible because o f the unrecognized function o f anonymity. The short answer to the second 
question is that the non-recognition o f the transparency of anonymity at work in the discourse of 
community points to its role in community as a discourse that features an immunity to authority. That is, 
taking its root in “the common: it is “without office” o f authority. To get some sense o f how and why this 
is so, I turn to Joseph Vining, whose book The Authoritative and the Authoritarian traces the legal and 
literary—root and vine—growth that we presuppose as the discourse of authority.
In a chapter titled Authenticity: Connecting the Speaker and the Spoken , Vining begins to approach not 
only a rhetorical situation, but also one that Burke would call an act of “identification” between speaker 
and listener (and perhaps an entire audience) to bring about a desired (on the part o f speaker and audience?) 
change.
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I also begin to hear in Vining, however, a Bakhtinian hint o f  the rhetorical: o f  what he termed a “special
conception o f the listener,” and o f what he meant by a “contact zone” ( as we will see below). For Vining,
authority and holding one’s attention are the same. There seems to be a  virtually complete identity between
them, Authority identifies the power o f  its office in whether or not it holds the attention o f a
community—literally those without office. It is always dangerous to jump from the primary speech genres
o f rhetoric in its original sense to the secondary genres of writing, but Vining does so in a way that Bakhtin
also often does in order to make a point about all o f discourse. But whereas Bakhtin increasingly opened up
the boundaries between what he called authoritative or authoritarian discourse and internally persuasive
discourse, Vining does so to make a much more closed down, exclusionary point about authority and the
presupposition of its authenticity.
Whether a listener continues to pay attention to a speaker, and whether a speaker has 
authority for [her], is the same question. But delegating writing without office does not 
produce a new authentic voice, nor attention, nor authority....If one did begin to pay 
attention one would soon stop. And actually one would not pay attention in the first place 
if  the deception were known from the beginning—any more than one would pay serious 
attention to an opinion that one knows is only the outcome o f a process, the speech o f no 
one (58).
O f course he has a point. As I pointed out very early on, Beckett’s Texts fo r  Nothing, for example, would 
not have received the attention o f  a world wide reading community that it has if  he had not written 
them—if they weren’t key run ups to his experiments in that have made him so famous an author-ity o f 
absent character and anonymous voices. Texts fo r  Nothing are “the speech of no one,” putatively 
rhetorically indifferent, but that speech was created by a very well known writer with office—that is, an 
AUTHOR. But Vining is way o ff  in at least two crucial, rhetorical, senses.
First, in terms of the larger project of the discourse of authority, (of the author-function), “putative 
authors” are assumed not to exist as individuals. Their speech is the speech o f no one and the result o f  “a 
process”—a writing process whose function derives not from the deception or inauthenticity between a 
writer and a  community, but from a profound act of impersonation and imagination that works dialogically. 
Forster taught us this much in his inquiry: the reader forgets the name o f the author and enters—often 
enough, but let’s take Beckett specifically—the speech of no one.
Second, Vining’s ( authoritarian?) idea is that no one pays attention to a text written by no one,
(meaning an anonymous writer, or collective of such). If  Forster is correct, then the entire logic o f reading
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is not to remember the author, but to take in dialogically the process of writing as a  special conception of 
speaking, and the process o f  reading as a special conception o f listening. The very process o f  authority 
works this way in and through a community through a pervasive “condition o f  anonymity.”
Finally, Vining is clearly blind to various kinds o f discourse communities. His officious dismissal of a 
writing process pretty much eliminates the common project o f composition: we are teaching, given his 
grand legislative schema o f  delegated writing, no one. But the charge that one stops paying attention to 
common writing is particularly belied by the attention I found was paid to the writing o f  no one, as we will 
see in Chapter Five, “Toward A Pedagogy of Anonymity.”
For now, given that we are in the process o f developing the relation of an unstable, contestable discourse 
o f community to a rhetoric o f anonymity, what is most amazing to me is how Vining glides toward, than 
blindly passes over the obvious contact zone between the office of anonymous authority and a given 
community whose “common” sense of itself is without office, but very much anonymous in its function as 
well. With his focus on the authenticity o f authority, he neither sees the authenticity presupposed by 
anonymity, nor that community, when reduced to its most common denominator, requires the immunity o f  
anonymity.
What does this mean— the immunity o f  anonymity ? It means that we might begin to think o f anonymity 
as not only a communicative function, with all the rationalities (full and fragmented) that inform identified 
and authorized discourse. We need to finally think o f  anonymity as a function o f community in the largest, 
ideal sense (since we already know it functions in the normative, face-to-face, text-to-text representations 
o f our everyday Iifewor[l]ds.
To get to that ideal sense o f community, we will need to first look at what some thinkers are presently 
concluding about the discourse of community. We’ll also have a look at Blanchot’s conception of 
community, since it is my reading o f his use of absence that has made possible the sense that anonymity is 
a form o f absence that gives presence both to what mean and can’t possibly maintain about identity, 
authority, and now, community.
The Discourses of Community: No Signs of Abating 
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Is Community Both Normative And Emancipatory?
This entire dissertation has carried on a border conflict with binary and dualistic thinking. Anonymity, I 
have tried to argue, is not—never has been, never will be—the binary other o f Identity, Authority, or 
Community. Anonymity is an emergent property of each o f these dominant terms o f  discourse. Anonymity 
has no binary opposition except for that o f Nominalism. But even in that ultimate binary code, we saw that 
it is impossible to decode one from the other— in much the same way that 1 depends on 0 for “writing” the 
code o f all word processing and Internet communication. (The ultimate “other” o f Anonymity might be 
Celebrity, what with its cult o f  “name recognition,” but when we begin to consider the anonymous 
functions of that subject position—name changes, enormous regimes o f privacy and identity protection in 
order to enable a consistent public or star image, we quickly retreat.)
The relation of anonymity to the discourse o f community, however, is the least binaric, I think. Part of 
the reason for this has to do with the initially simple breakdown o f  community into the public/private 
realmification that Hannah Arendt, Jurgen Habermas, Seyla Benhabib, among many others, have worked 
up in detail, and so well. For that fatal binary split, we need look no more far afield than into community 
itself. There appears to be a “normative” and an “emancipatory” concept o f community that we can look to 
from the get go when inquiring into the fissionable meaning and function o f community.
My reader might remember that we leaned heavily on Brubaker's and Cooper’s "Beyond Identity" to set 
up its problematic condition as a  term holding together one o f the founding discourses of philosophy—that 
o f the Subject. Near the end o f their analysis they conclude that the "[t]he use of'Identity' to define a host 
o f incommensurate meanings across a wide range o f disciplines shows no signs o f  abating (45, emphasis 
added). Whether or not the problematic Identity of the Subject is due, in whole or in part, to the 
anonymous function, is a matter o f dispute. What is indisputable is that the Name o f Identity—and what it 
Names—is never self-same, or identical, to itself, even when it becomes a "god-term” or "terministic 
screen" o f subjective consciousness. So too, with the discourse o f community, and its fate as the 
portmanteau word that must carry the freight of the founding philosophical discourse of "universal 
mediation."
Andrew Mason, in “Two Concepts o f Community,” makes the case for the “normative/emancipatory”
split in what community means and does. He reminds us that there are “ ...vigorous disputes over what
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counts as a community. Some argue that communities have to be face to face, while others allow that they 
may unite those who do not know each other” (3). Already we see the proximity o f  the discourse o f 
community to that o f anonymity. In making his case for two concepts o f community, Mason finds that the 
“normative” concept, though vague, is not “essentially contested,” while the “emancipatory” concept, 
though more morally robust, is split within itself along lines of the meaning o f “solidarity.”
The role of anonymizing forces in shaping both the illusions o f individuality and commonality across 
both accounts o f an ideal emancipatory community cannot be calculated, but only added to the overall 
question of authenticity. (It would seem that the contest over the meaning o f an emancipatory community 
carries over into educational settings, particularly when the term “discourse” is super-added to that of 
“community,” as we will soon see.)
Mason concludes that “[tjhere is nothing wrong with employing both senses of community, [but it 
would be confused to suppose that community in the emancipatory sense...is a more authentic community 
than in the ordinary sense” (14). What I conclude, given the split in the emancipatory sense, is that 
anonymity functions in the vaguely “social” ties that stabilize the normative sense, as well as in the more 
“moral qualities” which radically split the emancipatory sense of community.
The fact of social anonymity makes the first connection clear, but what of the second? The answer 
comes back to the ideological nature o f emancipation, and the resulting turn to politics and therefore to 
claims of identity and authority for what makes for—drives— community in the first place. Politics of class, 
race, sexual orientation, gender, religion, nation are not always open and “face-to-face.” They strive, often 
thrive, anonymously, in other words, and they must often be opened to community view and 
evaluation—“universally mediated” in some ideal sense—through the very same function of anonymity, 
since the normative eyes and ears o f community by vague association—not by emancipation—make a 
given individual vulnerable.
What’s Normative About Community?
Mason’s contention that the “normative” sense o f community is not essentially contested, or that it is, at
least, stable, is belied by Keith Stem’s study, Newspaper Use and Community Ties: Toward a Dynamic
Theory. In normative terms, the discourse of community, (vastly enlarged from Mason’s positing of it as
the uncontested binary other o f an emancipatory concept), is “the construction of community—a sharing of
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values and objectives— [and it] requires a communication process.”) This process however, is “much 
distrusted and abused” (146). Part o f  this mistrust and abuse stems from the use o f  anonymous polls and o f 
anonymous sources to make news. Despite the fault lines in what amounts to these anonymous “contact 
zones,”  they are widely used.
For Stamm, “[t]he heart o f the matter is that community process still lacks a communication mechanism 
that lives up to the democratic ideal o f citizen involvement” (147). Face to face meetings in the old town 
hall model have become impractical in the massification o f the lifeworld. Letters to the board o f Editors, 
(not accepted unless signed), have been a standing way for a community as a given readership, to respond 
to the social, political, and other changes re-presented in the anonymous view o f those same editors who do 
not sign their names, or identify their author-function.
The normative and emancipatory conceptions of community have become, in Century 21, a contact zone 
in its own right, where abstraction and concreteness, presence and absence, merge and reverse their ties to 
process, structure and place. The role of the anonymous function in these (uncertain}ties is, like 
community itself, “defended according to what it might become rather than for what it is or has been” (18). 
Community and Composition: Headed Off (Dis)Course?
Coincidentally, yet significantly, I think, "...no signs of abating" are the final four words of Peter 
Vandenberg's "Discourse Community," one o f the essays in a book he edited with Paul Heliker titled 
Keywords in Composition Studies. The full phrase—"the perceived explanatory power o f discourse 
community shows no signs o f abating" (70)—is a somewhat tongue-in-cheek residue o f how composition 
studies has received and revised these two constituent terms during its struggle to legitimate itself as not 
only the  second coming of rhetoric, but as a field with epistemological and pedagogical status equal to that 
of literary studies.
The strength of Vandenberg's entry, as with all the entries in this little book meant mainly for the
practicing compositionist, is that it takes an "OED" approach to its subject matter. That is, in three pages
this key term gets trenchant, if  not exhaustive, treatment. We leam that discourse community has circulated
in composition studies for less than twenty years. To the best o f his knowledge, we can credit Richard
Ohmann's 1964 discussion, "In Lieu o f a New Rhetoric," with juxtaposing the two terms, with not very
illuminating results. "The community that a piece of genuine writing creates is... fundamental [to] modes of
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perception, thought, and feeling. That is, discourse works within and reflects...a world view" (In 
Vandenberg 67-68).
Vandenburg then jumps to M. Jimmie Killingworth's 1992 article in Rhetoric Review to buttress support 
for the idea that once combined, the two terms become "useful in the theory and analysis o f  writing because 
[they embrace] the rhetorical concern with social interchange (discourse) and with the situation or context 
(community)" " (In Vandenberg, 68). Bartholomae and Herzberg are then brought to bear on the meaning 
and significance o f discourse. The former gussies up the common dictionary definition: It is a "peculiar 
way o f  knowing, selecting, evaluating, reporting, concluding, and arguing"; with well-defined "projects and 
agendas that determine what writers can and will do." The latter advances common sense about the term in 
this way: "discourse is a means o f maintaining and extending [a] group's knowledge and o f initiating new 
members into the group" (In Vandenberg, 68).
Vandenberg concludes treatment o f the meaning o f discourse with an interesting question: "Is discourse 
enabling or prohibitive?" (68). (Interesting because, this is a question that we bring to our understanding of 
anonymous discourse.) The question is meant to set the reader up for similarly questioning the capacities 
o f community. According to Vandenberg's findings, community has received far more attention from 
compositionists, primarily because o f its indeterminacy or "instability."
Joseph Harris' treatment of the term is given greatest authority:" community ...makes a rhetorical claim 
on us that is hard to resist." But he finds that our notions o f community are just that, existing "at one 
remove from actual experience....They are all literally utopias—nowheres, meta-communities—that are tied 
to no particular time or place" (Vandenberg 68). Elaine Maimon's treatment of the term is seen to be so 
inclusive as to become meaningless: every site within the academy (never mind outside it) is a community. 
Harris' reading o f  Maimon's pan-directional use o f community as "gambits," or "perform atives— 
statements...in which saying does indeed make it so" bolsters the sense that the term is vulnerable not only 
to utopianism, but to becoming uncritical.
Vandenberg finds that, according to Killingsworth, discourse needs "the ballast o f community, which
designates a (real or imagined) site for production" because discourse by itself is a one-way ticket to
abstraction. Vandenberg then quotes Killingsworth at length on the distinction between "local" and "global”
communities. Essentially, a local discourse community is "occupational" and "demographic," while "The
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global discourse community [is] mental" (In Vandenberg, 69). As can be expected, the local and the global 
communities are "involved simultaneously" in and around any individual. In fact, the ultimate space for 
local/global interrelation is "the individual as community" (Killingsworth) in whom, according to 
Vandenberg, "conflicting discourse practices" can be observed in both one's self and in the selves of others.
Vandenberg pays homage to Bruffee's Burkean take on community, and brings Harris back in to bolster 
it. In effect, composition studies has embraced the notion that community is a consensus of assumptions and 
values—what might otherwise be called our "common sense." Without this common sensical view o f 
community the goal o f collaborative projects can be quickly lost. And yet Vandenberg is careful to include 
Harris' final take on this idea o f community : there is "only an affinity o f beliefs and purposes'; "one does 
not need consensus to have community" (In Vandenberg, 69).
Vandenberg sharpens this line o f argument by quoting from his own earlier work on community:
When used to authorize a writing pedagogy...consensus-based conceptions...tacitly 
support the preservation o f  institutional authority by privileging discursive authority, a 
gesture that renders a  community an oligarchy, an exclusive rather than inclusive 
construct (69).
He gives Bizzell the last word, (arguably the greatest scholar o f  discourse communities our field has 
produced, and whose opinion on the meaning of “contact zone” extends her reputation, as we will see 
below.) Bizzell’s sense of this useful/useless hyphenated term leaves the curious composition-rhetorician 
with a decidedly equivocal sense o f Discourse Community : it can come "to seem like an oppressive 
affirmation of one—and only one—set o f discursive practices” (In Vandenberg, 70).
Composition’s Discourse Community of Anonvmitv
My interest in anonymity as a discourse, (and as a discourse community writ locally and globally) follows 
from the sense of Vandenberg's case for individual identities as local/global sites of communal conflict. I 
see the "the individual as community" function as coincident with anonymous discourse. Much o f the 
"consensus" governing our assumptions and values on anonymity is that it does not belong to the discourse 
o f community. If any discourse could be said to be a real or imagined site for production—a "nowhere" 
belonging to "nobody"— it is the discourse o f anonymity. Certainly, within the prevailing authorizations of 
this or that writing pedagogy, anonymous writing is so far from institutional recognition, so removed from 
institutional hierarchies of authentic disciplinary identity, authority, and community that it might not even
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register as a  marginal discourse. In the terms bandied by Vandenberg, it lacks the commonsensical 
"ballast" o f community, and is even more "abstract" then discourse.
Within the institutional purview o f rhetoric-composition studies it is fairly safe to assert categorically 
that anonymity lacks all power as a discourse community (although within literary and philosophical 
studies the "presence o f its absence," so to speak should now be far less transparent). But that safe 
assumption is belied by the pervasive use—the discursive-communal use—of anonymity in collegial review 
o f manuscripts for article publication and conference presentation. More telling—and defining, really—of 
anonymity's function as a discourse community in its own right is the now nearly universal institution of 
anonymous course evaluations. These are required o f  students at the end o f each semester's course work, 
and represent the last (and for many courses, the only) piece o f writing they perform.
This anonymous writing performance has a multiple readership: the instructor and his or her superiors 
directly. Indirectly, and ideally, however, the audience for this universal communication is one that might 
be thought o f  as universally mediated by all o f  one’s colleagues, students—really anyone who is part o f a 
given college or university discourse community. In its ritual repetition, accumulation, and retention across 
the discourse communities of every departmental discipline, (students’ anonymously compose these forms 
four times a semester, eight times in an academic year for four years), I believe a good case can be made 
that anonymity, in deed, functions not only for, but from, the complex and equivocal sense o f  discourse 
community outlined by Vandenberg. To pick up a  cue from Homer’s prototypical anecdote, it can be said 
by any one teaching from and for a particular discourse community that Nobody is evaluating me.
Following Vandenberg, I have a clear temptation to  pursue the questions that arise from his analysis of 
discourse community: Is this {anonymous}discourse community enabling or prohibitive, inclusive or 
oppressive? Does it belong in an anonymous abstract nowhere to anonymous nobodies, or is it the open, 
common property o f an anonymous everyone situated in concrete, rhetorical situations? Rather than pursue 
these questions, I will simply underscore what the reader might also sense to be a "problem" for the 
meaning of community. If anonymity is a discourse without office, we now see why community itself, true 
to its etymology, is also without office.
Let’s assume that the discourse of community and the community of discourse are as vexed and vacuous
as Vandenberg makes them out to be. (And remember he limits these questions and their open-ended
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answers to the discourse community o f  rhetoric-composition exclusively.) How, then, are we to think about 
a sense o f discourse and its sense o f  community that are prescribed by university mandate to foster an 
authentic rhetoric o f universal mediation (in which writer and the written are disconnected) by virtue of its 
anonymous function (I mean the course evaluation)? Given the (discursive) evidence I have accumulated 
across the last three chapters, we can begin to see, I think, that the anonymous function may well be a 
problem for the discourses of identity, authority, and community.
Given the principle o f reversal we have been pursuing throughout this dissertation, the anonymous is 
clearly a functioning part o f community’s permanent immunity from its own ideal. But immunity works in 
two orientations. For just as anonymity operates through the absence o f  a connection between speaker and 
•the spoken, it presents to the listener a special conception o f the speaker—a rhetorical indifference that 
connects both to a community—if  it is anywhere—in the text itself.
Here, then, is the beginning o f  what Bakhtin, in my reading, eventually meant by the contact zone: where 
the text is held in common, without the office o f writer in the way, the reader can focus on the grain of the 
voice (Barthes) and the going view (Bakhtin). The question then becomes: When a sense of authority is no 
longer delegated between the identity claim o f the writer and the reader’s identification with that claim, is 
there, following Vining, a reason to pay any further attention. Before we get to Bakhtin, Blanchot and 
Lunsford are made to commune on the possibility of reconfiguring the discourse o f community as a place 
unowned by the discourse o f author-ity. Thought o f in this way, community as a place of a “common 
share” becomes less oppressive than Bizzell has rightly pointed out above.
Sharing Community: Blanchot Meets Lunsford
The sense we took away from Vandenberg's review of community was that it does not, taken by itself, 
escape the blandishments o f abstraction. Its fate, like that o f ‘identity’, as a catchall, would seem to 
decrease, not increase, its authority. And, given its juxtaposition to discourse, itself impossibly abstract 
without the "ballast" o f  the comparatively more "concrete" community, we have anonymity’s nameless 
rhetorical indifference increasing the volume of its function, and thus it dislocates both.
Vandenberg's pragmatic point about "the individual as community" blending "mental" and
"demographic" locations meshes nicely with the poststructuralist certitude that discourse in general, and
anonymous discourse in particular, depends upon "no particular subject in history" (Bove 56). But we have
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already located anonymity as both a local and a global discourse in my first three chapters. It might, in fact, 
be thought that a complete phenomenology of anonymity covering its embodied and disembodied effects, 
amounts to its eco-location.
What we really need to do now, prior to positing Bakhtin as the best rhetorician o f  anonymity—what 
with his notions o f  "contact zones" and "a special conception o f the listener"—is to determine anonymity's 
ecko-location, in a metaphorical or metonymic sense. We can hold in mind the actual "biological" (in bats) 
or "technological" (in submarines) processes for locating distant or invisible objects by means of sound 
waves reflected back to the sender by the objects sought. We must, however, take the strangest kind of 
"eschatological" turn toward Writing, itself, as a finally in-human process for (dis)avowing whatever we 
mean by community.
Only one writer that I know of locates Writing as a final, echoing anonymous process in his own 
writing: Maurice Blanchot. His work is so dense and obscure, I will not spend much time on it in support o f 
anonymity's echo-location through "processes" o f what, given Vandenberg's hints, is beginning to look like 
the pervasive absence of community. Nevertheless, all o f  his work—from The Space o f  Literature to the 
one we shall linger on, The Unavowable Community—seem to be about absence: whether of the writer from 
writing, or of a community for those who have no community. We have encountered Blanchot earlier, in 
Chapter Two, when we discovered Foucault's and Derrida's dependence on his notion of the "work" o f 
"absence” as summed up in his 1955 "The Essential Solitude":
The writer belongs to the work, but what belongs to him [or her] is only a book, a mute 
accumulation o f sterile words, the most meaningless thing in the world....A book is not a 
work until being is pronounced in it. And in the end, the work ignores him [or her], it 
closes on his [or her] absence, in the impersonal, anonymous statement that it is--and 
nothing more (825 emphasis added).
I won’t belabor Blanchot’s repeat of what Plato seems to have been saying in The Cratylus : that the 
work of BEING is anonymous. For Blanchot, the "work" o f writing—whether it end in a book for the 
public library or in a diary for the hope chest —not only distances the writer toward an unutterable, endless 
point of disappearance. (Ong teaches us just about as much in "The Writer’s Audience is Always a Fiction": 
if the reader must imagine an absent writer in the form of an author-function, then so must the writer 
imagine an absent reader in the form of an audience function. Both functions operate anonymously.)
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The writer's sense o f community can not be involved with the work o f  writing because that work 
requires, then "closes on," the writer's absence, permitting a reader can find a presence in the work o f 
words, impersonal and anonymous as these are. The reader has no community with the writer at all, but 
may have with the work o f writing that is the writer’s unworking, according to Blanchot in The Unavowable 
Community. I write may have community because, as we have seen in Vanderberg's equivocal conclusions 
about a "discourse community," there may be "no (discourse) there" in community, and "no (community) 
there" in discourse at some concrete level o f a singular writer or reader.
Why, or how could this be so? Part of the answer returns us to Schutz's reciprocal sense of 
intersubjective anonymity. But Blanchot pushes the otherness o f intersubjectivity to the sort o f limits o f  the 
"enclave" Nantanson attempted to elaborate from basic anonymous sociality. Here is how Blanchot 
captures the problem in the second section o f The Unavowable Community, titled "The Exigency of 
Community."
...[T|f the relation of one o f  us with another one o f us ceases to be that o f the Same with the 
Same, [literally, the traditional intersubjective sense o f Identity] but rather introduces the 
Other as irreducible and—given the equality between them—always in a situation of 
dissymmetry in relation to the one looking at that Other, then a completely different 
relationship imposes itself and imposes another form of society which one would hardly 
dare call a "community" (3).
Blanchot goes on to play the familiar dialectical game I stand guilty o f throughout this dissertation: we
learn of the "exigency of community" (or o f identity, or of authority)—its urgent necessity— by having the
word continuously hailed into existence for our attention by any number o f discourse communities. This is
necessary, lest we forget to remember that its presence in our lives is somehow always and already absent.
(Where is our normative sense and existence o f community to be found—never mind trying to locate an
emancipatory sense/essence o f community?)
After making a good case that the pervasive sense of otherness in identity’s regime of sameness prevents
the meaning of community, he starts his next sentence this way.
Or else one accepts the idea of naming it community, while asking oneself what is at 
stake in the concept o f community and whether the community, no matter if it has existed 
or not, does not in the end always posit the absence o f community (3).
Call it community, but understand that in naming it thus, an absence must be accounted for. How so? As we
saw in a phenomenology of anonymity, the discourse o f Identity is shot through with otherness in our
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intersubjective and intrasubjective orientations. This continuum of otherness functions anonymously, as we 
saw. For Blanchot, it is the anonymity o f death that calls the self-other relation into the question of 
community: “That is what founds community” (9). But Blanchot is not nihilistic regarding the death- 
community connection. He simply wants to make sure that we understand that community is immune to the 
discourses o f Identity and Authority. Its material rhetoric, its function in connecting the speaker to the 
spoken—the Speaker Respoken— (Vining and Tolar Collins at odds) makes community
...not the place o f Sovereignty....[E]ven by giving it various names: death, the relation 
to the other, or speech when the latter is not folded up in ways o f  speaking and hence 
does not permit any relation (of identity or alterity) with itself. Inasmuch as the 
community on behalf o f everyone rules (for me and for itself) over a beside-oneself (its 
absence) that is its fate; it gives rise to an unshared though necessarily multiple speech in 
a way that does not let it develop itself in words: always already lost, it has no use, 
creates no work and does not glorify itself in that loss.
This characterization o f community has clear ties to the function o f anonymity: it makes possible a speech
that is beside-oneself, a multiple speech that might or might not be shared by a community in the sense of
being the common space for sharing views, values, visions that we cannot always hold in common: thus the
unstable sense of community as both emancipatory and oppressive. Isn’t this precisely the going view and
value o f anonymity itself? Further, the anonymous writer, by definition, sacrifices itself, s/he does not
“glory itself’ in the loss o f shared identification that might—or might not— constitute the meaning of
community.
On the issue of community making possible what Blanchot calls a “necessarily multiple speech” that
does develop itself in terms, or “in words” o f  the Sovereignty o f the Subject, o f a single Identity or
Identification (in those “words”), I am reminded o f another invocation o f feminist rhetoric in the same
volume of College English in which Tolar-Collins’ article appeared. In “Rhetoric, Feminism, and Textual
Ownership, Andrea Abemethy Lunsford reviews her work with Lisa Ede in Singular Texts/Plural Authors,
noting “ ...some of the problems attendant on continuing to try to fit the square peg o f multiple, polyvocal
creativity into the round hole o f singular “authorship.”
Their critique of “the hegemony of romantic authorship” (529) leads them to “ ...an  open
acknowledgement of the weaving together o f others’ words characteristic to some degree o f all writing”
(540). This notion of writing, o f language use, as “ ...a  stitching, a seaming together o f a garment...that is
taken from “what is out there” and that is thus both yours and not yours...[is]...very much in the spirit”
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(540) of what I believe Blanchot is trying to ascertain about the absence o f  community. If  community is not 
the place o f the Sovereign, romantic conception o f the Author, then it is a kind of anonymous “garment” : 
“It is what exposes by exposing itself. It includes the exteriority o f  being that excludes it” (Blanchot, 12).
In other words, “what is out there” and thus what is yours and not yours” (Lunsford). Lunsford goes on 
to analyze
[t]he result o f  such a reconfiguration[:] [it] would be to open up what Susan West calls 
the “authordoxy” to multiple voices, not just to those who are author ized to 
speak/write/be heard and thus to enlarge and enrich the conversation for all...in a way 
that “invites the participation o f others” (West 190, in Lunsford 540).
What unites Lunsford’s and West’s feminist rhetoric o f community with Blanchot’s “rhetoric” o f the same,
in contradistinction to the rhetoric o f author-ity, is the possibility o f  exposing the non-identifiable property
lines of discursive ownership as a “multiple speech.” What separates them is Blanchot’s insistence that
community is so always beside-oneself—and certainly beside the rule of “authordoxy”—that it is
effectively absent for the very “multiple speech” it makes possible. In other words, Lunsford’s
“commitment to giving voice to multiple positionalities as well as to women’s voices that have been muted
or ignored” (540) would seem to revile Blanchot’s sense that such multiple speech possibilities creates a
community that is “always already lost...has no use, creates no w ork....” And yet, I think she would have
to agree that the common taking from “what is out there” to weave a text o f otherness “does not glorify
itself in that loss” o f Sovereignty which Community [and] Writing produces.
But there is a further, deeper affinity between the great composition-rhetorician Lunsford and 
the great critical theorist Blanchot. I did not supply Blanchot’s final sentences in the passage 
quoted above that open a subsection o f The Unavowable Community , titled, “Community and 
Writing.”
Thus the gift o f speech, a gift o f “pure” loss that cannot make sure of ever being received 
by the other, even though the other is the only one to make possible, if not speech, then at 
least the supplication to speak which carries with it the risk o f  being rejected or lost or 
not received. Hence the foreboding that the community, in its very failure, is linked to a 
certain kind o f writing, a writing that has nothing else to search for than the last words:
“Come, come, you for whom the injunction, the prayer, the expectation is not appropriate 
(12).
In this invocation I hear echoing Lunsford’s call for “participating in such a refiguration” (540).
She is calling on the need o f all “ [s]choIars of rhetoric and composition... to identify, theorize, and
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begin systematically practicing and teaching alternative forms o f subjectivity and alternative
modes o f ownership” (541). Her invocation supports the same call by Blanchot for “a certain kind
o f  writing” that is not addressed to “God” or its proxy the author-function, but to that
reconfiguration o f subject positions as multiple speaking positions in ownership becomes
nominally absent. The rhetorical space or place o f community has to be reconfigured so that its
normative meaning, o f holding in common, o f  commonly shared views and values, does not run
the risk (as we saw in Vandenberg’s critique o f  community) o f becoming re-authorized in terms of
sovereign ownership. In teaching alternative modes o f subjectivity and ownership, we may have to
require what Blanchot tells us in another subsection titled, “The Sharing of the Secret.”
...that what was most personal could not be kept as the secret o f one person alone, as it 
broke the boundaries o f the person and demanded to be shared, better, to affirm itself as 
the very act o f sharing. This sharing refers back to the community and is exposed in it; it 
can be theorized there—that is the risk it runs—becoming a truth or an object that could 
be owned while the community...maintains itself only as the place—the non­
place—where nothing is owned, its secret being that it has no secret, working only at the 
unworking that traverses even writing, or that, in every public or private exchange of 
words, makes the final silence resound, the silence where, however, it is never certain 
that everything comes, finally, to an end (19-20).
In crossing Lunsford’s and Blanchot’s understanding o f an alternative sense of community (where the
ownership of subjectivity and the subjectivity o f ownership become (un)stitched and (un)seam(ly), what we
begin to understand as the garment of anonymity is really what community exposes by exposing itself as an
“unworking” of the public and private fringes o f writing.
We also understand that what Vining was calling the “secrecy of office” (of author-ity, of 
“authordoxy”), is revealed by community whose secret is that it is without office, which is no secret at all 
once we introduce the ownerless sharing o f  anonymous writing—that absence— into the absence of 
community that is always and already that absence o f the anonymous.
Most important to understand is that the sharing o f personal identity is emancipatory to the extent that
the community o f sharing monologues is maximized as a no place where no writing is owned. Only
anonymity can ensure this edge o f nowhere in which nobody needs to own or own up to what’s written.
Writers endlessly disappear in the act of anonymous writing . Anonymity is not the place o f Sovereignty, it
is the final unresting place o f community, as community is anonymity’s never ending test case for whom
the injunction, the prayer, the expectation, is not appropriate. The composition of community as a function
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o f  anonymity should enlarge and enrich the conversation for a ll... in a way that invites the participation of 
others. But because it is linked to a  certain kind of writing, a writing that unworks our expectations o f 
identity, authority and community, its sense of otherness, its multiplication o f voices would appear to have 
no use, to create no work (the work o f the Academy, for example, and whatever in hell it means by a 
discourse community.)
Between the disappearance o f the writer and the absence o f a  community whose finite reality is typified 
by anonymous social relations, however, I posit a radical performativity o f self-other relations that creates 
a shared sense o f what no one would dare call community. Call it then, a zone o f contact, descried, as we 
saw in Blanchot’s and Lunsford’s common sense o f  private/public boundaries getting broken and 
reconfigured, a zone o f  contact where the personal and public— one’s own or an other’s word— becomes 
(dis)owned and possibly (un)shared. It is this sense of community, as a place of rhetorical unworking and 
immunity that sets up a more considered sense o f anonymity as a  rhetoric in the work o f Bakhtin.
Bakhtin’s Rhetoric o f Anonymous Contact Zones 
Anonymity’s Dialogic Destination
What have we learned from our excursus into the meaning o f  community as a discourse of
anonymity? It might be summed in this way. There is no such thing as a community without a
discourse. If anonymity is a discourse without a community, then anonymity and community share
a vast discursive identity, a common sense o f office that is without office. The idea [1] o f an
anonymous discourse community reconfigures the discursive share o f Identity and the ownership
Authority, and in so doing opens up both oppressive and emancipatory possibilities for new
subject positions to speak/write. In real terms o f action, however, the composition o f an
anonymous discourse community “seems to propose itself,” (to adapt Blanchot’s foreboding about
the oppressiveness of community itself which Bizzell, as we saw, also senses),
as a tendency towards a communion, even a fusion, an effervescence assembling the 
elements only to give rise to a unity ( a supra-individuality) that would expose itself to 
the same objections arising from the simple consideration o f the single individual, locked 
in his [s/e] immanence (7).
How can we escape from this ironically solipsistic—arhetorical—sense of an anonymous
community? How can we aid and abet the rhetorical return to an eiro — “I say...”— that fully
162
R eproduced  with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
reconfigures the subject position of a first person singular as always and already an interalia—a
“We” who is both Some body and No body? I know o f  no better theorist than Bakhtin. The
Blanchot passage uncannily echoes one o f  Bakhtin’s last reflections made in “From Notes Made
in 1970-71,” right down to its technical jargon. But notice how Bakhtin opens up, emancipates the
single individual, locked in his/her immanence though the suggestion o f a communal anonymous
function. In this passage, Bakhtin is speculating finally on what he had long since posited as a
super-addressee o f  all discourse—that this ultimate sense o f audience originates in intra-
subjective consciousness, but does not remain there.
Does man [rib] remain only within himself [szc], that is, remain solitary? Something 
absolutely new appears here: the supraperson, the supra-I, that is, the witness and the 
judge (204).
Despite this clear sense o f proximity to what I have been contending is the anonymous function, the reader 
might ask skeptically, Why Bakhtin? For many o f  us know full well that the riverine nature o f his works 
have become one common well to which all kinds o f disc-ho[u]rses are brought to water. So now I lead a 
discursive horse with no name. Why Bakhtin? Bakhtin imagines a zone o f contact where anonymity and 
community drink.
Bakhtin’s imagination of discourse—whether authoritarian or internally persuasive, or double­
voiced—always points towards the “dialogical”, not the dialectical, as I have been doing throughout. 
D ialectical reasoning about the relation o f anonymity to the discourses o f Identity, Authority, and 
Community can not get us to a rhetorical conception o f  anonymity. I can tell you right now that I believe 
that the anonymous function is inherently dialogical and therefore eminently rhetorical, but readers are 
more likely to give credence to my belief if  I summon the author-ity of Bakhtin.
The obvious place to begin, then, is with Bakhtin’s The Dialogic Imagination , a group of four essays 
gathered from a larger collection o f his essays representing some thirty years o f thinking on the poetics of 
the novel, and amounting to his “middle period.” (It is interesting to note that Bakhtin’s early period, under 
Stalinism, saw the use o f collective, untraceable—and to this day contested—authorship, in which three 
books attributed to Bakhtin, come from the Circle o f  Bakhtin, with Medvedev and Voloshinov, 
significantly figuring in his (who’s?) author-function.)
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My present scope does not permit any reflection on Bakhtin’s lifelong interest in the author-function and 
its relation to the novel as the historical epitome of what he calls heteroglossic, internally dialogized, 
discourse. I cannot treat his distinction between “authentic” and “ inauthentic” double-voiced discourse, 
except to remind the reader that he felt that the separation of poetics and rhetoric created two kinds o f 
“monological discourse” which pass themselves off as authentically double-voiced. Lost to this discussion 
is a review and redescription o f  six ancient forms of “autobiography”— particularly the “rhetorical” and the 
“stoical” autobiography—which Bakhtin discusses in such detail in “Forms o f Time and Chronotope in the 
Novel” that no contemporary expressivist should ever feel a sense of being ahistorical or arhetorical.
But what of my sense of Bakhtin as a rhetorician rather than a literary historian who merges poetics, 
philology, and linguistics into what he would later come to call “translinguistic understanding?” He did not 
have good things to say about rhetorical discourse, generally, casting it into the realm, along with poetic 
discourse, o f “inauthentic double voiced discourse.” It was thoroughly “monological,” in actuality. It had a 
hand, with poetic discourse, in “centralizing” language life—a centralization which “novelistic discourse” 
had to struggle against long and hard in “the zone of contact” that arose between them. Yet, near the end o f 
“Discourse in the Novel,” in a subsection titled The Speaking Person in the Novel, Bakhtin has this to say 
about rhetoric and the rhetorical. His theme up to this point, (as we will see below), has been the image o f a 
speaking person in discourse that is anticipated in the listener, creating, in effect various speech and 
character zones.
It was Bakhtin’s desire to merge several lines of investigation toward a new human science. It might 
stand up to “[t [he entire methodological apparatus of the mathematical and natural sciences [that] is 
directed toward mastery over mute objects, brute things, that do not reveal themselves in words, that do not 
comment on themselves” (351). Rhetoric in its present state and form could not answer this call. “The 
importance of another’s speech as a subject in rhetoric is so great that the word frequently begins to cover 
over and substitute itself for reality” (353). Whatever sense o f “double-voicedness” rhetoric might achieve 
“ ...is abstract and thus lends itself to formal, purely logical analysis o f  the ideas that are parceled out in 
voices, an analysis that then exhausts it” (354 In the “contact zone” as Bakhtin analyzes it, we can sense 
that he wanted to take from the study of psychology “the possible inner monologues of developing human
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beings, the monologue that lasts a whole life” (345). He wished to make these monologues the purview of a 
rhetoric that could preserve the multiplicity o f voices.
Anonymity’s Rhetorical Force
Bakhtin’s examination o f  discourse is obsessed with voice and voices, double-voicedness, with the 
“image o f a speaker,” and “the image of a listener.” Together these dialogically concretize a much 
more abstract “image” “that is not the image o f a man [st'c] in his [sic] own right, but precisely the 
image o f  a language (336). It is to this more specific focus on what seems to be a “phonocentric,” 
but which becomes a dialogic, imagination that we first turn. In it we can sense Bakhtin’s desire to 
synthesize and synergize the best tendencies o f  rhetoric and poetics, psychology and philology.
We will ultimately focus on just a few pages from the subsection, The Speaking Person in the 
Novel. To set up this discussion of the contact zone however, we open with two passages from the 
first essay in The Dialogic Imagination. Once we have determined the context o f that phrase, as 
Bakhtin intended it in understanding the novel in its earliest appearance, we can then slowly 
“refract” and “reaccenutate” its meaning and function as partaking of anonymous speech as itself a 
“novel” discourse.
In “Epic and Novel: Bakhtin has this to say about the origin o f the novel,
The novel took shape precisely at the point when epic distance was disintegrating, when 
both the world and man [j/'c] were assuming a degree of comic familiarity, when the 
object o f artistic representation was being degraded to the level of a contemporary reality 
that was inconclusive and fluid. From the very beginning the novel was structured not in 
the distanced image o f the absolute past but in the zone o f  direct contact with 
inconclusive present-day reality. A t its core lay personal experience and free  creative 
imagination (39, emphasis added).
As we will see below, Bakhtin returns to this use o f the zone o f contact or contact zone and this discussion 
o f distance and proximity. In this first appearance what I find important is the resemblance o f the novel’s 
struggle to re-present o f “personal experience and free creative imagination” and the still embattled status 
o f “expressivism” within the field of composition-rhetoric. I see in Bakhtin’s description a reminder of 
expressivist discourse’s devotion to having students engage the zone o f  direct contact with inconclusive 
present-day reality. In contrast, “academic discourse” is “structured...in the distanced image of the 
absolute past” (in the sense o f other’s/author’s already achieved experience o f the written). These are
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artificially pure binary oppositions, to be sure—-just as Bakhtin’s oppositions between “epic and novel” are. 
The discursive reality is always heteroglossic (as we saw in our study of “ancient epic” material.)
And, in terms o f a hybrid, heteroglossic sense o f writing as a developing reality, we all understand that 
what Bakhtin is calling “a  zone o f direct contact” has become for composition-rhetoric almost a genre in 
itself. For if first year writing has anything in common across its many discursive forms and function, it has 
to be that its nearly universally required status makes it “ ...a  genre that is ever questing, ever examining 
itself and subjecting its established forms to review. Such, indeed, is the only possibility open to a genre 
that structures itself in a zone o f  direct contact with developing reality” [whether that developing reality is 
defined as academic discourse analysis or academic autobiographical analysis] (39).
Where and how anonymous writing could or should become part o f that struggle, o f that zone of contact 
with students’ developing academic reality—and with developing students’ academic reality— is the subject 
o f our close reading o f Bakhtin’s contact zone theme. That close reading o f the contact zone should 
develop yet another possibility that anonymity informs the larger inconclusive discourse of community, a 
discourse out of which any sense o f contact zones as a lived reality will appear. For now, we will return to 
the anonymity of discourse in more conventional rhetorical terms: the anonymous nature of the utterance.
Near the beginning o f the fourth essay in The Dialogical Imagination , “Discourse in the Novel,” 
Bakhtin reminds us o f the forces in language, and of their anonymous orientation.
Every utterance participates in the "unitary language" (in its centripetal forces and 
tendencies) and at the same time partakes of social and historical heteroglossia the 
centrifugal, stratifying forces (272).
The authentic environment o f an utterance, the environment in which it lives and takes 
shape, is dialogized heteroglossia, anonymous and social as language, but simultaneously 
concrete, filled with specific content and accented as an individual utterance (272, 
emphasis added).
For our purposes of understanding anonymity as the background condition for identity in community, we 
see a juxtaposition that should no longer strike us as peculiar: anonymity and sociality. We have been 
prepared to accept that anonymity is part o f the authentic dialogic environment o f every utterance. With 
Bakhtin we also begin to see that anonymity is essential to maintaining the structure and sense o f 
community when understood as a tension-filled negotiation between what is meant by the private/public 
self-presentations and our private/public otherness.
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That language is both anonymous and social is clear enough—a pure Saussurean precipitate that has 
undergone Bakhtin's unique metaphorical spin, as in the description o f the utterance just before the second 
passage in question. What are langue and parole for Saussure, are for Bakhtin "unitary language" and 
"heteroglossia”. Never mind trying to picture a situation in which a phenomenon wants to spin both 
outward and inward. Bakhtin believes it "possible to give a concrete and detailed analysis o f any utterance, 
once having exposed it as [just such] a contradiction-ridden, tension-filled unity o f two embattled 
tendencies in the life o f  language" (272). Having, I hope, exposed the discourse o f  anonymity as sharing 
this contradictory unity, I will not take up too much space here to underscore what has already been done in 
the name of Saussurean-Derridean binaries.
It is important to repeat, however, the counter-intuitive logic of the anonymous: it operates from and 
appeals to a social whole—a supra-individuality as Blanchot told us above. That the individual identity of 
its speaker/writer is concealed is merely a recapitulation o f the thoroughgoing anonymity o f those who, in 
occupying an audience or a readership, have no individual identity either. The normative rhetorical 
situation has the writer or speaker named and therefore "known" (if only in a formal, conventional sense). 
This norm "turns" on the expectation that the writer/speaker desires to self-identify for larger purposes of 
identification with a social but anonymous group o f reader/listeners. When the writer/speaker position 
remains "centrifugal" (turning outward toward the social) but unknown, a curious "centripetal” effect 
ensues, wherein the anonymity o f the writer "exposes" the anonymous but social mass o f reader/listeners. 
The writerly (rather than authorial) desire to identify with a readership is brought into tension with the habit 
and desire o f a readership to identify (if only in name) who is attempting an identification with a "me” or an 
"us." When taken together in Bakhtin's "centripetal" image, connecting the anonymous writer and reader 
constitutes a "unitary" sense o f the social.
Not only are the subject positions of writer/reader now "tension-filled" with a pervasive anonymity both 
social and personal, but the normative tendencies o f writing and reception to be centrifugal and centripetal 
can be seen to reverse spin. The anonymous writer is seen as making some sort o f inward turn while 
appealing outward to the community. The receiving community on the other hand can be seen to spin 
outward toward the unnamed in a flurry o f desire to first identify the writer, rather than identify with the 
writing—“the image o f  a language.”
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This description of what I believe happens within the action o f anonymity relies on Bakhtinian 
categories o f spin control. I don't think my adoption and adaptation is coincidental. For one thing, both 
Saussure and Bakhtin see language as a whole "structure"—a kind of commonwealth for all, but specific to 
no one person. We see this in Bakhtin's description: "anonymous and social as language."
The most critical point in my adaptation o f Bakhtin to anonymous discourse is to understand that the 
anonymous text is "simultaneously concrete, filled with specific content and [is] accented as an individual 
utterance" regardless o f the concealed identity o f the writer. In fact, that very concealment raises the 
intensity or level of difference of the anonymous text. To think o f the anonymous "utterance” as a genre of 
"dialogized heteroglossia" is to begin to understand the place it holds and shares in diversifying and 
stratifying, in widening and deepening, the needs and uses o f a discourse (of) community (both abstract and 
concrete, individually accented and socially anonymous at once.)
It would appear that anonymity not only holds in tension the centripetal and centrifugal forces of 
language and its users. Anonymity also resonates because it impersonates a fully rhetorical condition in 
which writer/reader and writing/reading become an act o f communion. The communion possible here 
happens along a continuum o f  otherness. Its presence— if desired— in the discourse of community is 
always, at the same, time an unspeakable absence whose special conception is all of us, listening. 
Anonymity’s Rhetorical Face
I have been building a general case for the “double-voicedness” of a presupposed contact zone that is 
anonymous and social because the contact zone is itself a construct of the “dialogic imagination” which is 
heteroglossic and hybridized by virtue of many contending “monological” forms. We also know that the 
monological “I” of private phonocentric consciousness is anonymous with regard to the “I” of the writer, 
the “I” in writing. Bakhtin’s bias, as we know, is toward the novelist, not what he calls the “prose writer,” 
or “the writer, simply the writer.” Still, he has much to tell us about the intra-subjective anonymity of the 
writer.
Even had he [s/c] created an autobiography or a confession o f  the most astonishing 
truthfulness, all the same s/he, as its creator, remains outside the world s/he has 
represented in her/his work. If  I relate (or write about) an event that has just happened to 
me, then I as the teller (or writer) o f this event am already outside the time and space in 
which the event occurred. It is just as impossible to forge an identity between myself, my 
own "I," and that "I" that is the subject of my stories as it is to lift myself up by my own 
hair (256).
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Bakhtin is alive to what he latter calls “the alien discourses” that inhabit, dialogize, and bring on an 
incipient double-voicedness in time most personal writing. He just wants to valorize their ultimate rhetoricity 
in the way the novelist handles tthem, choosing from the alien discourses o f autobiography or confession as 
easily as she or he does from radfio-nation, journalese, TVspeak.
But Bakhtin can never elide, irf  he would remain true to the project o f a dialogic imagination, the
monological; he can only d ism iss or displace its historic author-ity in the rhetorical and poetic forms both 
denigrated and appropriated by EPlato. He can’t and won’t, because o f his abiding interest in the image o f a 
listener/reader. Thus, in a Bakhrtinian redescription o f rhetoric, the eiro “I speak” undergoes a centrifugal 
spin, in which
[a] II rhetorical forms, nmonologic in their compositional structure, are oriented toward the 
listener and his (her) amswer. It is highly significant for rhetoric that this relationship 
toward the concrete listesner is a relationship that enters into the very internal construction 
of rhetorical discourse (2280).
However, Bakhtin, goes on to Hell us, the rhetorical conception takes “ ...the listener for a person who
passively understands but not ome who actively answers and reacts” (280). This is where he jumps from
rhetorical to novelistic discouirse, building a case that the latter creates an "internal dialogism"—
"aspects...that take the listener:...who actively answers and reacts" (280). In fact, Bakhtin tells us,
“[rjesponsive understanding i s  a  fundamental force, one that participates in the formulation o f
discourse...(280).
The key issue in what I would • call the “diabolical” account o f double-voicedness (autobiographically 
lifting oneself up by one’s owm hair), is that it remains a rhetoric o f  the listener/reader, not o f the 
speaker/writer. The writing “I” creates a written “I”—an other—which takes on an active, responsive 
understanding not for the writer but for still other readers. This “I”—already an alien discourse to the “I” 
that performed it, “ ...enters inlto dialogical relationships with certain aspects o f this system.” As a 
“speaker,” this “I” anonymous to the writer who created it, “breaks through the alien conceptual horizon o f 
the listener [-reader]” to become a  “...new form of internal dialogism o f the word” (282). Bakhtin is careful 
to distinguish the “alien” (literally  “other”) nature o f the writing itself (as “object”) from this new form of 
the alien. It is not “ ...the object* [of writing] that serves as the arena for the encounter, but rather the
subjective belief system o f the listener [reader]” (282).
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Under the protective/reflective, rhetorically alien, condition of anonymity, it is my belief that students' 
new found orientation toward the position o f  the listener/reader is altered once again through a doubling of 
the encounter "on alien territory." It is this sense o f  anonymity as the rhetorical common ground of such 
alien conceptions of listening—internally and externally dialogized—that begins to describe its structure 
and function as a  contact zone.
I cannot prove, of course, that Bakhtin would agree that anonymity, as a rhetorical form, answers his 
description o f a fundamental force o f  responsive understanding which, in effect, “looks” rhetorically to the 
listener, while rhetorically overlooking, or remaining indifferent to, the speaker. I cannot prove that he 
would see that anonymity functions “...moreover [as] an active understanding, one that discourse senses as 
resistance or support enriching the discourse" (280-1). (Though I think that students’ anonymous (dis) 
course evaluations, together with the academic herd o f unseen, but not unheard, anonymous readers who 
actively respond to fellow colleagues seeking publication more than fulfills the idea that it functions as 
resistance or support enriching discourse.)
I do think, however, that we can begin to understand something o f what anonymity’s “double- 
voicedness” might “look” like in a Bakhtinian rhetorical accounting. In the case o f  the anonymous student 
course evaluation, the special conception o f  the listener becomes double-voiced and internally dialogized 
when we remember that students are an audience of, and for, academic discourse; they are trained to 
listen—often passively— for 12 years. The special conception o f a listener which the anonymous course 
evaluation creates is one in which a speaker/writer (institutionally anonymous) seeks to break “through the 
alien conceptual horizon of the [student as] listener” 282).
But whereas Bakhtin goes on to describe this “speaker” as constructing “his [her] own utterance on alien 
territory, against his [her], the listener’s, apperceptive background,” the internal dialogism and the 
centripetal force of the passive listener gets reversed into the image o f the entire “student body.” This 
anonymous collective apperceptive “body” is “saving face” first, in order to share its centrifugal force at 
last. That is, students’ various audiences to the heteroglossic academic discourses o f a semester are given 
the chance to break through the alien conceptual horizon o f the teacher’s, and his/her institutionally, 
apperceptive background. In effect, through the internal dialogism of anonymity, anonymous listeners
170
R eproduced  with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
speak to anonymous listeners in a double-voiced discourse seeking a more active, responsive 
understanding.
In the case of the anonymous peer review, this reversal and reaccentuation o f the forces o f language and 
the imagined faces o f speaker and listener is already predicated upon the kind of “active, responsive 
understanding” Bakhtin underscores as fundamental. Yet the anonymous function remains constant as an 
internally dialogized, double-voiced discourse that reaccentuates a sense o f audience, not o f speech: readers
o f a writer who becomes their reader.^
If these two examples do not descry the kind of contact zone that anonymous discourse can be said to
create and occupy, then I have profoundly misread Bakhtin’s conceptual and rhetorical conceptions o f  the
listener as an image o f the language—social and anonymous—itself. Keeping always in mind Bakhtin’s
bias toward novelistic discourse, I nevertheless see and hear in the following passage the rhetorical
presence and inventiveness of the anonymous function. In my bias, the ‘writer: transgresses the “novelist”
and “the living heteroglossia o f  language” is always and already, as we know, “social and anonymous.”
The anonymous function as “double-voicedness,” then makes its presence felt, as we saw, through the
author-function, but also in the specific figure of the novelist.
This double-voicedness makes its presence felt by the novelist in the living 
heteroglossia o f  language, and in the multi-languagedness surrounding and 
nourishing his own consciousness; it is not invented in superficial, isolated 
rhetorical polemics with another person (326-7).
Bakhtin would find the anonymous discourse of my two examples o f course evaluations, and 
peer review salutation, inauthentic pretenders to genuine double-voicedness. In his view, what 
might be thought of as authentically rhetorical double-voicedness would be neither poetic nor 
polemical. Each is “monological” in his author-functional view. Yet, we also know that what 
Bakhtin has called the "possible inner monologues of developing human beings, the monologue 
that lasts a whole life" (345), is behind (or before, and following ever after) his fully achieved 
sense o f “double-voicedness.” This lifelong monologue that secures the certainty o f self- 
consciousness is, as we have already seen, populated by voices that are not our own, but which, 
assuming phonocentric normalcy, we dialogize as our own in a contact zone otherwise known as 
the “I-Thou” orientation.
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The rhetorical, internally dialogized nature o f this private, immediate, intrasubjective zone o f 
self-other contact was not o f much interest to Bakhtin. He was interested in its externalized, 
textualized reaccentuations that nevertheless, become again, internally dialogized. The idea that 
anonymity is a double-voiced contact zone, one rhetorically devoted to a special conception o f a 
listener/reader, is now ready to be realized in Bakhtin’s actual use of the term.
Anonymity’s Rhetorical Voice
The “Glossary” put together by editor Michael Holquist at the end of The Dialogic Imagination 
opens a definition o f “speech zones” this way: “Zones are both a territory and a sphere o f 
influence. Intentions must pass through “zones” dominated by other characters, and are therefore 
refracted” (434). This is not of direct interest to our discussion, since “zones” specifically aid in 
understanding the meaning of novelistic discourse’s “dialogized heteroglossia” as always having 
more than one “voice” (unlike, lyric poetry, for example, which Bakhtin calls “single-voiced 
discourse.”) But as we saw in our discussion o f the meaning and function of community, it seems 
to be a loading zone—much in the way that Identity is—for a number of incongruous uses and 
meanings. These include a “territorial” sense, and a values/views consensus site, whose “sphere o f 
influence can indeed be said to “refract” the intentions o f individual identity.
O f far greater interest to us, now that we have the basic drift that an author’s character’s speech
is polyvocal, (including the absent character that is the author’s), is Holquist’s author-itative
closing to this definition. (Fittingly enough, it also ends the Glossary.)
In Bakhtin’s view there are no zones belonging to no one, no “no-man’s land.” There are 
disputed zones, but never empty ones. A zone is a locus for hearing a voice; it is brought 
about by the voice” (434).
It would seem that that “no one,” “no body,” (or noman, the commonly mistranslated word for “Udeis”, the 
name used by the character Odysseus in one o f the founding speaking moments o f an anonymous contact 
zone), couldn’t claim an identity, authority, or a community. The anonymous, because it comes from no 
one, a no body, cannot claim a voice. In Holquist’s entry just above that for “zone” (whether a zone for 
“character” or for “speech”), we discover, however, that a “voice” is “the speaking personality, the 
speaking consciousness. A voice always has a will or desire behind it, its own timbre and overtones” (434).
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It would seem, then, that anonymity and its function either presents a  problem for “voice” and the 
speech/character zone it creates and is created by, or it is the problem o f  voice and the problem o f  the 
contact zone. It would seem that if  there are any dialogic “fault lines” in the contact zone created by 
speaking personalities, those fault lines are opened, widened, deepened, yet simultaneously transgressed 
-crossed—by anonymous speaking personalities which, as we have seen in Chapter Three, “Toward a 
History o f Anonymity,” create, in order to populate, any number o f contact zones.
Holquist is obviously basing his determination o f Bakhtin’s “view” o f  these matters of voice and zone 
on the text he has himself edited. Let’s return, then, to The Dialogic Imagination to confirm or disconfirm 
the definitions o f zone and voice as set forth in the “Glossary.” The section to focus on in the final essay 
“Discourse in the Novel,” is The Speaking Person in the Novel. As we have already seen, for Bakhtin, “the 
fundamental condition, that which makes a novel a novel,... is the speaking person and his [sic] discourse “ 
(332). Common sense tells us, and Bakhtin reminds us, that this speaking person is an “image,” an “artistic 
creation.” Further, the speaking person is “always, to one degree or another, an ideologue”—that is, one 
“who must defend and try out his [sic] ideological positions, who must become both a polemicist and an 
apologist” (333). Thus, in one o f Bakhtin’s many contradictions, genuine dialogized heteroglossia does, in 
fact, engage to some degree or another, a monological rhetorical purity, where polemics and apologetics are 
the rule.
It could not be otherwise: Bakhtin’s own system of a dialogic imagination is indebted, to some degree, 
to the lifelong monologue we carry around in our own heads: the polemics and apologetics of the voice that 
has been called self-consciousness, or more ethico-religious, “conscience.” Just as Yeats held that poets 
write out o f  “an argument with themselves,” so do we all operate from a contact zone whose speaking 
personality is dialogic—“it anticipates a listener” has “a special conception o f a listener,” in Bakhtin’s 
words.
The monological, single-voiced, discourse o f self-consciousness is actually “rhetorical” in its most 
robust sense o f an “active, responsive understanding.” The speaking personality—the character zone—o f 
the self is thus not only an ideological, discourse, but an “alien discourse” as well, since the self is dia­
logic, is split within itself between at least one speaking personality and one which is a listener—an other.
The self-sense o f otherness in its dialogic personality is not alienation in the existential sense developed by
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Nietzsche through Heidegger through Sartre, etc. It is an interalia -the “I” is the subject o f  a “You”—the 
most immediate o f  all orientations, and one that, we decided, contains an anonymous function.
Thus, when Bakhtin considers “novelistic discourse,” he is enacting a trans-positional—or what he very 
early on in his career called a transgredient —moment from the speech zone o f individual consciousness, a 
zone which is not purely or finally nominalistic, but rather, anonymistic in its provocations, its 
summonings, of voice. “The theme of the speaking person,” he writes, “is after all a subject sui generis, 
[that is, “unique” or “singular”] one that poses special tasks for our language in all its spheres” (337). And 
most certainly, Bakhtin is alive to the “alien discourse” o f  the image or theme of this rhetorical, ideological, 
consciousness o f the speaker. Writing about the “the transmitted speech of another” he concludes that it 
always “ ...must be kept in mind [fitting translation, that] i f  we are to make good our claim that o f all words 
uttered in daily life, no less than half belong to someone else” (339).
Trying to be quantitative, Bakhtin is basically reaffirming the [half] self- [half] other theme o f the 
binaric discourse o f  identity, and its subsequently more nuanced, phenomenological history. And, as we 
know from our own self-reflection of “I” whatever half belongs “to someone else” much o f  it is, to return 
to Natanson who is returning to psychoanalysis, “an immense remainder”—what I call “an immense, 
intense reminder” o f  the anonymity of our “other” half.
So already we are beginning to see that Holquist, in his pursuit o f compression with clarity that 
characterizes any “Glossary”, has significantly misstated the situation o f the “character/speech zone.” This 
zone may well be the zone o f “no one,” since “some one else” is just another no name for the other-ness of 
all such zones where “voices” take up the paradoxical position o f watchful listening and responsive 
understanding. This rhetoric of an intra-subjective anonymity o f “the speaking person” does not ignore that 
o f the speech zones o f  inter-subjectivity, where what Bakhtin calls “representability” must not be forgotten. 
That is, “[I] n order to assess and divine the real meaning o f others’ words in everyday life, the following 
are surely o f decisive significance: who precisely is speaking, and under what concrete circumstances?” 
(340).
Bakhtin has left the phenomenological or “artistic representation” of speech zones for “real” world,
face-to-face speech zones to make a point that we have not left uncovered in earlier chapters. Namely, the
immediacy o f  face-to-face, intersubjective orientations is the least anonymous o f all orientations, as we
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learned from Schutz. And yet, we also understand that the subtle shadings o f such orientations make the 
question o f “who precisely is speaking” answerable to the function o f anonymity as a contact zone whose 
immediate proximities and mediated distances continuously emerge within the larger problematic discourse 
o f community itself.
Where does this leave Holquist’s declaration that Bakhtin’s view of speech zones, o f the contact zones 
created by voice, does not entail an anonymous function or orientation? The scope o f our discussion cannot 
take up Bakhtin’s discussion o f “authoritative” and “internally persuasive” discourse as “a playing with 
distances, with fusion and dissolution, with approach and retreat” (344). (In the idea o f distance the 
anonymous function returns not with a vengeance, but with a murmuring voice o f rhetorical indifference: 
“What matters who is speaking, someone said....”). We are therefore poised to look at Bakhtin’s actual use 
of the phrase “the contact zone” (or perhaps the translator’s phrase, lifted from Mary Louise Pratt’s 
Imperial Eyes.)
In brief, Bakhtin’s believes that “authoritative discourse,” (founding exemplars being the holy canonical 
trinity I looked at in Chapter Three), does not permit us to frame its speech zones it into our contexts; it is 
not heteroglossic. (I believe my analysis o f Genesis fully contradicts Bakhtin’s dictum, since, if  framed 
within the context of the anonymous function therein, it is decidedly heteroglossic, and double-voiced.) He 
is partially correct, in view o f the anonymous function, that “[t [he zone o f the framing context must 
likewise be distanced—” for we understood, and, I hope, still understand, that anonymity is a distancing act 
between speaker/writer and listener/reader.
But anonymity is also a complex act of proximity for the writing itself as a special double-voiced 
conception o f the listener/reader— o f other voices in its contact zone. Thus, when he finishes that last 
declaration, “The zone o f the framing context must likewise be distanced— no familiar contact is possible 
here either” (344, my emphasis). We have to await the findings of Chapter Five, “Toward a Pedagogy of 
Anonymity,” to understand just how wrong Bakhtin really is about the possibility o f familiar contact in the 
rhetorical zone of anonymity’s “alien discourse.” This familiar contact operates on two planes—between 
the unnamed writer and his/her image o f speaking others, and between the named, face-to face readers of 
these writings of “no one” speaking about some one—the self itself an alien among its others.
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In the following passage, Bakhtin uises the very phrase, “the contact zone.” In terms o f Bakhtin’s 
thematically recursive approach and style, its reappearance after many years and essays after “Epic and 
Novel,” is not surprising, and would “seem to be a recapitulation o f  that earlier description, which we have 
treated above. But its appearance in tthis later context takes on a more universal meaning. He is no longer 
concerned with the novel and its discursive struggle, but with all discourse—with idea o f  any and every 
discourse community coming to termes with its sense of author-ity—of “authoritative discourse.” Here is 
where the fault lines inevitably ap»pear between what should be distanced or centralized. Here is 
where—and how— voices o f  discursive emancipation come to figure in and refigure the contact zone.
These non-authoritative voices are mot the guarantees of the discourse of identity, and certainly
not of community, given its contestaible discourse. They involve fresh personal experience and
free creative expression that are essentially without office. This makes them to some extent
immune to the official, already authoor-zed (default) line. Thus immunity enables the finding o f
fault in authority’s default line (of appropriateness, or correctness, for example.) As a phrase,
contact zone has become critical to understanding these multivocal fault lines in the discourses of
identity, authority, and community thait trouble composition-rhetoric. These fault lines also enable
it to transgress its theoretical and pedagogical troubles, making it one o f those “fields” o f  “studies”
that thrive (contra North) on heteroglos-sic, and multi-vocal discourses.
In the history o f literary languuage, there is a struggle constantly being waged to overcome 
the official line with its tendency to distance itself from the zone of contact, a struggle 
against various kinds and degrees o f authority. In this process discourse gets drawn into 
the contact zone, which resialts in semantic and emotionally expressive (intonational) 
changes: there is a weakening and degradation of the capacity to generate metaphors, and 
discourse becomes more reifh.ed, more concrete, more filled with everyday elements and 
so forth (345 emphasis added)..
Readers will note that Bakhtin is stilLl taking a shot at what he considers the monological purity o f 
poetry, especially lyric poetry, with its; proven (Bakhtin would say craven) capacity to generate metaphors, 
but not much else of ideological worth j. (In this, o f  course, he is wrong, ultimately, but he is still writing in 
the flush of a faith in the novel as comning to incorporate all discourse. What has, in fact, happened, if we 
march with Foucault, is that the “noved” is no longer new, and becomes just another episteme, no less, no 
more, authoritatively or internally persiuasive than The Bible or the daily newspaper. Bakhtin comes to this 
realization as his career closes. )
176
R eproduced  with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
More important to notice, I think, is the attempted ascendancy of prose writing that, in keeping with its 
etymology, does not turn like “verse” toward an authoritative past. Unofficial Prose does not genuflect 
before a canonical altar. It walks past it in the concrete pursuit of the everyday expression. In this, I think, 
we can identify a bit o f what’s at stake in the struggle over the meaning and function o f  the contact zone in 
composition-rhetoric. Before we get to some o f  the field’s reception and contestation o f the term, we might 
reflect, once again, on Bakhtin’s hope for a new rhetoric o f the contact zone. How far, from what Holquist 
asserts as being the view of Bakhtin, is that zone in which anonymity maintains a voice no less pervasive 
and functional than what we found in our analysis o f community as the site o f  some hoped for process of 
universal mediation?
The answer lies in the run up to what I believe amounts to Bakhtin’s call for a  new rhetoric o f the 
contact zone. The preparation for the contact zone is his conclusion about “internally persuasive discourse.” 
This is sort o f discursive life force is that struggle to hear and speak “one’s own word” within a lifelong 
monologue whose “ ...process is made more complex by the fact that a variety o f  alien voices enter into the 
struggle for influence within an individual’s consciousness”(348). He describes a process by which both a 
writer and a reader conduct “experimental guesswork [wherein] the image o f the speaking person and his 
[sic] discourse become the object of creative, artistic imagination” (348).^
We now begin to sense some anonymous fault lines in the contact zones o f speech, character, and of 
discourse at large, which Holquist did not take account. Between the image of the speaking person and the 
struggle o f alien voices with an image that, as we have learned, always anticipates a listener there is always 
a matter o f what Bakhtin calls “experimental guesswork.” But to discover that sense o f a possible new 
rhetoric o f the contact zone, where not only “alien voices,” but the voices o f “no body” do indeed speak, 
we need to leave The Dialogic Imagination and look to Bakhtin’s late writings Speech Genres and Other 
Late Essays.
At the end of “The Problem of Speech Genres” Bakhtin clarifies a blurring he often made in the
essays comprising The Dialogic Imagination regarding the “voices” o f spoken versus written
genres. This blurring was natural, o f  course, since the “image of a speaking/listening person” is
critical to understanding—to imagining—the dialogic representation o f reality in a novel. But
Bakhtin was also fascinated, as we saw, by the “monological” nature o f  individual self-
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consciousness and the voices it holds in tension as both a centripetal and centrifugal source for
what happens in novelistic discourse. By the time we get to “The Problem o f Speech Genres” he is
keen to re-sharpen some o f  the distinctions that tended to blend under the scrutiny o f his
experimental guesswork, between the utterance as an image and as an action.
Thus, addressivity, the quality o f turning to someone, is a constitutive feature o f the 
utterance; without it the utterance does not and cannot exist. The various typical forms 
this addressivity assumes and the various concepts o f the addressee are constitutive, 
definitive features o f various speech genres (99).
In this sense of turning to someone, we understand that the quality o f this addressivity is
various. There is intensely intimate, beloved, private, bedroom address, in which the exchange o f
voices are such that no one else will ever hear, (or care to hear, except that filmic love scenes
always parody these privacies with a watchful listening from nowhere). There are voices o f
strangers sitting in the airplane seats in front of you. What o f the collective addressivity in a full
restaurant growing louder until it is bearable because it is absolutely unhearable—a non-language
buzz and boom cocooning your intimate, private dinner talk? In the next paragraph, Bakhtin might
have saved many readers much trouble in their first and second passes through The Dialogic
Imagination if he had stated this, the paragraph following the one above.
As distinct from utterance (and speech genres), the signifying units o f a language—the 
word and the sentence— lack this quality of being directed or addressed to someone: 
these units belong to nobody and are addressed to nobody. Moreover, they in themselves 
are devoid of any kind o f relation to the other’s utterance, the other’s word (99, emphasis 
added).
True, true, Holquist was defining “speech” zones when he asserted that “in Bakhtin’s view there are no 
zones belonging to no one, no “no-man’s land.” But once we remember that these speech zones, these loci 
created by the voice for the voice, are in turn, made out o f words, we begin to understand—actively, 
responsively understand—how anonymity structures the contact zone of no body.
In his some of his very last writing—“From Notes Made in 1970-71: He asks” “Do there exist genres 
without an addressee? And then he writes, as if in answer: “The world without names.... Not from the thing 
to the word, but from the word to the thing, the word gives birth to the thing” (153). Words belong to 
nobody and are addressed to nobody. The contact zone o f anonymity is complete, and never empty, replete 
with a community that it might become. It gives voice to what is silenced. The unspeakable absence, and
178
R eproduced  with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
the absence o f  the unspoken, at the heart o f  community as a contact zone, cannot be understood in 
theoretical or rhetorical terms without taking account o f an anonymous function.
Anonvmitv and Pedagogical Artists of the Contact Zone 
Fault lines Part One: Pratt. Bakhtin. Hesford
I first became acquainted with Pratt’s notion o f a “contact zone” after I had first read Bakhtin in 1990. I 
picked up her book Imperial Eyes; Travel Writing and Transculturation and made my first foray into 
ethological and ethnographic research on the colonialist and imperialist encounters between the Western 
subject and its Native/Savage Others. I did not then appreciate the anonymous function in the moment of 
such encounters. It was not until Pratt published “The Arts o f the Contact Zone” where it was reproduced in 
Bartholomae and Petrosky’s Ways o f  Reading—an anthology I used as a TA while at The University of 
Massachusetts/Boston—that I began to sense the enormity of the concept’s importance.
I never did trace back the question of whether Holquist seized on Pratt to translate Bakhtin’s concept of 
contact zone, or the Russian translates Bakhtin’s inimitable neologizing straight into English, and Pratt 
picked it up through Holquist. It matters little, since Bakhtin and Pratt, have much in common for 
composition-rhetoricians. Both have been drawn into its discourse community so deeply and widely that to 
get some sense o f cogency behind the vast references to both thinkers, I seize upon the concept they share, 
as it were, to help composition-rhetoric, stay in contact with its own struggles and encounters.
In terms of my own research to contextualize my own past attempts to enable a contact zone 
through anonymous writing about the politics o f identity, (1994-5 at The University o f New 
Hampshire), the latest reference to Pratt’s use o f  contact zone appears in the 1998 Feminism and 
Composition Studies: In Other Words (Jarratt and Worsham. Editors.) In that book, Wendy 
Hersford’s “Ye Are Witnesses”: Pedagogy and the Politics o f Identity” sums up Pratt’s idea this 
way to set the stage for her own pedagogical experiments and experiences during the fall o f 1993 
at Oberlin.
Pratt’s notion of the contact zone helps us understand how historically oppressed groups 
negotiate identities and imagine communities in the context o f institutional power 
relations.
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Hesford has not read Imperial Eyes. Like all others, she seizes upon the “Arts of the Contact
Zone.” Pratt’s use of it in the larger study is not nearly so upbeat as related here. Still, the idea of
imagining communities within a contact zone created by voices o f  a dominant Other which then
provoke the suppressed voices o f the subordinated Other (thus the subtitle o f  the Jarratt/Worsham
edition, “In Other Words”) returns us to Bakhtin’s speech zones, and gives a poignant double
meaning to the idea that they are/are not inhabited by “no one.” She then quotes from Pratt’s “Arts
o f the Contact Zone” to define the term.
...a  space in which people geographically and historically separated come into contact 
with each other and establish ongoing relations, usually involving conditions o f coercion, 
radical inequality, and intractable conflict (Hesford, in Jarratt and Worsham 134).
The zone of contact Hesford creates her own intention and Pratt’s actual definition is very much 
reminiscent of Bakhtin’s sense of the struggle to make an authoritative discourse part o f one’s own word, 
make it internally persuasive, rather than hard edged and unalterable. Hesford then completes the 
ideological transformation o f  Pratt’s idea o f contact which she initiated with her uncited use (from Pratt) o f  
“ imagine[ed] communities” by applying its imperialist orientation to the normative entitlements o f a first 
world academic orientation.
O f course, Pratt performs this ideological transformation herself—in total— when she
reaccentuates her book length study o f subject peoples under Western domination into a
pedagogical application within the dominant zone o f  Western imperial power. In this sense, to
hearken back to Bakhtin, Hesford is struggling against Pratt’s authoritative, official line on the
contact zone. She seems to be suggesting that Pratt’s conception, as “the official line with its
tendency to distance itself from the zone of [academic] contact,” needs to be overcome—even
though Pratt has already overcome her own official line. The discourse o f academic community, in
other words, is one of various kinds of struggle with its own authority.
When applied to the academy, Pratt’s concept o f the contact zone challenges images of 
colleges and universities as stable and unified cultural sites where the principles of 
cooperation and equality obtain. In fact, colleges and universities are sites where the 
contradictions o f  power, politics o f representation, and construction o f historical memory 
are made visible. Collisions and conflicts among students illustrate how power is 
expressed and contested through written, spoken, and symbolic representation (134).
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I have no disagreement with Hesford’s appropriation and application of the term. It very much describes 
my pedagogical experience, except that I find the “contradictions” and “politics” she speaks o f were far less 
visible, thus my idea o f  an anonymous contact zone.
Fault lines Part Two: Pratt Bakhtin, van Slvck
Phyllis van Slyck’s 1997 article “Repositioning Ourselves in the Contact Zone,” is the next most 
recent appearance o f  the term. It also tells us much about how rhetoric’s-rhetoric’s discourse of 
community is (again Bakhtin) “a struggle [that is] constantly being waged to overcome the official 
line with its tendency to distance itself from the zone of contact, a struggle against various kinds 
and degrees o f authority. In this process [the] discourse [of community itself] gets drawn into the 
contact zone, which results in semantic and emotionally expressive (intonational) changes” in the 
original conception o f  the contact zone itself.
Van Slyck samples from Pratt’s article, opening with this epigraph:
What is the place o f  unsolicited oppositional discourse, parody, resistance, critique in the 
imagined classroom community? Are teachers supposed to feel that their teaching has 
been most successful when they have eliminated such things and unified the social world, 
probably in their own image? Who wins when we do that? Who loses? (in van Slyck 
149).
As we will see in Chapter Five, “Toward a Pedagogy o f Anonymity,” the answer to these questions, 
especially the first two, get treated in terms o f the anonymous function: the place o f all three of Pratt’s types 
o f “oppositional discourse” is located there; and furthermore, that “place” or contact zone that is anonymous 
writing is “the imagined classroom community”— the emancipatory/oppressive, essentially contested 
concept revealed over and against the normative sense—“unified social world”— o f community that 
generally pertains in teaching not to transgress, but to process community.
I have never felt more successful in my teaching then when I was teaching in the contact zone of 
anonymous writing. I state that even as I was made to feel a failure by many colleagues who felt that the 
prevention or elimination o f such transgressive, oppositional discourse (however residual and inconsistent) 
is the sign o f an emancipatory classroom community. Why? Because controlled consensus becomes self- 
fulfilling: a normative, authoritative discourse o f community o f the going view and going value of 
compositional identity “wins” and the hybrid, centrifugal, heteroglossic otherness o f writing itself “loses.”
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van Slyck’s pedagogy is not an anonymous one, but a close reading and oral/written response to “ ...a
variety o f postcolonial, nonwestem, and other so-called minority texts, in conjunction with western texts...in
an artificial space—the classroom—which does not appear to them to be safe or neutral” (151). Precisely
because o f their view o f  classroom vulnerability, and the power o f office held by the teacher within that
artificial space, making no real sense o f community possible—normative or emancipatory -the rhetorical
immunity of anonymity is necessary for sense o f safety and neutrality in terms o f teacherly/ institutional
power in the contact zone of the classroom.
van Slyck wants “to offer students modes o f resistance to their own and their peers’ cultural chauvinism,
yet [she does] want members o f the class to divide into separate and hostile camps” (151-52). I admire her
recapitulation of the contact zone in terms more faithful to Pratt’s original agenda than Hesford’s or mine,
which import first world identity politics into the contact zone. She cannot have the ideological struggle and
resistance inherent to the contact zone without having it operate as an absence -o r profound dissensus
between normative and emancipatory senses-- o f  community. Quoting Catherine Stimpson who is, naturally,
appropriating Bakhtin, she asks: “How can I demonstrate “that it is possible to live openly with difference in
a dialogic community?” ...—that students “...can engage in cultural analysis and ethical negotiations, without
necessarily coming to consensus”(152).
In reading her article, I she her giving the contact zone a short leash, pulling it back, before the logic of
its anonymously communal elements can assert the logic o f an answer to her questions. She is more
obsessed with proving to students that their “values are socially and culturally constructed” (152), and
having them “...recognize that the illusion o f a “core” self is at the heart o f essentialist positions which
privilege one culture over another” (153), then she is fully drawing them into the contact zone and its
anonymous destinies. Divided and hostile camps, tension in the enclaves, pressure between intersubjective
and intrasubjective transgressions that, in Pratt’s words, “clash and grapple with each other,”—these are
inevitable “fault lines” in the anonymous contact zone.
Because her pedagogy stands on the shoulders of not only Pratt, but also upon Bizzell’s and Miller’s
earlier (1994) invocations of the contact zone, she has the luxury and responsibility to quote each of them.
Speaking o f Miller, but not directly o f his notion o f “fault lines” in the contact zone, van Slyck repeats his
reminder, itself quoting Pratt, that “ “ ...there is still a great deal o f work to be done in constructing the
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‘pedagogical arts o f the contact zone’ ” and that one o f the most important steps [summarizing him] is to 
reconfigure power relations in the classroom” (152). She then quotes Bizzell, w hose  “OPINION: 
“CONTACT ZONES” AND ENGLISH STUDIES” preceded Miller’s “Fault lines in the Coratact Zone” by 
two months in 1994. Van Slyck’s quote is really Bizzell quoting Pratt’s original idea— “historically defined 
contact zones, moments when different groups within the society contend for...power “ (154-55).
Thus van Slyck’s focus on “power”—as understood by Miller and Bizzell (which is itself a  contact zone 
with fault lines), reduces the possibility o f the contact zone into simply redrawing, not transgressing the 
boundaries o f  academic power in the figure of the teacher. Standing on their shoulder, van S l y c k  asserts the 
power of the contact zone as an academically author-itative discourse community, not one in w hich is filled 
and defined by students’ voices as well: “Contact zones must therefore be defined [my emphasis] more 
broadly as spaces where diverse world literatures, and the cultures they represent and critique, «nay be taught 
in thematically organized contexts”(154). (Certainly, I taught the politics o f identity in a  ^ thematically 
organized context, using readings. The difference— the essential difference— was the anonymity o f one o f 
the contact zones enacted by what was defined for composition.)
Van Slyck’s “proposal for an English department contact zone course” (155) is simply repeating the 
official line laid down by Bizzell three years before on what contact zones are for, and how tfciey should be 
deployed (Bizzell’s “opinion”: give the power o f deciding what a discourse community back: to literature 
where it has always belonged, and get the expressivists—specifically Elbowians— out o f  the contact zone. 
Swell, Prof. Bizzell! Contact the zone o f postcolonialism if  you must, but is that contact zone- the only one 
that can interrogate the insidious, falsely emancipatory Western Selfs sense o f  entitlem ent through 
normative, exemplary identities of whiteness, middle classness, heterosexuality?
Eiro—I  say: Bizzell, along with van Slyck, are traitors to, or at least traders on, composition’s indigenous 
contact zone and its own imagined community o f discourse where the illusion o f  a unitary, autobiographical 
self meets its own social construction through writing the intersubjective experiences of identity within the 
anonymous ties and processes of otherness. Quoting Gerald Graff (no friend to composition, esccept that his 
dissensus model o f teaching has yet to be fully adapted to writing in and of itself), van Slyck believes such 
courses would become universal, standardized and could thus “be put into dialogue with o n e  another to
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create a sense o f [Graffs] “continuing community” ” (155). I will grant that she and Bizzell are correct— i f  
we are advocating abdicating control o f  composition as a distinct discourse community.
More generously, van Slyck is interested, as are we all, in teaching students “to define ethical positions” 
and that it is, in deed, “[p]art of our responsibility...to help students see that unreflective group consensus 
does not constitute an ethical position and that sometimes becoming an individual means standing apart from 
one’s community and questioning its practices and values” (156). To not see—or attempt the experimental 
guesswork o f-a n  anonymous contact zone as a way to stand apart from one’s community so as to question 
its practices and values, is, I think unethical. The powers that be institute anonymous course evaluations not 
for the going view and going value, but to aid students in standing apart from the academic discourse 
community and questioning its practices and values. So much more then, would this sense o f  resistance, 
parody, critique that Pratt calls for under van Slyck’s own regime o f (in) citation, under conditions o f 
anonymous classroom conditions.
Significantly, on the final page o f her article, van Slyck quotes from Bakhtin’s subsection “The Speaking 
Person in the Novel”. His idea o f “ideological becoming,” in which we “selectively assimilate the words o f 
others” is an opportunity for all o f  us “to explore our increasing cultural hybridity” (168). If  anonymous 
writing (and that’s a big IF) does perform at all what I am claiming for it—namely, contact with a 
continuum o f otherness, hostile and humble, compassionate and contestatory, oppressive and emancipatory, 
sincere and cynical—then the sense o f  hybridity van Slyck has apparently unwittingly adapted from 
Bakhtin’s own notion o f a contact zone will not go unnoticed or reimagined by the community o f  the 
composition classroom.
Being the hybrid voices o f no body, the anonymous function is a process o f ideological becoming no less 
ethical in its remarkable range o f dissensus and consensus than what van Slyck is call “world  literature.” 
“Anonymous” is part of world literature and o f all writing beyond literature. It is a process in which people 
have undergone various kinds of ideological becoming for as long as writing has existed. Van Slyck’s (and 
inferentially, Bizzell’s) “multicultural vision” is a confirmation o f Henry Louis Gates’ definition that such 
vision entails “identities [being] always in dialogue...as sites of contest and negotiation, self-fashioning and 
refashioning” (in van Slyck).
184
R eproduced  with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
When she ends her article by citing “this process” as described by Gates, it occurs to me that Gates has 
always understood, better than almost anyone, except for the great African-American writers it is his 
privilege to reposition in the white canonical contact zone o f literature what van Slyck is only now calling 
for. Van Slyck ends by calling us all to embrace “this process” of dialogically imagined identities so that 
“ ...we may all begin to reposition ourselves in the contact zone” (168 emphasis added). American slaves 
began by repositioning their identities in an anonymous contact zone not even Pratt can barely imagine. I 
find van Slyck’s invocation of a literary critic and theorist whose race has been the metonymic default line 
for invisibility and anonymity in its most oppressive sense yet another ironic oversight o f the anonymous 
function, always and already rhetorically (in)different to the other side of “our” “discovery” o f the contact 
zone.
Fault lines Part Three: Pratt. Bakhtin, and Bizzell
Patricia BizzelFs February, 1994 College English piece, “Opinion: “Contact Zones” and English 
Studies,” is remarkable for its continuation o f the ideological re-positioning o f composition- 
rhetoric’s on-going struggle between “academic discourse” and “expressivist writing.” Her brief 
excursus enables van Slyck’s impressive, but strangely myopic, proposal for reconfiguring and re­
positioning composition as a post-westem contact zone, where the personal narrative is exposed as 
narcissistic, uncritical pandering to an American obsession with a unitary, solitary self. By positing 
the true and rightful place of composition pedagogy—of all its writing—to be part o f  a larger 
“ideological becoming,” o f “struggling with an other’s authoritative word,” as Bakhtin had it,
Bizzell appears to have chased expressivism from the field to clear the way for composition- 
rhetoric as an exclusively literary sharecropper whose harvest is multicultural ism generally, and 
post-colonial critique specifically. Even Elbow, as she has it, is unnerved by the lack o f a place for 
literature in composition pedagogy during a summit conference some years ago on English Studies.
She pillories Elbow this way:
Elbow, although an advocate o f composition pedagogies in which each writer is to do 
pretty much as he or she pleases, was sufficiently troubled by [the evasion o f the place 
o f literature in answering the question, What is English!} that he propose his own list of 
literary contents for English studies in an appendix (165).
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I have no office, no authority, but I too advocate a pedagogy in which each writer writes as he pleases. The 
most personal writing— (to be distinguished from navel gazing, bourgeois, first World self-congratulation, 
or the composition o f complaint that spews from a larger culture o f  complaint (to be distinguished from 
legitimate discourses o f trauma, o f bodies/ psyches in pain) the most personal writing is intellectual and 
inter-textual. I have never encountered a personal narrative that couldn’t be re-mastered into a research 
paper that would satisfy BizzelFs adaptation of Pratt’s contact zone in which “all students [may see] their 
roots traced back to legacies o f both glory and shame” (Pratt, in Bizzell, 167). The hybridity, the double­
voiced discourse, o f the normatively named contact zone that is the personal plus textual essay is 
achievable. I have many class books o f students’ final essays to prove it.
Bizzell’s ultimate call for a contact zone leans on a different section in Pratt than does van 
Slyck’s derivative elaboration of Bizzell’s original sighting. She approves o f Pratt’s call for, oddly 
enough
exercises in storytelling and identifying with the...attitudes o f others... experiments 
in...the arts o f critique, parody, and comparison Including unseemly comparisons...; 
ways for people to engage with suppressed aspects o f  history (including their own 
histories); ways to move into and out o f  rhetorics o f authenticity; ground rules for 
communication across lines o f difference and hierarchy that go beyond politeness but 
maintain mutual respect; a systematic approach to the all-important concept of cultural 
mediation (Pratt, Bizzell 168).
Interesting, isn’t it that Bizzell elbows Elbow for “autobiography”, expunges the expressivist ethos from
any proximity to this new contact zone, and then shoe homs most o f what he’s been arguing for, especially
in Writing with Power, under the heel of Pratt’s “autoethnography.” Equally interesting is the unwitting
confirmation of a transgressive expressivism suggested by anonymous writing in the contact zone. As a
“way for people to engage with suppressed aspects of personal and public history; as a way to move into
and out of rhetorics o f authenticity through parody and impersonation; and as a systematic approach to
cultural mediation (where even, initially “mutual respect” is transgressed), anonymous writing is one
“way” toward those goals.
Bizzell, hidebound and blind because of Elbow’s challenge of otherness (a challenge that has its roots
the Sophists’ challenge to Platonism), ironically imagines much what an anonymous discourse community
is all about. Her author-itative “Opinion” is a startling example of late Bakhtinian rhetoric in which he asks:
“It is customary to speak about the authorial mask, But in which utterances (speech acts) is there a face  and
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not a mask, that is no authorship?” (152). That is, she knows not where o f the no one she is speaking for. 
Her famous linkage between “academic discourse” and “critical consciousness” must clearly be examined 
for the high threshold anxiety that must obtain for her perform a repression o f  the expressivist and 
anonymous voices that must have their eiro— their communal say—in spite o f  her identification with 
author-ity.
Fault lines Part Four Pratt. Bakhtin, and Miller
Richard Miller’s “Fault lines in the Contact Zone” is my version of saving the best and worst for 
last in arguing for and defending my sense that the anonymous function is not only an integral part 
o f what we mean by the discourse of community, but is essential to how we position our teaching 
and our students’ writing within Pratt’s own pedagogically applied sense of an “autoethnographic” 
contact zone. The presence o f the anonymous function in his descriptions o f his classroom and the 
surrounding academic discourse community is far more pervasive and penetrating than what 
Foucault abstractly imagined “unfolding” at the end o f “What is an Author?” In resummoning 
Blanchot from The Unavowable Community, perhaps I should write: The perilous and paralyzing 
absence that is anonymity in Miller’s descriptions o f  academic writing and response. Remember 
Blanchot asserting,
the supplication to speak which carries with it the risk of being rejected or lost or not 
received. Hence the foreboding that the community, in its very failure, is linked to a 
certain kind of writing, a writing that has nothing else to search for than the last words:
“Come, come, you for whom the injunction, the prayer, the expectation is not appropriate 
( 12).
...while asking oneself what is at stake in the concept of community and whether the 
community, no matter if it has existed or not, does not in the end always posit the 
absence of community?
Miller uncannily picks up Blanchot’s sense o f “foreboding” that is the absent community o f anonymous
writing, a writing that has nothing else to search for, precisely because it cannot be properly identified as
belonging to somebody. Because it belongs, rather, to no body, anonymity as a certain kind of writing,
lacks any authoritative claim to a community because addressivity and answerability are effectively,
dialogically, absent. It therefore, cannot be taken seriously, ultimately. It is rejected as craven precisely
because of its cunning, as absent precisely because o f  its arch altitude, as reprobate precisely because of its
attempt to revise the intimate, embodied, binary o f  response and responsibility.
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There is no audience for anonymity, Miller argues, because its anticipation o f  audience is an
image of a listener who remains silent, who cannot imagine how to become a speaker in turn.
What matters who is speaking/writing, concludes the listener/reader anticipated by the anonymous
function: for if  I respond, to whom shall I respond? What is his/her/their address(ivity)? The most
rabid, radioactive speech/character zone brought into being by the anonymous speaker/writer has a
very feverish but short run as a dis-ease, a very short half-life, Miller tells us.
The conventions governing the interchange, [of three anonymous posters and an 
anonymous interview with the feminist author o f the first poster in the school magazine] 
in effect, guarantee only that the described situation will continue: in this sphere, 
anonymous threats and ambiguous slogans combine to produce a  kind o f political 
paralysis, where nothing happens because nobody knows where anybody stands (403, 
emphasis added).
Yet, the emergence o f the anonymous function was found interesting enough—pedagogically 
irresistible—to Miller that he had to import its alien discourse into his classroom for analysis leading to this 
and other conclusions w ith his students. His conclusions about the composition-rhetoric o f 
anonymity—what its pedagogical object lessons are—are not, in my view, a matter of a very long 
rhetorical run for a very short didactic slide. The “fault lines” he traces in anonymity’s contact zone are 
numerous and interesting for study, perhaps, in a more universally curricular, and ethically applied fashion 
in the same way, if not for the same rhetorical “conventions” o f “otherness”, that “post-colonial” textuality 
(reading and writing) was at the time being advocated by Bizzell and at the end o f the 90’s by van Slyck.
The core documents around which Miller builds his sense o f “fault lines” in the contact zone of 
anonymity are three anonymous posters that have surfaced in what he calls an on again, off again, “corridor 
war” involving anonymous feminist speech against a rape culture and counter- anonymous speech 
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is brought in as exhibit A—a perfect heuristic-for bringing to life Pratt’s definition o f  “ “autoethnographic 
texts” as “heterogeneous on the reception end as well as the production end” (Pratt in Miller 401). “Here 
was writing from the contact zone that was simultaneously oppositional, parodic, resistant, and critical: 
how, I asked, were we to read it? (401).
Miller found the ensuing class discussion—which basically endorsed the poster’s condemnation o f rape 
and rapists, but found the intention-message o f the feminist/artist provocateur unhelpfully 
ambiguous—predictable, approaching banality. Given the combination o f the context and the location of 
this discussion and the spell cast by the rhetorical structure o f the first poster, it is hard to see how they 
could have said anything else” (401).
The “context” Miller is referring to is a kidnapping and sexual violation that had occurred the previous 
weekend. Against that context, I find it difficult to see how the appearance o f  the first poster could not have 
said anything else and with “signature” o f no one else. The second poster is a Derridean “play” at 
threatening the feminist outrage and extremity of the first. Its graphic complexity is almost impossible to 
reproduce here. Suffice to say it contains sexist slurs such as: WHORE TRAMP BITCH HOLE SLIT 
WENCH DYKE TEASE and ends with DOGS RUN.
These two posters, virtually back to back, are followed a month later by another anonymous poster
NOT ALL 
MEN RAPE 
SOME OF US 
JUST WATCH
(402).
Taken together, Miller found that his students unleashed brilliant flood o f interpretations of the meaning of 
all three posters, followed by stories of personal experience with daily acts o f  verbal or physical 
harassment/violence based on the gender/sex o f a given victim (generally female). What troubled him was 
that none o f this social constructionist and expressivist flash (orally reflected and discussed, not written) led 
“ ...to any sort o f consensus about which reading...was “correct” (402).
Miller concludes, “[t]his is one o f the hazards of allowing students to work with writing in the
contact zone”(402). He finds three hazards: meaning is up for grabs; local, situated knowledge can
trump a teacher’s global, textual knowledge; teacher authority in guiding consensus about
plausible readings is undermined. I quote at length his conclusion, having initially misread it, as
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advocating against an endorsement o f what bell hooks in Teaching to Transgress would call
authority o f experience, teacher vulnerability, and boundary transgression between empancipatory
and oppressive discourses inevitable to identity politics and its contact zones.
In place o f a community o f  uniform and obedient students, one finds a contestatory space 
where the vertiginous possibilities of the multivalent, multivocal text become at least 
momentary reality in the hands of a loosely federated, heterogeneous group with widely 
divergent reading abilities and political commitments (402).
Miller is stoic, if not stem in his conceptual attitude toward both the contact zone as a premise and ilts
specific engagement via anonymous discourse. He finds students’ entrance into the contact zone created b y
what Judith Butler would call “excitable speech”, and the resulting politics o f that speech’s performativiry,
“exciting” but hardly the final goal o f his pedagogical approach and ambitions for his students. By the tim e
of the third poster and the ensuing discussion, Miller concluded that the contact zone enacted by anonymi*y
“...designed to be “dangerous and political” ended up being dismissed as the work of cowards afraid So
make their position clear” (403). Like the peril (described above) o f having students have their way with tine
interpretive and authoritiative boundaries o f the normative contact zone that is the classroom, the apparently
“emancipatory” contact zone opened by anonymous speech, is ultimately “cast aside as nonsense” because it
lacks, as 1 said up top, addressivity and answerability.
So Miller was pushing his students past the initial excitable speech zone moment to come to some kind o f  
reflective, ripened conclusion. And he feels this rhetorical lesson learned about the provocative character o f  
anonymous discourse is “ ...is not an insignificant lesson to learn in a course devoted to thinking a b o u t 
writing as a process” (403). Thus, anonymous writing as a process may “buy the writer or writers thie 
freedom to express opinions and prejudices openly, but it does so at the cost o f undermining the credibility 
or significance of what is being said... [and] also helps to create an environment of suspicion and hostility-”
(403). So then, I must stand corrected, phenomenologically, discursively, historically, rhetorically, and, I 
suppose, where the anonymous contact zone most counts—pedagogically.
Rebuttal and Conclusion
The writing of No Body —like the speech of Udeis/Odysseus—might be a primal act of enlightenment in th'-e 
sense o f coming into our nominalist consciousness that identity is split, that we can do all sorts o f thing;s
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with words, and words with us. But Odysseus had to become Somebody; he had to disclose himself after 
concealing himself, even at the risk of getting himself killed after blinding his adversary through anonymity.
The risk in losing himself through continuous impersonation was too great, the stress o f his 
wandering/wondering too profound, that he had to rename to remind himself o f who he was and where he 
was ultimately oriented, to his Sovereignty first and last, to his wife, Penelope, distantly, to his son, 
Telemachus, far off, almost the other he had been before his odyssey as no body. Anonymously 
impersonating an old beggar, once home, he chooses his time to rename and reveal himself—the anonymous 
function shielding his identity, until the time was right for revealing his power: to take his revenge and kill 
his rivals.
Anonymity is serious play; no body doubts its perilous two-way tactics o f subjection. Yet it remains a 
useful contact zone, if not a permanent state of mind, since the mind is always embodied, and the body is not 
no body. It is a body, and is named, among other bodies. Anonymity is a contact zone, as Miller tells us, 
“where nothing happens because nobody knows where anybody stands” (403).
But— and this is a big BUT—Miller did not make the “autoethnographic texts” o f the anonymous contact 
zone a working part o f his own course “devoted to thinking about writing as a process” as I have. He 
engages with his conclusions about anonymous writing to “drive home the importance o f  balancing the 
strengths and weaknesses available within any given rhetorical approach” (403).
BUT: he did not begin his writing course with anonymity. He has done an incisive job o f weighing those 
strengths and weaknesses and concluded that the anonymous contact zone is so full o f  fault lines that it falls 
through into its own unanswerable, nonsensical, other-wise/unwise otherness o f the rebel yell/rhetorical hell 
o f nobody.
BUT: he did not text his findings from a rhetorical situation completely outside and other to his own to 
determine if the same results pertain. In driving home his point that the fear and suspicion generated by the 
last two posters’ suggestion o f complicity—sins o f  omission, not of commission—with the kidnapping/rape, 
he quotes one of his students as asking: “What if...the people producing these posters are in this class?” 
Miller answer to this is what I’ve already quoted: “a kind o f political paralysis” and a rhetorical suspicion 
and sense o f threat.
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BUT: if he had engaged the anonymous contact zone as part o f the pedagogical and rhetorical goals o f 
the writing process itself as “autoethnographic” he might have witnessed students who don’t need to ask the 
question What if...there are racists, sexual abuse victims, onanists, beautiful empaths, sexually confused 
searchers, god-hungerers, parodists, crticasters, sexists, anti-feminists?
Yes, what if NOBODY were any o f these identities. What if the class discussed the dialogical 
imaginations invoked or provoked by these contact zones? What if  they were the super-person, the super- 
addressee, the No Body at the center o f  audience that is the resonant, watchful listening absence at the center 
o f community itself? What if  those heterogeneous productions became common discursive property? And 
what if  only one student only revealed her identity at the beginning o f  one course and only one—another 
-student revealed his identity at the end o f that course in a reflective essay on his writing processes and what 
he learned about gender and sexual identity?
What then? What are we to do with all these cowards and suspects, the hostiles and the humbles, the 
humbugs and the humorists, with their undermined credibility and significance what was said/written in and 
about the anonymous contact zone? What if the fault lines are also de-fault lines for experimental guesswork 
about the essence of identity and the performative discourses constantly transforming it? What if anonymity 
and the discourses o f identity, authority, and community it contacts and hybridizes turn out finally to be a 
matter o f masking?
I present Richard Miller for a concluding answer to these eminently rhetorical questions. If, 
given those What Ifs,
Then This:
In the uncharted realm o f  teaching and studying in the contact zone, the teacher’s 
traditional claim to authority is thus constantly undermined and reconfigured which, in 
turn, enables the real work o f learning how to negotiate and place oneself in dialogue 
with different ways o f  knowing to commence. This can be strangely disconcerting work 
[and remember, he didn’t really work the zone], requiring, as it does, the recognition that 
in may places what passes as reason or rationality in the academy functions not as 
something separate from  rhetoric, but rather as one o f  many rhetorical devices (407 
emphasis added).
The anonymous discourse community, undermining the discourse o f  universal mediation, also initiates it, 
for it is not something separate from rhetoric. As one of many rhetorical devices it deserves, fault lines and 
all, a sustained trial as a contact zone, if  for no other rhetorical reason than to connect its heterogeneous
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production with that o f its fellow discourse of heterogeneous reception which also passes as rationality in 
the academy, and functions not as something separate from rhetoric as undermined but ever reconfigured 
super addressee—namely the anonymous course evaluation?
And what are we to do with these students who entered the course anonymously (in a critical
emancipatory sense) in the contact zone I provided and exited it anonymously in the contact zone
provided by the academic discourse community? Again Miller provides an answer.
For teachers who believe in education as a force for positive social change, the 
appropriate response to these new working conditions is not to exile students to 
penitentiaries or the psych- wards for writing offensive, anti-social papers. Nor is it to 
give free reign to one’s self-righteous indignation and call the resultant interchange a 
“political intervention” [which is precisely what occurred in the Henry Miller/Anais Nin 
parodistic power play in my department]. The most promising pedagogical response lies, 
rather, in closely attending to what our students say and write in an ongoing effort to 
leam how to read, understand, and respond to the strange, sometimes threatening, 
multivocal texts they produce while writing in the contact zone (408).
Richard Miller comes closest to understanding the strangeness, what I call the transgresshold of 
anonymous discourse. Yet, not having closely attended to his own students’ possible need/desire for 
anonymity, he doesn’t give full justice to the idea and practice o f a contact zone in which one’s own and an 
other’s word contend with and subtend each the other. In effect, he has traced a fault line up to, but still 
outside, the door o f his own authority and of his students’ struggle with its authentic disclosure o f how a 
classroom discourse community should conceal, or could reveal, itself as a contact zone where all the arts 
of rhetoric and composition come into play.
If Chapter Five, “Towards a Pedagogy of Anonymity,” had been an analysis of my close pedagogical 
writing in response to students’ struggles in the contact zone—addressed to No Body, yes?—then Miller 
would more closely understand the rhetorical usefulness of anonymity generated within, not without, the 
composition course. But of course, he does already understand that the fault lines lie not in ourselves, nor in 
others, but in the rhetorical situation, the facemask, that contact zone of writing that is always in parity with 
a voice already other-wise, already disappearing as eiro— as “I” write
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Chapter Notes
I It matters on the strength o f one familiar and pervasive example: “An official, speaking on condition o f 
anonymity, said today: ‘I . . .’” This is a material, embodied rhetoric, even as it is the speech o f no body, a 
reporter telephones or meets face-to-face with “someone” whom he or she knows but can’t identify to the 
community lest the authority that official holds in trust be compromised in personal or organizational 
terms. Yet, though anonymity would seem to decrease authority, it actually increases the power o f  its 
office. However, as I pointed out in the endnote to the General Introduction, there is a massive feminist 
critique o f rhetoric, and possibly o f  the anonymous-function, as a complicit form o f silencing—not 
speaking— the existence o f  those marginalized within the dominantly male operation of the author-function. 
Vicki Tolar Collins also uses the Beckett line as an epigraph to open “The Speaker Respoken: Material 
Rhetoric as Feminist Methodology.” Her opening assertions are worth quoting in full and commenting on, 
before we proceed with my admittedly male dominated investigation.
Postmodern indifference to who is speaking is a position authentically available only to 
those who already possess the authority to speak. When the primary modes of persuasion 
of a text (oral or written) are the ethos o f  the speaker and the moral argument o f  her 
narrative, who is speaking does indeed matter to the speaker, to the audience, to the
discourse community, and to historians o f  rhetoric  And when women’s lives are
formed and women’s voices are managed and silenced by the ways a production 
authority uses their discourse and the forms and forums in which it is published, who is 
speaking and who controls the materiality o f the message matters very much—culturally, 
rhetorically, and ethically (545).
Tolar Collins nails the point I have made about the author-ities o f Beckett, and then Foucault, having the 
luxury or privilege to be rhetorically indifferent, and to therefore countenance the invisible face or visible 
mask o f what I am calling the anonymous function. Whereas, women, blacks, emigres, criminals, and a 
host o f otherwise enslaved, oppressed, and marginalized persons have had to resort to the anonymous 
function to make their voices heard. Their subject positions are, in material and rhetorical terms, the name 
o f  Anonymous. Their essential “difference” from the discourse o f Identity, the cycles of violence and 
indifference to their speech by the discourse of authority, made, by default, the anonymous function their 
only rhetorical option—a kind o f author-function alter-native. This entire discourse o f anonymity as a 
suppressed rhetoric o f identity, authority, community—or otherness—is notably “absent” in these first four 
chapters. It was meant to be a part o f Chapter Three’s “Modem” and Postmodern” sections that had to be 
excised because o f space considerations. I try to bring Tolar-Collins consideration of The (Other) Speaker 
Respoken... into what I consider a material rhetoric as feminist methodology in Chapter Five, “Towards a 
Pedagogy of Anonymity,” where students’ anonymous writing—male and female—become a matter o f 
asking, over and ever again: “what does it matter who is speaking?” Anonymity is a matter—the material 
rhetoric—of private and State secrecy. In the final chapter, students’ anonymous documents—their 
testimony, confession, argumentation, invocation, all reaffirm my sense that an anonymous pedagogy is a 
material rhetoric as feminist methodology. My use o f  Bakhtin to aestheticize what I mean by a rhetoric o f  
anonymity is in large part due to the image, the imagination o f who someone is in saying eiro: “ Isa y ...."
^  Here’s an added centrifugal twist o f what I mean: The author’s self-generated summary o f his or her 
professional activity, which appears at the bottom o f articles published in College English, for example, is 
“alter-ed” by anonymous editors by substituting “He teaches...” or “She teaches...” for the original “I”—as 
in “I teach....” At the end o f one such anonymous blurb—now an example o f dialogized heteroglossia or 
double-voiced discourse for the community of College English— we find the final sentence o f writer, Anis 
Bawarshi. It reads: “He thanks the article’s anonymous readers for their thoughtful guidance.” A further 
twist here can be entertained, since Bawarshi’s article is titled “The Genre Function.” In this essay similar 
claims are made for the pervasiveness o f “genre” that I making for anonymity as a function.
3 It would seem that both sides o f the theoretical and pedagogical contact zone of composition-rhetoric 
could claim that they are engaging in this kind o f “experimental guesswork.” The academic expressivists
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would seize on the idea o f  struggling with one’s own word—as the image o f  a speaking person whose own 
voice is a kind o f experimental guesswork with alien voices struggling for influence and expression within 
the speech and character zones o f personal narrative. The academic discursivists would seize on a sentence 
that appears in between the two I’ve quoted above: “The importance o f struggling with another’s discourse, 
its influence in the history o f an individual’s consciousness, is enormous.” The fact is, most compositionists 
are experimenting—consciously or not—with a hybrid approach to teaching writing, since they are aware, 
given their own images o f a speaking person and alien voices, that a personal/intellectual struggle and 
experimental guesswork is ongoing within any individual consciousness during the performance o f writing.
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CHAPTER FTVF.
TOWARD A PEDAGOGY OF ANONYMITY
Expressing Anonymous Social Construction 
The Anonymous Function Within the Structure o f  English
We have, in the last four chapters, understood that it is not accurate to imagine anonymity’s dialectical 
relations as one o f binary opposition. Rather, we must think o f  it as a synchronizing polarity. As such, it 
prescribes our understanding o f autonomous self-other relations in all writing (Identity); it proscribes the 
authentic origin and propagation o f  canonical or official writing (Authority); and it describes the discovery 
of the universal hope'of mediation through a rhetorical sense o f writing as a speech zone that anticipates a 
special, perhaps surprising, conception o f the listener/reader.
In this final chapter, we will begin to see how the total Composition o f  anonymity—given the almost
spectral range o f its powers and dangers o f  impersonation—is a “problem” for composition-rhetoric as a 
pedagogical performance o f identity, author-ity, and community. Anonymous writing is a problem because 
it epitomizes the powers and dangers o f a “performativity revolution” (France 150) within the structure o f 
English Studies whose fault lines run deep and wide between the study o f literature and the study o f 
composition. It is a problem because it throws the expressivist claim for an autonomous, authentic sense o f 
self-agency and textual ownership in student writing into a “contact zone” where it meets the social 
constructionist claim for cultural structure and author-itative citation.
The result of this dialectical contact between agency and structure, between the performance o f self and 
the social prescription o f subjectivity under conditions o f anonymity, are dialogical possibilities for a 
discourse “community o f dissensus” where personal and social, private and public “thinking is a shared 
process without identity or unity (Readings 192). In seeking to create a concretely lived, dialogic 
imagination within the abstract hope o f universal mediation, anonymous writing functions precisely as a 
shared process without identity or authority—without unity—in a discourse o f  community devoted to
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responsively understanding the politics o f identity as a matter o f agency and structure, o f  autobiographical 
expression and academic scrutiny.
Alan France, in a recent article, “Dialectics o f Self: Structure and Agency as the Subject o f  English,” 
approvingly quotes Bernard Donald, who appears to be in support o f an anonymous pedagogy. “In our 
desire to foster student agency, we too often make o f the composition classroom...“a safe place where 
students can experiment with expressions but where the structure o f  those expressions remain outside the 
door” (148). Anonymous writing is just such a contact zone for both expressing and examining the 
performative agencies and structures o f  identity politics that would otherwise remain at the threshold of 
personal and the social constructions o f identity. Within the terms set forth by Ruth Spack in her article, 
“The (In)Visibility o f  the Person(al) in Academe,” we will come to understand that the safe-risk contact 
zone o f anonymity enables students to give voice to what Toni Morrison has called “Unspeakable Things 
Unspoken”—“such as “race,” “class,” “gender,” ...and “sexual orientation”—all terms whose meanings are 
contested—and these concepts have entered [as I will demonstrate, anonymous] pedagogical discussions in 
ways than challenge even revolutionary theories and practices” (9).
The rhetorical immunity provided by anonymity effects and affects the performative relations between 
personal and impersonal writing, enabling the emergence o f  seven major themes that I have identified in 
students’ anonymous writing. It is the goal o f  this chapter to analyze those themes o f  the anonymous 
function within the larger dialectical structures and dialogical functions out o f which composition-rhetoric 
finds its pedagogical mission as a revolutionary theory and practice of subjectivity split between the 
anonymous subject o f writing itself and the subject position o f the anonymous writer.
General Questions Guiding the Reading o f Anonymous Writing
Given the structure o f English Studies as struggling with a larger post-structural— performativity— 
revolution, does my particular application o f the anonymous function as understood in previous chapters 
enable other teachers to imagine through Peter Elbow, in his What Is English?, that anonymous discourse is 
devoted to:
“Using language actively in a diversity o f  ways and settings—...in a range o f social settings 
with various audiences where the language makes a differencef?];
Reflecting on language use. Turning back and self-consciously reflecting on how one has 
been using language—examining these processes o f talking, listening, writing, and reading 
[?];
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Trying to ensure that this using and reflecting go on in conditions o f  both nourishment and 
challenge...[?] (Elbow 18; emphasis in original).
Given the function of composition-rhetoric within the structure o f English Studies, does my particular
application o f  the anonymous function as understood in previous chapters enable other teachers to imagine
through Mary Louise Pratt in her “Arts o f  the Contact Zone” that the contact zone o f  anonymity is devoted
exercise in storytelling and in identifying with the ideas, interests, histories, and 
attitudes o f others;
experiments in... the arts o f  critique, parody, and comparison (including unseemly 
comparisons between elite and vernacular forms);
ways for people to engage with suppressed aspects o f history (including their own 
histories);
ways to move into and out o f  rhetorics o f authenticity;
ground rules for communication across lines o f difference and hierarchy that go 
beyond politeness but maintain mutual respect;
a systematic approach to the all-important concept o f cultural mediation (40; 
emphasis in original).
Finally, given the function o f the composition course within the larger structures o f composition-rhetoric
and English Studies, does my particular application o f  the anonymous function as understood in previous
chapters enable other teachers to imagine through Henry Giroux and Roger Simon in their Popular Culture,
Schooling, and Everyday Life that anonymity as “critical pedagogy” is devoted to:
...critically appropriating] forms o f  knowledge that exist outside students' 
immediate experience" [?];
[making] the familiar strange and the strange familiar[?];
[taking]...risks and struggle with ongoing relations o f power"? (Giroux and Simon 
3).
My personal interest in the anonymous function was in its reputation as a  transgressive mechanism: was 
its reputation as the contact zone for craven, injurious speech, invective, and malevolent threat, fully 
justified? Or might it also stimulate the empathic imagination, where impersonation, rather than 
denigration, o f the Other finds a fresh outlet in students' struggles with the politics o f identity? What would 
be the discursive and dialogical crossover effect if  both these voices and visions emerged under anonymous 
writing conditions? How would these voices influence my authority in the classroom? What would be my 
role—more vulnerable? —in mediating between the poignant and pointed invulnerability o f  the identities 
created by anonymous writing?
198
R eproduced  with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
These questions were stimulated by a close reading o f bell hooks’ Teaching to Transgress: Education as 
the Practice o f  Freedom. This chapter will try to answer these questions and others on the basis o f 
classroom practice and experience o f  the anonymous function.
Methodologies Guiding the Reading o f Anonymous Writing
My methodology for reading what I consider to be themes o f the anonymous function in students’ 
anonymous writings is informed by three central tenets o f expressivist, or authentic voice, pedagogy. We 
haven’t the space here to (re)consider Elbow’s legacy o f autonomy, Macrorie’s and/or Coles’ concerns with 
authenticity, or with Murray’s notion o f  writing for discovery (or what he calls surprise). As we saw in the 
first four chapters, Autonomy, Authenticity, and Discovery also happen to be critical to an understanding o f 
the discursive regimes o f  identity, authority, community—all o f  which depend upon the subordination o f 
anonymity for their dominant status in language life.
I have also very loosely adapted the methods o f case study for my close reading of these documents. I 
will be pointing up points o f  conflict, struggle, and transformation in the writing. I will also be interjecting 
my own notes on the class discussions of these documents—what I call the “community o f  anonymity.” My 
weaving o f my notes on these discussions is a form of autocritique, and is, in fact, "feminist" in its 
methodology because, ironically, it does not recognize the anonymity o f an objective professor whose 
evaluating "I" remains above or outside the revelations o f  students. In asking that students take on 
anonymity's cloak of invisibility in order to make most visible the many faces of their identity politics, I as 
teacher and researcher had to appeal to them (and to you, reader) not "as an invisible, anonymous voice o f 
authority, but as a real, historical individual with concrete, specific desires and interests" (Harding, 9).
In teaching the composition o f gender and sexual identity, and also racial identity and identification, and 
then re-searching that teaching experience, I realize that I, "the inquirer... must be placed in the same critical 
plane as the overt subject matter, thereby recovering the entire research process for scrutiny in the results of 
the research" (Harding, 9). That I was doing as much while teaching these courses, and was then placed in 
that same critical plane by colleagues for their scrutiny o f the results o f  the research I had reported to them, 
leads me to conclude that my use o f  feminist autocritique is meant to be a dis-placement o f authorship and 
its claims on identification.
That this could be seen by certain feminists as another male-ordered appropriation or subversion o f 
feminist knowledge is a risk I am willing to take, especially given my final, feminist conclusion: students
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need to write identification papers (rather, papers dealing with identification) without their nominal 
identities attached. Why do they need to write anonymously? Because the authentic detachment of personal 
identity from the subject position o f “college writer” honors an expressivist goal even as it argues for a 
socially constructed view o f  the student, her writing, her personal identity. Depending on who’s “feminism” 
one decides to commit to, the point where expressivism and feminism meet in composition pedagogy is 
generally agreed to be within a “contact zone” o f the personal and the political, the private and the academic, 
and in the transgression o f these for empancipatory, educative effects.
The Structure-Function o f the Writing Assignments
In Chapter Five I will examine the roles o f writing, reading, and exchanging within an anonymous 
“discourse community” I constructed and oversaw as part o f my general pedagogical approach and practice 
in the teaching o f composition courses at The University o f New Hampshire from 1994-95. We will focus 
on students’ anonymous writing within an otherwise conventional course in college composition. My 
approach attempts to merge the objectives o f both an expressivist and a social constructionist approach to 
teaching college writing. In seeking to take up the founding theme o f universal mediation, my courses are 
devoted to the writing, reading, and discussion (the composition-rhetoric) o f  identity politics gender, 
sexuality, and race). What I mean by a “conventional course” in composition is that students write weekly 
assignments on issues o f identity—gender, sexuality, race, class, etc.
One kind o f assignment is a reader response essay to assigned readings from either an edited reader I 
require for the course, or from my own edited course packet comprised o f readings that I deem to be both 
useful in terms o f laying out the social and ethical complexities o f particular identity enclaves, and highly 
provocative in the way they examine in public what students might have believed are “private” matters 
shared within their familial or peer group settings. *
Another kind o f assignment is a personal narrative about some aspect o f identity that students have either 
responded to as readers o f assigned academic material, or as writers reflecting on some issue that has been 
provoked or suggested by their reading and our class discussion of the reader response essays.
Between these two kinds o f assignments, both o f which are signed, I assigned anonymous essays that 
would probe more deeply (and perhaps candidly) into the issues opened up by students’ nominally identified 
writings. The idea was to weave (the literal meaning o f  text)  together different kinds o f
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“discourse”—academic, autobiographical, and anonymous— so as to capture something like a total 
composition o f  identity.
The final writing assignment for both courses involved a “research essay” which could incorporate all 
three kinds o f writing done during the course, together with additional library research and anonymous 
survey work students could choose to conduct in the class, in their other classes, in their dormitories, and on 
the larger campus.
I therefore suggestively titled my courses: “Identity: Reading It/Writing It/Revising It”; “Mediating 
Identities”; “The Composition o f  Gender”; “The Composition o f  Identity.” These last two course titles 
featured the anonymous writing I will present and analyze below according to several “emergent themes” o f 
what I have been calling the “anonymous function.” I will closely read and comment on 20 pieces o f
anonymous writing from these two courses.^
In both courses, I made the following proposal to students. I had included it in the outline for both
courses and reproduced it above the specific prompts for writing anonymously in issues o f identity.
I am asking you to  generate responses to privately held feelings and convictions 
about gender and sexual identity. Anonymity is the best guarantee I can think of 
for removing all obstacles from telling these particular "truths" while at the same 
time ensuring protection o f  your named identities. These documents will be 
Xeroxed and distributed to the class and become part o f  its public domain of 
discussion and reference (Dansdill).
I constructed the actual prompts for composition that followed this guideline to be as open as possible. For
the Advanced Course in Composition (“The Composition o f Gender”), the first assignment prompt read:
"Please feel free to write on any issue o f gender or gender identity which you consider to be significant." For
the second assignment the prompt read: "Please feel free to write on any issue of sex or sexual identity
which you consider to be significant." For the First Year Course in Composition (“The Composition o f
Identity,”) there were four such prompts. The only change in wording was “ ...any issue o f [race, gender,
sexuality, class].”
Seven Emergent Themes o f  the Anonymous Function
The Seven Themes I have identified as “emergent” properties o f  the anonymous function arose from a 
larger sample o f anonymous student writing (88 documents). Scope here permits only a reading o f  25 
anonymous documents.
1. The Significance o f Unnecessary Anonymity
2. Relations o f Normal Reader Response to Anonymous Reader Response
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3. Patterns o f  Impersonation
4. Identity Crises
5. Offenses o f Feminism/Defenses of Men and/or Patriarchy
6. Indeterminable Gender
7. Transgressive Relations
Since I did not carry out any form of control group analysis (for example, having my students, or students 
in another composition course, write on the same self-selected topic with their names attached), these seven 
themes, and the content that supports them, cannot be said to represent anything like a  "scientific" sampling 
o f  anonymous writing behaviors. Nevertheless, the themes or patterns that I have found can be understood 
and applied to the more "normative" event and context o f  composition teaching and learning—namely, the 
universal expectation and presence o f students' nominal identities. Those o f us who are accustomed to 
reading students' college writing under the normative event and context o f  their signatures
The scope o f  this dissertation does not permit a detailed analysis of all seven themes across the 20 
documents I have chosen for analysis. I have chosen to focus on Themes #3-7, with particular attention to 
#3 and #7, because I believe that the acts o f  Impersonation and Transgression I found in students' 
anonymous writing constitute an important finding about the expressivist argument for authenticity in 
students' nominally identified writing. The 20 documents cover writings in response to prompts dealing 
with significant experiences o f gendered and sexual identity, as well as a separate group on racialized 
identity.
My findings on acts o f  Transgression (expected) and on acts o f Impersonation (unexpected) are 
important because these point to a range o f  empathy and antipathy that is only partially present under 
normative expressivist conditions where students' names are part and parcel o f the demand/expectation for 
sincerity or authenticity in writing about personally significant experiences. Despite my lack o f “scientific” 
controls, it is fairly safe to assume that the absence o f their nominal identities—or rather, the presence o f the 
anonymous function—is responsible for some sense or degree of what Goffmann, in two studies, The 
Presentation o f  S e lf in Everyday Life and Stigma: Notes on the Management o f  Spoiled Identity, has 
referred to respectively as the sincere/cynical performance, and "discrepant identities."
I will also try to make a larger case, however, that this finding o f anonymous 
impersonation/transgression, or the empathy and antipathy o f anonymity, is worthy also o f  the social 
constructionists' claim to an epistemologically superior pedagogy. They make this claim because o f their 
apparent attention to more "socially" or "politically" significant issues than those fostered by an
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expressivist regard for the merely "personal." One o f  the arguments leveled against expressivist 
composition by social constructionism is that it is full o f  myopic ideological insights. It would be in the 
constructionist interest to experiment with the rhetorical immunity that anonymity supplies so as to 
determine whether or not the personal biases and self-absorbed values that are attached, fairly or unfairly, 
to expressivist composition, are in fact underwritten by a larger discourse o f  socially constructed 
expression.
In making the claim that expanding the use o f anonymity in the composition classroom (being always 
and already present in the form o f students’ anonymous course evaluations) can be used as a bridging 
discourse between expressivist and constructionist approaches, I will also be trying to make the case for a 
sense o f community—what Maurice Blanchot might call an "unavowable community"—that is unavailable 
or not completely accessible under these two contending approaches. I contend that the sense o f community 
through anonymity is both personally expressive and socially constructive because o f the passion—whether 
empathic or antagonistic— its enclave o f concealed disclosure generates.
This sense of passion (or, in keeping with the idea o f community, o f  "communion") is often missing 
from both expressivist and constructionist approaches to generating and elaborating students' understanding 
o f  academic discourse. The views and opinions expressed anonymously are, by definition, done so because 
they are not considered ethically normative or because o f a wish by the writer, for various reasons, to 
protect a range of realms—from those privacy and reputation, to economic and even physical well being. As 
we have seen, the range o f  motives for using anonymity—from human rights to hate speech—is far reaching 
in terms o f its possible sense o f discourse and o f  the community it will variously convince, persuade, 
outrage, entertain and, in general, become identified with.
Surely, all tried and true composition-rhetoricians—both expressivist and constructionist— will have 
sufficient courage o f their convictions about what best passes for authentic and/or authoritative writing to 
test those convictions against my claims for the anonymous function: that it subtends and extends their 
ideas about community, discourse, and that most temporary and temporized o f all academic phenomena— 
the discourse community o f a required course in college composition.
Before we analyze the five most important themes that emerged in my use o f anonymous writing in a 
decidedly hybrid approach to teaching composition, we need to look, in a provisional way, at the other two 
themes that emerged in my analysis o f 20 documents on race and gender issues.
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Anonymous Gender Identity
The Significance o f Unnecessary Anonymity
Given the contradictory, paradoxical, and performative mobility o f  the anonymous function, the idea o f 
anonymity as “unnecessary” is good place to open a  discussion o f  what might pass for anonymity’s 
necessity. Despite the fact that the determination o f  what passed for necessary or unnecessary sorts o f 
anonymity was limited to my own intuitive standards o f  interpretation according to Patterson and Kim's 
operational definition o f  anonymity within what they call "the cathartic process," I do think a clear line was 
established as I began to recognize emergent patterns. 3
I have been maintaining that anonymity's necessary disputability is a function o f  masking, and more 
universally, o f impersonation itself. What is pedagogically useful about that? That is, why do we need to 
test the meaning o f a persona—private and public~a meaning that is always a response to our conceptions 
o f Self and Other, against the regime of impersonation o f  which anonymity is a function, and quite possibly 
a contributing cause?
In the first document and others to follow, what I am equivocally tracing as the function o f  "unnecessary 
anonymity" is my way o f constructing an "out group" that indicates and reiterates anonymity's necessary 
presence. I will repeat, in a  tiresome manner, I suspect, that all teachers value the medium (if  not always the 
message) o f students' anonymous evaluations o f our teaching, a document that becomes open to all, part o f 
an anonymous institutional readership and record, a community discourse, and arguably, a discourse 
community unto itself. That is, the anonymous course evaluation is necessary, rather than unnecessary, 
(though most teachers and their evaluating peer committees, when they read them at all, take the unstable 
range o f students' insights, opinions and assaults with huge "grains o f salt".)
In my determination to analyze anonymity's borderline or equivocal necessity, I hope to prepare my 
readers for those documents where anonymity is clearly needed, and that there are pedagogical 
opportunities~if not outright necessities—well before and beyond its present use as an institutional 
evaluation tool and community exit document. The first exemplary document demonstrates, I think, the 
usefulness o f anonymity as an entrance document, and o f  continuing its presence within a given course as a 
discourse o f recognizance. Such an allowance o f the anonymous within and around all the named writing 
going on opens up the meaning and sense o f community within the composition class. If, therefore, there is
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a general suspicion o f  what passes for "feminism" as a popularly received discourse by students entering 
the academy, then it is not likely that that suspicion, and possible antipathy, is going to emerge in either the 
expressivist or social constructionist approaches. And yet, any authentic conception o f authenticity in 
students' voices and views would hope to account for antipathetic, as well as empathetic, performances.
To use a more familiar set o f  concepts, the "private" and the "public" performances of composition are 
in constant tension and contention. That is a normative situation because it is the function o f discourse to 
transgress and blur the boundaries o f the private and the public. In parallel, the binding energy holding any 
sense we have o f community is an open border between private and public. Because the anonymous 
function, for better and for worse, protects the private realm in actions upon and reactions from a public 
realm, the relation o f  anonymity and community is not merely conceptual, but rhetorically actual. 
Therefore, a working hypothesis o f  the anonymous function in college writing as a  performance o f identity 
and identification assumes that what students really privately believe about the politics o f identity has a 
place in our public reasons about what really matters about the politics o f  identity as a vast set o f  academic, 
author-driven discourses.
Anonymity's relation to, and effect upon, the academic discourse community as envisioned by either 
expressivist or constructivist assumptions are one not only o f literal transgression, or crossing, o f the lines 
between the private/public. It is one also o f  literal provocation—o f calling forth—o f  voicing and witnessing 
what is really important for students to leam about writing, about themselves and others as writers, and 
what composition as the total process o f putting the writing subject and the subject of writing together 
really means as an act o f community—o f shared and unshared values. The significance of an anonymity that 
I deem to be unnecessary to the discourses o f privacy and publicity, o f  Self-Other references, is that it 
nevertheless points the way to significant relations o f  social construction—o f important assumptions about 
what we share in common and what we don't share (in the double sense o f both identifying and concealing 
our differences.)
The numbers and frequency o f unnecessary uses o f  anonymity are significant because they call attention 
to our normative connotations o f  the anonymous condition as one o f  subterfuge or irresponsibility. 
Unnecessary anonymity might also signal many students' resistance to the idea o f anonymity out o f 
suspicion that their identities would not be protected despite the pains I took to make printing (random 
fonts), distribution and return (in a box outside my office) secure and confidential. Moreover, it is quite
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likely that given the uniform age (18-20) and background (suburban middle class) o f  my students, they did 
not have anything in their views and beliefs—within their inherited ideological matrix—that could answer to 
the paradoxical form and function of anonymity: that is, they had nothing to "hide and seek", to reveal 
under concealment. My finding about this particular "significance" o f the unnecessary use o f  anonymity 
points, most tellingly perhaps, to the sincerity/authenticity o f their performances as writers. I cannot, 
however, delve too deeply into these issues and questions.
After reading through the 31 documents generated in the Advanced Course in Composition, I came up 
with the following Breakdown according to the “General Subjects” covered in the anonymous writing.
A. Gender Roles and Rules: 12 documents
B. Hetero-Relations: 12 docs.
C. Sex and Sexuality: Calls and Responses: 5 docs.
D. Crises o f  Identity and Identification: 2 docs.
I then determined and correlated the number o f documents under each general subject area in which 
Anonymity is probably unnecessary according to the justification in the course outline and in my specific 






Thus, roughly one third of all documents were unnecessarily anonymous, with well over half o f those 
written about gender and gender identity (A.) falling into the unnecessary category. M ore interesting, 
ultimately, is that fact that over 60% of those written under the prompt of sex and sexual identity (B.) 
required anonymity. More interesting still is t 68% o f all documents required anonymity. Still, a 33% rate 
for unnecessary anonymity is significant. Another strand o f significance to be explored is the fact that, in 
keeping with my hybrid approach to teaching both expressively and constructively, a number o f the total 
documents had to be correlated to the decision by many students to use a Reader Response mode to 
assigned class readings, rather than writing anonymously from a pure expressivist standpoint.
In hindsight, I might have made a mistake in my prompt with the phrase "feel free" since it gave 
students an out to write anonymously under the more neutralized and neutralizing contexts o f reader 
response—as critics—rather than as writers themselves on these discourses of their identities. On the other
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hand, the use of anonymity by critics, especially in the 17th and 18th centuries, was widespread. 
Presumably, the kind o f insolence, indignation, or vilification that accompanied the necessary judgment o f 
the worthiness of this writer, or that authority, required anonymity. I did not find this to be the case with 
this group o f students. My open invitation probably diluted my expected expressivist results with more 
social constructionist reactions as represented by reader response. And yet the finding is nevertheless not so 
much an indictment or rejection o f  anonymity, as it is an indication o f where anonymity best plays its part 
in the discourse of identity—expressed and constructed.
The highest percentage o f unnecessary anonymity falls under the subject matter category of Gender 
Roles and Rules, with the largest percentage o f  Reader Response to academic discourse assignments 
occupying almost half o f that total percentage o f  unnecessity. Hetero-Self Relations, has a much smaller 
percentage o f unnecessary anonymity, though its total appropriation through Reader Response, like that of 
Gender Roles and Rules, is almost 50%. And yet the total percentage o f  unnecessary anonymity for this 
subject category remains stable at around 33% once Reader Response is factored in. By contrast, for the 
other two remaining categories—"Sex and Sexuality: Calls and Responses" and "Crises of Identity and 
Identification"—the convergence o f reader response in unnecessary anonymity is virtually non-existent.
My provisional conclusion on this score is that the more personal, private, or socially taboo the subject 
matter, the more likely is the necessity o f  anonymity. This is not a very profound conclusion, o f course. It 
is, in fact, belaboring the obvious. Anonymity is, despite its scope and range, a phenomenon of masking, 
even as it unmasks the more personal and private parts o f identity politics. But listing numbers of 
documents and relative percentages cannot usefully demonstrate the distinctions I found between necessary 
and unnecessary anonymity. Here then, are some representative documents in support o f  my 
categorizations. I begin our close reading o f students’ anonymous writing with 15 documents from the 
Advanced Course in Composition (“The Composition of Gender”) I taught in the fall of 1994. The first 
two documents represent the equivocal range o f anonymity’s rhetorical “necessity” or non-necessity as 
discussed above.
Document #1: Resistance to Anonvmitv—An Authentic Performance
The first document we will look at under the first emergent theme is significant because it is an
unequivocal— and ironically, highly provocative— example o f how and why anonymity might be utterly
unnecessary in composition instruction. The student is writing under the broad subject area o f Gender
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Roles and Rules. In the classic expressivist mode, the writer (whose real name has been repieced with a 
pseudonym to protect her identity) is recalling a significant event from her childhood when, invited to a 
friend's sixth birthday party, she determined that she was "not going to wear that "girlie" dress to the party."
I was determined to wear my very best, most flattering pair o f red Osh-Kosh B'Gosh 
corduroy overalls. This wasn't just any family birthday party either. All the doctors' and 
lawyers' children would be there. This was high class. I couldn't understand why I had to 
wear that ugly piece o f  femininity.... I had put my heat and mind into making the 
decision. I knew what was right. The strength that my mother had created wasn't going to 
fail. I did go to the party with my red overalls on.
It's rather funny how my mother had tried to prepare me to face the nasty looks and 
teasing that I would receive for wearing overalls. I looked like a boy in those overalls, 
and I didn't look "good" enough in those overalls. I didn't look feminine in those overalls.
I looked the way I wanted to look. When I arrived at the party however, all o f  the girls in 
their "cute little pinafores" were jealous, and I felt sorry for them.
My mother was no "Eternal Feminine," but she wasn't any brute either.... She taught 
me that there were no boundaries.
My parents were the main role models for what I believed is masculine or what I 
believe is feminine. My mother and father shared all o f  the household duties, and often 
switched roles. My father changed diapers without a wink, and brushed my hair, and 
bathed us.
 There were always waffly lines regarding gender roles in my household. All in all, in
my home, it didn't and still doesn't matter if  you are a  boy or a girl, man or woman, it just 
mattered whether you loved one another and were true to one another.
“Rood Christian”
The major point o f  reference in this document is the family, with a passing reader response reference 
to the "Eternal Feminine" which figured in many o f  the readings I required for the course. Anyone reading 
this, but particularly the expressivist teacher, would consider this a well-written opening attempt, or 
"essay", that discloses something personally significant but which the writer could comfortably share with a 
wider discourse community. Open-minded social constructionists—Bartholomae and Petrosky o f the early 
days o f Ways o f  Reading, for example— would also find potential in this essay, and would seize upon the 
slightly arch reference to class distinctions, the permanent effects o f the feminist revolution, and the 
dialectical—even dialogical—potential in the writer's knowing academic reference to the "Eternal 
Feminine."
If either type o f  writing teacher were told that the essay was written in response to a prompt that 
justified and required anonymity on the part o f  the writer, I'm positive that both would agree that 
anonymity wasn't necessary for recognizing or representing anything in the essay as written. Both would 
assert, I think, that the writer's voice is "authentic" and the "authority" o f experience compelling. But the
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fact that anonymity is unnecessary in the writing o f  this essay is more transparent: the writer printed and 
signed her real name at the end o f  the essay (which I have replaced with a pseudonym). When I asked her 
about her reason for doing so at the beginning o f  the second-class session, she replied, very directly: "I 
have nothing to hide. I don't believe in anonymity."
I scheduled a conference so that we could talk more at length about how we might honor her right to 
sign off on everything she wrote, while I proceeded with my experiment in a mix o f signed and unsigned 
writings. Within minutes, and with the same openness and firmness—ingenuousness, really—that informed 
her essay, she told me she was willing "to play along" since there was more than enough space for her to 
nominally identify herself. I was prepared to cancel the anonymous component in honor o f her rights as a 
dissenting minority. I f  “Rood” believed anonymity was an unnecessary and possibly unnatural 
interrogation of private/public speaking rights, then I would have to agree, since my own sense o f  
anonymity, as a transgressive, equivocal discourse was sensitive to the contradictory nature of concealed 
disclosure. She told me she thought the class was extremely interesting, and that as a matter of what I had 
presented as "teacher-research," she would support our experiment with anonymity even if  she didn't 
believe she would "hold anything back" because o f her name.
Rood’s sense of her inherent accountability and responsibility—her fundamental authenticity—confirmed 
one gnawing theoretical doubt I had about using anonymous writing: the premise behind Patterson's and 
Kim's use o f anonymity in The Day America Told the Truth was that we generally don't tell the truth, to 
ourselves or to others, about issues that really matter to all o f us. Rood was rightfully indignant that writing 
anything in her name was at some level disingenuous, and that she—whatever defined her core sense o f 
self—was to some degree the result o f  an imposture, or at least that her personal sense was informed, and 
performed, by a much larger function o f  impersonation.
Mainstream expressivists would, I think, rush into the breach opened by Rood's disavowal o f
anonymity. It is a questionable ethical assumption, a suspect pedagogical appeal, and in general, bad public
relations, to relay to students that they are engaged in various acts o f  deflection and indirection, imposture
and impersonation when they are required to write personal narratives that are by and large scripted by the
familiar discourses o f  family, schooling, peer relations, and popular culture. Since composition is a
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required course, one approach is to require them to write from personal experience, another is to require 
them to analyze others' writing. Now we have the prospect that students are required to tell the truth about 
what they really believe about matters o f personal and social, cultural and moral significance, and the only 
way to do that is to tell them that their nominal identities are masks that must come off.
“Rood’s” belief that she had nothing to hide—that she had in fact disclosed what she really thought and 
felt about gender roles and rules—could not be countermanded by my hypothesis that anonymous writing 
would somehow plumb more authentic depths o f her identity politics. In other words, for better or for 
worse, we need to take “Rood Christian” and all our students at their word, beginning with those words that 
are arguably the most fundamental: their Proper Names.
As a tried and true teacher o f expressivist principles, I agree with my own imagined upbraiding. As 
critical theorist, however, and one who takes seriously to heart the definitions and descriptions o f  what 
passes for "critical pedagogy," I am not satisfied with the tried and the true only, but with the unmarked 
boundaries of possibility, o f what remains to be seen spoken and heard. I knew that Anonymous writing 
was an all or none proposition for my composition courses, and for the sense o f community I was hoping to 
open. Rood Christian rescued my situation while justifying her own. Her character, and the character o f her 
first essay, openly tested the limits of my authority and my authenticity as a teacher and theorist. Satisfied, 
from what I could discern, that my pedagogy and I were not in fact disingenuous, as she might have 
suspected at first, “Rood” disappeared into the anonymous discourse community that then developed over 
the rest of the semester.
I might be accused o f  belittling and befuddling Derrida's ideas o f signature, event, and context, but I see 
that conference with Rood Christian as a defining event in recognizing the complexities o f  pedagogy itself, 
never mind an anonymous pedagogy. More important, I see her signature o f her proper name in effect 
underwriting, and literally undermining, the context o f  my requirement of anonymity. Her real name, in 
effect, reminded me that requiring anonymity might be utterly unnecessary to what I am contending about 
some larger issues o f authenticity and identity, authority and community.
I now turn to two more documents from a much longer series o f documents that point up gradations or
"transgressions" o f anonymity's (un)necessity. Bakhtin might call these gradations "transgredient moments"
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in which the discourses o f  identity, community, and authority might be said to (e)merge as functions o f  the 
anonymous. Like the openly self-identified essay by “Rood” these next two documents are written by 
females—if their deployment o f pronoun reference is to be believed. There is no assurance that these, or the 
next group o f  documents that I am going to assume are written by “male” writers, can be identified 
according to the writer’s gender identity. My assumption that they might be is to perform a double play 
with the imaginative impersonation function that is anonymity itself. It is up to the reader to determine 
whether it is important, given the anonymous function and the themes I have identified as emergent, to 
know the “identity” o f the writers in what should be, in the most abstracted sense of anonymity, a 
genderless zone of contact that always remains to be seen and heard.
I have been telegraphing, and by turns, short-circuiting my contention that the anonymous function, 
when required all along the line o f composition's assignment structure, opens up expressivist assumptions 
about authenticity, revealing its "discrepant identity,” to borrow a phrase from Goffman, and/or what 
Robert Brooke, also adapting from Goffman, might have called authenticity's "underlife in student writing 
instruction." Concurrently, I have promised to show that anonymity functions not only as a direct current 
within expressivist notions o f the personally authentic, but manages an alternating current which 
constructivists might tap into as "socially" authentic, enabling the kind o f  author-driven analysis and 
academic research that is said to distinguish it from the expressivists focus on "MEsearch."
The first document would seem to establish, however, an unequivocal basis for building a case against 
anonymity and its putative function as a provocation of greater authenticity in student writing. Document 
#2 falls into the same line o f unnecessity, but it begins to show an expressivist contour that skates close to 
the kind o f Prohibited Speech Foucault alluded to in his “critical “ approach to language: the discourses of 
desire and power, or o f sexuality and politics. It, and the next document, were shared and discussed in the 
first class session I devoted to theorizing the pedagogical difference—if any— in creating a “community o f 
anonymity.”
Document #2: Expressing the Social Constructs o f  Desire and Power
I have a very close friend who is a man. There is no sexual tension between us, only 
friendship. As I spend more time with this friend, whom I'll call Rich, I repeatedly see his 
personality change when in the presence o f other males. When he is my room, rocking in
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a creaky old rocking chair that belonged to my grandfather, he becomes more thoughtful 
and expressive. He has grown more and more comfortable with trusting me with his 
intimate thoughts, and he talks until all the things that are confusing him are said and he 
can take a deep breath and wait for some advice. I'm not certain if  he needs "womanly 
advice" or just someone to listen to him. Regardless, we all need support, and I'm glad 
that Rich can be open with me and let me be his friend.
But when the discussion is ended, and he is done telling me why he has been so angry 
with everyone, or withdrawn from his friends, or stressed, or feeling pressured by school 
and roommates, we return to his house and an amazing change occurs. His male friends 
are all at the, sitting around having one o f their "discussions" These "discussions" are 
characteristic o f  this group of men. It is what bonds their friendships. They speak with 
authoritative and opinionated voices, and are often times moved to their feet as they 
"discuss" the "benefits” of drug use, the "ridiculous" policies of the University and the 
"ineffectiveness" o f  the Durham police. These men are educated and they do make some 
intelligent statements, but usually it is a nondebate on hand. They validate one another's 
statements and tell and retell stories about their personal experiences that serve to further 
strengthen their shared opinion. Rich gets excited about these sessions in which he adopts 
an argumentative voice (though no one ever disagrees with anyone) and becomes the 
authority on whatever is the topic o f the evening.
I f  I, or anyone else who hasn't conformed to the opinions o f this group, risk making 
our opposing opinion known, we are faced with listening to five men validate each other 
and agree that the independent voice is definitely wrong. Another reason why I have 
declined participation in these discussions is that I have learned that the purpose o f  the 
talks isn't really to reach a conclusion, but to strengthen the ties o f friendship between 
these men. I don't recognize the man I am friends with among these loud and opinionated 
people, and I have learned to no longer look for him. Rich isn’t moody. He isn't 
necessarily weak; he is confused. I know I am not the only one who wonders who he 
really is; he asks himself everyday. That is exactly why he spends those hours in my 
room. He is too proud to let this inward side be shown to his male counterparts and he is 
too tender not to express it at all.
The first thing I notice in this document is this young woman's wisdom well beyond her years. She is a 
listener and an "empath," to borrow a coinage from Star Trek—The Next Generation. Her antipathy toward 
this male bonding ritual is perfectly tempered by a fine sense o f  irony. Of the documents covered by the 
subject area o f Gender Roles and Rules, I see it as the epitome o f  the theme o f anonymous empathy that 
points up the constructive, "therapeutic" mode o f  the anonymous function. Anonymity is necessary to cover 
the identity o f  her friend whom she'll call "Rich" (anonymity within anonymity) and, quite plausibly, to 
safeguard her connection to that reference to "sexual tension” and its difference from what has come to be 
misnamed as a "platonic" friendship.
My own attraction to this anonymous document is the exploration o f masculine identity, and o f her male 
friend's identity, as a "confused" struggle between the reflective and the reactive self. There is a sense that 
the writer is herself splitting the difference between male and female communication communities along 
stereotypical lines and, in doing so, is canceling out any special vantage point presumably gained by
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becoming anonymous. Again, too, it is not at all unlikely that this writer would have touched on the 
"otherness" at the core o f  her friend's gender identity and identification with equal insight and poignancy if  
she had responded to a standard expressivist prompt. And there is no reason why the writer wouldn't have 
practiced one tangent o f the anonymous function—pseudonymity— to protect the identity o f her friend even 
as she signed her own name to the essay. Certainly, the "Men Are From Mars, Women From Venus" 
binarization would have emerged under her signature.
And yet, what I hear in this essay is a quality of voice that is intimate and distant—"impersonal”—a 
quality that I identify with one o f  anonymity's effects. But without a control group to prove my intuition, I 
can only appeal to my readers' sense o f  what I, thanks to Beckett and Foucault, am pointing to: "What 
matters who is speaking?" What matters is what is being expressed'. "I have a very close friend..." The 
distance that anonymity literally "provokes"—calls forth, from the writer's first person point o f view adds a 
paradoxical proximity, even intimacy, that would not, I contend, emerge in this writer's obviously already 
strong responsive understanding. Many feminist theorists and rhetoricians would o f course take me to task 
on this question of rhetorical indifference. Thus, I can conjure my own well-developed feminist "other" 
responding to my tiresome repetition o f the Beckett/Foucault interrogation in this way
It may not matter to males who have the luxury o f  playing around with the sort of 
invisibility and oblivion that a male ordered history o f language activity has, until 
recently, visited upon women. But it matters very much who is speaking when women, 
within that prison house o f  language, have had to hide their identities with an anonymity 
that wasn't existentially heroic or arch-ironic, but necessary to their literary and often 
physical survival. Think o f  the Brontes or o f "George Elliot." Anonymity has been the 
enforced name o f women from laws barring their literacy to laws requiring they change 
their names into those o f  their husbands. Far from being an empancipatory function, your 
use of anonymity in the composition classroom is an unwitting, and possibly perverse, 
reassertion o f what Derrida has called Phallogocentrism.
My response to my internalized feminist Other is dogged, but not dogmatic. The anonymous is o f course 
Iogocentric, but this writer's use o f  it does not suggest the name of the father and the signifier o f the phallus 
penetrating a woman's "lack” o f reason. Or perhaps it is, in reverse. I f  Cixous is correct, the laugh o f this 
anonymous "Medusa" becomes more o f  a knowing smile at the impotent posturing o f male dominated 
discourse, a confusion that we can recognize at the end o f documents (not analyzed here), where the 
daughter o f  a father writes uncannily o f  his identification with the Mother, and of the Mother not being
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there to hold his hand so that he might shed neither manly nor womanly tears, but simply cry in that 
poignancy and passion that represents the "phallacy" o f  men's communicative rationality.
The lingering question o f whether the present document, or any of the others I have presented, is worthy 
of the term "academic discourse" from a social constructionist point o f view is, I believe, already answered 
by the present document's hybridity of artistic expression and critical analysis which cannot be dismissed as 
narcissistic, or even as essentially personal. It is itself a proto-treatise on the socially constructed reality of 
gender and a narrative o f an acute listener in Burke's "parlor"--one who hears a deep confusion in its 
"conversation o f mankind.''
The final document in this section of anonymous women writers culminates a theme or pattern we saw 
as a category or an Emergent Theme—defense o f men and anti-feminism. This theme alone is, I think, a 
significant finding, for it means that many women are afraid to voice their real feelings and ideas about 
what feminism means and what it has done or is doing for helping them define and redefine confusing 
issues o f gender. I f  only 30% of women are afraid to speak up for what they sense is a politically incorrect 
attitude in the supposedly liberal hot bed o f academia, it would seem to me we have a serious 
communicative issue in composition studies alone.
I would think that even my scintilla of documentary evidence would be o f interest to the feminist
teacher, to women's studies programmers, and to any one, male or female, who might wish to know what
students really think and believe about such critical issues o f culture and society as male and female roles
and relationships. It also seems to me that the functional hybridity I have been trying to link to
compositional anonymity also culminates a trend running through the previous documents. Moreover, the
uncertain and equivocal nature o f what motivates choice o f subject matter when anonymity is presented
(never mind required) to a young writer as a rhetorical position seems to settle itself decisively into the
utterly necessary range with this document.
Document #3: Reader Response and (TJnYNecessarv Anonvmitv
English 501, the one class that scares me. My biggest fear in this class is that I am not a 
feminist o f  any sort and I despise male bashing o f  all kinds. I hope this will not make me 
an outcast. I am trying to see both sides o f each argument and understand them as well.... I 
just cannot agree with some o f the authors we have read so far that blame men for all of 
the problems o f the world. Not all men are sexist pigs, as was stated in The Utne Reader.
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Would it be fair to say that all women are radical feminists? Not all men are out to rape, 
attack, and destroy the future o f  women. Would it be fair to say that all women are 
nurturing, baby-making housewives? What really drove me crazy was the idea, brought up 
in The Utne Reader, o f  mating two eggs to eliminate the male gender completely. The 
article stated that mothers did not want to raise sons who would most likely be potential 
rapists and murderers. Get real. I've got a wonderful little brother, and a marvelous caring, 
father. It sounds to me like that w e’ve have given up and lost all faith in human nature.
That was most upsetting. Humans cannot live a normal, healthy life if  they are constantly 
in fear. Sometimes women can be their own worst enemies.
I agree with the articles stating that communication is the key to a healthy relationship.
But that applies not only to romantic relationships but also to friendships, work 
relationships, and mere acquaintances as well. I also agree that women deserve equal 
salary for equal work and that there should not be any limitations placed on women in the 
work force. I guess I'm an advocate o f  equality rather than the domination o f one gender 
over another. Many o f  the articles we have read seem to be arguing with each other over 
who is the dominant gender when, in reality, it is neither. Both are fighting to hard and are 
too blind to meet in the middle. How dare either gender say or feel that they are superior 
to the other? Now the question is, if  wither group is right, what do we do? How do we 
remedy the situation o f  inequality without starting another war?
The pattern o f using reader response to initiate and open a set o f personal beliefs and opinions was a 
familiar one in the anonymous writing done in this class on issues o f  gender identity. My present scope 
does not permit the full range o f  the relation between reader response and anonymous response. I assume 
the writer is a woman, though, as with many o f  the previous documents, the use o f pronouns is, I think, 
deliberately neutral/neuter in order to make an ideological point, as well as ensure complete identity 
protection. The anti-feminist edge became pronounced in many o f these documents, except that this 
document sticks to a level o f  generalized others, rather than introducing and sustaining a significant other 
such as a father or mother, which was a feature o f many documents we can’t analyze here.
The fact that the class scares the writer is added rhetorical incentive, and pedagogical justification, for 
the use of anonymity. I am not, o f  course, advocating that students should be fearful in any class. The 
writer’s fear reference is to her views regarding feminism, and the assumption is that in giving equal time to 
women's as well as men’s movement readings (in sum, a complete gender studies course o f reading and 
response)I may in fact be advocating feminism. The writer is afraid that if  I knew his/her genuine views, it 
might affect her/his grade. The reference to being "a social outcast" extends this fear of an instructor's 
potential ideological bias and possible abuse o f  power at the writer’s expense to how the writer’s views may 
be taken by other class members. The writer is therefore using the mask o f  anonymity to speak the truth, as 
s/he understands it, about gender roles and rules, coming out as a mainstream liberal humanist.
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The writer's view o f  gender relations, from what I could gather, represented the majority view of the 
class, male and female, as we began our responses to these documents. I was tempted in this particular 
discussion to point to the difference between different kinds o f  feminists, working for very different kinds 
o f  equality—from pay/work equity and reproductive rights, to liberation from Disney stereotyping in 
mainstream culture to our massive pomo-rape culture. I was tempted to point out that there are 
pornographic feminists and there are eco-feminists. The discourse o f feminism, and the discovery and 
recovery o f the detested and contested "feminine" is everywhere, in the inkling o f female representation in 
Congress, in the glass ceiling o f  corporate culture, on the screens and pages o f mass media.
But I did not. I was happy to point out that this writer's desire "to meet in the middle" o f  the discourse of 
gender justified the use o f  anonymity, for the anonymous is itself a middling function: it both protects and 
projects a  writer's legitimate fears; it conjoins reader response and writer recognition; and it builds a
discursive bridge between the always confusing, contested concepts of identity and community.
Whether or not the anonymity o f the writer is functioning in the way I am contending, that it structures
this sort o f  hybrid, middling (literally, "mediocre") outcome, is o f course, wide open to argument. I cannot 
begin to reproduce the class discussion of this and the other documents. At the opening o f  the course and 
throughout the semester I underscored to students that their triple performative roles as named writers, 
unnamed writers, and as named, face-to face reader/respondents, to both levels of identity composition 
amounted to an experimental discourse community. My reader will have to take my word that the 
anonymity o f these texts opened up remarkable lines o f  communal inquiry and reflection. This community 
effect o f anonymity—whether the anonymity is purely necessary or not—is itself worth the experiment with 
invisible writers/visible readers.
The next three documents I have chosen for discussion of the significance o f "unnecessary anonymity"
are written by “males.” Like the previous three documents, they demonstrate a mix of expressivist and
social constructionist “trace elements.” In short, I am proposing that these and other documents we have
analyzed re-present a personal plus textual potential—a transgredient moment—that expressivists and
constructivists will claim as both familiar and strange.
Document #4: Expressing One’s Social Construction as a “Male”
This is probably one o f  the world's wonders. Why is it that women are unable to 
make up their minds? They will say one thing, change their minds, and leave
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males to figure out what the hell they are really trying to say. This can be very 
confusing for the male. What are his options? If he argues with her he is wrong, 
arrogant. Yet if  he acts the opposite then he is just trying to appease her so as not 
to have a conflict—or is he really just guessing at what she really wants and 
therefore not honestly interested in taking her feelings into account?
Perhaps much of this is founded in our roles of being males and females.
Scientifically, it has been shown that males change their minds more than females, 
but once a male has chosen he will usually stick with that decision. Females, on 
the other hand, will continue to waffle on issues right up to and sometimes beyond 
the point of no return.
Now the question is whether this study reflects biological programming or our 
socially programmed views. I f  they are biological there isn't anything we can do 
about it, but if  social, there is something that could be done. I f  tins one quality o f 
males and females was changed there might be a significant upgrade in the 
relations between the sexes. By this I mean that if  males and females were able to 
settle down and make decisions and perhaps stick with them, unless o f  course the 
circumstances change, the relationships of our sexes may improve, and there 
would be one less battle to fight.
Document #4 is a more familiar expression o f gender identity's socially constructed estrangement and 
engagement. Is its anonymity completely necessary? When compared to the overall rhetoric o f mixed 
motives and equivocal effects of the previous documents, my intuition tells me, Yes: The writer, (“male”), 
needs anonymity to safely make his stereotypical, almost loutish, but personally authentic views o f gender 
roles and rules known. That these authentic views are of questionable authority—a vague composite o f 
personal plus textual experience—is precisely why and how anonymity becomes a general heuristic and 
dialogical necessity.
I have attempted to headline a definitive interpretation of each of these documents, and then find as I 
transcribe them into the body o f my text, a closer reading occurs in the course o f  "typing" my students 
writing. Even in this document, which opens with what I called a loutish, or bigoted, male attitude 
regarding women's putatively fickle nature, we can see a progressive movement toward a more responsive 
understanding—toward an empathic imagination o f how and where the biological and the social might meet 
and complete one another. The overt subject—male versus female decision-making—is a not so transparent 
call for greater communication.
The writer's vague textualized appeals to scientific authority turn into rather more expressive appeals to
being "able to settle down." The social constructivist would jump on this as just another ill-conceived
expression o f personal bias: hasn't the writer read Deborah Tanner, for example? The expressivist might
equally jump on it as evading more specific elaborations of the writer's own gender role troubles: cut all the
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pseudo-scientific references to a pseudo-objective authority and tell your readers what's at issue personally
so that it can be better understood in broader terms o f general readability, if not social utility.
What I find compelling about this document is the either/or and neither/nor status in terms o f its
narrative and analytical identity. Now, can I prove that anonymity produces this personal plus textual 
hybridity (which I see as an opportunity for the writer and for his fellow readers as we discuss its strengths, 
weaknesses, and discursive possibilities)? No, I can't. But given the potential freedom o f expression and 
construction which anonymity can offer, I contend that the writer’s rhetorical equivocation (an initially 
sexist voice and final communitarian vision) contains a  personal and social vulnerability—a  quivering of 
gender roles, rules, and relations—that is an important part o f how anonymity reveals itself to a larger, and 
largely unidentifiable, community.
Document #5: Tradition and Transgression
In Document #5, we see a nod toward the reconstructive effects o f a feminist consciousness nearly unheard 
o f in “males” prior the last two generational cohorts (1960-1985) o f  which this writer is a middle member.
She Paid
"Let me pay this time," she said. "When you ask me out on a date, you can pay," I 
replied, not ever foreseeing that day. A couple o f weeks later I got a call. "Hi, it's me.
What are you doing Friday night?" "Nothing yet." "Good, I'm taking you to the movies, 
my treat. Be ready for seven-thirty. I'll pick you up." Ha, I thought, she took me up on 
my offer. At the time I told her that she could pay when she took me out, it sounded like a 
good idea. Now, it didn't. It was almost as i f  she was calling my bluff. What was I 
supposed to do? I decided to play along with the whole thing. Yet, for a date with a girl I 
had been out with a couple of times, I was more uneasy about the whole arrangement 
then I should have been,
The date ended up being rather awkward for me. When I got home that night, I started 
thinking about why it was uncomfortable. All she did was drive me to a movie and pay 
for my ticket. That was it. It was a trivial experience, but it highlighted the importance o f 
socially constructed gender roles we play. The role reversal had taken me out o f  a 
familiar role and forced me to play another. Her paying shouldn't have mattered, but it 
did. It was a classic example of the complexity o f  gender issues that are reinforced to the 
point that we take them for granted. I know now that it wasn’t the date that was awkward, 
it was making the choice between clinging to traditions o f old, or adapting to the ever- 
changing social arena.
The title tells us much about the power issues involved in dating and in who bankrolls its experience. It 
is possible that the writer's admission of feeling "awkward" and that having his socially "reinforced" role 
reversed made him "uncomfortable" was sufficient enough to justify writing anonymously. As an example 
o f what I have contending about anonymous discourse as a bridging discourse between expressivist and
218
R eproduced  with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
constructivist writing this text is exemplary of, if  a bit thin in, its hybrid indications o f  transgressing the 
personal and social.
Nevertheless, the expressivist use o f  dialogue to establish a  sense o f  his, and his woman's friend's, 
personal character edges into a fairly sharp and analytically succinct analysis o f  the "socially constructed 
gender roles we play." It is this in the writing that caught my attention. Without resorting to reader response 
(since there had been readings on gender roles and stereotyping), this writer manages to telegraph an 
academic, analytical awareness in his preference for a more personal narrative approach.
It seems to me that both an expressivist and a constructivist teacher would be interested in the potential 
this text offers to their pedagogical beliefs about what makes for authentic and authoritative composition. 
The voice is reflective on the subject o f  gender identity. The voice does not, however, reflect, necessarily, 
an anonymous function. What is being impersonated here? Is there any hint o f  code or content 
transgression? What is significant about the disclosures made by this writer who could very easily have 
signed his/her name to this writing? Why should this piece o f  writing be/remain unsigned? How does it 
foster Forster’s sense o f an anonymous “atmosphere”?
As for my sense o f the "impersonal/impersonating power o f  the anonymous function, there's no 
assurance that I correctly identified the gender/sex of the writers in the first five documents (except for #1.) 
But let's assume that their writers were female, and these last two writings were o f male origin. The 
question remains: What matters who's speaking in matters o f  gender identity? I will now entertain an 
answer.
What matters is what the community o f  writers, face  to face, will make o f  these voices, 
views and visions. What really matters is how these communal expressions o f  gender 
identity and identification will be socially re-constructed fo r  the use by the community 
created by a required course in composition. What matters is not the who but the what o f  
the writing—what it teaches us about our sense o f  Selfishness, o f  Otherness, and their 
communal expressiveness—constructive and destructive.
In trying to establish an equivocal sense of, and foundation for, the provocative possibilities of 
anonymous writing about gender identity, I suspect that the contact zone wherein my theoretical sightings 
and my documentary findings have long since transgressed the clear, pragmatic lines (if  there any worth 
redraw ing and defending) betw een  a necessary/unnecessary , and even perhaps, an 
appropriate/inappropriate use o f  anonymity.
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Document #6: Androgyny meets Anonvmitv as Threat to Identity
The final document in this section on Gender Roles and Rules is interesting as a borderline heteroglossic 
discourse because it responds to several different senses o f  authority—class readings, a female classmate's 
talking points in class, and to his girlfriend's views o f  what she wants in a man. Taken together, there is a 
sense o f  responsive understanding in this anonymous document that points to, even if  it cannot precisely 
locate, a sense o f  community "in this day and age with all o f  the mixed signals that men are receiving from 
both the females and the society in general?"
What does it mean to me, a male, in this day and age...? Does being male mean that one 
is still supposed to be provider for the relationship, acting as the warrior for women, but 
being chivalrous also? As we discussed in class, do women even know what they want 
from their men? My girlfriend says she wants a man with good hands, teeth, eyes, and he 
must be bigger than she is so she doesn't look like a whale. But, he also must be patient, 
understanding, sensitive to her needs, and be able compromise so that the relationship 
will work, be fun, spontaneous, compassionate, romantic, be one who will thrown in the 
sweet little things, talk with her and share his thoughts and feelings, be honest and open 
with her so that she knows that she is special. Yet, she does not need a male who is 
demanding or selfish, but give her the respect she serves. Needless to say she has a pretty 
good idea o f what she wants. I had to stop her so I might be able to write about it some.
So for the modem male, what is the boundary between being the chivalrous male, 
doing the "old-fashioned" things, and being a male that is insensitive to her and her 
feelings...This is very frustrating from a male's point o f view since their roles are 
changing. Maybe we are in the transition into being the Androgynous Male. I think so.
After reading that article, I connected many personal thought into what the author was 
saying about how males should be acting to make the world better. I agree that overall 
males need to be less aggressive than they are at present, but I also strongly agree with 
the woman in class who said that isn't the whole issue o f  androgyny based on common 
courtesy. Maybe both sides need to relax, and stop blaming each other for everything that 
has happened in the past. It is time to move on and look to the future.
Most remarkable here, I think, is the anonymous reference to "a woman" in the class who spoke o f the 
androgyny o f  being polite to one another. This begins to suggest the possible “androgynous” function of 
anonymity. Or is anonymous androgyny a fiction? Despite the sense of cyberspace and digital discourse 
being “sexless” (so to speak!) it seems pretty clear thus far that the gender identity o f  those writing 
anonymously is rather trans-apparent. Conversely, the tenacity o f  gender identity is opaque to the function 
o f  anonymity—resistant to its rhetorical possibilities. Whatever the reality, it seems indisputable that the 
reality o f  anonymity’s impersonal structure/function in theoretical, historical, and rhetorical terms is 
becoming a possibility in writing that would otherwise not be unexpected under normal nominative 
conditions. But that’s the question: Is the anonymity thus provided functioning in light o f  what has been
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established in the previous chapters? No...not yet. But the underlife o f composition is coming to the 
surface, is my sense—a sense I can’t imagine my reader doesn’t share.
Toward An Unavowable Anonvmitv
The necessity of teaching composition as a call/response to an unavowable community o f writing, not of 
writers, is clear if anonymity does in fact function as dialogized heteroglossia. I f  it doesn’t then it is utterly 
unnecessary to both composition pedagogy and to any sense o f an educative effect. Once we begin to 
reflect on the collective information and communicative rationality represented in these 6 documents, 
however, we see the countenance o f  the kind of community problematized by Mason and Stamm. The 
anonymous sense o f community suggested in these writings—and given their use in face-to-face 
discussion—is more empancipatory than Mason and Stamm have found in the world. In other words, we 
begin to see where and how Blanchot’s sense of community and Lunsford’s sense of ownership is 
collected, copied and redistributed to each absent writer/present reader so that they can read, respond, and 
have a sense of common ownership of these texts.
Because they are anonymous, each text is written by some one o f them, but in a real sense, each is 
written by any one o f them for all o f them. No one person stands out in these nominally unidentified 
attempts at gender identity. This possibility o f anonymous composition as community property—and as the 
communication of identity—is no mere conjecture. Its possibility is very real pedagogically. The reality of 
anonymous composition as an act o f  community becomes available to both the expressivist and the 
constructivist. Imagine these documents not as pinned up on these sheets undergoing what amounts to a 
variation o f  the old New Critical approach to literary interpretation. Imagine instead them in the common 
possession and discussion of those who wrote them, and then you will begin to see what really happens 
when anonymity meets community in the composition of gender.
I chose these documents to close out this first section of document analysis to point up what seems to 
suggest a trajectory o f "masculine" versus "feminine" identification under cover o f anonymity. That is, the 
men writing in this first round o f assignments were either drawn toward expressing the quintessence of 
male identity through descriptions o f  various defining rituals and codes o f  masculinity. The women writing
221
R eproduced  with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
on condition o f anonymity seem to suggest a pattern of desire for communication/ communion/ community 
beyond the definitions o f  their gender identities.
Anonymous Sexual Identity 
The Emergence o f Anonymous Impersonation and Transgression
In this section I will be presenting and analyzing documents that cross the assignment and border line from 
issues o f  gender identity and identification to those o f  sexual identity and identification. This does not mean 
that these writings deal exclusively with sex, as in sexual intercourse. On the contrary, the concept I have of 
"Heterosex-Relations" has little to do with sexual activity, and everything to do with its re-activity. These 
documents were written in response to a very general prompting that replaced "significant issues o f  gender 
identity and identification” with "significant issues o f sexual identity and identification." As with the first 
set of documents, I took fairly detailed notes on each class session involving response to students' 
anonymous writing. For this round o f documents and discussion, I also had an audio tape player in the 
middle o f the table to record these discussions. The sound quality o f  these recording is often muddied to the 
point o f being untranscribable. Many voices projected well, (mine, most audible, ironically), while others 
were whispers eddying in a larger white and anonymous noise. The specificity o f my recall on what I 
asked and lectured on in connection to the issues brought up in students' anonymous writing can be credited 
or discredited by these tapes. But the documents, I believe, generally speak for themselves, in answer to 
general questions of anonymity's necessity, hybridity, authenticity, etc.
As with the first group o f assignments, there was a variety o f modes and dominant nodes o f reference. 
Some used reader response as a  pretext for venting personal feelings and views that might not always get a 
public airing; others used the platform of textual reference in order to launch into personal narratives. Some 
locate themselves in the family unit, some in the college community, some in that "contact zone" that 
Bakhtin refers to when trying to explain a writer's "dialogized heteroglossia" o f voices and their utterances 
across "character zones.” Thus, in my interpretive scheme, heterosex-relations and heteroglossia are 
complementary ways o f  reading and thinking about the personal plus textual bridges that I believe get built 
under cover o f anonymity.
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As we saw in the anonymous documents o f gender identity, there was a  questionable, equivocal sense of 
anonymity genuine necessity. I will no longer second-guess and belabor this question in this section o f 
document analysis. I have several reasons for doing so.
First, students did what they were told to do and wrote anonymously. If  their documents did not meet 
some optimum or otherwise expected measure o f what might be thought o f  as anonymity's "standards and 
practices" they are nonetheless examples o f  anonymous writing and some clear, even if  ambiguous, 
patterns and themes did appear to emerge. Second, no matter how open and liberated our culture has 
become with regard to sex and sexuality, the openness is largely foreclosed to those who would continue to 
tell the truth about its private/public identifications. That sex and sexuality research enjoyed a remarkable 
opening that is only a half-century young—bom with the researches o f Kinsey, and Masters and Johnson in 
the late forties and early fifties—is indisputable. Whether or not it has been allowed to grow up and become 
authentically adult in that openness is another matter entirely.
During the months of late 1994-1995, the time I taught this course, the almost instant dismissal of 
Jocelyn Elders, Surgeon General under President Clinton, severely stunted the mature growth o f sex 
education. Dr. Elders resigned "in disgrace," for in effect, "prescribing" masturbation as a public health aid 
in addressing our culture's repressive attitudes toward sexual desire and in drawing off sexual energy that 
would otherwise find outlets in teen sex, disease transmission, pregnancy, and date rape. Given Elders' fate, 
why the very idea o f  sexual intercourse, never mind its status as an academically appropriate discourse, is 
still very much "taboo." It remains, remarkably, a prohibited discourse, with a gaping double standard even 
in academic sectors.
Thus, scientific and humanistic "sex researchers" explore every area and nuance o f the sexual, with their 
findings open to the winds in terms o f  being a discourse community and community discourse. Yet, in 
pedagogical activity, the determination to read and write about sex and sexuality remains a remarkably 
reactionary, inflammatory undertaking, as my own experience—not with my students, but with colleagues— 
will attest. The coupling (so to speak) o f  anonymity and sexuality is no accident or mistake, o f  course, 
since the revelation of, and traffic in, anything considered taboo, sacrilegious, or even slightly deviant from 
certain norms, has and will require anonymity—for better and for worse.
The final reason for ceasing my equivocations about the equivocal necessity o f  anonymity in these 
students' writings is that its equivocative function (literally, equally necessary and unnecessary) is
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ultimately exceeded by its provocative possibilities. The anonymous functions, that is, by literally "calling 
forth" an otherwise unnamed range o f voices and visions which, in my standard Civil Liberties Union view 
o f free speech rights, can—and should—be disclosed and deconstructed by whatever discourse community 
arises or exists to respond to them. So no more equivocations, if  you please. Composition-rhetoric—both 
expressivist and constructivist—exists, in large part, as a provocation to more traditional areas o f  English 
Studies, and should therefore carry its provocative mandate as far as our students can understand and 
respond within distinct, i f  untested, limits of free speech rights and standards of communicative rationality. 
Document #7: Reader Response to Feminism’s Homosexual fMiOther
The following would seem to be a straight-ahead reader response to the authority o f an author and her text. 
Like most o f the documents that feature reader response as either a nudge toward more personal 
connections, or in order to express various levels of indignation (primarily against feminist discourse), this 
student seriously (but not, I think, deliberately) misreads the author's (Constance Penley) analytical 
intentions in an essay titled "Cultural Studies, Feminism, and Psychoanalysis." Penley analyzes the work of 
certain feminist cartoon "slashers" who reverse the compulsory heterosexual roles o f  the original Star Trek 
characters—Kirk, Spock, and Bones—and depict them as homosexual comrades in explicit sex play on the 
planets they visit in a nod to the work o f William Burroughs.
Penley is also careful to protect the identities o f these illustrators; their anonymity prevents 
identification by those in our popular culture whose homophobia might take a threatening turn against 
them. The writer ignores or misses this irony in making his/her? own anonymous case. The illustrations are 
provocative, to say the least, and fascinating, if one can appreciate and apply the lesson of such a reversal 
in heterosexual identity and hero identification.
The very idea that such strong men, exploring outer space, could be homosexual is not only 
transgressive, but cognitively and emotionally dissonant: the double identification and indemnification of 
Rock Hudson being precisely the sort of exception that proves our compulsory heterosexual rule. 
Presumably, if these slashers were male and depicted Star Trek's heroic trio having sexual intercourse with 
some o f  the ship's female personnel (the ship's Communication's officer, Ahoura, comes to mind; has 
anyone ever noted that her name is rather homynymically too close to "a whore ah"?) or with some alien 
courtesans, the anonymous writer might have to consider the double-standard involved.
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"Kirk to Spock. Kirk to Spock, do you read me?" "Yes, captain, in fact, I am presently 
directly behind you guiding my starship into your base."
Hello” ! Hmmm, let's see, today I could write about my garden, that book I just read, 
life, or even death. Naw, on second thought, I'll just write about Kirk and Spock's 
intergalactic love affair. Is this the thought process behind the Star Trek slash magazines 
as were talked about in Constance Penley's piece?
First, anyone who is such a huge Star Trek fan, or "Trekky", has problems. These 
people are social outcasts, people who hide in fantasy....They dress like their favorite 
characters, attend conventions, all because o f a television show. Let's face it, there's 
fandom, and then there is fanaticism....It is this group that must be the writers o f the Star 
Trek slash mags. So, to sum up, these people have problems. Taking it even further, 
picture these people twisting the characters to meet their own wants and desires, serious 
problems!
To use the title of Star Trek is misleading, instead something like, "Star Trek the 
Homosexual Adventures would be more appropriate. It seems inconceivable to me that 
anyone would sit down and start writing a Star Trek adventure, then decide, "Hey I think 
I'll have Kirk and Spock humping each other!"
If  some feminists think this is a media that they should further explore for the benefit 
o f women's popular culture, I shudder to think what the future o f female entertainment 
holds. Maybe Donahue will start having sex with Geraldo. Oh Phil. Phil. Next episode 
let's get Oprah in on this!"
Constance Penley boldly goes where no woman has gone before, and I wish she 
hadn't. The in-depth descriptions o f Spock's penis were humorous for a moment, but to 
involve his or Kirk’s or Bone's genitalia in a Star Trek adventure is too much. Hey 
Constance, you need to get out more kid! Try looking for an intelligent, insightful, more 
artistic solution for women in poplar culture.
The composition teacher interested or willing to experiment with students' writing anonymously on the 
politics o f sex and sexual identity, needs to have, I believe, a very liberal view of free speech, o f ideological 
bias, o f  not only tolerating, but o f accepting whatever students write. Pre-set standards o f politically 
(in)correct views on the part o f the teacher need to be reset toward the default margin o f "no fault." This 
does not mean that the views expressed in writing, and especially in anonymous writing, should not 
undergo open and honest critique. On the contrary, because o f the rhetorical immunity bestowed by 
anonymity, the writer must expect that he or she will get as good or bad as he or she gives.
The element of "backtalk" in this document shows up in many other documents, and is notable enough to 
qualify as a sub theme o f my findings. One would expect that "backtalk" would figure even more 
prominently than it did. In this case, the writer is talking back to the author—Penley. The academic worth o f 
this is (u)questionable, (given anonymous course evaluations), but since we are all interested in how writers 
respond to various texts—whether autobiographical or author-driven—anonymous backtalk should not be 
ignored or discounted.
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Because we all encounter some degree of such backtalk in students' anonymous course evaluations, in 
those exit documents, there is often an interesting shift in writers' sense o f an addressee. Sometimes the 
writer is addressing an equally anonymous official or group o f  university authorities who are presumably 
waiting to read what a given student really thinks about a teacher and a given course. Other times the writer 
turns to address the teacher o f  the course. The anonymous function o f  the document enables this shift o f 
addressivity as well as the freer use o f backtalk. That is, the impersonal form of the document permits the 
anonymous student to get more "personal."
Although the backtalk in this document was not directed at me, or at the course, it was getting 
rhetorically personal with the author. I made the class to understand that as a community responding to 
these documents they were to feel as free as possible in responding to the good, the bad, the ugly, and the 
sublime. This writer's text was treated accordingly. (The attentive reader will note the implications o f 
Miller’s findings as to the fault lines emerging in the particular contact zone I created in order to provoke 
the very kind o f rhetorical situation he finds banal and ultimately useless because o f its fundamental ir­
responsibility.)
In our discussion, the first issue was whether the writer was male or female. It was surmised that the 
writer was male. This was inferred from the homophobic, and anti-feminist heat of the document. Others 
made the point that heterosexual women can be equally homophobic, and anti-feminist, as we had already 
witnessed in other documents, so it was more or less determined that the gender identity of the writer was 
indeterminable, and that anonymity and the writer's own work to cover his/her gender trail was successful 
enough, that perhaps the writer's gender identity didn't matter.
Many comments were made about the writer’s homophobia and double standard about pornographic 
illustration. It seemed like it would be OK, two women said, if  women were depicted having sex with other 
women, even though the writer didn't actually assert that. One male said it wasn't at all clear that all 
"trekies" were "social outcasts" as the writer said. Besides, he said, where's the writer's sense o f fun in 
having imaginary relationships? Another student pointed out that the writer did seem a bit amused, at first, 
but like the writer, she was mostly shocked at the pictures—so much so, she was unable to read Penley's text 
very closely.
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I asked several questions: Why does the writer assume that Penley was writing this essay and 
researching this popular cultural work by feminist artists for the exclusive use o f  women, and o f  feminists 
in particular? What i f  the artists were male and/or homosexual, without any allegiance to feminism? How 
would that change the writer's sense o f  what was going on and what Penley was analyzing? Doesn't 
Penley’s analysis have a much broader audience and serve a vast number o f  popular and academic 
purposes, especially given her title? And what about the fact that Penley maintains the anonymity o f her 
subjects and their work in the course o f  her analysis?
I also was careful to praise the honesty o f  voice and view in this writer's text, even if I found serious 
fault with it. I said that the sharp, sarcastic tone, especially in the final, personal, first name basis assumed 
by the writer ("Hey Constance...") was effective as a dramatic or rhetorical flourish. I wondered, however, 
whether the writer knew anything about Penley's personal life, where she went, etc., never mind if  the 
writer was familiar with her vast and impressive scholarship on a range of academic and social issues. For 
all that, the writer’s right to respond as a reader in any way he felt necessary to advance what he deemed a 
significant issue o f  sexual identity could not be questioned.
This writer, and all other writers using anonymity for purposes o f immunity were ultimately not immune 
to criticism o f their writing. They can listen to and consider what is being discussed by the community 
formed by the class without having to be identified as the "butt" o f such criticism. If Penley were at the 
table, it has to be assumed that if  she wished to rebut the writer's positions she could do so with as much 
conviction and force not knowing whom in the class actually wrote the piece. She could be assured that her 
criticism would have an open ear and hearing even if  the face-to-face nature o f  dialogical interaction were, 
in effect, closed.
I then repeated what would become an almost tedious point throughout the semester. That it is the
anonymity o f this writer that should protect him or her from taking any criticism personally. The
"impersonal" status o f  the writing helps us focus on the writing, what is written, and not on who the writer
is. If the writer does take anything said about his or her anonymous writing personally, then she or he has
the option o f revealing him or herself. I made the case that it would be better for them and for the whole
class, in terms o f  criticism, that they not only remain concealed, but that they get into the act o f either
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defending or attacking their own work, since both lines are going to get represented and crossed by the 
sixteen members o f the class, and no one is the wiser if  you are the actual writer, or an interested reader- 
respondent.
This line, I was to remind them many times, between the personal and the impersonal—a wavy line o f  
impersonation, which comes from persona, meaning "mask"— is a matter o f provocation and performance. 
As we can see, I told them, there is a very fluid line between the personal and the social, between the 
private and the public. It is not so much that the feminist slogan "the personal is political" is true, which it 
certainly is, I said. It is more so the case, at least in the composition class, that the personal is academic 
(which you should've learned in writing personal narratives in first year English); that the private is both 
social and intellectual, personal and community property (which you will Ieam in this course). I said that in 
the two documents we have already seen, the function o f the anonymous has much to do with how we are 
composing the politics o f identity, and how that identity politics composes our anonymity, and that our 
anonymity as writers paradoxically names parts o f our identities that we can identify with and write about 
as a community.
I told them I was attracted to Penley's essay not for the provocative "shock effect" o f its pornographic 
and sexually deviant, or "taboo" subject matter, but because o f  Penley's decision to keep the artists 
anonymous. If they (the students) decided to write about these artists' work, and Penley's work on them, 
they would have to reappraise what audience means, since Penley's audience and those artists' audience 
operate in two different communities o f discourse. My assignment o f  Penley's essay makes these students 
an audience o f two kinds o f authorship, with two very different senses o f  authority.
Add to this the motives for anonymity. Penley, in her research, actually discovered the identities of these 
artists but assured them she would maintain their anonymous cover. Whereas students come into a course 
fully identified as students—their nominal identities being at least as important—and arguably more 
important— to the university as are their actual privately lived/felt senses o f  them selves. I require that they 
assume anonymous identities in parallel with their named identities as writers. I have a clear interest in how 
the motive o f rhetorical immunity works itself out in a composition course. But I also wanted not so much
228
R eproduced  with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
to protect as to project the privacy o f  identity into yet another sense o f  audience—that o f the class as 
discourse community, rather than a discrete series; o f  nominal identities.
Anonymous awareness, especially in college coourse, is duplicitous in, well, a double sense. There is the 
reader's awareness o f the student not being there - (as one o f 16 names vaguely identified with a particular 
face) and o f  being very much there as a writer with a voice and view. There is also the speaker/writer 
awareness o f  being simultaneously present and : absent to community recognition. W hat is the effect on 
composition when transgressing the law—or at leaast norm— o f the proper name, especially when the subject 
o f anonymous writing—identity— is itself doublirng as an academic exercise o f textual authority, and as a 
personal exercise o f being alive through languages experience? Is there any use in provoking students into 
thinking about sexual identity as both a stable a ttribu te  and as a highly fluid performance; in showing them 
that what passes for academic discourse is widaer and deeper than what they m ight have believed and 
experienced in their time as college students; in Hhaving them respond in writing to identity's provocative, 
evocative and equivocative energies?
Needless to say, the students in my class foundH these periodic disquisitions bewildering, impossible to 
follow—"whoosh" as one student would exclaim a n d  gesture with the flat o f his hand across the top o f his 
head. I did not intend to lose them, as I have probably  lost my present audience. I wanted to convince them- 
-as I do you— o f  the rhetorical exigency o f anonynmity. My enthusiasm for the personal plus textual identity 
of this essay was tempered by the realization that rthe writer o f Document #7 might have achieved virtually 
the same hybridity as a named, known writer. Bunt as I have been reiterating to you, I reminded them too: 
there are gradations to these transgredient relationss o f  discourse.
Document #8: Anonvmitv as the Parody o f C atharsis
The following text takes the hybrid line b e tw een  author-driven reader response and self-expressive
projection o f that response into far more personal (yet social, and therefore political) territory than did the
homophobic rant against Penley. It also contains: plenty o f  backtalk, much o f it resembling the kind an
instructor would expect to hear in the anonymous course evaluations required o f students. Never mind the
idea o f  using anonymity to interrogate the privat*e and public curves o f identity's binding energy as it is
passed through acts o f composition. It seems to mne that the level of backtalk in this document should be
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continuously anonymously present in the course structure—from the very beginning o f the course, and not 
at the end where the students' anonymous presence passes out o f pedagogical existence.
As for what some might object to as an extreme form o f the expressivist goal o f  having students write 
about personally significant experiences, I can only respond that the subject o f self-sexuality is, as former 
Surgeon General Elders will attest, both a private part o f  our social well-being, a personally cathartic 
process, and a public and therefore political health crisis o f immense import. With this document we have 
all these issues plus the issue o f  impersonation, and quite possibly, a  parody o f  the cathartic process as 
described by Patterson and Kim, and one I attempted to import and have students take seriously in the 
course o f composition.
Originally, when I chose to take this course I was under the impression that it would be 
similar to English 401, a five-page paper every week about whatever. Evidently it's not!
At first I was astounded by the idea o f  a gender based reading and writing course. My 
only impression about this course was sex, sex, and sex. I recall continuously showing 
friends the bizarre Kirk and Spock illustrations found in the lengthy packets assigned to 
me. I was humored by these pictures, at the same time confused as to how this will help 
me with my skills as a writer. The thought of how this is allowed to be course material 
continually reappeared in my head. Finally, I came to the realization that the issues will 
require me to think about it continuously. Already this course has taken a toll on me.
As I read through the packet I found similar connection with my own life. For 
instance, in the beginning o f  the Kipnis article she discusses an anti-pomography 
documentary by a feminist author-poet who believes that masturbation promotes political 
quietism., which I also find true. In today's society people tend to hide their sexuality. 
Masturbation is a taboo practice, most everybody does it, yet you are not supposed to talk 
about it or worst, get caught.
However through my experience I have come to a contradiction o f this belief. I was 
presumably alone with my only companion, a copy o f Tracy Lord's "I Love You" that I 
found in my mother's underwear drawer while snooping for her lace bra and panties that I 
frequently wore. I got into uniform and inserted the movie. Moments later I found myself 
engulfed in a fever o f cash fantasy, which at the same time my 15 year old sister, whom I 
have strangely attracted to, interrupted during the climax o f  m y performance. At first I 
was extremely embarrassed. I feared she would think o f me as an extreme pervert, or to 
make matters worse, tell my friends and family.
The first paragraph amounts to a very candid (conservative university workers would say "damning")
appraisal o f the course. Looking past its content, the writer’s voice and perspective should be familiar to us
as long time readers o f the anonymous student evaluations o f our own teaching. Looking straight at the
content o f  this first paragraph, we can see that the writer is shocked, confused, alive to the transgressive,
provocative and "taboo" nature o f  some o f  the course material, and was therefore doubtful as to its
academic value, and was, in sum, amazed that such material (even though thoroughly academic in its
invention and circulation) "is allowed to be course material."
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More crucial, I think, is the pedagogical question by the writer as to how such material could be helpful 
to his/her "skills as a  writer." That question, o f course, rears its head continuously in the division between 
expressivists and constructivists: which approach will best hone and expand students writing skills? My 
decision to experiment with a hybrid approach, using anonymous writing as a hypothetical catalyst to 
connect and refract our field's two dominant pedagogical strains or refrains would mean that Penley and 
Kipnis were no less mainstream academic constructivist templates than are the essays of E.B. White or 
George Orwell in standard composition "readers" for writing.
This first paragraph is itself a hybrid or heteroglossic discourse o f  student course evaluation, reader 
response and personal expression. It would be easy for a composition teacher o f a more traditional, less 
experimental leanings to jump on the last sentence o f this paragraph and conclude that the course is 
provocative to the point o f  harming students' psyches, their moral-aesthetic sensibilities, if  not wasting time 
better spent in truly improving their capacities and potentialities as writers. I can imagine such a colleague 
asking something like: "Do we, as writing teachers—as not only skills-based instructors, but as ethical 
gatekeepers of certain academic norms—really want to have our courses "take a toll" on our students?"
My answer is that acquiring and performing and earning a sense o f  identity in all its private-public 
complexity always already takes a  toll; that toll is part of human consciousness itself. The assumption that 
18-19 year olds aren't ready or able to stop and examine the costs and benefits of being on this "toll” road 
that has already taken them on a journey past many entrance and exit ramps of identity and community is 
an impoverished pedagogical vision, and just plain insulting to these late adolescent animals who are 
driving in and driven by various composites of language consciousness writ large.
My colleague, still unconvinced, might point to the vague use o f the impersonal pronoun reference in 
the sentence, "Finally, I came to the realization that the issues will require me to think about it 
continuously. "Think about what,? my incensed colleague will ask. "Sex, sex, sex"?
No, I will answer. The "it" refers back, I believe, to "the course material."
"But if  we take the writer on his or her (we don't even know the writer's gender, isn't this 
important?) terms o f reference, isn't "the course material" thoroughly equated with SEX?"
No, if  you read closely, you will see the phrase, "At first I was astounded...." And in the 
next sentence: "My only impression was sex...." One o f  my readings is that the student is 
putting together a vast and confusing set o f discourses and attempting to move from the
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textual to the personal and beyond: where the private and the public can impersonate one 
another.
"But for what pedagogical purpose—for what specific "help" with the student's "skills as 
a writer"? my colleague will ask.
And I would respond: This writer doesn't need any help. The skill this writer is helping 
himself or herself to is the skill o f  impersonation, and more intriguing, to the skill o f 
parody." The writer, I think, is teaching me something about composition, and doing it, like 
he/she would do in the anonymous exit document, with the immunity o f anonymity—which 
is, o f  course, excruciatingly ironic, since the writer is using anonymity to disabuse me o f 
my illusions about anonymity’s usefulness in composition.
But never mind, what other teachers might think or believe in (mis)reading this student's figuration o f  a 
"toll." We will get to the issue o f this student's parodic impersonation o f  Patterson and Kim's idea o f 
anonymity as a  "cathartic process" in due course. We have been able to see the high profile that Penley’s 
close reading o f those feminist slash illustrators has now assumed for at least two anonymous writers. 
Unlike the other writer’s homophobic reaction to Penley's text, this writer simply reduces its message as 
"sex, sex, sex" and that therefore this is what my course apparently is about.
To the writer’s credit as a responsive reader, he/she also mentions another essay I assigned from the 
collection Cultural Studies (Grossberg, Nelson, Treichler,.) by Laura Kipnis titled "(Male) Desire and 
(Female) Disgust: Reading Hustler." That essay is a Feminist-Marxist deconstruction o f Hustler, 
Penthouse, and Playboy, with each magazine correlated to our notions o f "lower," "middle" and "upper" 
class graphed upon a spectrum o f "hard" to "soft" pornographic denigrations o f women. Unlike the Penley 
essay, Kipnis did not include illustrative examples. Instead, the anonymous writer seizes upon Kipnis' 
reference to a now famous 1980's Canadian documentary on the effects o f  pornography on its workers— 
male and female.
In that film, one anti-pornography feminist speaks about the link between masturbational fanatasies and 
political quietism. (Interestingly, Norman Mailer, no friend of feminists, rages against male masturbation in 
response to pornographic images, or to any imagined other, for that matter, as a destroyer o f  the 
"imagination" in his 1970 collection o f  essays, The Prisoner o f  Sex. More interesting still, is the 
coincidence o f Surgeon General Elders' 1995 battle with conservative public opinion on the question of 
practicing and advocating masturbation for reasons o f public health—rather than any fear o f political 
quietism or aesthetic dissolution.)
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The anonymous writer in my course does something quite interesting in terms o f reader response to 
academic textuality. First, the Penley and Kipnis references are conflated so that sex is itself pornographic 
and sex with oneself is a narcissistic betrayal o f our social and political responsibilities. This, the writer 
tells us, is "true" in his/her experience. More interesting, that experience "contradicts" what he/she is 
defining as "quietism" Is the writer playing with the literal and figurative tangents o f  "quietism" in 
paragraph two?
On the personal level the writer is making reference to the fact that one must keep quiet—not speak— 
about the taboo subject o f  masturbation, as well as be quiet in terms o f  noise lest one get caught in one's 
family or dormitory unit. On the political level is the writer also keyed into the contention that masturbation 
pacifies our revolutionary energies to struggle against the injustice and exploitation o f pornography—that 
pornography is the greatest o f opiates, and masturbation is this drug's most insidious delivery system? My 
sense is that the writer is unaware o f Kipnis’ sense o f masturbation as political quietism.
The writer, however, has decided to share a personally significant experience that is "a contradiction o f 
this belief." The writer writes that she/he came to this contradiction o f  what seems to be a socially—and 
academically—sanctioned belief about masturbation "through my experience." The question before us is, is 
the reference to "experience" only that which the writer then describes, or is it also standing for the writer's 
experience as an anonymous writer. It seems safe to conclude, on the strength o f the writer's own 
disclosures, that the she/he would never have written this document if  anonymity were not a required 
condition. The actual sexual experience o f masturbation as described by the writer does not, in the strict 
terms o f Kipnis' reference o f political quietism, contradict it.
On the contrary, the writer’s experience resoundingly confirms it. The writer is only playing off the 
literal meaning o f being quiet, not getting caught, and keeping his/her sister quiet about what she has seen. 
Operating in, or underwriting, this object lesson about quietism is the more complicated issue o f  the 
private/public and personal/political lines that are, or should not be, crossed, pointing to larger moral issues 
o f  shame or lack thereof. Having implied that the writer is not canny to the multiple meanings inherent in 
quietism, I am also open to the idea that the writer is uncannily aware of the "personal/political"
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consequences o f  the sibling disclosing the writer's situation: "I feared she would think o f me as an extreme 
pervert, or to make matters worse, tell my friends and family."
In other words, the writer is very sharply signaling to me, the instructor, and to the rest o f  the 
community, that anonymity as an imaginary stage for impersonating possible others, is both risky and 
necessary for overcoming quietism. However, when we look at the narrative details— o f the pornographic 
video belonging to the writer’s mother; o f  the dressing up in the mother’s lingerie; o f  the "cash fantasy" 
reference (a complicated phrase combing the porno industry’s "money shot" and the sex worker's real 
desire—not getting laid but getting paid), and last, but in effect, the opposite o f  least, o f  the incestuous 
reference to the  writer's sister—we have to conclude that the writer is also poking fun at the idea o f 
anonymous disclosure. That perhaps, we should all really quiet about what passes within the private realm— 
particularly in our conscious wishes or desires.
Given the traditional linkage o f political disingenuousness with anonymity on one end, and of sexually 
taboo, or normatively shameful, activity with anonymity on the other, I think a convincing case can be 
made that the writer is: first, exercising the opportunity to imagine a private (and not, I think, unusual) 
sexual experience as someone Other than who he or she really is; and second, is performing a remarkable 
parody o f  anonymous disclosure that satirizes the entire premise o f catharsis. As a knowing (or unwitting) 
parody o f  catharsis, the writer is making a point about anonymity as kitsch. Anonymous writing comes 
cheap. Its shoddy artistic, or ersatz literary, value comes at the expense, ultimately, o f  all composition and 
its pedagogical aim.
The question o f  this writer's gendered and genital identity is, as I said, indeterminable in the way the 
she/he deployed pronouns o f personal reference. Still, I would hazard to guess that the writer is a man, 
particularly given the reference to dressing up in a mother's lingerie, and the incestuous reference to a 
younger sister. The real possibility o f  this being a parody o f anonymous catharsis is increased when the 
writer is hypothesized as male, but i f  in fact the writer is female, the composition as kitsch category is not 
at all diminished, and in many ways increases in ways that Penley, Kipnis, and other feminist academicians 
might find as troubling as the anti-feminism running through many o f  the documents heretofore.
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I think I have already indicated my positions on the compositional, community, and pedagogical value 
o f this document I should be more explicit as we move into the territory opened by document #8.
First I believe backtalk to and about the instructor and his/her intentions is a good and healthy 
discourse, with powerful pedagogical value, that is only an eleventh hour ritual at present with anonymous 
course evaluations, whereas students should be able to chime in "hourly," as it were.
Second, I am firmly of the opinion that Dr. Jocelyn Elders was run out on a rail for telling an important 
public truth about sexual hygiene. Candid talk, writing and discussion about sex and sexuality—homoerotic, 
autoerotic, heteroerotic—is a must in all sectors o f public service, particularly in the educational trajectories 
o f adolescents. The "composition" o f sexuality is neither the be all or end all o f  my courses on writing 
identity politics, but it is pedagogic-all. Elders is one o f  my pedagogical heroines. Her courage in what bell 
hooks has called "teaching to transgress" was worth the loss o f her position as a powerful black woman, 
worth even the obloquy that has followed her ever since—much o f it misogynist and racialized.
Third, on the possible phenomenon of anonymous impersonation—of the mask unmasked beneath a 
mask; o f the suspect and susceptible depth o f  its provocation  o f  other voices and o f voicing Others—I 
believe its potential lies less in whether writers are being more or less (dis)ingenuous or (in)authentic, and 
far more in how it opens up the academic discourses o f  personal narrative and textual analysis to a larger 
sense o f the community o f composition.
I cannot locate my notes on the class discussion o f this document, but I do recall that my contention that 
the writer was being satirical and poking fun at the entire premise o f using anonymous writing was 
considered quite possible. The "shock value" o f  this document was an attempt to outperform what the 
writer saw as mere shock value in Penley's essay, and presumably in my approach to composition. I also 
recall taking the opportunity to apply what I had learned from bell hooks' Teaching to Transgress and 
spoke of how a teacher's real authority sprang from being open and vulnerable; that if  this or any other 
student felt that anonymous writing was ridiculous, or damaging, or even simply a playful waste o f time, 
we could agree to stop it. No one took me up on the offer, nor did their anonymous course evaluations 
indicate this.
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Document #9: Schutz. Foucault, and Blanchot—Anonymous Sex Face-to-Face
Here is a straight ahead personal narrative—no reader response. When set against some o f the ambiguities 
o f  #8—the cynical/sincere, parodic presentation— one will say: "Nothing ambiguous or disingenuous about 
this. This is an authentic look at what frat parties really look, sound, smell, feel, and are like- for many 
women who venture there.
JOE COLLEGE
A bead o f sweat slides down the length o f my nose, clinging to the end for a momenit 
before falling onto the beer drenched concrete floor. I pulled my baseball cap fu rther 
down on my head, hoping to cover my flushed cheeks and hair which was wet from  
sweat and rain. Dancing in the glow o f  a black light, I felt free from the stress o f m y  
classes and let myself enjoy the music and the delirium of drunkenness. I felt His hands 
rest on my shoulder for a moment, and I turned around to look into His deep blue ey es  
that contrasted dramatically with His dark black hair. He is a friend o f a friend, am 
acquaintance that demands a nod o f  the head or a quick hello in passing.
With a quick smile, I fulfilled my obligation and turned my attention back to m y  
roommate, who had acquired a dancing companion while I wasn't watching. The three= 
of us, and then four, moved in the freedom and confidence that a few drinks can give- 
Male laughter escalated and mingled with the softer tone of a  female's as our dancing 
became less inhibited. Over my partner's shoulder-I saw Him dancing slowly with a tall- 
slender girl with long thin hair. I felt a pang o f  jealousy tear at my heart, but for w h a t 
reason I didn't know. I pulled away from my group and walked over to the couple. H e  
turned toward me, and I suffered the loss o f words. I didn't know what compelled me to* 
approach the two, so I laughed off a  wiseass comment, punched Him on the arm like a n y  
of his other buddies would do, and returned to my group.
When I rejoined my roommate, I was handed another beer from the seemingly 
endless supply (the advantages o f  knowing a Brother at the house) and tried to forget the- 
unexplored feelings that were creeping into my mind. The hours passed and the dark: 
room became less crowded. The eyes o f  judgment and confusion had turned away from, 
us, and He approached me. His arms wrapped around my waist as the tape began to 
replay for the fourth time that night. My stomach turned as I asked myself i f  it was 
wrong for me to be with Him like this, i f  I should forget the feelings o f  excitement that 
stirred in me, and go home. But then He laughed, and my laughter rose up to meet His.
This was a game, and though we both acknowledged that, we had both decided to play.
That night has been played and replayed silently in my mind in the weeks past since 
then. I can barely remember the hardness o f His lips on mine, His hands holding m y 
arms down, not allowing me to push him away. I have attempted to forget the events o f  
that night on the third floor o f  the fraternity, and I have hushed the longings to be with 
Him again. We pass one another in the corridors and sometimes manage to exchange 
more than the obligatory greetings, and other times a smile is barely manageable. It's 
strange to continue our relationship as it was before that night, but there really is no 
alternative. We sat across from one another at dinner tonight, our friends on either side 
o f us. The girl he had a terrible crush on last semester captured his attention for the 
duration o f the meal, and I managed to survive without feeling too embarassed.
Is this essay outside the normative range o f  personal disclosure that a mainstream "expressivist'”
approach to composition can produce? Undoubtedly yes, and yet many o f  us who have spent much* time
with students' personal narratives will recognize many o f  the textual features that have come to be
identified with expressivism. Expressivist as it might be, it is a fairly safe bet that this essay w ould  not
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be passed in with the writer's proper name attached. Does that mean that if we require/permit students 
to write anonymously there will be an across the board increase in essays that are both revealing o f 
difficult experiences and as powerfully written?
Given what I have presented above, there is no active correlation between anonymous writing and 
"better" writing, and so the answer must clearly be, No. The next question to answer is: what 
pedagogical value would this essay have in either an expressivist or social constructivist course? As 
with so many of the above documents, I believe it places a burden on both approaches to meet in the 
middle o f their contending premises.
That is, the expressivist teacher would have to admit that all writing is laden with identity politics 
and ideological centers o f  gravity, and that much of what makes students' personal experience 
"significant" is precisely this level o f the undisclosed. The significance of what gets concealed and 
revealed in students' purely "expressivist" (and, for that matter, in their purely "constructivist") 
performances is vast and complex. There are both legitimate and unnecessary senses o f  shame. There is 
the tyranny o f internalized community standards o f  conformity and decency that are often minefields o f 
hypocrisy. More moderately, there seems to be a bright line, however wavy and thin in places, between 
private and public discourse, with the discourse o f the personal, (which expressivism depends and 
trades upon for its truth effects), making up the actually visible or written spectrum of that line's 
brightness. These and other socially constructed fields o f force have to be taken into account when 
opening up the revealed/concealed binary that nests within the expressivist approach.
How should a social constructionist approach to composition handle the presence o f such utterly 
social constructs as romantic/sexual mating games, alcoholically amplified, and other drug-infused 
emotional states, never mind the possibility o f date rape in students' writing? It seems to me that those 
who would dismiss this text because it is written from an autobiographical, rather than authorial and 
analytical perspective, are both ignorant and arrogant as to the sources of that shibboleth—social 
construction—which is often used to silence any alternative approach as both theoretically naive and 
pedagogically narcissistic.
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I see this essay as a model o f both compositional ideals: personally and socially significant. Its 
larger social significance—from the deleterious synergy o f  men's "fraternal" association with free 
flowing alcohol, to the necessity o f providing healthy, safe sites for romantic, erotic and, like it or not, 
sexual mating rites, to the borderline prospect o f  consensual sex versus date rape—is a set o f discourses 
that the expressivist has little justification in ignoring. The expressive poignancy and authenticity—the 
outright authority—o f its voice and view would be hailed as exemplary i f  included by an academic 
author pursuing and pushing the socially constructed limits o f what has come to be called autocritique 
in which a mix of the personal and textual get closely referenced and reflected upon.
My notes on the class discussion around this document divided over the question o f  consensual sex 
or date rape. The class tentatively concluded that my sense o f the writer's emotional confusion and 
ambiguous sense o f her autonomy—particularly in the sentence: “I can barely remember the hardness of 
His lips on mine, His hands holding my arms down, not allowing me to push him away”—was offset by 
what followed: her longing for him; their awkward but discreet distance, especially given the presence 
o f the "other" woman in "His" life. There seemed to be the sense that what happened to this writer was 
what I grew up referring to as a drunken, lust-driven fling, not a rape.
When I tried to provoke a comparison between this and the defense o f men's sexual attitudes and 
behavior based on an anonymous dormitory survey, there was a stunned silence. Eventually objections 
arose that dorm life and frat parties were very different situations. I wondered what would be the result 
o f that survey if  taken in several fraternities. Many felt the situation in the essay was "complicated," but 
that sex and sexual identity is always so. Plus, throw in a powerful drug like alcohol.... One woman 
hoped that if  the writer felt she had been raped, the LJNH rape crisis center is totally confidential (and I, 
o f  course chimed in that confidentiality is part and parcel o f the "anonymous function."). The next 
week one young woman brought in the center's brochures and gave the center's location on campus— 
"just in case."
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Document #10: Anonymous Backtalk and Transgression o f  Authority
In this document we see more o f  what I have called student "backtalk" that is rhetorically aimed at me, the 
instructor, and at the premises o f a course on the "composition" o f gender and gender identity. The 
impudence is very direct—that is, it comes across without the performative or exhibitionist antics we saw 
earlier—but is also quite artful. In this sense it should be recognized in any instructor's more memorable 
reading encounters with students' anonymous course evaluations. As an act of resistance it is both highly 
playful and deadly serious. (Like those before, these issues are o f  the highest import for both social and 
pedagogical analysis.)
The writing raises a grain o f voice and sharpened point o f view that I was hoping for as part o f  my 
hypothesis as to anonymity's higher yield of an authenticity that might be valued by both expressivists and 
constructivists. Perhaps an instructor with thinner skin over his or her ego would have trouble with this 
writer's response to a prompt to write about a significant issue o f  sexual identity. I must admit, that on first 
reading, I was startled by the sarcasm and the incisive reduction o f  my overly complex presentation of 
sex/gender identity (most o f  which I learned from a book titled Paradoxes o f  Gender.)
But then I remembered hooks’ principle of vulnerable authority or authoritative vulnerability. On 
second reading, I was amazed and amused by this essay. I deeply respect its authentic sincerity, as I do the 
others in this section. My respect for the “authenticity” o f the masturbation fantasy turns on the “sincerity” 
of its performative hybridity, not o f what I would call the authority o f its personal experience. But these 
are artificial distinctions, prescribed by expressivist and social constructionist values, whereas I am 
interesting in transgressing the authority of both these pedagogies in the interest o f  forming an/other kind 
of (in)avowable community.
Suspicious as it seems to be o f me and of my intellectual premises for the course and for the specific
assignment prompt, I found it to be equally reconstructive as a hermeneutic response to its own suspicion
and not, as it turns out, to me as its key suspect, but to the question o f identity itself. Everything we do in
terms of negotiating all questions o f identity is a self-other transaction, and can therefore be considered a
performance along a basic script line running from true to false sincerity. In view of this transgredience,
and of the transgredience o f expressivist and constructivist goals, it also a good idea to keep in mind this
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simple two part rule of all assignment heuristics: Be careful what you ask for; don’t be surprised when you 
get what you ask for. SO: "Write about a  significant issue o f sexual identity...."
Sexual identity. If  I asked Sigmund Freud where my sexual identity came from, he would 
say that it was determined even before my personality, around age six, and that the core 
o f  it lies in the subconscious. Sigmund Freud was a revolutionary in perceiving and 
constituting what we know today in the field o f psychology, and I think he has much 
ground about the only way to really understand my sexual identity, through the 
subconscious.
Join with me now, then, in being hypnotized. To be hypnotized, one must trust in the 
hypnotist and be willing.
Sexual identity is just like that. One really has to step away from oneself to try to 
grasp the concept o f it, yet must try to recognize the influences that made us the way we 
are today.
Unfortunately, I have no desire to delve into the depths o f  my subconscious to 
retrieve an inkling o f  truth about my sexual identity. If  I had problems with my sexual 
identity, I would seek professional help. But for the sake o f  Reading Gender/*\Writing 
Gender....
To step away from the subject for on brief moment, which really depends on how fast 
you read, what is the symbol "/* that has been appearing on our papers? My theory: 
the two opposing slashes are legs and the asterisk is a variable private part. Just a 
thought.
Sexual identity, and what it means to me. That rhymes. Yes I do have a lot o f  
sentence fragments, but I figured that was better than not using punctuation at all. I am 
saving that for my next anonymous essay.
Sexual identity is the formulation o f  the effects of gender on a person, therefore 
creating a unique perception o f  one's sex. The effects o f gender are cultural and therefore 
are intensified by the parenting process, as parents are also products o f  the cultural arena.
The cultural backgrounds pertaining to "sex" identity are important factors in one's 
sexuality, the quality or state o f  being sexual.
Essentially, gender identity and sexual identity are closely wed with slight 
differentiation. One differentiation is sexual preference. Sexual preference is not 
determined by gender or cultural suppositions as much as it is instinctive. Instinctively, 
all humans are heterosexual. This does not state that all humans prefer the opposite sex, 
but instead, states that the only way for humans to reproduce is through heterosexual 
relations. This puts the heterosexual preference in the unique position o f  being the only 
preference that can procreate.
The reason that sexual preferences are partially removed from the cultural issue of 
gender, is because many choose to go against cultural lines to protect their choice. Also, 
sexual preference is not a direct result o f anyone's influence o f any sort. The truth in this 
matter is shown when a  heterosexual couple produces a child that is not o f  the same 
preference.
To venture further, sexual preference is the main constitution o f sexual identity, since 
it is the purpose to which the identity serves. Identity is the form that serves the body in 
pursuing one's sexual preference.
I am heterosexual. That does not tell you anything about my gender or parents, yet it 
is the basis for my sexual identity. What makes my identity unique to other 
heterosexuals?. That is where the influence o f  parents comes in. But alas, I am where I 
started, trying to portray the influence o f my parents on my sexual identity.
In closing, I pose the question: Is sexual identity a true replication o f  one's uniqueness, 
or is it the composition o f  a form to which an identity should replicate?
The hectoring/lecturing side o f this voice is quite remarkable, I think. As a first attempt at an essay on 
the sexual—whether it is one's physical, cultural, or psychic identifications—I thought it first rate, and said
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so. The bit about Freud's early experiments with hypnosis to access the unconscious was I said, correct, but 
that the writer left out the truly revolutionary part: that Freud abandoned hypnosis for a discursive and 
dialogical "cure." Whether psychotherapeutic talk can verbalize the contents—repressed or otherwise— of 
the unconscious continues to be debated.
More important, I said, was that the point o f all talk therapy was to help a client gain a distance on—to 
begin to mediate— his or her immediately problematic situation. It was also a fact that many therapists 
encourage to write down issues that come to them between sessions. I told the class that this was the case in 
my experience as a client seeking psychoanalytic perspective on my problems with my father. I had also 
discovered that many past students had confirmed that their therapists were asking that they supplement the 
work o f talk by keeping a journal, both for venting and for analyzing issues that emerge in therapy sessions 
or between them. I told them that one student in this very class had confided that writing was a part o f  her 
formal therapeutic sessions and that the therapist had encouraged cross over between the writing being 
done for those sessions and for the classes in this course. I f  talking—and increasingly, writing—are 
considered part o f a cure for what ails and assails us in our quest for and questions about identity, I saw no 
reason to dismiss it as hypnosis, but more toward a discursive diagnosis and prognosis, and an essential 
part o f what all three o f these words share at their root: the ancient Greek word gnosis: literally knowledge, 
the process of knowing.
That the writer conveniently left this notion of talking or, in the present case/course, o f writing about 
something o f significance to the writer in terms o f sexuality was interesting to me. It seemed as if  the 
connection to be made in this document, though not made directly by the writer, was that I was trying to 
use anonymous writing to have or help students access their unconscious desires in sexual terms. The 
present writer would have none o f  it. That act o f principled—and more or less informed— resistance was to 
be congratulated, I felt. But I strongly disagreed with the writer’s premises and conclusions.
This wielding o f  professorial power on my part, this determination to inject the full energy o f  my
responsive understanding o f  students' writing using the full measure o f  my experience as an emotional,
social, and academic creature two and half decades their senior, is a mix o f  vulnerability and authority that
could not, I believe, work without the shield that anonymity provides between teacher o f  writing and
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writing student. As I have contended above, anonymous evaluation can and should travel in alternating 
currents between students and teacher throughout the semester, and not just at the end, when students use 
that shield on the final day o f class. I f  used in this alternating way, the anonymous’ function’s discursive 
current opens up, rather than closes down, responsive understanding. Ever attuned to the contradictory 
status o f the anonymous, I nevertheless am convinced that the absence o f  students' names and their 
presence as persons writing creates rather than dissipates the possibility for communion and discursive 
community.
I was also pleased to admit that the writer had used anonymity in order to speculate—correctly—about 
the meaning o f /*\ in my course title Reading Gender/*\Writing Gender. The genital level o f sexual 
identity is fairly telling in determining biological differences in human sexuality. I included this 
provocative/evocative symbol to telegraph my sense that the line between sexed and gendered identity was 
genital and cultural—and therefore both highly personal and decidedly impersonal or textual. I was not out 
to offend anyone with this symbol, but trying to defend and add to the paradoxical condition o f identity in 
general. In responding to the document in this way, I also lauded the phrase" "variable private part” for its 
correspondence, in my view, to the variable public parts" o f our presentation o f self or identity 
performance. I then reread the following paragraph.
To venture further, sexual preference is the main constitution o f  sexual identity, since it is 
the purpose to which the identity serves. Identity is the form that serves the body in 
pursuing one's sexual preference.
I said I thought this summed up the paradoxical and nearly enigmatic condition o f identity politics at 
large, whether we focus one o f its "embodied" indexes such as the genital level o f  sexuality, or moved 
progressively out of the body into the "body politic" where sexuality and gender not only move and merge 
discursively but cross into and over racial and class based discourses o f identity. Where does consciousness 
end and body begin? Can we "walk" and "talk" this boundary? Where does the body o f one self end and an 
Other body begin, and what does the "social" as opposed to the "personal" have to do with this 
demarcation?
I liked the confidence in this paragraph that reduced the question o f  identity to that o f an embodied 
condition, and a biological one at that. Perhaps the writer was aware that Freud argued that "biology is
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destiny" and that the "ego is always a bodily ego." The idea that identity is a form that serves the body is 
elegant and compelling, I said, but did the writer, or anyone else in the class have the sense that this wsas 
only half the loaf—that the body is a form that serves the discourses o f identity as both a personal and socLal 
performance?
I ended by wondering about the final question — “Is sexual identity a true replication o f one's uniqueness, 
or is it the composition o f  a form to which an identity should replicate? Was it sarcastic or serious—sincere or 
cynical? I reminded the class that many readings would touch on the idea o f essential versus culturaHIy 
constructed and socially reinforced differences. I mentioned what Adrienne Rich has called a cultural regiime 
o f  "compulsory heterosexuality" even in the wake o f birth control and other reproductive technologies whiich 
create a purely "recreative" rather than solely "procreative" feature o f  sexual identity.
The ensuing discussion was not what I expected. Many students felt that the writer had evaded the originial 
question, and had actually distorted it by deciding to link sexuality to one's parents, and then deciding not to 
"go there." The influence o f  parents was one possible point o f  departure but there were many others- I 
interjected that Freud did go there—back to the mother and the father, I said, in brilliant and not so brilliaHit 
ways, a hundred years ago. All sorts o f analysts have returned to the family as the site o f  sexuxal 
identification ever since Freud combed literature and decided—how?—to map the murder/incest themes oof 
Greek tragedians onto the coordinates o f sexuality. And, as we saw, cynically or not, the writer in tthe 
pornographic fantasy had gone there, straight into his or her mother’s bed and lingerie drawer. It's all right tto 
go there, I said—on any terms o f  (dis)ingenuity. It seemed to me that the writer o f the final document wsas 
saying: "I will go there via strict definitional terms, as I understand them." And that was okay too, I said.
I said I found the question o f  sexual identity to be a tough, literally, “hidebound” one, and one that 
couldn't begin to be answered by a course in writing, but that that didn't mean we shouldn't try. If—as it seem s 
to me— the answer to the writer's final question has to do with a positivistic endorsement o f heterosexualitty 
as a procreative force left to scientific thinking, then the writer is correct in maintaining that all Identity is thae 
result o f  an egg and sperm interaction and "composition"—in vitro or in vivo. This is a "significant" issui-e, 
and it pretty much consigns all my transgression theory o f a gender/sexual border discourse to a dustbin. I 
also wondered if this part o f  the writer's essay needed to be anonymous? All parts featuring back talk to thae 
instructor parts did, because no matter no matter how vulnerable I myself might be, I was still an authority,
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with power over students. I felt that the impudence or strong conviction wouldn't have shown up in a named 
essay. The students felt this was also true.
Anonymous Sexfuall fdentitv—Dialopical or Diabolical?
Given the range o f revelation and reference in the documents in between these, I felt that I had confirmed two 
sides o f  the anonymous function. One side is the reception o f anonymity as socially and rhetorically suspect: 
a space for deviance, discontent, and demagoguery. The other side is anonymity as a space for empathically 
exploring, compassionately considering the problem o f a gendered/sexualized se lf and concomitant others. In 
between these expected and unexpected poles, we saw the emergence—and confirmation really—o f a 
Goffmannesque view o f  representation that might travel from his concern with face-to-face interactions into a 
nameless/faceless, but certainly not an aimless, or purely reckless, discourse o f identity politics.
We saw sincere and cynical provocations in these anonymous presentations o f  self that should give all 
teachers some sense that anonymous writing is neither a reversal or a mere repetition o f either expressivist 
notions o f  authenticity, or o f constructivist notions o f  author-ity. The presence o f transgressive and 
prohibited discourse has risen with the inclusion o f  the anonymous function in the composition course, but 
not with anything like the virulence or violence one might envision and therefore conclude that anonymous 
writing is too pedagogically hot to handle and too "politically" risky in terms o f  its "incorrectness." I have 
tried, all through these many pages o f analysis, to err on the side o f making a case against the "necessity" of 
anonymity by pointing to content that might very well have found its way into signed essays.
But for a document on masturbation not included here, these six documents comprise my evidence for 
themes o f  impersonation and transgression. 7 out o f  33 writings doesn't exactly conform to, or confirm, 
one's worst expecations and connotations o f anonymity. Even 3 of the 16 documents written explicitly on 
the topic o f  sex and sexuality is remarkably low. Because I did not worry about a larger statistical sample at 
the time o f  trying out my ideas, and because I have all along made the case for the performative variety and 
textual hybridity o f anonymity's concealment/catharsis function, I am neither disappointed nor surprised by 
this finding. Even when we hitch the wagon o f  my tiny experimental course to the star o f  such a large study 
using anonymous surveys as Patterson's and Kim's The Day America Told The Truth: What We Really 
Believe About Everything That Matters, we can nevertheless begin to see that what students really think is 
worth writing about under anonymous conditions is hardly shocking.
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Anonymous Racial fdentitv
First Year Composition
The required first year composition course at The University o f New Hampshire I taught in the spring o f 
1995 followed the advanced course in composition (English 501, Fall 1994) in which I first tried out the 
idea o f anonymous writing. In the first year course I decided to try to cover four major bases o f  identity 
politics. Instead o f a writing/reading course in gender/sexual identity, I titled this course "The Composition 
o f Identity: Race, Class, Gender, Sexuality." I used a reader edited by Virginia Cyrus titled Experiencing 
Race, Class, and Gender in the United States. My course outline was more or less identical to that o f  the 
advanced course. The passage from Patterson and Kim's The Day America Told the Truth: What We Really 
Believe About Everything That Matters was also a part o f  that outline. In addition to the named writing 
assignments involving reader response to the essays in Cyrus' text, and a long final essay o f  personal plus 
textual research on an issue o f identity politics, I required that students produce two separate anonymous 
essays on issues o f race, gender, sexuality, and class identity.
Ten students were enrolled in the course—8 women, 2 men. The 80 documents they produced both 
repeat, and in many cases, radically extend my general findings o f impersonation along lines o f  empathy 
and antipathy toward the class-based and race-based position o f the Other. Because all ten students in the 
course were from "white" middle class backgrounds, (not surprising given that New Hampshire's race/class 
breakdown is one o f the least diversified in the country), it was relatively simple to identify and analyze the 
concept of "generalized otherness."
The scope o f this dissertation does not permit an analysis o f the 20 anonymous documents on class 
identity. Though these exhibit a similar "cathartic" authenticity regarding "the poor” along an empathic and 
antipathetic spectrum, I have chosen to focus on ten o f  twenty anonymous "race" documents. They are 
more dramatic in their transgressive and transgredient moments o f self/other identification. The high degree 
o f personal/private disclosure in terms o f gendered and sexualized identity which we saw in the 501 course 
are, if  anything, more in evidence behind the racialized mask o f anonymity. But as we saw in the previous 
analyses of gender and sex identity, the mask o f  anonymity "falls" in strange and unexpected—impersonal— 
ways when writers exercise the rhetorical immunity granted them for the exploration o f race consciousness.
The first assignment prompt was as follows: "Please write an essay on any issue o f race or racial
identity/identification that is o f private—or public— significance to you." As with the advanced course, I let
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students choose whatever mode o f  response they felt would best serve the opportunity o f immunity 
provided by anonymity. Some used reader response modes to the authors they were reading in Cyrus on 
Race and Racism; others looked into the depths o f their ideological hearts to what they really believed-, and 
others, as I have alluded to above, and throughout this study, used anonymity to explore acts o f 
impersonation similar to what we saw in certain documents in Section Four: Anonymous Sexual Identity. I 
analyze the ten documents produced under this prompt in separate subsections below.
In addition to using Patterson's and Kim's passage on anonymity as a  "cathartic process" to help students 
structure and justify the use o f anonymous writing, I included one o f  the surveys it used in its national 
study: "Are You a Racist? In the second round o f anonymous writing, I asked students to take this survey, 
reminding them that it was taken by thousands of their fellow citizens under conditions o f anonymity 
similar to their own. I then asked them to respond anonymously to the results o f this survey. My scope 
permits only two of those local, pedagogically anonymous responses to an anonymous survey o f our 
national racial attitudes.
Document #1: Anonymous Reader Response to Racism
This first document uses the mode o f  reader response to one o f the essays in Experiencing Race, Class, and
Gender in the United States. I remember being impressed by its equivocal use o f the collective, communal,
(and reconstructively anonymous) "We" which is most familiar to Americans in the opening words o f the
U.S. Constitution: "We the People, in order to form a more perfect Union...."
"White People"— We are what is considered to be the- "norm" according to the article 
entitled "White Privilege: Unpacking the Invisible Knapsack” and when you stop and 
think about it white people are the norm and we do have what you would call an invisible 
sack. Lets think about it for a minute.
*We can speak to the public without putting any race on trial.
*We can do well in a challenging situation without being called a credit to our race.
*We can also be pretty sure that if  you ask to talk to "the person in charge" you will be 
facing a person of our race.
T hese  are just a few points that many black people cannot count on.
Peggy McIntosh [the author o f the above essay] speaks o f how white women find white 
men oppressive because o f their unacknowledged privilege and this, on the other hand, is 
how black- people view white people; oppressive. They find it discomfiting to be with us, 
but yet we don't feel it because it is an unacknowledged privilege. A majority of our daily 
lives that we take for granted, black people are fighting for. It is a form of racism that 
most o f us are not aware of. The whites were made to feel superior while the blacks made 
to feel inferior. As Peggy McIntosh stated, is this really a privilege?
Note that * means taken from text
Though I don't wish to return to the questionable theme of anonymity's necessity, it is worth noting
that as an act o f reader response Document #1 is act o f summary and paraphrase, lacking even the
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expressivist threads o f  indignation or righteousness we observed in other documents in this mode. Any 
yet, because o f  the sensitive subject o f historic "white privilege"—a reality that almost always manages to 
disappear in most debates on the need for affirmative action—I sense that the writer is relieved to have the 
rhetorical immunity to address the issues raised by McIntosh. The writer would rather not be nominally 
identified in her/his identification with the "politically correct" position o f recognizing that "white" 
privilege transcends particular socio-economic differences o f  class and represents an always-already 
symbolic and discursive advantage over being "black."
This sense o f caution, and the pointed use of "we" as standing for a particular kind o f  "people" 
originally privileged by constitutional decree (over and above an original lack o f citizenship status for 
white women, children, and white men without property) makes for an odd poignancy in the writer’s 
voice. Addressed to one's fellow white people, this sense o f  "we" is shot through with guilt, and projects 
an empathy for those excluded by its sense of a collective identity.
Given the "whiteness" o f the class members, I continually imagined how and whether I could have
4
run this course i f  a single "person o f  color” or i f  any number o f "nonwhite" people were enrolled. As we 
saw above in documents where attacks on feminist discourse were frequent enough to qualify as a theme 
o f  anonymous writing, this sense o f necessary imm unity with regard to issues o f  "political 
(in)correctness" should never be taken lightly when we ask students to write honestly and 
straightforwardly about any issue that genuinely qualifies as "academic discourse” in the hybrid sense I 
have o f that highly contested descriptor. As we will see below, the writer's need for some sense of 
immunity was as justifiable as for those of his/her classmates who strongly opposed such sentiments 
about "white privilege.
Document #2: Forster’s Empathic Imagination
Here the writer continues the mode o f reader response, but chooses to look up the word "prejudice" in the 
dictionary. His/Her reader response to the word's two denotative fields, ideological and legal, is a 
connotative tour de force that is both personally and socially significant—its hybridity stylized to the 
point that it qualifies as a lyric "confessional" poem.
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I FELT SUPERIOR TO THAT
Prejudice: An unfavorable opinion formed beforehand or without knowledge.
I am guilty o f  the first and o f  the second. By the definition relating to law I have 
damaged and injured in some form and have not been punished but in essence have 
punished the opposite.
I saw a man in ragged jeans and a dirty coat and I said '"poor" and I stayed away 
because for some unknown reason I felt superior to that.
I saw a woman in the grocery store with two children buying her groceries with food 
stamps and I said the children will have a sad life and will have a hard life and I stayed 
away because for some unknown reason I felt superior to that.
I saw a women working in a  broken down factory and I said I will never work in a 
dirty place like t-hat and I stayed away because for some unknown reason I felt superior 
to that.
I saw two black men with baggy jeans and shirts and I said ’Ghetto" and I stayed away 
because for some unknown reason I felt superior to that.
I drove down the street and saw a family living in a shack and I said I will never live 
in an awful place like that and I stayed away because for some unknown reason I felt 
superior to that.
One day I was seen by an individual and they thought unapproachable and said 
challenge and became m y friend. And for some unknown reason she was not superior to 
that. She was not prejudiced and for that reason I was lucky because I gained something 
in which a value could not be placed.
In shame I must say, I am guilty o f the first and o f  the second.
This writer is actually merging the complex interlocking prejudices o f  class and race consciousness. I chose 
it for the second document to be discussed because I felt it carried forth many o f  the feelings o f Document 
#1. The notion of "invisibility" which Peggy McIntosh analyzed in the essay that Document #1 responded 
to became big topic in this class. I felt that that the repeated emphasis on seeing in Document #2 was a fine 
amplification of the paradoxes o f  white invisibility and privilege and the continuing visibility o f African- 
American disadvantage. White people don't think o f their whiteness as invisible, but often respond to the 
high visibility of a "black" person, especially one in their all white community. Generally, whites are most 
visible and "blacks" are virtually invisible in both historical and popular terms o f what really matters 
socially, economically, politically. The lines between appearance and disappearance, between blindness 
and insight are taken up in Document #2 in interesting ways. The sense o f "white" guilt in this document is 
palpable and is also part o f "white privilege" part of what we carry in our invisible knapsacks.
Because I do not have space to consider the anonymous writings on class-consciousness, I thought this 
document might suggest some o f  that identity relation's borderline with race consciousness. Mainly, 
however, I used it to open a discussion about the sources of how and why "we" feel superior" and whether 
the structures o f prejudice (bewilderingly complex constructs o f familial, educational and mass cultural
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inculcation) can turned into the kinds of shame that often—wrongly—accompany American's feelings about 
sexuality. The fifth stanza is the only explicitly racial reference. The struggle to understand the reason or 
emotion o f "white" racial and community superiority is repeated in the phrase "because for some unknown 
reason."
By linking up the two repeated phrases, "I saw..." with "for some unknown reason" I tried to open a 
discussion about the deep-seated, almost invulnerable irrationality o f prejudice as an ideological apparatus- 
-a "natural" part o f being human. The final anecdote holds out something more than hope that such 
intractable constructions within one's sense of, and defense, o f identity. The operation o f  the empathic 
imagination, o f an Other's attempt to rationally communicate despite the writer's antipathetic sense of 
his/her self as superior, asserts a parabolic force upon the entire poem, so that the feeling o f superiority 
curves back and collapses upon itself. The illogical nature o f pre-judgment is judged through an act of 
passionate communication. Not only the medium of prejudice, of hate speech, we see in this document that 
the anonymous functions equally in favor o f love and its "unknown reason."
My notes show (I had dispensed with the audiotape for technological and pedagogical reasons) that I 
began to praise the creativity o f  this writing, that it reminded me of the grand, vatic voice that Whitman 
made famous, with its repetition and passionate cataloguing o f experience. I wondered if  such a text would 
have appeared under signature, or if  somehow the anonymous function made it possible. I still wonder. 
Because this course met at 8:30 in the morning, I had a difficult time getting my students to wonder with 
me.
Because o f my own long and passionate undergraduate training in the reading and writing o f poetry, I 
was stunned to find three writers who consistently used the rhetorical opportunity provided by anonymity 
to respond more "artistically" than academically. As a matter o f expressivist or social constructivist 
identification, these "poetic" responses to the prompt to write about racial identity helped considerably to 
fill out what I am maintaining is the unexpected thematic finding o f anonymous impersonation.
This practice o f  trying out other voices and visions—o f trying to become a person other than the self of 
the writer—was especially evident in this 401 class. We saw its parodic extreme in the 501 class. In this 
class, we see it at its optimal reach as vatic —oracular, prophetic— in the next two Documents. (I had stated 
in the introduction that I would follow the sequence I originally determined for class discussions. I make an 
exception here because I want to register my passionate, but improvable, contention that anonymity, as
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much as the predilection o f a given writer, stimulated these voices that could be fro m  any one and no one.) 
I find them to be examples o f Bahktin's "transgredient moment" where the compos-ition's expressivist and 
constructivist objectives address and transgress one another across the embattLled lines of academic 
discourse. I suppose I am going to show and fold early here, since I have always beecn more o f a poet than a 
prose writer.
With these next two documents, I would wish to make a case for teaching com position as an epidemic — 
not just academic—discourse: one that affects many persons—both internally and exrtemally present—at not 
only one time, but throughout a student's lifetime. The reader will therefore need to rtake the subjectivity of 
my analyses as a barely contained assault upon the whole idea of treating student's wjriting as objects that I, 
as teacher-researcher, can dissect with the tools o f my trade and training. I still "Iistesn" to these anonymous 
voices in much the same way I did when I first heard them and helped to orchestrate. and conduct them with 
the class once they all had each other’s scores in front of them.
Document #3: The Vatic/Epidemic Voice
Like #1 and #2, this document uses mythology to revoice white privilege, prejudice,: and the passions of
their unknown reason. It suggests that the passionate sense o f otherness speculated  by Natanson and
extended by me, could be redirected into empathy and community action in the composition course.
My name is Daphne. If  you haven't heard o f  me before, I am a character from Gireek mythology. 
According to the myth, I am a nymph who is transformed into a Laurel tree= to escape the- 
pursuing Apollo who is out to rape me. If  the myth were to be rewritten today, I • would probably 
be the "typical" American; white, young, and moderately attractive. Instead o f  tuying to escape 
from Apollo, it would be minorities that I am running from.
As time goes on and the minority populations are rising, the white population ris leveling off.
Soon, whites will be the minority in America. These are facts that scare a lot o ff  people, myself 
included. The idea that minorities will take over is one that many try to ignonre. Just like we 
shouldn't cross the street when approaching a black man, we also shouldn’t run fb-om the truth.
Because our country is so diverse, we are faced with many problems that we c=an only 
overcome as a society. What will happen to our country? Should we have an offilcial language?
Why not an official religion while we're at it? I f  we dictate what language is to b e  used then we 
might as well dictate religion too, since they are intertwined. If we do this, we=re taking away 
the freedom that we have all been fighting for. We could always do what I did iln  my myth and 
try to escape the problems by hiding. When we do this, we don't get to do what we really want 
and the problem is left for someone else to take care of. Our other option is to edducate ourselves 
to be more diverse and more accepting o f others. This would be the better choiice. Although it 
would take more work and effort, the result would be a better society and a bettear understanding 
of the people we're sharing the Earth with.
Again, the writer’s open and authentic use o f  "we" refers to "white people" such as hear self. (I am assuming,
which I shouldn't given the variability o f anonymous transgression and transgredienoce, that the writer is a
woman because o f the choice o f "Daphne." There is no overt sense o f shame or guailt, as in the first two
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documents, with regard to what amounts to a mythification o f  an historical and hysterical white flight from 
"minorities. The rather unmitigated sense o f white civilization being chased and under threat o f  cultural 
(and actual?) "rape" is o f  course one o f the more excruciating ironies o f  all history, since it was a "white" 
European civilization and its enclaves which chased down "black" civilizations and murdered, raped, and 
enslaved them physically and culturally. This "white" fear o f  minority others ("blacks" remain the main 
worry, but "browns" and "yellows" are bringing up the massive rear o f this privileged, irrational fear) is 
laughable to black Americans, o f course, whose entire historical awareness is punctuated by fear o f white 
persons—from the rape o f  black girls and women during slavery, to the beating and lynching o f  black boys 
and men for the crime o f  "raping (that is, "looking at") white females.
This document takes a  curious turn, however, with the last sentence o f  the second paragraph. The 
question is whether the writer’s sense o f the ethical ("we shouldn't cross the street...we.._s/zow/d/« 't run from 
the truth") can overcome the open admission that she and other white people have been educated to fear 
"black" and other persons o f  color. The next two paragraphs lose the poetic imposture, and the 
metaphorical voicing. The expressivist tenor fades in favor o f  a more constructivist vehicle o f  analysis. 
"[HJiding, which drops the feminist logic of the Daphne and Apollo myth, is out o f the question it would 
seem. White people can't be hiding from, they must be "sharing the Earth with", those they once pursued 
and are now fleeing. This document, though not as "vatic" in its expressive totality as in Document #2, nor 
as static in its constructivist mimicry as in #1, is a curious hybrid o f  "white" conservative fear and liberal 
hope. That is, the politics o f  its identity, as well as the identity o f  its politics, it is an "epidemic" reflection 
o f "white" norms of identity, authority, and community.
I was careful not to launch into a deconstruction o f  the writer's reckless use of one o f many Greek tales
o f rape. After all, anonymity not only functions as a scene for immunity but for creativity. In essence
ungradeable, students sense, consciously or otherwise, an opportunity to do things with words they would
not otherwise attempt under either official regime o f named/graded writing. Unnamed and "trans-graded"
writing is for common and communal response and evaluation. I noted the attention to an "official religion"
and to an "official language" in the third paragraph. What I found interesting was the mix o f languages in
this essay—one experimental and expressively risky, the other much more recognizable as officially
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academic, a construction o f  socially sanctioned, politically correct views that had to somehow rescue the 
authentic, but nevertheless racist fear o f historically white self-understanding.
Document #4: White in Night’s Satin
Here the idea o f "white self-understanding" is taken to its poetic limit, recapitulating and concentrating the 
forces o f guilt and shame we saw in various densities in the previous three documents.
As I walk along the winding road
(beside me dusk has settled on wild flower and oak tree)
And think of how we came to be 
Such powerful figures in society 
I wonder to whom this blame is ode.
The infinite sounds of chirping crickets 
And whispering winds 
Knock my conscious self into the realization 
That the color o f my skin is all to blame.
Pinkish beige that turns to royal red under Summer's sun
Then fades to a light, regal brown
Only to be swept away with Winter's first snow.
I walk alone.
Our color is like the seasons 
fading, blossoming then regressing.
Why can't we see that all colors follow that same pattern?
As I walk, the night has settled 
The light has gone
And I embrace the blanket o f  darkness that now covers us all.
And I am as Black as can be.
Throughout all seasons,
When night tip-toes gently to each doorstep 
We welcome in the darkness that allows bonfires,
City lights and a romantic mood.
Yet when the embers die,
The city sleeps
And the romantics turn out the lights
We are faceless
Bodiless






I know this 
And because o f  this
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I walk alone.
I walk alone.
The point where a course in composition must recognize both critical and "creative" writing is not 
always explicit, and often not expected. Certainly, a portfolio-based composition course can produce 
"creative" writing from students, but as a general rule, the mandate o f  the required course in college 
composition involves "non-fiction." Fiction and poetry writing are offered in an English Department's 
upper level courses, as are those courses devoted to the non-fiction genre of "literary analysis." 
Composition is traditionally confined to a rather narrow swath o f writing: personal and impersonal essays 
and a longer cross-disciplinary paper of "academic research."
My contention that anonymity opens up the discursive lines between the personal and the textual should 
logically extend to the somewhat blurry genre distinctions between fiction and non-fiction, as well as 
creative and critical writing. In this particular class, at least, the opportunity—rather than immunity—of 
anonymity revealed at least three students who were most comfortable writing in a poetic mode. It might be 
argued that the mask provided by anonymity was not trusted enough by these students, and so they opted 
for a lyrical—rather than personal— voice and vision. Anyone opposed to anonymous writing on 
pedagogical, never mind ethical, grounds might also point out that Document #4 could have been written 
under the writer’s name. There is nothing remotely transgressive or shameful in its content.
Neither personal narrative nor reader response to the question of racial identity and identification, 
Document #4 is an "ode" meditating on and mediating the sense o f "blame" all "white" people carry in the 
invisible knapsack o f  their historical privilege. The gender o f the writer is indeterminable. The voice 
speaking to us is operatively androgynous and striving for a vatic, yet thoroughly embodied and complicit, 
presence as its "I" (anonymously "all o f us" "faceless") walks alone, yet encompasses an ultimate 
constitutional sense o f  "We" the people in order to form a more perfect union "embrace" an existential 
"darkness that now covers us all." I thought it brilliant and recall celebrating its explicit insistence that 
"Black" is the color o f human consciousness; on its call for colorblindness given the mortal darkness we all 
must bear.
My notes suggest that, witting or not, this text is tuned into a hermeneutics o f "reconstruction" rather 
than one of "suspicion" about Self-Other relations. Its sincerity is so thoroughgoing it creates a powerful
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sense o f  an opposing cynicism about racial harmony. I believe the authenticity o f its cathartic 
progressivism arises not in spite o f  but precisely because o f the anonymous function, and is as palpable as 
that o f  earlier documents on sex and sexuality, whose cathartic parody was unequivocally transgressive. In 
preparing the order o f documents for class discussion, I could not but help follow its empathic vision with 
another "creative" attempt, but one that operates at the sincerely antipathetic end o f  rhetorical pathos.
Document #5: Pravinp for Racism
This next document concentrates all o f  one’s suspicions of anonymity as a  haven for hateful cowards. This 
“prayer” acts in the same way that the white hood o f  the Klan has to conceal hatred under the mask o f a 
twisted Christianity.
To the Big Man Upstairs,
I am writing this letter because I really need your help. You see, 
the problem is that I am sick o f living in a place where everyone around me is either 
Black, Asian, or Puerto Rican. I don't think it is fair for them to drive me from my home.
I want to know why these people are allowed to take our jobs, steal our money, and go to 
our schools.
Come on, why did you even create them anyway? All they do is cause trouble.
They kill, steal, cheat, and lie- just to name a few. If that isn't bad enough, they stand 
around with their hands out begging for more. Don't they get enough?
I am so sick of all these minorities running my town. Just look at their area- it 
makes the whole city look like a dump. Then they have the nerve to walk out into the 
street without even looking. We should start giving community service awards to the 
people who hit the most.
Look, all I'm asking for is a little help on your part. What do you say big guy? It 
wouldn't be that difficult for you to think up a disease that would get rid o f  them and end 
our misery. So, can you do me a little favor?
Thanks in advance—I'll owe you one.
Sincerely,
A Devoted Believer Downstairs 
I recall that the linkage o f  religious devotion to white supremacy in this mock letter to "God" stunned the 
class, particularly since we had had just marveled over the spiritual spectrum o f  Document #4: over its 
sense o f  "white" as a reddening, browning, and blackening toward some greater awakening o f 
responsibility. (If I had thought o f  it then, I might have typed out the lyrics and played the song by Johnny 
Cash, "Man in Black," for comparison to the writer's sense o f aloneness in service to a greater sense o f 
community.)
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Exceeding the sexually transgressive documents we have seen, Document #5's of racial identification 
opens up what we commonly mean by a taboo subject. By combining religious praise with racial hate 
speech, this profane letter o f  prayer-anti-epistle, really—is transgressive in the sense generally used by 
religious believers: it "sins" against the law of love thy neighbor as thy self. Lacking only "nigger" and 
other ethnic slurs to drive home its emotionally and politically divisive point, it is a scary reminder that the 
heterodoxical discourse o f  such online hate groups as "The World Church o f  the Creator" is real, is binding, 
is doctrinal.
My notes show that my first question to the class was originally: "How should the Big Man Upstairs 
answer this Devoted Believer in White Supremacy"? Given the class’ stunned silence, my journal shows 
that I extemporized, grasping at the rationale I had supplied to the class from The Day America Told the 
Truth. I asked instead: "Do you believe that the writer is really expressing what he/she believes about 
people who are "other" than "white"? Or do you think that the writer is impersonating a  white supremacist 
in order to provoke a reaction from us?'
My notes showed an interesting mix o f horror and outrage from some class members —that it didn't 
matter whether the writer was trying on a persona or not—and a more tempered reaction from others: we all 
know racism is out there; i f  you ask for it, you'll get it, since anonymity protects it." "This is very bad shit," 
one particularly outspoken female student concluded. Another woman said: "The only way this could come 
out is through anonymous writing. But what good does it do us, now that it's out?" That set o ff a discussion 
about keeping a lid on hate speech or letting it out. I said that not only anonymity protects this kind o f 
speech, but the U.S. Constitution does as well. Several class members shook their heads, as i f  in disbelief.
I weighed in with some o f  the ongoing debates over free speech. Some o f us take the position that such 
speech, and such groups should be outlawed, their ability to write and speak in public banned. This was 
clearly a violation o f  our Constitutional guarantee that loads the freedoms o f religion, assembly and speech 
together into one very complex and dense legal decree. At the other end o f  the absolutist spectrum, some of 
us argue that corrosive as it is, such racial hate speech needs to be out and in the open, lest it fester and 
grow under repression.
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I told the class that I was a Civil Libertarian in this regard, and that crying out "Fire" in a crowded 
theater was clearly speech that could cause physical harm and that it was not so much "speech" but 
tantamount to an "action." The Supreme Court had ruled on such speech and found it in violation o f our 
rights to free speech. Similarly, writing "nigger" on an African-American Church door, or scratching Nazi 
and its identifying swastika in a Jewish cemetery, was a violation o f free speech and a punishable crime. 
There was a spectrum o f "injurious" speech, however, that was in fact protected by the Constitution, and 
that "fiery speech" was different than the speech that screamed "Fire!" Like it or not, this letter to one 
person's sense o f God was protected by our freedom of speech, and my take on it was: Now that it's out in 
the community of this class, what do we do with it? What can it teach us; what can we teach its writer?
I found it impossible to get down everything said and explored during the discussion o f  this document. 
My teaching journal is also o f  little help as I was trying to cover the entire class discussion, not just 
individual documents. One observation I made was that every one— all ten students— participated in the 
discussion. That means that the writer—whoever he or she was—was comfortable enough with the immunity 
provided by anonymity to discuss the document. Obviously, that writer in his/her role as face-to-face, 
public speaker did not reveal his/her identity by defending the sentiments in this document. I can only 
conclude that within the well-reasoned position o f  several students that emerged during the discussion— 
that racists exist and that tolerating, rather than repressing, them was the ultimate "Christian" response—one 
could find our "Devoted Believer Downstairs."
In presenting the opportunity o f anonymity on the first day o f class, I had been careful about what I
called standards and practices. I suggested that writers mix fonts and sizes o f  text from document to
document. I urged them to strive for gender neutrality or androgyny, particularly since there were only two
males in the class. I also underscored the importance of participation in discussion o f all our reading and
writing and reading—named and unnamed. 15% o f  their grade was based on class discussion—on talk, on
being there in speech—and that covered their talk about anonymous writing that was itself, paradoxically,
"ungradeable." Besides, I said, with such a small class, anyone who remains silent is liable to be identified,
rightly or wrongly, with the writer o f  a particular document. I think all these reminders and urgings
motivated and fascinated the students. Between students' invisibility as anonymous writers and their
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visibility as named writers and as speakers in class, we had a very complex circulation o f disclosure and 
concealment, I said. It was up to them how their intertwined roles as persons—and personaes—worked out 
over the course o f the semester.
Looking back at Document #5 now, six years later, I remain pi l l ed by the answer to the question I 
asked the class. Is this writing an act o f impersonation—o f performing and in some sense authorizing what 
the writer imagined to be the role script o f a white supremacist? Or is it a true reflection o f  a student's 
ideological beliefs who took seriously the opportunity o f  rhetorical immunity provided by anonymity? In 
terms o f the idea o f "authenticity" is the apparent sincerity expressed by this "Devoted Believer" in "God" 
as some "Big" White Redeemer o f a Master Race any less authentic i f  in fact, the writing is an imposture? 
If Document #5 is a cynical performance—that is, if the writer is privately quite liberal in his/her positions 
on racial and religious tolerance—then what does this tell us about the writer's "expressivist" intention to get 
"personal" and to achieve an "authentic" voice?
It is quite possible, as we saw in Document #19 above, that the writer is responding creatively to the 
methodological mandate o f  the "cathartic process" o f anonymity as described by Patterson and Kim. That 
writer's satirical imagination was given free reign under anonymity, free enough, we saw, that the 
sincere/cynical binary does not—can not—on one level o f  expressivist premises—hold. I had said that this 
hybridity of expressivist motive and constructivist effects produced a parody of anonymous catharsis in 
Document #19.
In the present Document # 5 ,1 am wondering whether or not the writer isn't also exercising the parodic 
or satiric side of the imagination, as if to say:
Listen to this bigot. I know you recognize this voice and script o f the hateful hypocrite. 
Remember how easily "white" religious belief and white supremacist hatred can serve one 
another. "I" —the writer—do not believe this; the "I" o f  this person speaking here is not 
"Me" but just between your metonymic I and mine there is an anonymous "We" the People 
who believe and speak this way. What matters who—you, me, anyone—is speaking? This 
letter, for all I know, could be written by too many o f  Us.
Once the trope or turn of expressivist authenticity is opened outward by the centrifugal, social force o f
anonymous writing, its social constructivity along lines o f  sincerity and cynicism, o f  authority and
appropriation, and o f mimicry and masquerade, realizes new kinds o f spin. Thus, as with the performative
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hybridity we saw in some of the texts in “advanced” anonymous writing on sex and sexuality, Document 
#5 is difficult to identify as either a text of: personal expression, social construction, or something o f both 
in terms o f  racial identification. It is this both/and quantity o f  private and public discourse, the density of 
absent identity and o f  community presence that is carried in anonymity's invisible knapsack.
Document #6: The Voice of the Native American (TvDOther
In this document we see one more example o f  impersonation, as well as a return to the "vatic," yet 
decidedly embodied, voice o f a mother keening for her child. Document #5 calls forth—"provokes"— the 
vatic voice and vengeful vortex o f "God" to answer a profanely racist prayer (enacting a terribly sardonic 
twist on the Old Testament Psalms which beseech an unpredictable God to deliver His Chosen People from 
their oppressors). Document #6, by contrast, is vatic in that it impersonates the sacred bond between a "red" 
mother and her "red" children. In the voice o f  an American Indian, a mother in her Mother Country 
keening over the loss o f her son's cultural and personal identity under the anonymizing force o f "white" 
civilization.
They have taken my children away, the government. They say that my children will 
become civilized. What is this civilized, I do not know civilized (pg. 304).
The pain hurts me so. I can't sleep, I can't eat, I can cry no more. My body is numb 
and I've stopped talking. People say that I am turning into a crazy woman. I think I am.
They have taken my children away. I hold my son's hair in my hands, they cut his braids 
off, he has white man's hair now. I can't hear any voices no more, no children playing, no 
laughing, no singing. It is a quiet place now. It is death and I am like a dead woman. I 
close my eyes and I see my children boarding a train, I see their eyes., so lost, so afraid, 
this haunts me. Their eyes do not leave my head. The government says they will be better 
off. They will learn many things. They will grow to be better people—they will become 
white people. Who is the government to say how my children should be raised. What 
about, me, I am their mother. What about, their culture, who they are, where they have 
come from. What about the future, the Indian future? They turn my children to white 
people. I spit on the government for what they have done. They had no right to take my 
babies. There are no voices now, no laughing, no singing, no nothing. They leave me a 
dead woman—as dead as my husband, father, brothers—"red" men, their red blood on the 
snow. Red as the blood o f the white man.
My love o f poetry has perhaps forced the notion o f a "vatic" voice into greater prominence than a 
literary analyst would accept. The anonymous voices we have heard are foil o f  pathos, bathos, are ironic, 
sardonic, and some might say idiotic (and they would correct, given the literal meaning o f "idiot", from 
idiom, meaning one’s "private sense or meaning" making idiots o f us all. But vatidi These documents don’t 
have anything like the prophetic reach o f Keats, Whitman, Dickinson or o f  Yeats, Eliot, Auden.... But the
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etymological density o f  vatic, comprising sight and madness, prophecy and frenzy does fit into or behind 
anonymity's mask.
As in Document #4’s lyrical yet philosophical treatment o f  humanity's shared darkness, in Document #6 
we see the multiple exigency o f anonymity as a rhetorical function. The Indian mother is unnamed; her 
unnamed children are taken away by anonymous bureaucracies o f  white civilization who will ban their 
language, change their names, erase their identities; her anonymous kith and kin lie dead and bleeding in 
the snow; and the writer has assumed this persona under the prompt that one write anonymously about a 
significant issue o f  racial identity or identification. The rhetorical density of anonymity as an exigent 
situation o f impersonation is both subjectively transparent and objectively opaque: we see and hear through 
the writer’s self-concealment the disclosure o f  an Other’s suffering. The anonymous antipathy— and 
profound alienation— o f Document #5 is countered by the anonymous empathy of #6.
One might seize upon the writer's opening paragraph, and the reader response reference—"(pg.304)" — as 
a howlingly false note. Quoting three sentences from an essay in Cyrus' Experiencing Race, Class, and 
Gender, when the mode and mood requires a pure "expressive" form of discourse, is a Personal plus 
Textual miscue, ruining the performance, one might say. The writer's provocation o f what Bakhtin would 
call an "internally persuasive discourse" is betrayed by an amateurish and inauthentic disclosure of 
"authoritative discourse."
Without going into an inter- and intra-textual bender, I would castigate both the creative writing teacher 
and the critical writing teacher whose respective devotion to one kind o f monological purity or another 
blinds them to this writer’s attempt at dialogical imagination. The writer is trying to telegraph as subtly as 
possible a very genuine sense o f  performance to the reader, as i f  to announce:
The following sentences are from an essay I read about concerning the fate o f the Indians at 
Wounded knee. This essay quoted an unnamed Indian Mother's cry that was translated into 
English and used by another writer for her critical purposes. For my creative (and critical) 
purposes, I am appropriating the voice/image of that anonymous Native American Person because 
I "hear" and "see" what else she might have cried out to the world, or inside her head, "crazy" with 
anger and grief. I do not claim to have invented this Person. I am only trying to imagine—to 
impersonate—her suffering in continuing her speech.
This, any way, was the way I approached this document in class discussion, as I was particularly keen at
the time on hybrid textuality and discursive impurity. I thus found this piece of writing to be a fascinating
exemplar.
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My notes show that I was also trying to get the class to understand the "vatic" or prophetic quality o f 
this impersonation compared to the voice o f  the "Devoted Believer Downstairs." The idea that the voice in 
that writing was also prophetic—an equally authentic way o f  seeing and hearing a significant issue o f racial 
identity politics—had the students pretty much shaking their heads in disbelief, cognitive dissonance, 
emotional overload—it is difficult to know or to transmit to a reader outside one teacher-researcher's way of 
holding and beholding the students in one’s class.
My motive in treating these documents this way, however, and my overall compositional goal for 
having students write anonymously, did seem to register more clearly. They seemed to appreciate the fact 
that these writings were community property over which we could all communicate, and even use—for 
purposes o f contestation or communion— in the longer essays o f personal plus textual research to which we 
would sign our names. Keep in mind, too, that along with these essays distributed as common property, I 
distributed my own written responses to these documents, so that everyone would have not only their own 
and everyone else's unnamed writing, but would have one named writer responding to what he saw and 
heard in those anonymous voices and visions.
The last four documents took up two class sessions. I might have saved Document #5 above to include it 
in this group, but was more interested to use it as poetic and vatic contrast to the empathic yearning 
evidenced in the other four documents. Document #7 resembles several documents o f  the first group in that 
it continues a yearning for a "yellow” Other, and attempts to serve as a warning about the pervasive politics 
o f white supremacy. Documents 8-10 are less about yearning in hooks' direct sense, than they are burning 
in their role scripts o f "white" racial identity and identification.
Given the white supremacist voice we heard in Document #5, it might be said that any positive or 
reconstructive sense o f  "yearning" in hooks' sense is sardonic and perverse. But I think she kept her 
definition deliberately wide open to permit identity mobility, impersonation, and transgression. I keep 
going back to her exhortations in Teaching to Transgress, wherein she writes forcefully about getting to the 
authority of students' experience. If anonymity does help toward the goal o f teaching to transgress by 
getting to some of the communal sources authorizing "white" identity, (what she calls "a pervasive politic
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o f white supremacy" in Yearning), then we can't suddenly turn away from the discovery that there is a 
taboo "yearning" for white supremacy.
Composition-Rhetoric has its own split pedagogical identity along these lines. Social constructivists 
often write with an air o f "academic" supremacy over expressivists. Composition should be about 
constructing competencies, o f  learning to write using the rules and tools o f the academy: authors and 
sources—primary and secondary. The expressivist approach believes that composition should be about 
yearning to write, o f  opening up innate powers o f curiosity using the roles and tales from one's personal 
experience. That both approaches depend upon the pervasive discourse o f  the "social" doesn't in the least 
grant a superior or supreme stature to the constructivists. Both approaches also traffic in non-fictional 
writing. Writing as a mode o f  learning is going on in both approaches. But which approach best fits into 
hooks' definition o f yearning as we move to these last four documents?
"Yearning,” hooks writes, “is the word that best describes a common psychological state shared by 
many o f  us, cutting across boundaries of race, class, gender, and sexual practice (27). Both fit, because 
compositionists should be devoted to putting both approaches together in the service o f  learning to yearn 
and yearning to learn through writing. This both/and, rough and ready sense of textual and performative 
hybridity means that identity politics cannot be ignored by the expressivists nor secured by the 
constructivists.
Once finished with these documents, completing our final round o f anonymous writings on race 
consciousness, I looked around the table and realized that half o f  us were yearning toward white supremacy 
and half were yearning toward that color blinded and blended darkness o f  human identity itself. This was a 
community o f  writing worth learning about. What matter who was writing? Did the writers identify with 
each other or with their texts?
Document #7: Reader Response and Writing for Discovery
In this document we return to the mode o f reader response in which a writer reminds us o f  just how
important authors are. As a form o f  reminiscence, this writer represents the case for a social constructivist
approach to teaching composition, with its claim to a greater sense o f  author-ity as a non-solipsistic,
historical consciousness o f  claims and warrants already received and responded to by a  tradition o f  other
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nameless readers long before and long after this particular response. And, to repeat: Given the power o f  
precedence which social constructivism gives to authorship, what matters, outside o f grades and credit 
identification, who is summarizing and reminding us o f  John Hershey's important work?
THE NISEI SCANDAL 
John Hersey's Behind Barbed Wire positively shocked me. I am not proud to admit my 
ignorance o f  this piece o f World War II history, but it is the god's honest truth, I was 
completely oblivious to this scandal.
It is hard to swallow that our government again allowed such barbaric treatment of 
another class o f  the human race within our own shores. It was an outright defiance of 
everything the Constitution stands for. Actually, considering the history o f  this country's 
treatment o f  the black class, I don't know why I am so shocked. Perhaps it is because 
our high school history books have given us so little, i f  any, attention to this piece of 
WWU history.
Over one hundred thousand Japanese American citizens were sentenced to 
concentration camps within the U.S. during WWII in a half-assed attempt to protect our 
country from any further attacks or espionage aimed at the homeland. Many o f the 
incarcerated Japanese American citizens had family members who were part o f the US 
troops risking their lives overseas. Nonetheless, if  an individual was from the Japanese 
American class o f  people in selected sections o f  the country they were sentenced to a 
concentration camp, stripped o f  their homes, their worldly possessions, their dignity, 
and maybe, some part o f their "identity."
Led by an obsessive Army Lieut. John L. DeWitt and his cronies, "The War 
Relocation Authority," one o f the worst crimes in American history was committed.
They actually wrote the laws as they went along to justify their actions. Furthermore, 
upon releasing the evacuees, our country still remained inhumane. Absolutely 
astonishing and frightening stuff.
This document returns us to the nagging question o f  anonymity's necessity, particularly when anonymous
response or reaction is linked to the generic academic mode o f  commentary. A very slender case can be
made for using the mask o f  namelessness in the writer's admission o f  ignorance o f  Japanese internment
camps. The writer is "not proud" o f being "oblivious " o f  American malfeasance, yet we can not sense that
she/he is really ashamed, particularly when a legitimate case can be made, as the writer suggests, for
historical disinformation and noninformation—censorship by omission—in public school textbooks.
The fact is that many students, as we have seen, either do not trust or believe in the
immunity/opporutnity offered by anonymity. Others, it would seem, do not have anything personally
"significant" to speak about in terms of racial identity. Being "white, middle class, etc.," is an ideological
norm that is so effective, I believe, that it makes for a sense o f identity—o f literal self-sameness-which can
not imagine a sense o f  difference as a source of economic, political or psychological discontent. But the
writer needs to come up with something to write about. Having left open the anonymous reader response
option, I surmise that students can more easily avoid or evade the politics o f their own identities or the
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discourses underwriting their role scripts. I respected this option now, and I did then (even though I would 
eliminate the reader response option in future anonymous experiments in the interest o f  expanding the 
possible instances o f impersonation or transgression.)
My notes show that I commented on this writer's revelation o f  American evil in the form o f racial 
identification. I complimented the writer’s sense that a "white" structure o f identification made it as easy to 
stereotype suspicion and fear o f "yellow" and "slant eyed" citizens, as it did "black ones. I did point out that 
the writer’s use o f "class"—as in "another class o f human being" and "the black class" was interesting and 
revealing. The suggestion in this use o f class as in "classification" was that "the white class”, o f which the 
writer was a member, had the power and privilege o f classification.
Two students made much of the writer’s sense that this internment o f  Japanese-Americans affected their 
sense of identity—that part o f it had been stripped. One made a connection to this writer’s reference to a loss 
o f  identity loss and the writer o f the Indian mother’s "cry from the heart.” A good discussion opened up on 
the subject of racial oppression as not just a "black thing," as one student phrased it. It seemed to be "a red, 
yellow, and brown, thing." I reminded them o f the anonymous writer who wrote "I Walk Alone” and 
his/her attempt to displace the supremacy of whiteness and return us all into, ironically, a common sense of 
our darkness.
I concluded by saying that for the writer responding to Hershey’s book, his/her intellectual discovery as 
a reader that the Unites States Government had identified a portion o f  its citizenry as Other, then alienated 
them physically and socially, was a personal plus political discovery. I said it didn't matter if the 
significance o f this writer’s identification o f racial consciousness was not overtly personal since it was clear 
that the writer's intellectual discovery and disclosure o f  its significance was powerful and useful to us all. 
The writer states that she/he wasn't surprised to discover this sorry story as part o f American history given 
the alienated history o f  "black" people. Yet it was clear to me, at least, that the writer's own whiff of 
alienation upon discovering that a democratic government and later, those educational authorities 
responsible for constructing students' sense o f history, might be complicit in preempting a truly democratic 
sense o f empathy and solidarity based not on "white" identity politics but on, ideally, a politics o f our 
common, genetically anonymous, humanity.
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Given the revelations awaiting the class in the next three documents, I think I was trying to gird myself 
as much as them with some rather shaky and increasingly suspect liberal pieties which I pushed pretty hard 
in 1995: reading and writing about the "politics o f identity" I exhorted them, should place a higher profile 
on the meaning and action o f "empathy" and "compassion," o f "solidarity" and "community." Six years 
later, I am out o f work under a President elected not by a popular majority o f the people, but by a 
conservatively appointed Supreme Court who mindlessly repeats his campaign oxymoron: "Compassionate 
Conservatism."
Six years later I am reading a book by George Lipsitz titled The Possessive Investment in Whiteness: 
How White People Profit from  Identity Politics. Any yet, despite Lipsitz's convincing expansion of 
McIntosh's "invisible knapsack" into an total "economy" of white privilege, including the academic 
commodification o f "identity politics," which I so eagerly bought into as empancipatory for my "white” 
students, I think my pedagogical use o f  anonymity easily tapped into what he calls the "unconscious 
racism" o f white people. It is unconscious, Lipsitz claims, because o f the historic linkage between property 
and whiteness. Actually, the next three documents strongly suggest that there's no need to recapitulate 
Freudian dynamics for this racism. It is quite near many white people's discursive surface.
That is the lesson o f the race survey in The Day America Told the Truth. Americans need only the 
guarantee of anonymity and they will tell the truth about the politics o f identity. That I then had these same 
students take that survey and write about the results in terms o f racial identification in order to compare 
themselves with, and identify themselves with, the thousands of anonymous Americans who also took that 
survey, was intended to experiment with the anonymous function "squared"~to square ten students' 
anonymous identifications of race with a much larger community o f "white" America. I had no idea at the 
time I presented the last three documents o f the first round of anonymous writing, that 50% o f these white 
students would, by the logic o f the survey, be considered "racist." My immediate challenge was to square 
the clear evidence in some of the previous documents o f a compassionate impersonation o f the Other in 
order to educate for empathy with these three documents.
Like the letter from a "Devoted Believer Downstairs," these three writers were either impersonating the
unconscious role script o f America's pervasive "White Supremacy," or they were expressing a genuinely
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personal—and "possessive investment"— in "white" alienation and hatred. My class notebooks show that I 
seized upon the idea I had in response to Document #19 in my 501 Class involving a  parody o f  anonymous 
sexual transgression. Perhaps these racist writings were "experimental"; the writers were trying on the 
persona o f the white racist or supremacist. Perhaps they were playing with fiery speech, impersonating 
hate.
If  there is no politically correct dialogical place for hate, anonymity is a monological space for its 
projection (as well as for the selfs yearning for connection and communion.) I also reconnected the idea o f 
McIntosh's "invisible knapsack": that white privilege was carried in it, but so was the fear and hatred o f 
others who represented the opening o f that privilege. Thus, the invisibility o f  the anonymous writer and the 
idea of white privilege being invisible to those o f  us who wear whiteness as easily as clothes so favored and 
familiar that we forget they cover our nakedness and its construction o f  shame enables what is otherwise an 
unconscious sense o f supremacy (and the suspicion that accompanies all superiority) to come into view.
In other words, I did my best to "accept" these writings for what they clearly seem to be: uniformly 
authentic expressions o f  racist hatred. At the same time, I used them, if  memory serves, to confront head on 
the socially constructed nature o f racism, that it was not innate, that its underwriting by familial and 
communal forces could be over-written and re-written. (Or, to return to clothing and metaphors o f  cloaking 
and covering, the knapsack can be cast off, the color o f  mastery finally seen in its invisibility to be 
unsuitable, and the immunity o f  anonymity—its invisible nakedness paradoxically responsible for a change 
in one's moral wardrobe.
As a performance o f identity, the racist role script could be reexamined and recomposed. Depending on
how the community o f  the classroom handled them, the writers o f  these scripts could decide within the
same secrecy that created them, to never replay them in any context—public or private; the last word in the
composition o f any one's identity was never said, written, or done until the body that mobilized it had itself
decomposed. But when you read these, the first questions that will come to mind are rather more
pedagogical: Would I want to teach this class? What can I do with these compositions in light o f  teaching
writing? The subject is writing, after all, and not identity politics, right? Is it possible to hold a class in
which persons o f  "color" are in possession o f these investments in white supremacy? Let's look at the
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documents and close out our analysis with some extended reflection on some possible answers to these 
questions.
Document #8: What “WE” Really Believe about Affirmative Action?
I think that the passages we read about different races and cultures were primarily focused 
on minorities. Very seldom was there an article about a white man and i f  there was it was 
just about how well that he had it. Right now, statistically, white middle class males are 
discriminated against more than any other nationality. Now that there have been all o f these 
minority quotas recently passed by congress, workplaces and schools need to meet these 
numbers and it leaves the white male population standing in the background. Workplaces 
should hire on the ability and efficiency o f  the worker, not their ethnic background or the 
color o f  their skin. I kind of think that some stuff that they do for minorities is almost unfair 
to white people. I feel that there are a lot o f things that minorities can say or do and get 
away with, but if  a white person does it is being racist. For example, the black Ms. America 
pageant. There is no way whites could get away with having a white Ms. America pageant.
Also, there is no white history month to recognize the developers o f this country and the 
people who made it what it is today.
Reader response mode turns instantly into a  personal reaction o f  the embattled white male now familiar 
in a changed and highly charged landscape o f  diverse feminist, ethnicist, and nationalist discourses that 
appeared to be silent, even non-existent a generation ago. The continuing preponderance o f white males in 
control o f  legislative government, industry, and media would seem to be more o f  last waltz to this young 
white (man?). Or perhaps this is a white woman defending men of her color, aware that feminism and its 
original impetus in affirmative action policies has both benefited her identity space and endangered her 
embattled counterpart?
What I find most dramatic about this text—and most useful as an expressive opening for a more complex 
textual construction involving academic research for the class as a whole—is the resistance to the readings. 
The investment in white privilege, the capaciousness o f that knapsack is seen as wholly earned, achieved 
without any denial o f access or opportunity to those bound by an other color. This resistance is deep and 
ingrained, almost required if  we think o f  identity itself as purely a set o f  individually acquired 
characteristics that are now being unjustly appropriated and redistributed to those who didn't create or 
accumulate them. Attached to the investment in whiteness is a vast capital flow whose freshets are political 
and cultural as much as they are economic. No exhortation to the contrary, even when it might pry open the 
eyes o f  the invisible watcher/writer, is going to easily deactivate ideological circuitry hardwired and 
strapped to one's back.
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The last two examples the writer uses are genuine, i f  disingenuous, logical yet irrational, serving better to 
prove the very point she/he is trying to disprove: that whiteness is not a source of privilege or a power but 
one of historical grievance, one on the verge of erasure. Never mind that the Ms. America Pageant and all 
its local precedents were devoted to and maintained an all-white flesh parade until the 1960's. Never mind 
that "white history" doesn't need the sop o f a month when it can tap the sap of some two millennia. (My 
memory is returning as I return to these documents. I was careful but ample in the historical heat and light I 
brought to my critique o f  these documents.) Whereas Document #3 uses the figure o f "Daphne" to 
dramatize the retreat o f whiteness from a molesting minority horde, but in the end rescues itself by 
counseling some form o f  solidarity through communication, Document #8 uses the desperate o f trope o f 
reversing the mythic fortunes. Daphne is chasing down Apollo, God of light and Reason, reducing him to 
darkness, obscurity, oppression—aiee, the rapine o f reverse discrimination!
I did not become this sardonic in handling this first (and second overall) example of white supremacy 
coming to the fore under the cathartic process o f anonymity. I was vehement but not inclement. It turned 
out that other members o f  the class took up the cause and responsibility o f empathy. Class notes quote one 
student saying: "The writer seems to have no sense o f history at all-white, black, red, brown, yellow, or 
green. You'd think the discovery that there's a history of everyone and everything, but some of it never gets 
taught, would make us humble, like that writer about the Japanese internment—amazed not angry." Silence. 
One long enough that it seemed best to move on to Document #9.
Document #9: The National Sickness with No Pedagogical Cure?
"ANOTHER VERSION"
I'll admit it. I am a White Supremist. My father was one, my grandfather was one, and 
so were my great grandfathers before them. They were good men, every one o f them.
They knew what an honest days' work meant. They knew what it meant to be a proud, 
responsible, God fearing American.
But the damn niggers and the 'Ricans and now the gooks. They are milking us dry 
while they are taking advantage o f us. It is no small wonder why this country has such a 
huge deficit. Hanging around the welfare office with their eight plus babies. Whining "I 
can't work, I have no one to tend to my babies during the day." By the time they leave, 
they've perked up though, with their supplies o f welfare checks and food stamps. Mind 
you, paid for with our hard earned money.
Then drive o ff in their shiny new Cadillacs. They got their tinted windows rolled up, 
and their air conditioners on, AND THEIR RAP MUSIC BLASTING! My pickup starts 
to vibrate when I pull up beside o f  them.
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And the black boys nowadays all belong to those gangs. They spend their time 
heisting drugs and gun money by breaking into our homes and our stores, and by "trying' 
to harrass good honest people on street comers by sliding some dirty old rag over our 
windshields, while poking their noses and their long fingers into our wallets.
The Cubans and the 'Ricans are hauling all the drugs into this country. They're the 
ones pushing them in the schoolyards on poor innocent children. Last year I had to pull 
my girl and boy out o f one school and put them in another school on the other side o f 
town. They told me what was really going on in that first school. Thank God, I'd taught 
them right. They got no help from their teachers, they said their teachers feared for their 
lives.
And now we got those slant-eyed gooks opening restaurants and stores in every other 
part o f  town. I'll bet they're hauling in drugs too.
We have got to put an end to all o f  this and soon. Wake up America! We have no time 
to waste, I've been noticing their attitudes are getting more uppity everyday. I just don't 
know where they are getting it from. We are certainly giving them everything they need.
Is this a parody o f white supremacist racism? Is it another ironic impersonation that perfectly levels all 
the real Archie Bunker's o f the world at the same time that it deftly cavils with the serious intentions o f an 
instructor obsessed with identity politics? Is the writer using the mask o f  anonymity to fulfill an 
assignment and a rationale that headlined a  methodology of catharsis, and in desperation to come up with 
something "authentic"—short o f attempting to capture some galling, bewildering sense o f  the problem and 
its scope in "true" personally significant terms—decided to socially construct and impersonate a bigot while 
leaving plenty o f  ironic clues that it is all travesty: both the supremacist attitude and the writing 
requirement? Yes. I want to say yes.
The final paragraph is particularly revealing as a winking at the reader, as i f  to say, "Are you with me 
reader? I  would not identify myself as a white supremacist. But the metonymic "I” I have created is my 
way o f  identifying the type for an interested community." This becomes all the more plausible when we 
review the clever equivocation o f the title. I f  I am correct, if  anonymity creates this double mask— 
"Another," or even an animad-"Version" for writers, so that the goal o f catharsis beyond the expected 
parameters o f expressive significance is generally elusive and often and especially allusive not to the self 
but to an almost unimaginable otherness in emotional and social terms, then the satirical imagination is to 
be prized for its own sake. O f course the pragmatic instructor could weigh in with this suggestion: "Why go 
to all the trouble and risk o f anonymity and simply ask students to impersonate a bigot, or a slave, or a 
dying native American, etc.?"
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My answer is that I wasn't after impersonation or the satirical imagination. I was after some privately 
held convictions or prejudices whose public consequences are clear to anyone who believes that the reason 
racism or sexism or classism exists and persists is because identity itself is in constant flux, a barely stable 
consortium of contending voices and authorities. And o f course, there is always the possibility that this 
document is what the writer really believes. Either way, whatever the truth o f  this text's expression or social 
construction, its hybridity and performative fluidity should be o f  interest to those who weigh the benefits 
and drawbacks o f  one approach to teaching composition over an other.
It is also important to remember that these documents are community property—both for talking over
and writing over in the named documents they will produce under a pedagogy o f double-voiced discourse.
So perhaps it doesn't matter who is speaking and why, under what degree o f authenticity or performativity.
What matters is who is listening and for what purpose. Anonymous writing, because it reduces the author
and writer both to an other, is keen to the reality o f an audience and/or a readership as totally other as well.
What matters who is listening or reading? But if  someone—anonymous, endlessly second person singular
and plural that You are—is listening/reading then the text that "I" have become is all that matters.
Composition: putting the anonymity o f  You and I, o f Us, together again in the image o f a text.
Document #10: Admitting Racism or Opposing Race-Based Admissions?
“You have no respect for me just because I'm black." "You won't hire me because I'm 
black." "You won't let me get into your college just because I'm black." These are 
phrases which strike a  strong feeling in me. I have a problem with people who blame 
other people, especially whites, for all o f the bad things which have happened in their 
life. I don't see how affirmative action can right the wrongs o f the past. How can it better 
our society today?
So you didn't get into the college that you had your heart set on. Do you blame it on 
the white man who is head o f admissions? Maybe you blame it on the great grandson of 
the man who owned your great grandfather. It's probably due to the fact that your SAT 
scores -weren't as good as those o f your peers, regardless o f  their color. Maybe you didn't 
have any extracurricular activities.
You probably wouldn't have this problem if  affirmative action had placed quotas at 
the college o f your dreams. (Unless your dream college was UNH where they'll take any 
minority in order to diversify the "most white college in America.") So you are now 
attending "Quota U." Are you proud that you got into this college? Chances are there are 
probably students who did not get into Quota U. who have better GPA's and SAT scores 
than you. They're sitting at home after their classes at a  community college only because 
a set o f numbers kept them out o f  their dream college. I ask you, do you think this is fair?
I sure as hell don't.
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Document #10: an anonymous "white" "I"—male or female—addressing an equally anonymous "You"—a 
"black" male or female. The "I" is angry, indignant, and despite its rabidly unfair, vulgar reduction o f 
"affirmative action" to "Qouta U", it is attempting some kind o f dialogical reality by imagining what this 
"black" You is thinking and saying about an affirmative "action" that was created in response to the 
negative action against and reaction to "blackness" as an identity and a legacy in history.
This text opened a discussion into how the wrongs of the past 300 hundred years can be redressed today. 
When will equality o f  opportunity be a reality and how will we do it in a colorblind way? Is affirmative 
action really "reverse discrimination"? Whose responsibility is it to create educational opportunity for all of 
us? Does the quest for diversity in a university really deny certain "white" students an opportunity they 
once enjoyed when there was no diversity (in other words, total discrimination and segregation, a short 
generation ago?)
I asked all these questions. I had scribbled them down in my class book. I exhorted the class to use this 
document and these questions that it is underwriting in anger and research the answers if  that is where their 
signed essays should take them. The emotion in this writing is totally legitimate, I said, but where is the 
information which supports the source of its reasoning? Is there information that reduces this document to 
an unfair and uninformed analysis of the reality o f affirmative action? I said it was my sense that blind rage 
rather than focused reflection controlled this writing, but that that was all right. True believers against 
affirmative action are as socially constructed as those who truly believe that if  it is eliminated we will see 
the reason why it was implemented in the first place: racism is a negative action with continuing 
consequences. Is the writer's rage against affirmative action, I wondered, or is it against a racism that made 
such action finally necessary?
It did not seem to me that this writer was impersonating or parodying anyone. In this case, anonymity 
was unmasking and unmuffling an identifiable sense among "white" people that it is not their privileges or 
power being taken away by such policies as affirmative action, but their rights. I said I didn't see it this way 
and told them a story o f  my friend Gregory, a black man whom I shared many classes with at The 
University o f  Massachusetts in 1983-4 when we were both working toward our secondary teacher 
certification.
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We became very close, discussing all issues o f  education, and comparing our appointments as student 
teachers in the Boston Public School system. We gave each other encouragement and ideas. We were both 
aghast at some o f the conditions we encountered, and amazed at how few black teachers there were—"a few 
pepper specks in a big old salt shaker," he said, and I couldn't but agree with both the reality and the power 
o f the metaphor.
When we had our certificates and went out to seek the two jobs that opened in the Boston Public Schools 
we both got interviews. Gregory got one o f the jobs. I didn't get either. One white administrator who I had 
interviewed called me in a clear violation o f policy to tell me that I had to accept the realities o f  affirmative 
action. He said it with a half conspiratorial, half sympathetic slant in his voice for the white guy left out in 
the cold. I told him, with tears o f  indignation or dignity springing into my eyes and voice— it is still hard for 
me to trace out, that if  he were referring to my friend Greg, or to the Hispanic woman who got the other 
post, then I had let him know that I was supremely happy for both o f them. That perverse as it might sound, 
the superior candidates, the best people overall, given all things considered, got the job. "Hmmm, well. 
yes...good luck in your future, etc, young man." And that was it.
I told the class I still felt that way after ten years, even more so. That I was honored to lose out to those 
two people; that we needed them not only for their training at my—at our—institution—but they needed their 
identities in a school population vastly underrepresented by non-white American citizens. I didn't feel 
wronged at all. If I lost out on that teaching job because of my white skin, then it was nothing compared to 
the centuries o f lost opportunity for Greg's black skinned predecessors. I felt ennobled, not negated, 
enraptured, not enraged.
"What do you think?" I asked them. "Is that a legitimate way to feel about affirmative action and 
quotas? Should my attitude be a  model for how all whites should feel about the issue?" The silence was 
long. And I'll never forget the two responses that finally came. One student said: "No." Another student 
then answered: "Yes." And with that neat line drawn down the middle o f our discussion, I initiated the 
second round of writings on race: Anonymous writings on the anonymous survey "Are You a Racist?"
Conclusion: Roads Not Taken and the Possibility o f  “Anonymity Squared”
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Perhaps I should have started and ended with that second round o f  documents, particularly given the 
anonymous convergence o f 10 American white students at The University o f  New Hampshire with 
thousands o f  Americans, white and black, whose anonymity was guaranteed when they answered the same 
survey. The sense o f community —o f  alienation—or something o f  both they felt in writing up their reactions 
to these results is ultimately more telling as justification for using anonymity than what I have presented 
above.
The doubling or squared effect o f anonymity—between local student discourse and national citizen 
discourse; between academic and socially constructed approaches to significant issues o f  our American 
experience and what we personally, privately— really— feel and believe about them; between our sense of 
identity and our sense o f  community as a text open to all—lent an impersonal, objective, and composing 
atmosphere to the class. We took it in stride that half o f us were, if  the survey was an accurate measure, 
"racists." I think this finding provoked the class into a stronger sense o f  what the "politics" part o f  identity 
really means.
After that round o f papers, the last document I will present below showed up in the papers on gender 
identity. It is, I think, an attempt to come to terms with happened in that second round o f race papers. I 
reproduce it here to suggest the use o f anonymity as an ongoing evaluating tool that reveals for the class, as 
well as the teacher, the personal and social—the total academic- discourse underwriting a composition 
course throughout the semester. In this way, the exclusive exit document of anonymous evaluation, that last 
day of identifying what "they" really think about us, and more important, about “academic” writing can 
turn into, and turn us toward, a reasoned reconsideration o f the composition of anonymity itself.
ANONYMOUS WRITING 
When we talk about the readings on race, in class, all I have to go by and discuss with the 
group, is what I read. I do not know enough about race and racial issues to go into a big 
discussion on it. I have a fear and a blindness o f the unknown. I live in a  life where I see 
people o f  all different kinds o f races wherever I go, but that is all I can go by, is what I 
see. I never had the chance to talk with a black person in depth, where I could ask 
questions about their life and culture and about other things that I am curious about. This 
is because I do not work with them, live with or near them, or deal with them in my 
everyday life. I wish I knew more information about different ethnic groups and races, 
and I wish I knew more people from different ethnic backgrounds.
When I came into this English class I did not know what to expect, especially when I 
got my book and it said, "Experiencing Race, Class, and Gender in the United States." I 
thought that this class was going to be very confusing to me because I did not know a 
whole heck o f a lot about race, class, and gender. But after we read the sections in the
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book and started to discuss them, I was not confused about the subject as much and I am 
beginning to enjoy our discussions in class more and more. This class, to what appeared 
to be boring at first, is not boring at all but actually interesting and makes you think and 
analyze subjects and topics that you normally would not even give a second thought 
about because it may not even be apart of your life or our lifestyle.
When we have class discussions, it is interesting to find out what people have to say 
and think about on the topics that we talk about. Listening to other students views on 
racial issues, gets me thinking about the topic more and in depth myself. I am amazed 
that I never even thought about most o f the racial issues that we talk about, before, until I 
came to class and started reading about race and started to read about things that are 
always happening around me and are a part of life.
But I never took notice or gave a thought about them before because I do not deal with 
the prejudice and hard life o f  acceptance that others may feel. But I do know that even 
after this class is over, I will never be that blind again to the racial issues and things that 
happen in this world that I was oblivious to before.
I don't know how much love there is in this class compared to the hatred. I guess 
there's a  lot o f  both in all o f  us. I never thought we could write and talk about both at the 
same time., but I think it is best to keep on doing it.
In this document we encounter what I believe hooks means by “yearning” — a desire for the Other, a
knowledge o f Other. I believe this document unveils and clarifies what Natanson meant by a passion for the
Other which the anonymous enclave provides. I believe we have traced this sense of yearning and passion
in many o f  these documents, even those, and perhaps especially those, whose possessive investment in
“whiteness” expresses itself as a fear and loathing of racialized Otherness. Aside from the expressive Self-
Consciousness o f  this last document, we begin to see that anonymity is a public shelter for private
reflection. Free from the law o f  the Proper Name and its controlling discourse of Identity, this writer is
writing about, reflecting on, the politics o f her identity for the first time. Anonymity augments and
amplifies the distancing effect o f writing, provoking or calling forth a self that might imagine others, desire
others, recognizing the blindness o f  the self and the insight that otherness may in fact underwrite self-
expression.
I have a fear and a blindness o f  the unknown. I live in a life where I see people o f all 
different kinds o f races wherever I go, but that is all I can go by, is what I see. I never had 
the chance to talk with a  black person in depth.... I wish I knew more information about 
different ethnic groups and races, and I wish I knew more people from different ethnic 
backgrounds.... But I do know that even after this class is over, I will never be that blind 
again to the racial issues and things that happen in this world that I was’ oblivious to 
before.
This is really what expressivism is supposed to do—or at least, this is what anonymous expressivism can 
do. It bridges traditional expressivist writing and social constructivist writing as reconfigured and realized 
in what should be a continuous use o f anonymous discourse in teaching composition. This document serves
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as segue to a consideration o f whether the documents produced under an anonymous pedagogy fulfils the 
premises and promises o f a “critical pedagogy.” After taking stock o f 20 documents across two classes, my 
readers may remain unconvinced that anonymous writing in a composition classroom does what I argued it 
would do in Section One o f this chapter.
In a projected sixth Chapter, titled “Toward an Ethics o f Anonymity,” I would reproduce the passages 
from students’ formally anonymous course evaluations commenting on the use o f  anonymity—what they 
really think about anonymous writing. These texts, functions o f double voiced discourse, o f anonymity 
squared, might lend greater “authority” to my admittedly nascent claims about the composition of 
anonymity as a critical pedagogy o f  prepossessed identity politics and a hopeful, never to be possessed, 
discourse o f community yearning for mediation o f  self and other.
All that I can do at this point is to ask, once again: What matters who is writing ? No theory, history, or
pedagogy o f writing can any longer ignore the composition of anonymity in forming an answer to that 
question. I can hear the critical, still suspicious reader begin to howl that I am running a composition class, 
not an anonymous survey counseling service.
My response is that composition is like no other course in the university in that it permits students to 
cross between the established discourses o f their families and home communities, and the emerging 
discourse communities they encounter at college—never mind, for a moment, the academic discourse 
communities which certain o f us are so worried about as somehow not getting their fair share of student 
exposure and inculcation.
Composition has the opportunity, and literal response-ability, to take on the social and political aspects 
o f the personal and the private as these are re-presented in the hybrid, ever-changing intellectual act of 
writing. The genderist, feminist, realist, idealist, textualist, and yes, expressivist and constructivist, 
demands placed upon this single required course places composition instructors— particularly those who are 
devoted to using the writing conference— in a role that is part institutional archivist and part lay therapist. 
The former speaks to and directs a student to sources such as the library or the world wide web or to other 
professors and other courses; the latter listens to and connects a student to sources within the student and, if 
need be, to confidential others. I have had to do this kind o f connection countless times—from admissions 
o f homosexuality, to eating disorders, to substance abuse, to rape. Students' own unbidden confidences 
reveal that many are already using various therapeutic sources both on and off campus.
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I see nothing whatever problem atic in students identifying with the ways I identify with and evaluate 
issues in their anonymous w riting . Personal and private issues have clear social and public avenues and 
outcomes. If their therapeutic > character reveals itself under textual representation, then I deal with the 
textual first and last as an academ ic matter. Students, not teachers, should be the ones to make the 
personal/private an academic maatter —and vice versa—and they do with surprising frequency. Anonymous 
writing is simply one more asp-ect o f discourse that, already a part o f public interchange, can be made to 
operate beyond its present use ass a largely ceremonial exit document.
Chapter Notes
* Anthologies by both Cyrus antd Rothenberg are both academic in the depth, and popular in the scope, o f  
the writers and analysts they Have chosen for their presentations o f  identity politics. Please see my 
Bibliography for information on their books.
-  16 students, 8 female, 8 male, ’-were enrolled in an English 501/Advanced Composition course, titled "The 
Composition of Gender" in the F-all o f 1994. Two assignments guaranteeing anonymity, were given to these 
students, totaling 32 documents (£1 missing).
10 students, 8 female, 2 male,, were enrolled in an English 401 first year required course in Composition, 
titled “The Composition o f  Ideentity: Race, Class, Gender, Sexuality. Four assignments guaranteeing 
anonymity, were given to these sstudents, totaling 80 documents.
Because of space limitationas I have 10 documents from the 501 course to reflect Seven Emergent 
Themes that I believe followed cBirectly from the anonymous condition o f the writing. I chose only the first 
10 o f  20 documents from the R a c e  component of the second course. The present scope o f this study does 
not permit a full study o f  all diocuments. I have scanned the original documents into the body o f  this 
chapter’s text. I then cleaned inp spelling and grammar errors, but otherwise did not alter the surface 
features o f these texts. For reasoons o f space and reader attention, I have excerpted passages from some o f  
the longer writings. I have indicated this with a series o f ellipses. The font for these documents (New York 
10) is consistent with the rest o f  rthe dissertation. Originally, students were encouraged to mess around with 
fonts and sizes to strengthen anomymity’s general masking effects.
3 James Patterson and Peter K im . conducted a massive study o f American attitudes and beliefs in the early 
1990’s titled, The Day America "Hold The Truth: What People R eally Believe About Everything That Really 
M atters. In the foreword they a^sk rhetorically why they or the people who responded to their questions
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about ethics, race, sex and sexuality, class, money, and community should believed. Their answer was 
significant enough I felt, to reproduce for my students as way to situate and justify the use o f anonymous 
writing in a course devoted to identity politics.
It all started with this simple observation, a fact o f  research life: Most people want to tell 
someone what they really believe and what they really stand for. But that desire is 
tempered by the realistic fear that telling the truth will get them into trouble with their 
spouses, their bosses, their parents, their friends, or their neighbors. So, people rarely find 
anyone they trust enough to let all o f  their precious defenses down (4).
Readers will recall our extension of Foucault’s discussion o f the rarity o f  discourse as a “fellowship” in 
which there is an ambiguity between secrecy and disclosure. We will also recall his focus on Prohibited 
Discourse in which not anything by anyone can be said, though the desire may be there, particularly in the 
face of the pow er o f  truth regimes to not wish to hear the truth about how politics is actually conducted 
across private and public lines. For Patterson and Kim this desire to speak to the truth, however much 
prohibited by various sites o f  authority, could only be performed by what they call “the cathartic process.”
The most crucial technique we used in our testing is known as the cathartic process. We 
allowed people to unburden themselves with total anonymity. Once granted that, people 
were willing to truthfully answer questions o f  even the most intimate nature.
We guaranteed to the people we interviewed that no one who read their replies would 
know their identities—no one would know their names or addresses. In these 
circumstances, people felt that they could tell their secrets and share true feelings (4 
emphasis added.)
Although I could not guarantee “total anonymity” to students, one has to assume that they—like the 
adults interviewed by Patterson and Kim—want to tell the truth about the politics o f  identity and of their 
identifications. Their fear o f teacher, peer, and the larger sense of authority represented by the university 
community has to be accounted for in the same way that these researchers accounted for it. This, anyway, 
was my rationale in proposing anonymous writing to students writing about their identities. To really get to 
what one really thinks o f  gender, sexual, and racial identity, identities have to become concealed as they 
are begin disclosed/opened to scrutiny by a given community.
In Patterson and Kim’s term of ‘the cathartic process” we can trace the Ancient Greek dramatic 
innovation o f  using masks or “personae” in their performances. We can also begin to understand Schutz’s 
phenomenological sense o f  private provinces o f  meaning getting crossed and a “shock experience” arising 
there from. Furthermore, in the notion o f  cathartic process, we can see what Natanson was getting at in his 
notion o f passion in the enclave that Otherness provides, since anonymity provides the opportunity to speak 
or write about issues that always present an otherwise capacity depending on the realm—private or 
public—in which it is being disclosed. And finally, in this sense o f anonymity as a cathartic process, we 
understand Forster’s sense o f anonymity as an ultimate act of imagination in which author/authority 
disappear. Transferred to the writing process o f composition -rhetoric, this sense o f  imagination is cathartic 
in ways, perhaps, that expressivism hasn’t yet imagined, yet might logically encourage, but which the 
social constructionist will most certainly disparage.
4
At The University o f  Massachusetts/Boston, where I was also a composition instructor, the "racial" 
composition o f  classes was far more diverse. I was under the influence o f Goffmann's "stigma theory" at 
the time of my final course there, and was astonished to find two students spontaneously using anonymous 
writing to describe the stigma o f being handicapped in response to our reading o f  Nathaniel West's Miss 
Lonelyhearts. No one else, where 50% of the students were African-American or Latino, responded 
anonymously to the stigma o f  "race" in a course that I had titled "The Composition o f  Self." I have avoided 
the political/pedagogical mess I would encounter i f  one or more o f UNH's rare students o f "color" had 
shown up in the class devoted to writing anonymously on racial identity. The question o f  anonymity’s 
ethics and the problems o f  political correctness cannot be treated in this writing.
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